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Abstract:
This thesis aims to analyse the normative rationales behind non-citizens’ legal standing in two 
liberal nation-states. The thesis takes the cosmopolitan and communitarian rationales as its 
theoretical starting point. Specific attention is given to the possibility of coherently combining 
the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales. The thesis analyses the actual legal 
standing of non-citizens in the U.S. and Germany and so links the political theoretical 
discourse to alienage jurisprudence. The conclusions drawn are that both the cosmopolitan 
and the communitarian rationales underlie non-citizens’ legal standing. The treatment of non­
citizens is fairly normatively coherent and in line with a weak cosmopolitan perspective. The 
thesis, however, identifies limited but important normative contradictions in the treatment of 
non-citizens and outlines, on a practical level, what is required to remedy this situation.
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Chapter One 
Non-Citizens -  Persons or Aliens?
According to the national ideal, the right and duty o f each governm ent is to  promote the interests 
o f  a determinate group o f  human beings, bound together by the tie o f  a com m on nationality... and 
to consider the expediency o f  admitting foreigners and their products so le ly  from this point o f  
view . A ccording to the cosmopolitan ideal, its business is  to maintain order over the particular 
territory that historical causes have appropriated to it, but not in any w ay to determine w ho is to 
inhabit this territory, or to restrict the enjoym ent o f  its natural advantages to any particular portion 
o f  the human race. (Sidgw ick 1897: 308)
Thus described Sidgwick, some one hundred years ago, what he saw as the two broad 
philosophical alternatives to the treatment of non-citizens. These two philosophical 
perspectives, hereafter called cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, have together come to 
constitute the normative foundations for the treatment of non-citizens in liberal nation-states.1 
It is also clear, with historical hindsight, that the often uneasy co-existence of these two 
philosophical perspectives represents a great normative challenge for liberal nation-states:
From the vantage point o f  the twentieth century, there seem s to be a contradiction between the all- 
inclusiveness o f  human rights and the exclusiveness o f nation-states. A ll dem ocratic states pledge 
allegiance to human rights, but at the same time they reserve certain rights (such as the right to 
vote) to nationals only. Human rights take humanity or world society as the context o f  inclusion  
and claim that every human being has a right to be included. The question is included in w h a t? 
(Halfmann 1999: 379, emphasis added)
The fact that liberal nation-states are constituted by both cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism hence generates the question -  what rights should non-citizens be granted 
or denied? And it is this question that is the central focus of this thesis. The question is a 
political theoretical one; accordingly, the task is ‘to relate a coherent body of principles’ to the 
issue of the treatment of non-citizens (Plamenatz 1960: 46). More specifically, the aim is 
twofold: firstly, to deduce what the normative rationales behind the laws that regulate non­
citizens’ legal standing in liberal nation-states actually are; and secondly, to determine if these
1 The twofold categorisation deployed here is com m only used throughout the literature, though alternative labels  
such as liberal and nationalist are som etim es used (M ulhall 1992; Linklater 2002: 256— 257; V ertovec 2002: 
10).
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rationales constitute an internally consistent position, i.e. analyse if the treatment of non­
citizens is normatively consistent.
This introductory chapter will briefly outline the general framework within which this issue is 
situated. The chapter will subsequently spell out exactly which questions the thesis will 
provide an answer to, explain what the purpose of answering these particular questions is and 
explain why this amounts to a valuable academic contribution. It will furthermore provide 
definitions, establish a clear remit for the analysis, and explain the choice of case studies and 
the method used.
Introduction and General Framework
Liberal nation-states suffer from an internal normative tension. As liberal states, they are 
committed to and constituted by the idea that all human beings, as self-determining 
individuals, hold a universal and equal right to personhood; from this perspective, state 
membership/citizenship makes no intrinsic normative difference to the rights of any person. 
As nation-states they are, however, also committed to and constituted by the idea that they 
each represent a particular nation, which has a right to self-determination; from this 
perspective, membership/citizenship does make an intrinsic normative difference: members 
have special rights in virtue of their membership, which non-members do not. Liberal nation­
states thus tread a fine line as they try to balance their commitment to special rights for the 
members of their particular nations with their commitment to universal individual rights. 
Liberal nation-states, by their very nature, thus stand with one foot firmly placed in normative 
particularism and the other foot equally firmly placed in normative universalism:
Built into the self-understanding o f  the national state, there is a tension between the universalism  
o f  an egalitarian legal com m unity and the particularism o f a cultural com m unity bound together by 
origin and fate. (Habermas 1996b: 287)
This tension might have remained an intriguing, but purely theoretical issue, were it not for 
the facts that the world is finite while people (and resources) are mobile. The fact that people 
always have crossed -  and will continue to cross -  national/communal2 borders means that the
2 The words com m unity and nation w ill be used alm ost interchangeably the only slight difference being that the 
word nation is used in a more specific sense and taken to denote a larger political com m unity. The word nation­
state w ill thus be used to denote a state that represents a particular political com m unity, i.e. a nation. The reason  
behind connecting com m unities, nations and nation-states in this way is  twofold: first, the thesis has a state
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question of how non-citizens are to be treated becomes a very real political and legal issue. 
Transnational interaction is perceived as a problem by some and as an opportunity by others. 
Be that as it may, the fact is that ‘the ship or the camel (the ship of the desert) make it possible 
for people to approach their fellows and that people cannot disperse over an infinite area as 
the earth is a globe’ (Kant 1991b: 106; see also Benhabib 2004: 33). Thus, people from 
different nations unavoidably end up side-by-side, and there is no escape from addressing the 
question: how should liberal nation-states treat the non-members that reach their shores and/or 
live in their midst?
The presence of such non-citizens in liberal nation-states is, moreover, a very salient political 
issue. This is because non-citizens affect so many different spheres of the societies they live 
in -  including the very makeup of the body politic -  as a result of the fact that people are 
cultural, economic and political actors all rolled into one. Furthermore, rates of migration 
have accelerated in recent decades; as a result of that the world has entered a phase of 
increasing globalisation. Globalisation is a process characterised by an increase in the velocity 
and intensity of political, economical, social and cultural interactions (Giddens 2000: 92; Held 
1999: 1-31). Migration is an intrinsic part of this process. The fact that individuals are 
political, economic, social and cultural actors all rolled into one makes increased migration 
the globalisation phenomenon par excellence.
It can, of course, always be debated to what extent globalisation is a new phenomenon, and to 
what extent it is increasing. Globalisation sceptics, however, seem to be an ever-decreasing 
minority, and they tend to focus on questioning the increase in transnational economic 
activities (Hirst 2000); what cannot be denied is that the number of people that live in foreign 
states is increasing. In 1910, 33 million people lived outside their own states, while the 
corresponding figure was between 160 and 175 million in 2000. The number of people 
residing in foreign countries has thus increased almost six-fold during a time when the world 
population has little more than tripled. This trend has, furthermore, accelerated during the 
latter part of the past century (Benhabib 2004: 5; Massey 2004: 1).
perspective, and second, communitarian discourse in general, as w ell as in this specific area, starts from the 
assumption that m ost states are nation-states. A s such they are the political expressions o f  national com m unities, 
and therefore constitute the appropriate level for regulating immigration (W alzer 1983; M iller 1995; Tamir 1993; 
M eilaender 2001; Friedman 1994: 333— 334).
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There is also currently a strong migration flow from the developing world to the developed 
world; hence this accelerating trend is most noticeable in liberal nation-states where the 
population of non-citizens is rising sharply, and becoming increasingly diverse (Held 1999: 
314-318; Massey 2004: 1-3). This upward trend of migration from the poorer parts of the 
world to the richer ones also means that the remittance income that immigrants send home is 
becoming an important part of the developing world’s economy: it now outstrips the total 
amount of official foreign aid to the developing world, and makes such migrants the 
developing countries’ main export to the developed world in terms of foreign exchange 
earnings (Massey 2004). The upshot is that liberal nation-states are hosting increasingly large 
and diverse populations of non-citizens, and the issue of their legal standing is becoming ever 
more significant in both the developed and developing world.
The existence of such large non-citizen populations poses a specific challenge to liberal 
nation-states along the lines outlined above. Liberal nation-states are committed to respecting 
individuals’ right to self-determination, and this right is in principle equal and universal. The 
question then becomes: to what extent, if at all, can liberal nation-states invoke the idea of 
national sovereignty to discount non-citizens’ universal and equal right to individual self- 
determination, without giving rise to normative inconsistencies?
The question of which rights should or should not be applicable to non-citizens is a difficult 
one to answer for liberal nation-states. Consequently, the debate over non-citizens’ rights has 
been raging since the very beginning of western political philosophy (see next chapter). This 
thesis will deal with the particular issue of how this problem has been dealt with, in practice, 
in two large and influential liberal nation-states. More specifically this thesis will answer a 
two-fold question: What are the normative rationales behind the laws that regulate non- 
citizens’ legal standing in the U.S. and Germany; and is the treatment o f non-citizens in the 
U.S. and Germany internally normatively consistent?
The Aim and Purpose o f the Thesis
The thesis thus aims to contribute to the political theoretical debate over the treatment of non­
citizens by analysing the normative rationales behind non-citizens’ legal standing in the U.S. 
and Germany. This means, in practical terms, that the first task is to deduce3 and characterise
3 The term deduce here refers to the tracing o f  or the deriving the m eaning o f  som ething. Here, the term does not 
refer to logica lly  inferring som ething.
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the normative rationales behind the laws that regulate non-citizens’ legal standing in the U.S. 
and Germany. The second task is to conduct an analysis o f their internal coherence. This two­
fold task will be fulfilled in four closely related steps. The first step is concerned with 
identifying the theoretical bases of the normative rationales behind the treatment of non­
citizens. Liberal nation-states are constituted by both the cosmopolitan and the communitarian 
rationales, as described above, and the first step is devoted to uncover these two normative 
rationales, from a political theoretical perspective. Such a theoretical excavation clarifies what 
these two existing normative alternatives actually entail and what the normative logic or 
reasoning behind each is. The first step hence clarifies, on a theoretical level, the normative 
foundations that lie behind the treatment of non-citizens in liberal nation-states. Such a 
theoretical identification of the two rationales also makes it possible to identify their 
application to existing laws regulating non-citizens in the two states. That is, the theoretical 
identification of the rationales creates a tool that will be used for the task of deducing the 
rationales behind the actual laws of the U.S. and Germany (see step three).
The second step is to theoretically identify consistent overall perspectives for the treatment of 
non-citizens based on the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales respectively. It is 
clear that a consistent approach can be identified by applying each of the two respective 
normative rationales to all potential rights that non-citizens could be granted or denied; it is 
also clear that the scope for maintaining such quickly diminishes if rights based on these 
alternative rationales are combined. That is, if non-citizens are granted the right to refugee 
protection as a universal cosmopolitan right, then it becomes inconsistent to deny them the 
right to security or subsistence as part of the community’s right to self-determination; 
conversely, if non-citizens are denied the right to admission due to the community’s right to 
maintain itself as a particular nation, then membership cannot be open to all non-citizens. 
There are, however, some limited possibilities to consistently combine the normative 
rationales, and a relevant consistent normative perspective that combines the two rationales 
will be analysed in the second step. The second step hence lays the foundation for the internal 
consistency analysis by identifying consistent approaches based on combining these two 
normative rationales. By doing so, the second step also further clarifies what the normative 
alternatives are.
The third step takes us into the empirical world, and to the analysis of the case studies. In this 
step, the normative rationales behind the actual laws regulating the legal standing of non­
12
citizens will be deduced. This will be done by first outlining the legal treatment of non­
citizens in the U.S. and Germany; following this, their normative rationales will be deduced 
by drawing on the theoretical identification in step one (for more details, see the Method 
section below).
The completion of steps one, two and three thus provides a clear picture of the different 
coherent theoretical options for the treatment of non-citizens, as well as a clear picture of the 
normative rationales behind the actual treatment of non-citizens. This sets the stage for the 
crucial fourth step, which is concerned with the internal consistency analysis of the treatment 
of non-citizens as characterised by the case studies. In this fourth step, internal inconsistencies 
assessed with reference to the actual overall normative commitments of the two states will be 
identified. Therefore, the case studies are the sole focus of the critical analysis, and it is 
internal consistency that will be measured. The further theoretical question of what constitutes 
the best normative approach will not be addressed.
The theoretical exercise in the second step, however, plays two important roles in the fourth 
step. Firstly, it functions as a general blueprint for identifying the two states’ overall 
normative positions, against which their internal inconsistencies are identified. Secondly, the 
consistent perspectives identified in the second step also function as detailed benchmarks for 
identifying which positions are internally consistent. The fourth step hence builds on all the 
previous steps to provide a critical analysis of the current treatment of non-citizens in these 
two states, based on their normative commitments. The fourth step thereby generates 
proposals for changes to the laws regulating non-citizens’ legal standing based on the pre­
existing normative commitments of the two states; it will be undertaken at the end of the case 
studies.
The purposes of fulfilling these two tasks (over the above-mentioned four steps) are threefold. 
The first purpose is a clarifactory one. That is, the first purpose is to clarify in theory, and in 
practice, what the existing normative alternatives entail and what the normative bases for the 
actual treatment of non-citizens are. This is important, as no truly fruitful normative debate 
about non-citizens’ legal standing can take place in the absence of a clear understanding of 
where we stand and what the politically relevant normative alternatives are. The first purpose 
is thus to provide a foundation from which an applied normative debate of non-citizens’ legal 
standing in these states can take place. There is a need for this kind of clarity. Matthew
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Gibney has, for example -  in relation to the refugee debate -  pointed to the problem that 
empirically inclined commentators tend to launch normative critiques without theoretically 
analysing or clarifying what normative obligations states can be said to have; conversely, 
political theorists analyse the nature of these obligations, but fail to connect them to the 
existing political framework and legal practice, and hence render their critiques somewhat 
otherworldly (Gibney 2004: 15-16).
The second purpose is to conduct a critical analysis of the normative consistency of the actual 
treatment of non-citizens in the U.S. and Germany. The fact that this analysis takes place on 
an applied level means that it generates specific and applicable suggestions for changes to the 
laws regulating non-citizens’ legal standing where they are found to be normatively 
inconsistent. The normative force of the recommendations will, hopefully, be particularly 
potent as they are based on existing normative commitments, and tailored to the existing legal 
framework.
The third purpose, more general in nature, is to shed some light on what kind of political 
communities the U.S. and Germany are. Their treatment of non-citizens does not generate a 
complete account of the nature of these political communities, but it reveals much about their 
normative essence and self-perception. To what extent are they political communities based 
on the notion that all individuals are equal and have the same rights? And to what extent are 
they political communities based on the notion that rights are particular, being attributes of 
membership? That is, their treatment of non-members constitutes a reflection in which the 
essence of these political communities can be viewed (Kantstroom 1993: 158-159, 178; 
Benhabib 2004: 2, 176; Schuck 1984: 85). In this respect, the issue of non-citizens’ legal 
standing is particular interesting as, in the words of a legal historian: “Legislation is a major 
function of the state and a powerful means of social change; it is also a precious indication of 
the general level of civilization and of prevailing ideas about society.” (van Caenegem 1991: 
37) In sum, this thesis, taken in its entirety, will provide the applied normative clarity required 
for a fruitful normative debate of this issue, critically assess and make practically applicable 
recommendations for changes to the current situation, as well as shed some light on the 
general question of what the natures of the U.S. and German political communities are.
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Contributions
This thesis draws on a very large number of political theoretical and jurisprudential writings. 
The theoretical framework draws on the vast political theoretical discourse around non­
members/citizens’ moral stranding as well as on the smaller discourse around the normative 
aspects of immigration to liberal nation-states. This thesis also draws heavily on the 
jurisprudential discourse around non-citizens’ legal standing in Germany and the U.S. In 
terms of the thesis’ contributions to these discourses it can be said that the thesis makes a 
general contribution to the long-standing normative discourses around the moral status of 
non-citizens and the normative discourse around immigration to liberal nation-states. This 
general contribution chiefly consists of adding empirical material to these normative 
discourses. The thesis, however, also makes a small theoretical contribution by analysing the 
possibility to coherently combine the cosmopolitan and communitarian rationale in this area.4
The thesis’ specific and direct contributions are however made to the smaller normative 
discourse surrounding non-citizens’ actual legal standing in the U.S. and Germany. This 
discourse constitutes a relatively unexplored area. Probably as a consequence of that it 
straddles the rather solid border between political theory and jurisprudence. Political theorists 
usually operate on a level of abstraction that lies above particular rights and actual laws. To 
the extent that specific rights become part of the analysis they tend to be hypothetical or used 
as illustrations, lest the specifics get in the way of the theoretical argument. Jurists on the 
other hand take the actual law as their point of departure and fairly frequently take an interest 
in non-citizens’ overall legal standing, nor are normative aspects absent from jurisprudential 
analyses of non-citizens’ legal standing. From a political theoretical perspective, however, 
what the jurisprudential analysis often lacks is a comprehensive normative foundation. That 
is, the kind of normative foundation that makes it possible to see the entire normative 
edifice/construction behind particular rights; i.e. the kind of normative foundation that makes 
it possible to truly see how, and not only where and in what way one position differs from 
another and to analyse if the normative foundation of different laws are incoherent rather than 
simply different. That said, a normative discourse around non-citizens’ actual legal standing 
in the U.S. and Germany exists and it is steadily growing. Notable contributions include 
(Gibney 2004; Rubio-Marin 2000; Bosniak 1994; Scaperlanda 2001; Schuck 1984; Gibney
4 That is , the thesis a lso makes a small contribution towards increasing the presently inadequate supply o f  
practical political theories that com bines these tw o rationales, as called for by Brubaker for exam ple (Brubaker 
1989a: 4 -5 ) .
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1986; Joppke 1998a; Meilaender 2001; Aleinikoff 2002b; Neuman 1996; Neuman 1991; 
Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996).
The thesis makes two unique contributions to this specific discourse. First, the thesis provides 
a comprehensive and thorough political theoretical analysis of non-citizens’ overall legal 
standing in the U.S. and Germany. Other analyses have either been political theoretical in 
nature but have focused on limited areas of non-citizens’ legal standing, or have looked at 
non-citizens’ overall legal standing but have only partly looked at normative aspects (for an 
example of the first see Gibney 2004 and for an example of the second see Scaperlanda 2001). 
Second, the thesis provides a systematic analysis of the internal normative coherence of non­
citizens’ overall legal standing. The two contributions are connected in that the combination 
of political theoretical depth and the extended legal remit paves the way for the internal 
coherence analysis of non-citizens’ overall legal standing.
In terms of prior contributions Matthew Gibney’s and Ruth Rubio-Marin’s seminal books 
merit special attention. These books have been great sources of inspiration and most closely 
resemble this thesis (Gibney 2004; Rubio-Marin 2000). Gibney’s and Rubio-Marin’s works 
interweave political theory and actual laws in a similar fashion to this thesis. These two books 
do, however, differ in significant ways from the thesis at hand. Although this thesis’ 
normative point of the departure and foundation is similar to Gibney’s, Gibney pays more 
attention to the political level whereas this thesis deals exclusively with existing laws. 
Gibney’s book moreover focuses on the narrower question of refugees and includes many 
more case studies than this thesis. Rubio-Marin, on the other hand, focuses more broadly on 
non-citizens’ legal standing and uses the U.S. and Germany as case studies. But Rubio-Marin 
chooses a less political theoretical starting point, and is more interested in the conditions for 
achieving membership than the question of which rights belong to members and which belong 
to non-citizens qua individuals. Finally, the nature of the arguments for change presented in 
these two books differs from the arguments in this thesis. Gibney’s and Rubio-Marin’s 
arguments are based on their empirically and theoretically well-founded views, whereas the 
arguments in this thesis are derived from an internal coherence analysis.
The Nature o f the Thesis
It should be clear at this point that this thesis is a slightly unusual political theoretical project. 
A short explanation of the nature of the kind of political theory this thesis exemplifies will
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therefore further clarify the thesis’ aims and purpose. This project differs from mainstream 
political theory mainly in that it is empirically driven. This means that the thesis is not only 
applied, but it takes the actual treatment of non-citizens in the world we live in as its empirical 
starting point. The underlying rationale for this approach is that political theory is as much 
about clarifying normative alternatives, working out consistent approaches to existing 
normative problems and putting forward critical suggestions for change based on where we 
actually stand as it is about improving conceptual philosophical tools, constructing ideal 
theories and putting forward critical suggestions based on where we ideally should stand.
This thesis therefore belongs, broadly speaking, to what Miller calls the Aristotelian School in 
the sense that Aristotle (in contrast to Plato) thought that political theory should take practical 
politics as its point of departure (Miller 1999: 52; Dunn 1990: 195). Aristotle’s defence of this 
kind of political theory remains unrivalled:
But there are o f  course som e today w ho concentrate on the search for the highest constitution, 
w hich needs ample resources; others talk rather about som e com m on constitution, yet d ism iss 
entirely the constitutions that actually exist and sim ply g ive their approval to the Lacedaemonian  
or som e other. But what is needed is the introduction o f a system  which the people involved will 
be easily  persuaded to accept, and will easily  be able to bring in, starting from the system  they 
already have. [...] Thus it is another o f  the duties o f  a statesman, in addition to those stated, to be 
able to render assistance to actually existing constitutions, as noted before. (Aristotle 1992: Book  
IV 1288b39)
The advantage of the empirically driven approach cuts deeper than the fact of it simply being 
closer to politics. There is always a gap between abstract philosophical concepts and 
actionable norms that can be enacted as laws. Philosophical concepts thus remain, empirically 
speaking, slightly nebulous or even indeterminate until they have been transformed into 
actionable laws. This means that the empirically driven approach has an advantage over 
mainstream political theorising in that it is able to make a normative contribution at the level 
where political changes ultimately take place. The suggested changes in this thesis are, in this 
sense, ready for implementation -  or at least have a direct political and legal relevance that a 
more abstract analysis cannot offer.
This is not to deny that the empirically driven approach does have its own drawbacks. It does, 
for example, remain silent in terms of what constitutes the best possible solution and does not
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produce any conceptual improvements. The empirically driven approach is not a better way of 
doing political theory; it is a complementary way. In other words, the nature of political 
theory as a discipline ultimately concerned with practical events engenders the need to work 
on two levels, the purely theoretical level and the applied empirical level. The particular value 
of this kind of applied and empirically driven political theory, which neither answers the 
question of what the ideal solution might be, nor leaves the philosophical tools it uses in a 
better condition than they were found, is aptly described by Beitz (See also Dunn 1985: 187— 
189; Dunn 1990: 193-196; Miller 1988: 651 for similar positions):
Although m y discussion is necessarily preliminary, I hope that it w ill have several kinds o f  value 
in its ow n right. The m ost important o f  these is that it can bring som e conceptual clarity to an area 
in which confusion is  endem ic. If  readers are not persuaded by m y criticism s o f  prevailing view s  
or by the alternative positions I outline, m y discussion should at least illustrate the respects in 
which such view s require more careful formulation and defence than they have heretofore 
received. Even when I make no attempt to resolve outstanding controversies, m y analyses o f  the 
normative concepts involved in them should make clear what the controversies are about and what 
would be needed to resolve them. (B eitz 1999a: 6 -7 )
This approach is perhaps less theoretically challenging than identifying an ideal solution, but 
it is no less important or valuable than the pure political theoretical approaches. It is also 
important to point out that this empirically driven approach should not be mistaken for a 
comparative politics approach. This thesis does not contain any positive elements. No attempt 
is made to explain why or how the laws analysed were enacted or implemented. The political 
forces behind the enactment and implementation of the analysed laws remain hidden. This 
means that the normative rationales behind these laws are deduced, and their normative 
consistency analysed, independently of the combination of political, social, legal and 
economic forces that might have led to their enactment. That is, the normative rationales that 
ultimately underlie the laws are analysed, ignoring all other aspects of the legal and political 
process.
This means, further, that the questions of to what extent and in what way normative issues 
have an impact on the political processes lie beyond the scope of this project. This is not to 
say that an examination of normative consistency cannot have an impact on legal 
adjudication. The nature of legal adjudication means that there is an inherent drive towards 
consistency, and there are examples of how the drive for consistency has affected legal
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adjudication in this area (Schuck 1984: 47-49). It is also clear that that normative consistency 
has political significance, as it affects the strength of any laws enacted. As a prominent legal 
scholar puts it:
Far more important, they [normative contradictions in immigration law ] are sapping immigration  
law  o f  its moral force in the eyes o f aliens, em ployers, officials and the general public. Law  
without legitim acy is little more than naked force, the power, as it has been said, that com es out o f  
a barrel o f  a gun. And because immigration law reflects som e o f  our m ost deeply held values 
concerning com m unity, self-definition, national autonomy, and social justice, any diminution o f  its 
legitim acy entails a profound, perhaps irretrievable, loss. (Schuck 1984: 80)
The fact that this thesis analyses the normative rationales behind laws, as distinguished from 
the broader political process that determines the content of such laws, does not mean, 
therefore, that normative issues are irrelevant to the broader political process: it simply means 
that it is assumed, as in political theory in general, that the normative end result of any 
political process can be analysed separately from the specifics of that process, and that 
normative issues have an independent value that goes beyond their demonstrated impact on 
that process itself.
Clarifications and Key Definitions
The term non-citizen is obviously central to the thesis. The term denotes a legal distinction 
between members and non-members of a state. Non-citizen is thus defined as: a person who is 
neither a citizen nor holds a legal status that is equivalent to that o f citizenship.5 The 
subsequent question is: which sub-groups of non-citizens in this sense are to be included in 
the analysis? The thesis aims at providing an overall analysis of the legal standing of non­
citizens. This means, prima facie, that all non-citizens should be included in the analysis. One 
group of non-citizens -  short-term visitors -  is, however, excluded from the analysis. The 
reason for this is that short-term visitors differ from non-citizens who wish to reside in a state 
in ways that have a great significance for the thesis’ analysis. First, many of the specific rights 
included in the analysis (see below) do not pertain to short-term visitors. Second, and closely 
related, short-term visitors cause little concern and their political significance is low, as they 
lay claim to few rights and have a much smaller impact on the body politic than non-citizens 
who reside (or wish to reside) in states other than their own.
5 It should be noted that this definition is som ewhat broader than the term denizens. This term figures frequently 
in the literature but it refers, historically and currently, to a privileged group o f  non-citizens: those that hold a 
permanent resident status and the term denizen is too narrow for the purpose o f  this project (Hammar 1990a: 14— 
15).
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The omission of short-term visitors from the analysis is in line with a basic legal distinction in 
the two case studies. In the U.S., immigrants are admitted for the purpose of taking up 
residence whereas non-immigrants are just that, and hence are admitted for short-term visits. 
The difference between non-immigrants and immigrants, in terms of their desire to reside in 
or merely visit the U.S., gives rise to a differentiation in terms of the criteria for entry and in 
terms of the legal entitlements they hold once inside. Moreover, non-immigrants who want to 
adjust their status (i.e. to become immigrants) while in the U.S. have to be admissible under 
the rules regulating entry for immigrants (Carliner 1990: 60; Legomsky 1997: 2-5, 99, 502; 
Immigration and Nationality Act (henceforth DMA) 101). Similarly, in Germany a distinction 
is made between short-term stays and stays of longer duration. Stays of longer duration 
require that the non-citizen fulfil the conditions for obtaining a resident or a settlement permit, 
whereas short-term stays do not (Immigration Act 6).6
Undocumented or illegal immigrants (henceforth called undocumented residents)7, will be 
included in the analysis as their intention in general is to reside in the country, rather than just 
to pay a short-term visit. Short-term visitors, who overstay, ipso facto , intend to extend their 
stay, and the difficulty of passing borders illegally means that few non-citizens would do so 
merely to pay a short-term visit or to commute between countries, although some illegal 
immigration clearly is seasonal. Detailed facts about the duration of undocumented residents’ 
stays are for obvious reasons hard to obtain. Existing approximations, however, support the 
assumption that the bulk of undocumented residents are not short-term visitors. As much as 
33% of the undocumented residents in the U.S. have been in the country for over ten years 
and 94% of such adult men and 54% of adult women are in the labour force (Passel 2006). 
There are no approximations of the average duration of undocumented residents’ stays in 
Germany; but the fact that the nationality of undocumented residents in Germany mirrors the 
nationality of asylum seekers indicates that the undocumented residents have entered 
Germany with the intention of residing in Germany, and that the vast majority of them are not 
commuting between their home country and Germany, as none of the countries bordering
6 It is  o f  note that Germany decides the requirement for long-term stays, whereas short-term stays require a 
Schengen Visa, for which the criteria are decided by the Council o f the European Union on a basis o f  unanim ity 
(Treaty Establishing the European Union; Sinn 2005: 39; Immigration Act 6).
7 The term undocumented residents is used rather than the term illegal immigrants as the latter seem s to pre-empt 
the analysis o f what this group’s standing should be and it is a lso slightly confusing as the term immigrant 
usually is used to denote non-citizens who are legally in a state.
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Germany has generated a large number of asylum seekers after 1989 (Interior 2006a: 18; 
Cyrus 2004; Interior 2005f: 27-28).
One further clarification is needed, as the non-citizen citizen dichotomy indicated by the 
above definition unfortunately is not perfect. It should be noted that a small group of nationals 
who technically are not citizens exist in the U.S. This group of non-citizens nationals, almost 
exclusively natives of American Samoa and Swains Island, will be treated as citizens 
according to the above definition, and will thus be excluded from the analysis. The reason for 
this is that nationals who are not citizens have the same rights as citizens, save for the fact that 
nationals who are not citizens have lesser rights in terms of being entitled to sponsor 
naturalisation than citizens (Legomsky 1997: 2, 1009-1010).
The German system used to give rise to much larger difficulties in this respect as the term 
German national used to be considerably wider than the term German citizen. This was due to 
the fact that a sizable number of so-called ethnic Germans8 were considered to be German 
nationals. German nationals held all the rights of German citizens while technically not being 
citizens; a legal difference existed between the groups, as only citizens were protected from 
deprivation of nationality (Sorensen 1996: 72; Miinz 1998: 160; Koopmans 2000: 199; 
Neuman 1998: 270-271).
The concept of ethnic Germans still exists, and is recognised in the German Constitution (das 
Grundgesetz, hereafter the Basic Law) (Basic Law 116 (1)). However, recent changes (1999) 
to the law pertaining to ethnic Germans have removed the difference between German 
nationals and German citizens by automatically granting citizenship to already recognised 
ethnic Germans as well as to all who, in the future, might be recognised as such (Green 2000: 
118; Hogwood 2000: 127-128; Interior 2005f: 85; Nationality Act 7, 40 (a)).9 This means that 
the difference between citizens and ethnic Germans, for the purpose of this thesis, is at this 
point eradicated.10
8 Ethnic Germans is the com m only used term, although other terms such as status Germans, repatriates and re­
settlers also are in use (Martin 1994; M iinz 1998; Marshall 1996; H ogw ood 2000: 127, 133).
9 This right to citizenship also extends to all non-German fam ily members o f  ethnic Germans. The definition o f  
fam ily members is furthermore wider than the definition that applies in the case o f  a non-citizen’s right to fam ily  
re-union (Interior 2005d: 80, 82, 85; see also the German case study).
10 It should be noted that recent changes to the law regulating ethnic Germans did not only relate to the right o f  
ethnic Germans to automatically becom e citizens. Restrictions on w ho qualifies as an ethnic German, numerical 
restrictions, reduced social rights and other substantial measures to reduce ethnic immigration w ere also put into 
place (Marin 1994: 216— 217; Groenendijk 1997: 466; Hoffman 1999: 370; G eddes 2003: 84— 85). M oreover,
21
Another change in the 1990s -  the creation of EU citizenship -  did however increase the 
complexity of who is to count as a German citizen. EU citizenship is created by EC law,11 a 
form of supranational law that is applicable in Germany and is superior to German statutes. 
This does not, however, mean that EU citizenship constitutes a federal citizenship that 
eclipses German citizenship such that all EU citizens must be seen as German citizens. 
Holding EU citizenship only confers a partial status, as EC law only regulates limited areas of 
national law and EU citizens are not on par with German citizens in Germany.12
This partial nature of EU citizenship is also reflected in the fact that EU citizenship does not 
confer an independent status over and above a national citizenship: the Treaty clearly 
stipulates that jurisdiction over nationality solely rests with the individual member states 
(Joppke 2001b: 353-356; Joppke 1999: 27-37; Kurthen 1995: 931; Nascimbene 1996: 3; 
Sorensen 1996: 154-155; Treaty Establishing the European Union 17). This means that EU 
citizenship is based on a mutual and reciprocal agreement by EU member states to afford each 
other’s citizens limited legal privileges. EU citizenship is hence not the equivalent of German 
citizenship, and this means that EU citizens will be placed in the category of non-citizens 
under the above definition. This is in line with the German Immigration Act, which defines 
EU citizens as non-citizens, albeit EU citizens’ legal standing is regulated in a specific sub-act 
(Immigration Act 2).
It has now been established which categories of non-citizens will be included in the analysis. 
Thus, it is time to move on to the definition of legal standing. Liberal nation-states are rights-
only persons bom  before 1993, unless reasons o f family reunification are cited, can now claim  the status o f  
ethnic German (Groenendijk 1997: 467; M iinz 1998: 170— 171; Bom m es 2000: 102— 103; Green 2000: 110; 
Joppke 2001: 36— 37). These changes have also altered the process for qualifying as an ethnic German so  that 
the process now more c lose ly  resem bles an ordinary immigration process (Marshall 1996: 256— 257; 
Hailbronner 1998: 212). This point should not, however, be overstressed, since ethnic Germans never were seen  
as citizens living abroad according to the ju s  sanguinis principle, in w hich case their right to enter Germany 
would not have been a matter o f  judicial regulation. In other words, qualification as an ethnic German has 
always been subject to specific legal controls (Neuman 1998: 270). These recent changes, furthermore, mainly 
concern the process o f  qualification; the definition o f w ho is  to be counted as an ethnic German is still based on 
descent and affinity to German culture (Groenendijk: 1997: 469). This is  im m ediately clear from the latest 
official declaration o f the criteria for qualifying as an ethnic German:
German nationality presupposes descent as the natural child of a German citizen or a German national, evidence of an 
avowed belief in German national values, as well as confirmation of this belief by informally imparted knowledge of the 
German language. (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 29)
11 The term EC law  is used to underscore that only enforceable supranational law is o f  interest here; so-called  
soft law is  hence not included in the analysis.
12 It is o f  note that EC law in this area partly pertains to EU citizens, and partly to so-called  third country 
nationals, but that many o f  the rights analysed are not affected by EC law (See the German case study for more 
details).
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based communities; hence the term legal standing refers, in general, to a person’s legal rights. 
A legal right is, according to the everyday use of the term, a legal provision that either grants 
access to something, like social welfare or the right to vote, or entitles a person to protection 
from certain interventions in her life, like the right to be secure in person and property. Non­
citizens’ legal standing can hence be defined as those legal entitlements non-citizens have or 
are included in, or conversely lack or are excluded from  as compared to citizens. This 
definition draws heavily on Guiraudon’s, and the basic idea is aptly summarised by her: “In 
the simplest of terms, it can be understood as what is not forbidden to non-nationals, what 
foreigners are included in.” (Guiraudon 1998: 305)13 This is a basic definition, and the 
analytical remit will be drawn considerably tighter as only certain rights will be included in 
the analysis (see below).
This takes us on to the definition of national jurisdictions. There are, broadly speaking, two 
main options. The two states’ jurisdictions can be seen in terms of their geographic or 
administrative boundaries. That is, a state’s jurisdiction can be seen as co-extensive with its 
territory, or it can be seen as co-extensive with its exercise of sovereignty. The two 
alternatives obviously overlap to a large extent, as the modem state is based on the notion that 
it is sovereign over its territory. There is, however, nevertheless an important difference, with 
important normative implications, between the two alternatives. This difference is engendered 
by the fact that the two states in question (like many others) exercise sovereignty outside their 
national territories, by deploying their state officials in refugee camps, sea vessels, foreign 
airports, diplomatic missions and military installations. (It should be noted that a state’s 
embassies are regarded as part of its national territory.) In order to include these forms of 
exercise of sovereignty within a state’s jurisdiction is defined as: all instances where a state 
exercises effective sovereignty over non-citizens. The reason for opting for a definition that 
includes all forms of exercise of effective sovereignty, rather than a purely territorial
13 N on-citizens’ obligations w ill not be included in the analysis, as non-citizens in general have the same 
obligations as citizens. M inor exceptions to this rule exist. The exam ple that springs to mind is military service, 
but non-citizens’ obligations vary even in terms o f  this duty, and it should be noted that non-citizens’ obligations 
cannot be assumed to be lesser in this respect. N on-citizens are not obliged to serve as conscripts in Germany, 
but certain non-citizens are subject to military drafts in the U .S ., France and Italy, for exam ple. N on-citizens, 
moreover, have a less favourable standing than citizens in this regard, in certain instances. A ll non-citizens 
(including undocumented residents) in the U .S ., save for non-immigrants, are liable to drafts but cannot becom e  
officers, for exam ple. N on-citizens that are released from serving in the military in the U .S. are, m oreover, 
permanently ineligible for citizenship, and non-citizens were excluded from the am nesty granted to individuals 
w ho left the U .S. to avoid m ilitary service during the Vietnam War. (This exclusion  includes U .S. citizens w ho  
surrendered their citizenship to avoid the draft) (Benhabib 2004: 158— 159; Carliner 1990: 210— 213).
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definition, is that the thesis is concerned with these two states’ choices, as political 
communities, and a territorial definition omits important choices that they make freely.
This issue of exercising sovereignty abroad underlines the need to clarify that the thesis is 
concerned with laws that are directly applicable in national courts. This does not mean that 
international law is irrelevant to the analysis. International law, in fact, plays an important 
role, as key elements of international law have been incorporated into U.S. and German law, 
as the case studies will show. This means, however, that the limits implied by the institutional 
framework of nation-states is taken as a given. The states will therefore not be criticised for 
failing to act abroad, at the international level, or for failing to build a capability to do so. This 
is in line with the thesis’ focus on the here and now rather than on ideals for the distant future. 
However, a state can be criticised, from this perspective, for failing to uphold certain rights in 
those instances where it exercises effective sovereignty over a non-citizen, even if this is done 
outside its territory;14 it should be pointed out that the word effective is key, as the definition 
is based on the idea that a state’s jurisdiction and responsibility are limited by constraints on 
its ability to exercise sovereignty within an existing framework. This means that the mere 
presence of public officials outside the territory does not in itself expand the state’s 
jurisdiction; nor are territories where armed conflicts are ongoing considered to fulfil the 
definition of effective sovereignty.
The term rationale is used in accordance with its standard meaning. A rationale is hence “the 
fundamental reason or logical basis” for something (Oxford Dictionary 1997). Normative 
rationale is then ipso facto defined as -  the fundamental normative reason that justifies or 
validates a given law. A normative rationale hence does not refer to a specific normative 
argument, but refers to the deeper or more fundamental normative reasons or logic behind the 
arguments, that is the normative basis for a law. Put in slightly more philosophical terms, 
normative rationales can be said to be somewhat less distinct than first principles, but the 
concept of first principle provides a good indication of the meaning of the term normative 
rationale. Such normative rationales can be said to consist of a few (depending on the
14 It could be added in this context that the U .S . Supreme Court, at least, in relation to the right to H abeas  
Corpus, has recently rejected the territorial jurisdiction principle (Rasul et al.v. Bush et al. (2004): 2695— 2696, 
see the U .S . case study for more details). The notion o f  purely territorially based jurisdiction a lso sits 
uncomfortable with the Basic Law, as its first article stipulates that a ll state authority must respect as w ell as 
protect human dignity. The German Constitutional Court (B undesverfassungsgericht) has indeed also explicitly  
rejected the idea that its jurisdiction is limited to German national territory (Rubio-Marin 2000: 207— 208; 
BVerfG E 76, 1 (1987), see the German case study for more details).
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preferred breakdown) internally consistent basic principles that together constitute the essence 
of a normative perspective.
The fact that such normative rationales constitute basic normative perspectives also explains 
how states can be said to base their laws on a cosmopolitan rationale even though it is 
sometimes assumed that the very idea of state laws based on a cosmopolitan rationale is self­
contradictory. This assumption is, however, based on a conflation of limited enforceability 
with limited validity (Galloway 1993: 278-281; Habermas 1996a: 456-457; Baubock 1994: 
233-234). Habermas drives home this point very forcefully:
A s enacted actionable norms, constitutional rights are valid within a particular legal community.
But this status does not contradict the universalistic meaning o f the classical liberties that include 
all persons as such and not only all members o f  a legal community. Even as basic legal rights, they 
extend to all persons insofar as the latter sim ply reside within the jurisdiction o f  the legal order. 
(Habermas 1996a: 456)
In other words, the issue of normative scope is analytically distinct from the question of legal 
scope, and a commitment to cosmopolitanism does not generate any corresponding 
commitment to a world state.15 As Beitz aptly puts it: “Moral cosmopolitanism is 
distinguished not by any particular view of world organization but rather by a view about the 
moral basis on which this question should be decided.” (Beitz 1999b: 286) A failure to make 
this distinction between normative and institutional commitments has caused some confusion 
in the academic discourse, and the importance of not conflating these two positions is 
increasingly apparent (Caney 2005: 5, 15-16; Tan 2004: 10, 94-95; Beitz 1999b: 286).16
The precise details of what is meant by the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales 
will become clear over the next chapter. It is, however, noteworthy and should be stated from 
the start that the label cosmopolitanism is not used exclusively by philosophers that focus on 
individual rights but also by some utilitarians and some post-modern philosophers; it is, 
however, the cosmopolitanism based on individual rights that can be found in the political and 
legal discourses in liberal nation-states, and it is therefore this form of cosmopolitanism that
15 A nalogously, communitarians are not theoretically com m itted to the argument that all nations have a right to 
statehood, although they often com m it them selves to this position on instrumental grounds.
16 That said, it should be noted that d ifferences in terms o f  preferred institutional setup can have important 
normative im plications (Caney 2005: 5 , 15— 16). Institutional solutions, or the means to a normative end, can 
give rise to new normative problem s, and can therefore becom e part o f  the normative debate. T his com plexity is, 
how ever, avoided in this thesis, as the institutional setup is  taken as a given and does not constitute part o f  the 
normative analysis.
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will be of interest in this thesis (Tan 2004: 46; Fine 2002: 139-140). Nor is the 
communitarian label exclusively used by philosophers that emphasise communities’ right to 
self-determination according to their own social meanings; the label is also used by certain 
Marxists (Gutman 1992: 120-121). It is, however, the former kind of communitarianism that 
will be of concern here, as it is this form of communitarianism that can be found in the 
political and legal discourses in liberal nation-states.
The Thesis' Analytical Remit
The thesis’ analytical remit is limited by the fact that it only is concerned with two states. The 
remit is further (and significantly) limited by the fact that the thesis is only concerned with the 
current legal standing of non-citizens. This means that the historical aspects and developments 
in the two cases studied are of interest only in so far as they have a bearing on the analysis of 
non-citizens’ current legal standing. This means that no overall historical analysis will be 
provided, although the analysis of the current legal standing of non-citizens occasionally 
warrants brief historical excursions.17 No cut-off date by which current is defined is set. The 
time of writing thus defines the term current. This decision is based on the notion that non­
citizens’ overall legal standing changes incrementally, as it is made up of a large number of 
statutes and constitutional provisions. There is thus no reason to set a specific date to establish 
that a particular dramatic change has been included or excluded. That said, every effort has 
been made to include the latest changes in this area and changes until 2007 are included.
The foregoing restricts the remit considerably, but it still leaves the task of pinning down 
exactly which rights will be included in the analysis. The fact that the two normative 
rationales co-exist in liberal nation-states and often dominate different areas of rights, makes 
it paramount to cover a wide area of rights in order to assess the overall legal standing of non­
citizens. A more narrow focus, excluding certain areas of rights, would have undermined the 
basic ambition of providing an overall analysis of non-citizens’ legal standing in these two 
states. The reason for including a wide range of rights in the analysis is thus analogous to the 
reason for including all non-citizens who reside (or wish to reside) in the two states. The
17 The American legal system  is part o f  the com m on law tradition, where case law  plays an important role as a 
source o f  law , and the case law in this area has a long history. Germany’s legal system  belongs to the civ il law  
tradition, where case law plays a much lesser role. In Germany, the focus lies more on the wording o f  the law  
and the intention o f  the legislator, and the text o f  the German Basic Law is central to the analysis o f  non-citizens’ 
legal standing in Germany. The B asic Law still qualifies as a young constitution, but it w as the result o f  a long  
historical process, and it is necessary to partly unravel German constitutional history in order to unearth the 
meaning o f  the principles behind the B asic Law.
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guiding principle for choosing the specific rights has hence been that the whole gamut of 
rights available in liberal nation-states should be covered.
The selected rights have been divided into five realms, comprising the admissions rights, civil 
rights, political rights, social rights and naturalisation rights realms. This five-fold 
categorisation draws on Hammar, who places the issue of non-citizens’ rights between the 
admissions realm and the naturalisation realm;18 and on Marshall’s famous categorisation of 
rights into civil, political and social rights (Hammar 1990a: 16-21; Marshall 1992: 11-14; 
See Layton-Henry 1990 for a similar combination of these two categorisations). That said, it 
makes no difference which realm a right is placed in, as the division of rights into these five 
realms only serves the purpose of making the analysis and presentation more transparent.
Each of the five realms contains one or more specific rights. The total number of rights 
included in the analysis is 17, and the rights are as follows. From the admissions rights realm: 
1) the right to be admitted for the purpose of residing. From the civil rights realm: 2) the right 
to freedom of speech and conscience; 3) the right to hold and to acquire property; 4) the right 
to freely choose one’s profession; 5) protection from (arbitrary) intervention in person and 
property; 6) the right to equality before the law (protection from discrimination); 7) the right 
to a fair trial and the right to seek legal redress (open and fair access to courts and procedural 
due process rights); and 8) the right to secure residency (the right not to be expelled and 
uprooted from one’s life). From the political rights realm: 9) the right to vote; and 10) the 
right to stand for elections. From the social rights realm: 11) the right to subsistence; 12) the 
right to basic health care; 13) the right to basic education; 14) the right to a share of welfare 
provisions on an equal basis; 15) the right to higher education; and 16) the right to 
comprehensive health care. From the naturalisation rights realm: 17) the right to be 
naturalised (the right to citizenship).
The above list is intended to cover the most basic legal rights within the existing legal 
systems of both these states. This list is fairly comprehensive, but it is not exhaustive. A list
18 Minor differences between naturalised and native citizens exist in som e liberal nation-states. The exam ple that 
springs to mind is the constitutional requirement o f  that the U .S . president m ust be a native bom  citizen. T his  
might be o f  sym bolic importance and perceived as important in terms o f  safeguarding the nation from external 
threats, but it is relevant to very few  individuals and applies to no other political o ffice, although a person m ust 
have been a citizen for a specific number o f  years in order to be elected to C ongress (seven years for the H ouse  
o f Representatives and nine years for the Senate) (U .S . Constitution art. 2 sec. 1 cl. 5; art. 1 sec. 2 cl. 2; art. 1 
sec. 3 cl. 3).
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containing all rights that might be deemed basic would become too long. This means that 
some rights that could be considered basic are excluded. Potentially basic rights have been 
excluded on two different grounds. Firstly, rights that are seen as basic from a particular 
philosophical perspective, but which have not been recognised as such by the existing legal 
systems are excluded, as the thesis focuses on the existing legislation; cultural or 
environmental rights are potential examples of such rights. Secondly, rights that are deemed 
less important for non-citizens than the listed rights, but which nevertheless can be seen as 
basic are excluded on grounds of limited space.
The Thesis’ Legal Remit
This thesis depends on a close connection between political theory and law. This means that a 
legal remit corresponding to the analytical remit outlined above must be identified. It is clear 
that the general legal context is constituted by American and German law.
In the case of the U.S. it can be said, first of all, that only federal and constitutional law is of 
interest, and that state law will not constitute part of the analysis.19 The reason for this 
limitation is that the jurisdiction over and regulation of non-citizens (nowadays) is firmly 
placed at the federal level.20 This means that state laws are only of indirect interest, in so far 
as they are linked to federal or constitutional laws. This narrows down the remit in terms of 
levels of law but the remit can be drawn even tighter, as only certain areas of law within these 
two echelons of law are of interest. More specifically, three legal areas constitute the precise 
legal remit of this thesis. Immigration law covers laws regulating entry and expulsion of non­
citizens (Legomsky 1984: 256; Motomura 1992: 1626; Nedzel 1997: 129; Legomsky 2001: 
365; Taylor 2001: 133; Motomura 1994: 202; INA 101 (17)). That is, immigration law covers 
the first realm, and the right to secure residency from the civil rights realm. However, the 
overall treatment of non-citizens spans beyond immigration law, and alienage law covers 
non-citizens’ general legal standing and other substantial rights not covered by immigration 
law, such as most civil, social and political rights (Aleinikoff 1998: 511-513; Nedzel 1997: 
129; Motomura 1994: 202). Alienage law thus covers the civil, political and social rights 
realms, (save for the right to secure residency, which is covered by immigration law). The 
right to naturalisation, i.e. the right to acquire citizenship after birth, is covered by
19 This restriction o f  the remit does not exclude constitutional law that applies to the states. One case where state 
laws make up the federal policy will also be included; this is the case o f the federal electorate, which is m ade up 
o f  the com bined state electorates (see the case study for more details).
20 The federal level is also where the U .S . is represented as a sovereign nation, a fact that a lso goes a long way  
towards explaining why the issue o f  non-citizens’ legal standing is dealt with at the federal level.
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naturalisation or nationality law. Naturalisation law hence covers the fifth and last rights 
realm, the naturalisation realm (Boswell 1992; Weil 2001; Legomsky 1997: 1039, 1053).21 In 
terms of legal sources, it can be said that the Constitution, constitutional case law and the INA 
constitute the main legal sources in this context.
As in the U.S. case, the legal remit in the German case is also limited to the echelons of law 
that apply on the federal level and this for analogical reasons (Neuman 1990: 82; Bowie 1954: 
660-661; Kommers 1997: 75-76; Basic Law 72, 73 (2-3), 74 (4)).22 Here also, a further 
tightening of the remit is possible, as only alienage jurisprudence is of interest. In Germany 
however, alienage jurisprudence is not divided into different areas of law but is made up of 
one area -  Auslanderrecht or foreigners’ law, which deals with all major areas of non­
citizens’ rights (Rittstieg 1993: 2). This means that the foreigners’ law covers all five realms 
and thus constitutes the specific legal remit of analysis in the German case study.23 It can be 
said in terms of legal sources that the Basic Law, Basic Law case law, the Immigration Act 
(Germany’s first Immigration Act which came into force on 1 January 2005), the Nationality 
Act and the Asylum Procedure Act constitute the main legal sources in this context. Beyond 
that, the Treaty Establishing the European Community, certain EU directives and some 
international law conventions directly affect non-citizens’ legal standing in Germany (See for 
example Council Directive 2003/109/EC; Council Directive 2003/86/EC; Council Directive 
2003/9/EC).
21 Note that that naturalisation law  is a narrower concept than citizenship law , which also includes acquisition of  
citizenship at birth, loss o f  citizenship and rights and duties o f citizens (Neuman 1994: 247).
22 The B asic Law explicitly  bestow s the power over immigration and naturalisation to the federal legislative  
branches. The legislative pow er over law s relating to residence and settlement o f  non-citizens is  concurrent. This 
means that the states {Lander) have a right to legislate, but only if  the Federation has not chosen to exercise its 
right to legislate, in which case federal law overrules state law; further, the Federation has a right to legislate if  
the matter cannot effectively  be dealt with on the state level, or i f  a state law  might harm the interest o f  other 
states, or the people as a w hole, or if  it is necessary to maintain the econom ic unity o f  Germany. The right to 
determine if  there is a need for federal legislation, furthermore, rests with the federal legislature, although the 
German Constitutional Court police abuses o f  this right. This m eans that the Federation p ossesses the bulk o f  
legislative power in this area, and more importantly it is responsible for legislation that concerns the basic rights 
that are o f  interest in this thesis, whereas the states’ main responsibility lie at the level o f  implementation (B ow ie  
1954: 660— 661; Neum an 1980: 82; Kommers 1997: 75— 76; B asic Law 72, 73 (2— 3), 74(4)). The fact that the 
German states carry much o f  the responsibility for implementing the law s that regulate the treatment o f  non­
citizens m eans that many o f  the federal law s in this area are so-called framework law s (R ahm engesetze). This 
m eans that the federal law s set binding guidelines or frameworks that limit the states’ leew ay in applying these 
law s, but the final implementation is carried out by the states (Cremer 1998: 53 , 63; Guiraudon 1998: 296; B asic  
Law 83— 86; Cyrus 2003: 7). It should, m oreover, be noted that federal law , EC law  and the German Basic Law  
are superior to state law , including those enshrined in state constitutions (Benda 1981: 3). The impact o f  state 
law and the differences between states thus appear on the level o f  implementation, and this level -  for all its 
general relevance -  is not covered in this thesis.
23 The entire analysis w ill take place within the remits outlined but this does not mean that these entire remits 
will be analysed. The unit o f  analysis is the enumerated list o f basic rights, and this unit fits within the 
established remits but it does not span them.
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The relationship between supranational law and German law merits a brief discussion. Article 
24 of the Basic Law states that “[t]he Federation may, by statute, transfer sovereign powers to 
international institutions” and Article 25 makes the general rules of public international law 
directly applicable in Germany (Basic Law 24, 25). This creates a link between the German 
legal system and supranational law. This link has subsequently been strengthened by the fact 
that Germany (albeit as the then Federal Republic of Germany) has joined both the EU and 
the Council of Europe. Much of the influence of supranational law is transmitted via German 
law and the drafting of German laws is partly shaped by Germany’s supranational legal 
obligations, especially the obligations deriving from its membership of the EU and the 
Council of Europe. The influence of supranational law, however, also extends to German case 
law. The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have had a 
substantial influence on German case law. The importance of the European Court of Human 
Rights in this area was, for example, made very clear and entrenched in 1987 when the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German constitutional court) ruled that: “... when interpreting 
the Fundamental Law [the Basic Law], the Court must have regard to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the caselaw which ensues therefrom 
[sic].” (BVerfGE 74, 358 (1987): 370). The impact of supranational law on German law will 
not, however, be further analysed in this thesis because the question of how law develops or is 
shaped lies outside the scope of this thesis, as explained previously (Neuman 1990: 82; 
Kommers 1997: 75-76; Frowein 1992).
The Choice o f Case Studies
The choice of national case studies simply reflects the desire to make a direct normative 
contribution that pertains to the world we live in, rather than the world we ought to live in, as 
described earlier. Both the number and the specific choices of case studies are closely related 
to the nature and method of the project. The limited number of case studies is justified by the 
fact that they are very comprehensive, covering several categories of non-citizens and a whole 
gamut of basic rights. A complementary reason for limiting the numbers of case studies is that 
the comparative element of the thesis is limited to illuminating and clarifying the normative 
basis for the treatment of non-citizens in the two states. That is, the comparisons made are not 
intended to establish any general conclusions that would be valid for all liberal nation-states.24
24 To devise an analytical framework that allow s one to draw general conclusion in this area is, i f  at all possible, 
a tall order, as the com plexity and differences betw een these tw o studies strongly suggests.
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That said, the choice of case studies is partly influenced by the fact that these two states make 
for interesting comparisons, highlighted by a brief comparison in chapter six.
Size in terms of the number of non-citizens who reside or seek entrance in a country has been 
the primary selection criterion. This follows from that the ambition has been to make the 
analysis directly relevant to the largest possible number of individuals and that it is not 
possible to draw general conclusions that would be valid for all liberal nation-states from this 
kind of case study. The choice of the U.S. and Germany25 is straightforward from this 
perspective. The U.S. and Germany are the largest net receivers of immigrants and host larger 
non-citizen populations than any other liberal nation-states, although a few smaller liberal 
nation-states do host larger non-citizen populations in relative terms (Passel 2005: 19; Passel 
2006; Interior 2005f: 21-26; Zlotnik 2004).26
The non-citizen populations in these two states are indeed larger than many states’ total 
population. The U.S. hosts a population of 14.4 million (2005) legally residing non-citizens, 
and the estimated population of undocumented residents stands at 11.1 million (2005), putting 
the total at a staggering 25.5 million (Passel 2006: 3-4).27 Germany hosts a population of 
legally residing non-citizens of 7.3 million (2004). The estimates for undocumented residents 
are less reliable in Germany, and vary from 0.1 to 1.5 million (2002) (Vayrynen 2003: 11; 
Interior 2005e; Interior 2005f: 8-23; Cyrus 2004: 32; Sinn 2005: 6). This puts the total 
German figure at around 8 million. The laws analysed in this thesis thus pertain directly to at 
least 33.5 million individuals in total.
An additional factor in choosing the U.S. and Germany for the case studies is the increased 
salience of migration in these two states due to the rapid growth in the size of their non-citizen 
populations. For Germany this growth is nothing short of a social revolution. The non-citizen
25 On a separate note, it should also be m entioned, that the German case study, with a few  exceptions, is  based on 
English sources. A ll quotations from court cases are English translations, m ade by legal experts. The decision to 
rely chiefly  on English-language materials and to keep the text monolingual is based on two related facts. One, 
the thesis is written for an English speaking audience. Two, there is a plenitude o f  material available in English, 
as many German leading scholars write in English and the German governm ent provides a lot o f  information in 
English. These two facts made it possible to m ake the thesis more accessible for its audience without having to 
adjust its content in linguistic terms.
26 Germany and the U .S . are tw o o f the m ost influential states in the world, which also means that their treatment 
o f non-citizens has an important effect on other states. This impact can be direct, as when the treatment o f  non­
citizens in these countries affects the number o f  non-citizens that seek adm ission to other states. These states 
could also have an indirect impact on other states due to the likelihood that their size and standing could m ake 
them standard setters.
27 Note that these figures are based on official censuses, and that estim ates in this area vary som ewhat.
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population grew from 1.2% in 1960 to 8.9% in 2003. The U.S. has always had a large non­
citizen population but it has grown rapidly after the end of the Second World War. The annual 
immigration inflow, in the U.S., has also peaked in absolute terms, reaching 1.5 million 
immigrants in 2000 and since then staying above the one million mark (Held 1999: 315; 
Interior 2005g; Passel 2005: i, 54).28
The thesis’ nature and method makes the task of connecting law and political theory 
paramount, and the fact that these two states are constitutional has also influenced the choice 
of case studies. A constitutional state’s legal system revolves around a legal nucleus that 
clearly spells out the normative principles that legitimise the exercise and limits of power 
(Rubio-Marin 2000: 6-7; Karpen 1983: 60-61). This means that constitutional systems draw 
normative principles directly into their legal discourses: the interpretation of law, in light of a 
constitution that explicitly states the basic principles for the exercise of power, generates 
values as a by product, to borrow Karpen’s phrase (Smith 1985: 6-7); the fact that legal 
adjudication plays a particularly pivotal role in these two constitutional states is also a great 
advantage, as will explained below (Faist 1995a: 223).
Method
Political theory is defined by its questions rather than its methods. This is a natural 
consequence of the fact that any answer to the central question in political theory -  how we 
ought to live together? -  has implications for what is considered a valid method for answering 
it. This means that the method varies with the nature of the political theoretical project, and 
that method as such in political theory is not well defined (Kymlicka 2002: 5). That said, at 
least two common standards that are of relevance to the present work can be said to be widely 
accepted in political theory. One is internal consistency, and the other the correctness of
29empirical premises (Glaser 1995: 22). The thesis’ analysis must hence, at the very least: (a) 
rest on correct empirical assumptions, meaning that the normative rationales must be 
identified correctly and on sufficient grounds; and (b) the thesis must be internally consistent 
in terms of its initial analysis of the alternative theoretical approaches to the treatment of non­
28 It should also be m entioned that Germany’s m embership in the EU constitutes an additional reason for 
including Germany in the analysis. The existence o f  EU citizenship and EC law in this area constitute an 
interesting developm ent, both in terms o f  creating a group o f  privileged non-citizens, as w ell as in terms o f  
introducing a supranational level that affects non-citizens’ legal stranding.
29 A  third criterion, correspondence to moral intuitions, is usually included am ong the com m only accepted 
standards (Glaser 1995: 22). This criterion is, how ever, not relevant to this thesis as it deals with existing rules 
that enjoy wide support and are based on normative rationales that are w idely accepted.
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citizens, and in terms of its internal consistency analysis of the U.S.’s and Germany’s actual 
treatment of non-citizens.
The more specific and fundamental methodological challenge this thesis faces concerns the 
task of deducing the normative rationales behind the laws that regulate non-citizens’ legal 
standing. It is assumed that all laws analysed in this thesis ultimately rest on some normative 
foundation. This is clearly not the case with all laws in general. The normative rationale 
behind the law stipulating right-hand-side traffic in the U.S. can hardly be said to be the 
opposite of the normative rationale behind the law stipulating left-hand-side traffic in the U.K. 
Laws of this technical or pure regulatory nature cannot be said to rest on a normative 
rationale.
This thesis is, however, only concerned with laws that regulate basic rights, and such rights 
only make sense in a normative context. A law stipulating left-hand-side traffic as opposed to 
right-hand-side traffic makes sense in the absence of any normative rationale, as it only is a 
question of co-ordination and not a question of bestowing or withholding a right. A law 
stipulating that only people with blue eyes have a right to vote, on the other hand, makes little 
if any sense in the absence of a normatively relevant meaning for this characteristic. The need 
to belabour this point is at least partly engendered by the sharpness of the English language. 
The term Recht in German and Ratt/ret/rett in the Scandinavian languages, for example, 
encompass the notions of law, right and justice. The fusion of these terms makes it harder to 
conceptualise the notion of law without implicating the notion of justice and to conceptualise 
the notion of justice without referring to law.
The basic rights in this thesis will be considered as Rechte in the sense that they are rights 
sanctioned by law, and resting on a normative rationale. It is absolutely crucial to point out 
that this assumption in no way means that laws are assumed to be normatively driven or 
informed, or that legislators perceive normative consistency as an aim in itself when they 
promulgate laws. It only means that a law regulating a basic right is assumed to ultimately rest 
on an explicit or implicit normative rationale -  at least in principle -  whatever the cause that 
led to its adoption happens to be. The assumption made is therefore not that normative 
rationales can explain why non-citizens’ have been included or excluded from certain basic 
rights, but that the laws that regulate non-citizens’ legal standing implicitly or explicitly rest 
on some normative rationale.
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This still leaves us with the specific methodological challenge of how the normative rationales 
behind laws are to be deduced or identified. The methodological key to this problem is also 
based on the disconnection between the political process that precedes the enactment of a law 
and the normative rationale that underlies laws regulating basic rights. This disconnection 
reduces the complexity that might otherwise be involved, as questions about why and how a 
law was enacted (and the like) can be bypassed. This disconnection also makes it possible to 
focus solely on the discourse with the clearest emphasis on the normative aspects of the law. 
This means that the thesis draws mainly on the jurisprudential discourse, as jurisprudence or 
the philosophy of law provides an excellent bridge to political theory (This literature is 
extensive and for but a few examples see Whelan 1983: 447, 449-^450; Schauer 1986: 1505, 
1507; Wu 2001: 62; Aleinikoff 1998; Bosniak 1994; Schuck 1984; Neuman 1994; Schuck 
1998b: 19-81; Heller 2001; Neuman 1991; Wright 1994; Nafziger 1983; Joppke 1999; Rubio- 
Marin 2000; Scaperlanda 2001; Kantstroom 1993; Krajewski 1996).
It will become evident in the case studies that the connection between alienage jurisprudence 
and political theory is strong and that the main jurisprudential discourses and their central 
doctrines in fact can be directly linked to the thesis’ political theoretical framework. The 
details will be outlined and become clear in the first sections of the case studies; it suffices to 
say at this point that the key legal doctrines and principles ultimately boil down to the 
cosmopolitan and communitarian perspectives discussed above.
The vast majority of the basic rights analysed in this thesis have come before the 
constitutional courts, and have hence become part of these jurisprudential discourses. This 
means, in practical terms, that the specific analysis of a particular right, in almost all 
instances, starts by placing a right within the relevant jurisprudential discourses; that is to say, 
most rights can be directly placed within a universal or a particular rights paradigm. This 
makes it possible to immediately connect the analysis of particular rights with the relevant 
jurisprudential discourse -  and in turn to the cosmopolitan or the communitarian rationales, as 
the jurisprudential discourse in each area corresponds to the two rationales. That said, such a 
first, immediate connection cannot in itself yield a conclusive result and the specific rights 
must be analysed in more detail.
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The jurisprudential discourse continues to play a vital role at this stage of the analysis, as it 
not only categorises and describes different rights, but also draws out the underlying 
arguments for why specific rights are informed by elements of doctrines that rest on the 
cosmopolitan and communitarian rationales respectively. This means that the jurisprudential 
discourse identifies distinct signs that reveal which of the two normative rationales underlie 
any particular right. It can be said, in more practical terms, that the more detailed analysis of 
specific rights is based mainly on an examination of court cases, which are analysed in terms 
of the jurisprudential discourse involved around each one. The detailed analysis of rights in 
relation to this discourse usually yields a conclusive result in terms of what a law’s underlying 
normative rationale is. That said, the analysis is sometimes shored up by further references to 
the relevant academic literature and/or analysis of the legislative process. The very wording of 
the law can also, in conjunction with the relevant academic literature, sometimes provide 
further evidence.
In sum, the practical analysis is based mainly on constitutional court rulings, but also on the 
relevant academic literature, the actual legal text and material from the legislative process. 
This detailed analysis is guided by, and relates to, more general jurisprudential discourses, 
which in turn are connected to the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales. This 
means that the analysis in this thesis will illuminate, conceptually speaking, how an abstract 
normative rationale has been (perhaps unwittingly) translated into an actionable norm/law, by 
identifying the rationale first in its abstract philosophical form, then in its abstract legal form 
and finally in its applied legal form. The analyses will not, it is worth stressing again, 
demonstrate how and why this norm has been turned into an actionable law.
It should be pointed out -  given that the analysis draws extensively on constitutional 
jurisprudence -  that the analysis does not depend on or subscribe to a specific method of 
constitutional interpretation, such as the grammatical, the historical, the structural/systemic or 
teleological methods. These methods are concerned with interpreting and applying the law 
based on the history of the law, its wording, its structure or its perceived overall purpose 
(Kommers 1997: 42-45). The fact that the analysis carried out here does not endorse or 
depend on any specific method of legal interpretation is simply a reflection of the fact that the 
task of applying the law (or historically understanding it) is not part of the analysis. The task 
of applying the law is also, in general, prior to the task of inferring the normative rationale 
that underlies a law. The constitutional courts do, in fact, deploy a number of different
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interpretation methods in applying the law (Kommers 1997: 42). But this is of no 
consequence to the thesis’ analysis, as it does not aim to explain the decisions from a legal 
perspective, or to criticise the decisions, but simply aims to analyse the normative rationales 
that underlie the laws.
There is always the risk of basing the analysis on insufficient evidence, and it is important to 
note in this respect that a right cannot, for example, be said to rest on the communitarian 
rationale simply because non-citizens are excluded. The exclusion must be based on their lack 
of membership in the particular political community in question. That is, non-members must 
be excluded on the ground that they are morally less relevant as non-members, not because a 
functional division has been made between political units, for example. Nor can a right be 
seen as resting on the cosmopolitan rationale just because non-citizens are included; non­
citizens must be included on the basis that they have a universal right to self-determination.
It is, moreover, important to note that rights based on individual autonomy need not be seen 
as having universal scope. The rights of Germans under the Basic Law are often based on an 
individual right to autonomy, see for example (BVerfGE 7, 377 (1958)). In sum, it is 
important to note, in general, that the real question is not simply that of what rights non­
citizens have, but that of the grounds on which they hold these rights; this means that there is 
always a need to go beyond the fact that rights include or exclude non-citizens, or that rights 
are based on individual autonomy, for example; a normative rationale can only be identified 
once it is clear what the grounds for inclusion or exclusion are.
This need to base the analysis on a sufficiently deep level is not simply a philosophical 
problem. The technical challenge of penetrating the legal structure can also create problems in 
this regard. There is always the risk that a normative rationale might be misconstrued due to 
the internal legal structure of the argument being overlooked or misinterpreted. The pre­
emptive doctrine is a case in point. This doctrine is based on the notion that the federal 
government in the U.S. holds the right to regulate non-citizens’ legal standing. This doctrine 
is normatively void, at least in relation to the issue at hand, as it simply delegates a right to 
regulate a particular issue to a specific level of government (Koh 1985: 98-99). This means 
that any decision to strike down a state statute that is based on invidious discrimination does 
not, in itself, equal a universal protection from such discrimination. The Supreme Court could 
very well strike down the statute according to the pre-emptive doctrine, but this does not
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preclude the federal government from retaining and exercising the right to deploy the very 
same distinction that was found invidious when deployed by a state. Thus, it is necessary to 
peel off all the layers of administrative rules and fully account for the legal structure before 
the underlying normative rationale can be conclusively identified.
In conclusion, in this first chapter it has been established what questions this thesis will 
answer, what the purpose of answering these questions is and what academic contributions 
this will produce. In addition, the key concepts and the remit of the analysis have been 
defined. The nature of the analysis and how the analysis will be undertaken in practical terms 
have been outlined. The second chapter will identify and discuss the cosmopolitan and 
communitarian rationales. The third chapter is the last theoretical chapter and it builds on the 
identification of the rationales and constructs theoretically coherent positions to non-citizens’ 
legal standing based on the two rationales. The fourth chapter and the fifth chapter constitute 
the case studies. The case studies are comprehensive and therefore each divided into three 
sections. The case studies’ first sections describe non-citizens’ legal standing. The second 
section deduces the normative rationales behind the laws presented in the first section, partly 
drawing on the second chapter. The third section is devoted to the internal coherence analysis. 
This analysis is based on the states’ positions as they have emerged in the two first sections of 
the case studies in relation to the coherent positions identified in chapter three. The sixth and 
ultimate chapter is devoted to a final analysis of the thesis’ findings and it highlights some 
interesting points of comparisons between the case studies.
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Chapter Two 
Cosmopolitanism vs. Communitarianism
Two normative rationales
If the power o f  thought is universal am ong mankind, so  likew ise is  the possession o f reason, 
making us rational creatures. It fo llow s, therefore, that this reason speaks no less universally to us 
all w ith its ‘thou shalt’ or ‘thou shalt not’. So  then there is a world-law; which in tum means that 
w e are all fe llow -citizens and share a com m on citizenship, and that the world is a single city. Is 
there any other com m on citizenship that can be claim ed by all humanity? And it is from this 
world-polity that mind, reason, and law them selves derive. (Aurelius 1964: Book IV 4)
* * *
The final association, formed by several v illages, is the state. For all practical purposes the process 
is now complete; self-sufficiency has been reached, and while the state cam e about as a m eans o f  
securing life  itself, it continues in being to secure the g o o d  l ife ... .  For the real difference between  
man and other animals is that humans alone have perception o f  good and evil, just and unjust, etc.
It is the sharing o f  a com mon view  in these  matters that makes a household and a state. (Aristotle 
1992: Book I 1252b27-1253a7, em phasis in original)
This chapter will explore the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales in detail. The 
analysis of the two rationales will include an examination of what a political community 
based on each rationale would look like. The aim of extending the analysis beyond mere 
description of the rationales is to render them more tangible in a political context. This will 
also help to prepare the ground for the next chapter, where the construction of theoretically 
consistent approaches to the treatment of non-citizens is carried out. It is worth repeating that 
the aim is not to evaluate the two rationales or to critically analyse or compare them. Due 
warning must therefore be given to the reader not to expect too much theoretical depth here: 
the essential purpose of the chapter is to describe and clarify the nature of the two rationales, 
in order to establish their philosophical bases and meanings.
The Cosmopolitan Rationale
The analysis of the cosmopolitan rationale will pay special attention to Kant’s writings, as 
Kant is the most influential cosmopolitan philosopher. The centrality of Kant’s work is, 
moreover, enhanced by the fact that Kant’s philosophy bridges the cosmopolitanism of the 
ancient world with its modem successor. That said, an analysis of cosmopolitan thought must
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commence with the cosmopolitanism of the ancient world. The etymological roots of the term 
cosmopolitan are found in the ancient Greek word kosmos, meaning world, and the word 
polis, meaning city. These roots reveal the basic idea behind cosmopolitanism as a universal 
and boundless philosophy, where location or membership is seen as normatively contingent. 
The cosmopolitan tradition goes back at least to 300 BC to the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of 
Sinope. Diogenes’ most famous follower Zeno of Citium established a philosophical school 
under the simple roof of his porch in Athens and it was the location of the school that gave 
name to the cosmopolitan school of thought called Stoicism (Stoa meaning porch in ancient 
Greek) (Nussbaum 1997; Schlereth 1977: 58; Heater 2002: 26-44; Fine 2002: 138-139).
Stoicism developed as the poleis of ancient Greece, where the notion of a particular 
citizenship and local patriotism constituted core norms, gave way to the Macedonian and later 
the Roman empires where notions of human similarities and transnational co-operation 
became much more important. Interest in Stoicism continued throughout the ancient era, but 
Stoicism did not develop into a comprehensive philosophy until Roman times, under the 
influence of philosophers like Seneca, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius (Nussbaum 1997; 
Schlereth 1977: 58; Heater 2002: 26-44; Fine 2002: 138-139; Arieli 2002: 13). Roman 
Stoicism has exercised great influence over later cosmopolitan thought not least via Roman 
law. Roman law was created in order to unite and keep together virtually the whole known 
world and thus a legion of nations. To this end Roman jurists deployed the abstract Stoic 
philosophical notion of equal personhood as the foundation for the empire’s universal legal 
system and as part of this system Roman law introduced the notion of the sovereignty of the 
unqualified individual.30 This influential notion meant that a person, as a legal subject, was 
conceived without regard to her membership or position within any group (Fine 2002: 139; 
Noll 2000: 75-76; Arieli 2002: 13-15).31
Early cosmopolitanism was based around a few basic tenets, succinctly conveyed by Cicero 
(see also the initial quote for a similar exposition by Marcus Aurelius):
30 It should be noted that this law , ju s  Gentium , only applied when non-Rom ans were parties, as disputes 
between Romans were regulated by ju s  Civile.
31 The cosmopolitan nature o f  Roman law  w as a great inspiration for legal scholars in the tw elfth century, w ho  
sought to m ove away from the feudal order. The fact that Roman law  had so much to say about the state and its 
em inence also inspired European statesmen w ho tried to replace the feudal order with modern states. These  
statesmen were, however, also inspired by A ristotle’s notion o f  the secular and autonom ous p o lis  (van 
Caenegem: 1991:133-136). The marriage o f  universal individualism  and the absolute sovereign secular state is 
still evident in the existing state order.
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True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is o f  universal application, unchanging and 
everlasting; it sum m ons to duty by its commands, and averts from w rongdoing by its prohibitions 
. . .  W e cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and w e need not look outside 
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter o f  it. And there w ill not be different law s at R om e and at 
Athens, or different law s now  and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law w ill be valid  
for all nations and all t im es... (C icero 1994: Book III XXII)
Cicero also identified the main moral implication of the cosmopolitan perspective, and can lay 
claim to coining the key phrase, dignitas hominis (the dignity of man), that is central to 
cosmopolitanism. This expression entails the notion that all individuals have a universal right 
to have their personhood respected and protected, as they as rational beings are capable of 
exercising self-determination (Cancik 2002: 19-22, 27).32 The Stoics hence originated the 
notion that justice is universal, that all human beings (as rational creatures) possess human 
dignity which bestows rights on all persons independently of what culture or nation that they 
belong to and that persons therefore on a basic level are equals (Colish 1990: 97, 100, 
146;Coleman 2000: 251, 258-259; Heater 2002: 32; Fine 2002: 138-139; Arieli 2002: 13; 
Cicero 1991: Book HI 28; Seneca 1995: Book 3:28).33
The notion of a divine universal law that bestowed rights on all persons was passed from the 
first cosmopolitan philosophers to the Roman stoics and on to the Christian natural law 
philosophers. The problem with this notion was its ambiguity not to say its indeterminacy 
which was caused by the fact that no agreed criterion or basis on which a law could be said to 
be universal existed. This problem was not confined to the theoretical world of philosophers; 
jurists also failed to turn natural law into a distinct or coherent notion. As one legal historian 
describes the situation during the Middle Ages (Williams 2003: 49; Heater 2002: 34-36; 
Nussbaum 1997: 36-39; Cancik 2002: 33-37; Arieli 2002: 13; Dicke 2002: 113):
32 The dignity o f  man was only one form o f  dignity in the Roman world, and although it w as the m ost basic, it 
was hardly seen as more important than the dignity o f  the state or the dignity that fo llow ed  a particular rank 
(Cancik 2002: 2 3 -2 4 ).
33 It is crucial to appreciate that the Roman Stoics, more than earlier and later cosm opolitans, view ed them selves 
as citizens o f tw o com m onwealths (Heater 2002: 37):
For there is a fellowship that is extremely widespread, shared by all with all (even if  this has often been said, it ought to be 
said still more often); a closer one exists among those of the same nation, and one more intimate still among those of the 
same city. For this reason our ancestors wanted a law of nations and the civil law to be different: everything in the civil law 
need not be in the law of nations, but everything in the law of nations ought also be part of civil law. (Cicero 1991: Book 
III 69)
One [commonwealth] is great and truly common to all, where gods as well as men are included, where we look not to this 
comer or that, but measure its bonds with the sun. The other is that in which we are enrolled by accident of birth -  I mean 
Athens or Carthage or some other city that belongs not to all men but only a limited number. (Seneca 1995: On the Private 
Life 4)
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In fact, how ever, everyday-life w as but a pale reflection o f  that great platonic id ea .... The ju s  
divinum  or naturale was a very vague law , w hich had never been put in writing and w hose content 
w as therefore strictly unknown or at least uncertain. Its interpretation depended on everyone’s 
personal understanding and could vary enorm ously according to the individuals concerned, 
whether governors or governed -  and what is the practical value o f  a supreme but unknown law?
(van C aenegem  1991: 189)
It was this problem that Kant set out to solve. By replacing the general theistic foundations of 
much of early cosmopolitan thought with the concept of individual autonomy Kant managed 
to provide cosmopolitanism with a clear foundation from which specific determinate universal 
rights could be derived. It must be remembered that the Stoics exercised a profound influence 
on later cosmopolitans including Kant and he retained the key notion of universal reason 
(Williams 2003: 49; Heater 2002: 34-36; Nussbaum 1997: 36-39). For Kant, as for the 
Stoics, reason was an a priori concept that is independent of empirical context or experience. 
This means that reason is a thing in itself. That is, reason is objective in the sense that it is not 
dependent on a particular context. Further, it is universal in the sense that it applies 
independently of any particular context. The novelty of Kant’s philosophy lies in the fact that 
he turns reason into, not only the means for accessing the universal law, but also the source or 
basis of universal law. The universal good or justice is, on his account, not a divine law that 
speaks to us as rational creatures; rather, the universal good is what reason tells us can be 
maintained as a universal law. So the content of universal law can be found or re-discovered 
and explicated by asking what can be held as categorically just, i.e. just independent of any 
context or particular circumstances. This is the meaning of the Categorical Imperative, which 
in its first formulation, states that “ ... I should never act except in such a way that I can also 
will that my maxim should become a universal law.” (Kant 1993: 402) That is, there is a 
universal law and it stipulates that one should always act in such a way that one could wish 
that all others would reciprocate in kind (Wood 1999: Section I; Kant 1993).
At this point, it seems almost as though Kant’s cosmopolitanism is a basic philosophy of non­
contradiction. Do only what you would want to have done to you. This is, however, an 
erroneous conclusion (sometimes drawn) from the Categorical Imperative, and Kant 
ultimately put more flesh on the notion of what is universally just (Smith 1991: 73-78). The ‘I 
can will universally’ bit is crucial in this respect, as it connects the individual as a morally 
responsible agent to the notion of the universally good (Kant 1993: 402). Kant held that only 
human beings are moral agents, as moral agency presupposes a free will, which in turn only
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rational creatures have. Rational beings have the ability to grasp what the universal moral law 
is by using their rational faculty, but they actively have to use their rational faculty and 
practical reason (ability to chose what is rational) in order to embrace it. The connection 
between choice/will and morality means that an act only has moral worth if it is freely willed 
or chosen.
This is why the fact that an act can be universalised is not enough, it must be actually willed 
in order to have moral worth. That is, a moral law must be chosen; its status as moral depends, 
or lies, in the fact that it is chosen. Human beings are not hardwired to act in accordance with 
(or contradict) the universal moral law, and individuals do not end up following the universal 
law as a consequence of being endowed with it by God, by nature or in virtue of a specific 
upbringing. This means that individuals are self-legislators: they give a universal a priori law 
to themselves, i.e. a law that they do not receive from others and are not nurtured to embrace. 
There is thus an intrinsic connection between free will and the universally good in Kant’s 
philosophy, and it goes beyond the fact that the normative validity of a just act depends on the 
fact that it is independently and freely chosen; the universally good ultimately consists in 
respecting individuals’ ability to exercise their free will or autonomy (Kant 1993; Wood 1999: 
Section I).
It is also this capacity for autonomy that bestows an absolute and universal value on 
individuals. This follows from the fact that individuals as self-legislators are universally 
valuable, as their capacity for autonomy is not good in relation to any specific aim. The 
human ability to exercise autonomy is a universal value in that it is not contingent on anything 
else, such as membership or particular empirical contexts, and this means that individuals as 
autonomous beings have a universal and absolute value or human dignity. That is, they are 
valuable not as means to some other end, but as ends in themselves (Kant 1993; Wood 1999: 
Section I). This means that the Categorical Imperative cannot simply be seen as a rule of non­
contradiction, and that it also can be formulated as: “Act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as 
an end and never simply as a means.” (Kant 1993: 429)
To sum this up, people, as autonomous individuals, have the ability to act freely -  i.e. 
independent of any social context -  which in turn means that they have a universal value; and 
if people have a universal value, due to their ability for autonomous action, then the only
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thing that can be willed universally is that all human beings’ capacity for autonomy is 
respected. It is also clear from this that the Categorical Imperative protects human beings’ 
autonomy in general, and not only the right to choose the universally good. This simply 
follows from the fact that it is not the consequence of making the right choice that has value 
but the underlying ability to choose it autonomously; or to put it differently, the use of the 
rational faculty must be respected in general, as one cannot respect the free moral choice of 
following the Categorical Imperative while not respecting the actual function or exercise of 
choosing. To put it yet another way, if the value of our faculty for reason lies in that people 
can freely exercise their ability to choose, then their right to choose must be respected, not 
just their particular choices. The core of Kant’s moral and political philosophy is thus that all 
persons have an absolute value, or even better human dignity, due to their ability to exercise 
moral autonomy (Kant 1993; Dicke 2002: 112; Eckert 2002:46).
Moreover, the facts that all human beings are seen as autonomous and that all have the right 
to exercise their ability for autonomy leads to the crucial conclusion that human beings are of 
equal moral worth (Wood 1999: Section I; Kant 1993; Kant 1991a: 64-74; Williams 2003: 
70, 99). This dual normative premise, of equal universal worth, leads to Kant’s notion of the 
Kingdom of Ends. The Kingdom of Ends is the idea of an order where all individuals have an 
equal right to exercise their autonomy and pursue their own ends, as long as they respect all 
other human beings as autonomous persons just like themselves. The Kingdom of Ends thus 
entails or translates into a universal principle of rights stipulating that individuals have a right 
to exercise their individual freedom as long as this is compatible with everyone’s equal right 
to do the same (Kant 1993):
Every action which by itse lf or by its maxim enables the freedom o f  each individual’s w ill to co­
exist with the freedom o f everyone else  in accordance with a universal law  is right (Kant 1991c:
133)
The notion of the Kingdom of Ends hence lays down the foundation for individuals’ rights 
and generates a general rule for measuring the extent of these rights. The cosmopolitan order 
hence combines positive and negative freedoms, and focuses on the need for equality, and on
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individuals’ ability to co-operate on the basis of such equality, in order to achieve freedom for 
all (Kant 1991a: 73-79; Williams 2003: 92-102):34
For w e are interested only in the fo rm  o f  the relationship between tw o w ills, in so  far as they are 
regarded as fre e , and in whether the action o f  one o f  the tw o parties can be reconciled with the 
freedom  o f  the other in accordance with a universal law. Right is therefore the sum total o f  those 
conditions within w hich the w ill o f  one person can be reconciled with the w ill o f  another in 
accordance with a universal law  o f  freedom. (Kant 1991c: 133) [or in more familiar terms] . . .  for 
each m ay seek his happiness in whatever w ay he sees fit, so  long as he does not infringe upon the 
freedom  o f  everyone else within a workable general law  -  i.e. he must accord to others the same 
right as he enjoys him self. (Kant 1991a: 74)
The essence of cosmopolitanism has now been outlined. This leaves the more detailed task of 
drawing out the basic components of the cosmopolitan rationale. This will be done in relation 
to modem cosmopolitanism, since much scholarly effort has gone in to dissecting the basic 
tenets of cosmopolitanism. The modem cosmopolitans have, moreover, made some further 
conceptual contributions to the cosmopolitan school of thought, and the analysis will draw on 
them to further clarify the cosmopolitan rationale. Modem cosmopolitanism does, however, 
retain the basic features of Kantian and Stoic cosmopolitanism.
Modem cosmopolitanism finds its representatives in influential writers like Barry, Beitz, Hart, 
Held, Nagel, O’Neill and Pogge, among others. There are of course differences between these 
writers, but modem cosmopolitanism is united by some core assumptions that together 
represent, or make up, the cosmopolitan rationale (Held 2002b: 11-17; Pogge 1994: 89-90). 
The central component of cosmopolitanism is individualism; it is individuals as autonomous 
persons that hold rights -  not groups, or individuals as members of groups. That is, it is 
individuals’ ability to act autonomously and to guide their own lives that makes them truly 
human and bestows dignity/value on them (Hart 1955: 175-176; Beitz 1999a: 53, 215; Beitz
34 This standard, based on an equal right to autonomy, applies “ . . .  only to those relationships betw een one 
person and another which are both external and practical, that is, in so  far as their actions can in fact influence  
each other either directly or indirectly.” (Kant 1991c: 132— 133) This means that cosm opolitanism  only gains 
practical relevance in so far as individuals are interconnected. Kant not only assumes that individuals in general 
are interconnected, but further argues that the world constitutes an interconnected sphere:
Since the earth is a globe, they cannot disperse over an infinite area. . .. The peoples of the earth have thus entered in 
varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the 
world is felt everywhere.” (Kant 1991b: 106— 108, emphasis in original)
The Kingdom o f  Ends is hence an attempted solution to the practical moral problem that global 
interconnectedness g ives rise to. (For further com m ents on the close link between global interconnectedness and 
cosm opolitanism  see Kant 1991b; O ’N eill 1994: 81; Habermas 1997: 121; Scheffler: 1997: 192; Waldron: 2 3 6 -  
237).
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1998: 826; Barry 1998: 145; Barry 1999: 13, 38; Pogge 1994: 89, 115; Benhabib 2004: 97; 
Tan 2004: 1; Held 2004: 172; Wood 1999: 156). The notion of individual autonomy is closely 
related to rationality, which is another core component of cosmopolitanism: it is the faculty of 
reason that enables human beings to exercise autonomy and give them the ability to grasp 
moral norms (Calhoun 2002: 99-101 ).35
The combination of individualism and rationality/autonomy as the basis for rights leads to 
cosmopolitanism’s third key component -  universalism. Cosmopolitanism is universal in 
terms of validity in that it applies to all cultures, being based on the fact that all individuals as 
rational beings can equally see what is universally just. Cosmopolitanism is also universal in 
scope in that it encompasses all individuals, as autonomy is seen as a universal characteristic 
that all individuals share in (Pogge 1989: 250; Barry 1998: 156-157; Pogge 1994: 89; Caney 
2005: 26, 78).36 The final key component of cosmopolitanism is equality, i.e. that all 
individuals have equal rights. The notion of equality follows from that all individuals share 
the ability to exercise autonomy and therefore have an equal right to concern as autonomous 
individuals.
In sum, the cosmopolitan outlook is thus constituted by the notion that individuals as 
autonomous persons have a universal and equal right to freedom, and an equal right to 
concerns (Hart 1955: 175, 190-191; Kant 1993; Barry 1998: 146; Pogge 1994: 89-90; Caney 
2005: 64-65; Tan 2004: 1; Held 2004: 172). This outlook can best be understood as a 
universal individual right to be treated with impartiality. The impartiality criterion stipulates 
that all moral choices must be thought of and evaluated as if all affected by the choice could 
come to occupy any of the potential positions that an affected person could end up in as a 
consequence of the choice. The impartiality criterion is thus a heuristic device that can be 
deployed to test whether a given decision is compatible with the universal right to equal 
concern (and hence can be accepted as a universal maxim) (Beitz 1994: 123-125; Habermas 
1993: 137; Nagel 1991: 64-71; Barry 1998: 145; Held 2004: 109-110; Wood 1999).
35 It is noteworthy that many m odem  cosm opolitans have jettisoned Kant’s metaphysical edifice where 
rationality as a thing in itself is the basis for the universal good (See for exam ple H eld 1995: 167, 188, 223, 282; 
Held 2002b: 13-17; Habermas 1996a). M odem  cosm opolitans instead tend to rely on the notion that individuals 
would endorse cosm opolitanism  if  they scrambled out all egotistical assumptions (see the impartiality criterion 
below ).
36 It is o f  note that all cosm opolitans hold that cosm opolitanism  is universal in scope, i.e. applies to all, but that 
som e cosm opolitans hold that it is not universal in validity, i.e. that cosm opolitanism  cannot be demonstrated as 
universally valid (Caney 2005: 2 6 -3 3 ).
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The impartiality criterion does not alter or add to the cosmopolitan rationale, but it constitutes 
a conceptual development, as it makes it easier to deduce what is compatible with the 
cosmopolitan rationale. Modem cosmopolitans have contributed with another conceptual 
development of this kind by making a distinction between formal and substantial rights, 
making it clear that formal rights to self-determination can be empty. This is an important 
distinction, as it can be used to show that the right to self-determination does not exist in the 
absence of a certain level of social and material goods, and that hence only equal substantial 
rights are compatible with the impartiality criterion (Barry 1998: 146; Beitz 1998: 830; Pogge 
1994: 89-90; O’Neill 1994: 84-86; Beitz 1995: 127-136; Held 1995: 192-195; Held 2002a: 
42-44).
To briefly recapitulate, it can be said that the Stoics created the core of the cosmopolitan 
canon. It was the Stoics who first held that at least some rights are universal, and belong 
equally to all individuals as partakers in reason. Kant’s cosmopolitan philosophy embraces 
this notion and further develops the cosmopolitan philosophy by anchoring the notion of equal 
individual rights in individuals’ capacity for self-determination. This is a crucial development, 
as it creates a criterion from which a coherent normative basis for individual universal rights 
can be deduced. The modem cosmopolitans retain the basic principles of Kant and the Stoics, 
and further develop cosmopolitanism in two important ways. The impartiality criterion does 
not change the cosmopolitan rationale, although it often is seen as replacing Kantian 
metaphysics. It is, however, a very important conceptual development, which makes it much 
easier to cash out the implications of the cosmopolitan rationale. Nor does the modem 
cosmopolitans’ focus on substantial rights, rather than formal rights, change the cosmopolitan 
rationale, but it is another important development because it highlights that the impartiality 
criterion is not compatible with anything less than substantial rights. In conclusion, the 
cosmopolitan rationale can be said to be based on the idea that: individuals have an equal and 
universal right to exercise self-determination, and therefore a right to be treated with equal 
concern simply in virtue o f their status as persons.
The Nature o f a Cosmopolitan Political Community
So what would a political community based on the cosmopolitan rationale look like? A 
cosmopolitan political community must be a Rechtsstaat (a state ruled by law) in the full 
sense of the word. This means that the state declares its law transparently and publicly, so as 
to enable people to plan and guide their lives; that all are equal before the law, so as to protect
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individuals from invidious discrimination; and that the power of the state is limited, so as to 
create room for and respect the universal right to individual autonomy. (For a fuller discussion 
of the concept of Rechtsstaat see the German case study.) This means that a cosmopolitan 
political community cannot be a pure democracy, as no power can override individuals’ 
universal right to autonomy. That said, a cosmopolitan political community must be 
democratic. A person does not have the right to have a say over all things that affect her. An 
attractive potential partner’s decision to turn down a marriage proposal will affect the snubbed 
person, but the latter has no right to partake in the other person’s decision. She does, however, 
have the right to participate in all collective decisions that affect her ability to exercise her 
autonomy.
Thus, a cosmopolitan political community must allow all individuals who are affected by its 
decisions to have an equal say over these collective decisions, i.e. the right to participate in 
the political process derives from the fact that collective decisions affect individuals’ right to 
self-determination (Caney 2005: 158). Democracy hence rests, in the cosmopolitan 
perspective, on the notion of universal individual autonomy and equality, not on the notion 
that a nation has the right to express its collective will (Held 1995: 71, 145-158). This also 
means that democracy, to the extent that we live in ‘overlapping communities of fate’, to use 
Held’s famous phrase, should be transnational (Held 2000: 424; compare Kant above). This 
follows from the fact that a democratic process must be delineated by those whom the 
decisions affect -  not by any particular community.
Communal borders and/or memberships are morally arbitrary from the cosmopolitan 
perspective, as it is individuals’ ability to exercise autonomy that forms the basis for rights 
(Barry 1999: 53; Pogge 1994: 107). The fact that all individuals are entitled to equal concern 
on this basis, moreover, has very important and wide-ranging implications for the concept of 
national sovereignty. A cosmopolitan political community cannot invoke the notion of 
national sovereignty to disadvantage certain (equally entitled) individuals due to their 
nationality, as this would violate the impartiality criterion and thereby the idea that all 
individuals have a right to equal concern qua persons. This means that national sovereignty 
must be in line with the equal concern allocated to citizens and non-citizens alike (Cole 2000: 
184-185; Habermas 1994: 22-25; Beitz 1991; McCarthy 1999; Fine 2002: 144-145). A 
national populace can neither ignore the individual rights of minorities within the nation, nor 
the individual rights of non-citizens. Or to put it in more philosophical terms: to discriminate
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against individuals on the grounds of membership violates the impartiality criterion, and 
thereby non-citizens’ equal universal right to individual autonomy. This means that 
individuals’ rights trump nations’ rights in a cosmopolitan political community (Cole 2000: 
184-185; Habermas 1994: 22-25; Beitz 1991; McCarthy 1999).
The notion of a cosmopolitan political community, where universal individual rights trump 
the right to communal sovereignty, only becomes fully comprehensible in light of the 
cosmopolitan position on culture. Culture is seen as important in that it constitutes a necessary 
background, or context, from which individuals exercise their autonomy; human beings are 
cultural beings and cannot make sense of the world outside some social or cultural context. 
This does not mean, however, that individuals are dependent on a particular culture. 
Individuals’ intrinsic identities vary within nations, and some key elements of certain 
members’ identities can stretch over national borders and connect them to people with whom 
they share very little else.
Culture, from the cosmopolitan perspective, is like the air we breathe: we cannot live without 
it, but it is all round us. This means that there is no such thing as a particular German culture 
that people in Germany depend on for their ability to exercise autonomy (Hall 2002: 26-27; 
Held 2002c: 52-53). No more than there is such a thing as German oxygen that Germans need 
to survive. Germans need both oxygen and culture, but both, the culture and oxygen that 
Germans breathe are simply floating all around them, and cannot be classified as German in 
any meaningful sense. This perception of culture is perhaps best captured by Waldron:
W e are made by our languages, our literature, our cultures, our science, our religions, our 
civilization -  and these are human entities that go far beyond national boundaries and exist, i f  they 
exist anywhere, sim ply in the world. (Waldron 1995: 103 em phasis in original)
This means that culture is recognised as essential to human beings, but culture is not a 
cohesive or all-encompassing entity. It follows from this that it is not necessary, and indeed 
impossible, to protect particular cultures, or particular communities based on a shared culture.
The ability and key to moral and social co-operation is instead to be found in all individuals’ 
ability for autonomy and the mutual recognition of the same; it is a defining feature of
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cosmopolitanism that the ability to co-operate morally, socially and politically does not 
depend on particular cultures or communities (Heater 1990). As Williams puts it:
Kant regards liberty as constraint under external law  that permits us to pursue happiness in our 
ow n w ay without fear for our lives and arbitrary arrest. The civil conditions under which this 
occurs are tied neither to any particular national state nor to any particular cultural conditions. 
(W illiam s 2003: 99)
This means that both the notion of culture and the notion of justice transcend specific 
communities, i.e. Moralitat transcends Sittlichkeit (Habermas 1996a: 513, see below for a 
further discussion of these concepts). This specific perception of culture is pivotal, since it 
explains both how universal moral deliberation is possible and why communal sovereignty 
cannot be defended on the grounds that individuals depend on the existence of particular 
cultures.
In sum, the basic structure of the cosmopolitan community is embodied in the democratic 
Rechtsstaat. A democratic Rechtsstaat embodies the cosmopolitan rationale in three related 
ways. One, it provides all individuals with the right to equality before the law; two, it entitles 
all individuals to an individual sphere that the state or other individuals cannot encroach upon; 
and three, it gives all individuals an equal say in the collective decisions that affect their 
ability to govern their lives. These features must, moreover, be applied universally from a 
cosmopolitan perspective and thus cover citizens as well as non-citizens (Linklater 1998: 
189-193; Held 1995: 145-156). Only a democratic Rechtsstaat that respects the equal rights 
of all individuals would pass the impartiality criterion or be a community based on principles 
that all individuals could agree to (Held 1995: 147-148, 160).
The Communitarian Rationale
The history of communitarianism is less well delineated than the history of cosmopolitanism. 
That said, the roots of communitarianism can also be traced back to the ancient Greeks, 
notably to Aristotle. Communitarianism is in general based on the notion that moral virtue or 
justice develops from, and is based on, human association -  and is thus not an a priori 
concept but is particular to specific communities/nations. This means that morality and justice 
are intrinsically intertwined with membership in particular communities, and that justice is not 
universal but particular to distinct communities (Coleman 2000: 186-192; Aristotle 1992:
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Book I 253a29). From this perspective, people can only exist as truly human and moral beings 
in particular communities:
A m ong all m en, then, there is a natural im pulse towards this kind o f  association; and the first man 
to construct a state deserves credit for conferring very great benefits. (A ristotle 1992: Book I 
1253a29)
A ny one w ho by his nature and not sim ply by ill-luck  has no state is either too bad or too good, 
either subhuman or superhuman -  he is like the war-mad man condemned in H om er’s words as 
‘having no fam ily, no law, no hom e’; for he w ho is such by nature is mad on war: he is a non­
cooperator like an isolated p iece in a gam e o f draughts . . .  (Aristotle 1992: B ook I 1253a l)
The communitarian perspective found its most powerful modem philosophical expression in 
Hegel. Hegel reacted against Kant’s notion that morality could be detached from the empirical 
realm, i.e. detached from particular nation-states, and that membership therefore was arbitrary 
from a moral point of view:
Essentially, how ever, it [patriotism] is the sentiment which, in the relationships o f our daily life  
and under ordinary conditions, habitually recognises that the community is one’s substantive 
groundwork and end. (H egel 1967: § 268)
The rational end o f  man is life  in the state, and if  there is no state there, reason at once demands 
that it be founded. .. .  It is false to maintain that the foundation o f  the state is som ething at the 
option o f all m embers. It is nearer to the truth to say that it is absolutely necessary for every  
individual to be a citizen. (H egel 1967: § 75 Additions)
The basic idea that Hegel is putting forward here is that membership in a particular 
community is essential for a person’s very humanness. Hegel’s argument clearly draws on 
Aristotle, and his idea that the polis lies at the heart of a truly human life. Aristotle and Hegel 
can also be said to be the two philosophical titans on whose shoulders communitarianism rests 
(Gutman 1992: 120-121; Avineri 1992: 1-2; Kymlicka 2002: 208-210; Smith 1991: 4-5, 8, 
31,43, 106).
This longstanding tradition experienced a renaissance in the early 1980s when Sandel, 
MacIntyre, Taylor and Walzer created a modem communitarian canon (MacIntyre 1981; 
Taylor 1985; Walzer 1983; Sandel 1982). The modem communitarian canon bears a close
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resemblance to its historical precursor, and modem communitarians draw heavily on Aristotle 
and Hegel.37 Communitarianism represents, at the general level, a distinct and cohesive 
philosophical perspective, though many specific differences between its particular 
philosophical proponents can be identified (Kymlicka 2002: 273-276; Mulhall 1992; Gutman 
1992).38 The analysis below will mainly draw on modem communitarians, as they tend to 
focus more clearly on communitarianism as a particular philosophical perspective, and the 
communitarian rationale hence appears in a more condensed and accessible form in their 
writings.
Communitarianism clearly challenges and contradicts the cosmopolitan view of justice as 
something universal, as communitarianism perceives of justice as something that is particular 
and dependent on cultural/communal contexts. This basic difference in this perception of the 
nature of justice is easy to grasp for German (and Scandinavian) speaking persons, as these 
languages contain one word for a universal notion of justice Moralitdt (moral)39 and another 
for justice as communal standards Sittlichkeit (Sedlighet/sedelighet/saedelighed).40 An act can 
therefore be described as plainly universally wrong or immoral (unmoralisch) or as not being 
according to customary values (nicht den Sitten entsprechend).
The notion of Moralitdt represents Kant’s struggle to detach justice from particular 
circumstances and particular histories in order to discover an abstract, but universal, notion of 
justice; whereas “ ... Sittlichkeit or ethical life ... is rooted in the customs, traditions and 
practices of a community.” (Smith 1991: 8) The communitarian perspective is thus based on 
the notion that normative issues are questions about what constitutes just behaviour at a 
specific time for specific people in particular communities (Avineri 1992: 1-2; Kymlicka 
2002: 208-210) As Aristotle, later echoed by Macintyre, puts it:
Similarly the task o f  all citizens, how ever different they may be, is the stability o f  the association, 
that is, the constitution. Therefore the virtue o f  the citizen must be in relation to the constitution;
37 The creation o f  a m odem  communitarian canon also fo llow ed  a very general historical pattern, where the 
prominence o f  a universal moral theory is follow ed by critique from philosophers w ho em phasise the importance 
o f  the particular. Plato w as fo llow ed  by Aristotle, Kant by H egel, and R awls by the m odem  communitarians, 
although R awls partly abandoned much o f  the apparent universalism o f  his early writings (R aw ls 1999).
38 The differences between particular thinkers are o f  no concern here, as the task at hand is to outline the basic 
communitarian rationale.
39 It should be pointed out that the word moral also is  derived from the Latin word for custom and that there 
therefore, etym ologically  speaking, exists no difference betw een the terms.
40 The term Sittlichkeit still carries the m eaning o f  m orally wrong and is hence not the equivalent to customary or 
com m e il fa u t, which denotes that som ething is in accordance with etiquette or tradition rather than moral.
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and as there are more kinds o f  constitution than one, there cannot be just one single a n d  perfec t 
virtue o f  the sound citizen. (Aristotle 1992: Book III 12 7 6 b l6 , em phasis in the original)
Moral philosophy is often written as though the history o f  the subject w ere only o f  secondary and 
incidental importance. This attitude seem s to be the outcom e o f  a b e lie f  that moral concepts can be 
exam ined and understood apart from history. Som e philosophers have even  written as i f  moral 
concepts w ere ... t im eless.... This is obviously false. M oral concepts are em bodied in and are 
partially constitutive o f  social life. (MacIntyre 1998: 1 -2)
The basic communitarian notion that justice depends on the existence of particular 
communities is based or rests on the epistemological argument of social embeddedness. The 
social embeddedness argument holds that individuals make sense of the world and gain 
knowledge of normative issues via a social process, rather than by any autonomous use of 
reason (Sandel 1982: 150, 179). The best way to understand this social process is, perhaps, to 
think of it as a hermeneutic circle. In other words, it is a process where the whole can only be 
understood in relation to its parts, and the parts can only be understood in relation to the 
whole, so that the whole and the parts are intrinsically connected. That is, individuals can only 
make sense of themselves as parts of a social or cultural whole, and a culture as a whole can 
only be understood as a web constituted by its members and their associational interactions.
More specifically, this process works through the social direction and interpretation of 
particular social meanings in a given community. This means that a person’s actions are 
directed or informed by her social understanding of what constitutes acceptable or just 
behaviour; and her self-perception or self-image is in turn shaped by the community’s 
feedback on her actions. The upshot of this process is that members internalise and become 
constituted by the social meanings embedded in their community, and the community exists 
in these shared understandings that constitute its members (MacIntyre 1981: 204—225; Taylor 
1985: 15-57; Walzer 1983: 8, 261; Margalit 1990: 444-449). The social embeddedness 
argument thus gives rise to the communitarian perception of a community as a social or 
cultural entity made up of common understandings of what constitute justice. Aristotle 
conveyed this idea succinctly: “The virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the 
arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice decides what is just.” (Aristotle 
1992: Book 1 1253a29)
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The particular social meanings in a particular community do not only create a particular 
perception of justice -  they are also constitutive of and shape individuals as members of a 
particular society. The constitutive power of sharing values, moreover, goes beyond the fact 
that members can makes sense of other members’ moral claims, and that members act on 
shared social meanings binds them together in a community:
Inter-subjective meaning g ives people a com mon language to talk about social reality and a 
com m on understanding o f  certain norms, but only with com m on m eanings does this com mon  
reference world contain significant com mon actions, celebrations, and feelings. T hese are objects 
in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes a community. O nce again, w e cannot really 
understand this phenomenon through the usual definition o f  consensus as convergence o f  opinion  
and value. For what is meant here is som ething more than convergence. Convergence is what 
happens when our values are shared. But what is required for com m on m eanings is that this shared 
value be part o f  a com m on world, that this sharing is shared. But w e could also say that com m on  
m eanings are quite other than consensus, for they can subsist with a high degree o f  cleavage; this 
is what happens when a com m on meaning com es to be lived and understood differently by  
different groups in a society. It remains a com mon m eaning, because there is the reference point 
which is the com m on purpose, aspirations, celebrations. (Taylor 1985: 39)
A community is thus based on the fact that inter-subjective meanings are turned into common 
meanings in such a way members start to share goals and aspirations. This has a direct impact 
on the notion of universal individual claims for rights. For if justice is a set of social meanings 
that members of a community come to understand and be constituted by in a social process, 
then there can be no neutral universal point from which the notion of justice can be 
objectively evaluated. There is not such a thing as a thing in itself. Nor can an individual lay 
claim to any right that is not recognised and shared in a given community. This means that 
communitarians reject the methodological individualism of cosmopolitanism in favour of 
methodological holism; justice can only be understood and analysed as a holistic 
phenomenon, where the overall particular social context determines what is just.
The upshot of the epistemological argument for social embededness is hence that the 
community is prior to justice. Or put differently, the question of what justice is can only be 
addressed retrospectively, after the question of what the community is has been answered, as 
MacIntyre puts it (Sandel 1982: 150, 179, 186-187; MacIntyre 1981: 204-225; Taylor 1985: 
10-57; Sandel 1992: 22-24; Walzer 1981: 3-30, 312-321; Smith 1991: 41^12, 133):
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I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be good for one w ho  
inhabits these roles. A s such, I inherit from the past o f  m y fam ily, m y city, m y tribe, m y nation, a 
variety o f  debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. . . .  The notion o f  escaping  
from it [my particular background/circumstances] into a realm o f  entirely universal m axim s which  
belong to man as such, where in eighteen-century Kantian form or in the presentation o f som e  
m odem  analytical moral philosophies, is an illusion and an illusion with painful consequences. 
(MacIntyre 1981: 2 2 0 -2 2 1 )
The community is thus seen as a cohesive and unified entity that is made up of shared 
understandings, and members belong to their communities like they belong to their families. 
This does not mean, however, that the community is one large family. Communities consist of 
several layers and families, the civil society and the political sphere are all part of the same 
overall community. A community is hence not a large family based on biologically driven 
loyalty, but is made up of smaller units that together constitute an entity that shares an 
understanding of their common social and political good. This also means that the community 
constitutes a unified whole that cannot exist without the family, the social and the political 
spheres which together make up the community/nation (Smith 1991: 9, 130; Buchwaiter 
2001; Hegel 1967: § 151 Additions, 181; Durst 2001: 231; Aristotle 1992: Book I 1252a34- 
1252b27).
A person’s family, social and political lives are hence connected to a particular community, 
and the community’s different spheres cannot be disconnected from each other but constitute 
a unified whole. This centrality and omnipotence of the community re-connects to the social 
embeddedness argument. The fact that individuals are constituted by their shared 
understandings means that they cannot make sense of who they are and what is just outside 
their community. This is where the intertwined perceptions of family, social and political life 
have been formed, and it has become part of who they are. Individuals are thus dependent on 
particular communities in order to make sense of themselves as moral beings; only sub 
humans and super humans can exist outside a particular community (Aristotle 1992: Book I 
1253al-1253a29).
Communities also play a key role in motivating people to act morally. A person cannot be 
moved to act morally by abstract universal principles from a communitarian perspective; as 
such principles do not connect to or resonate with a socially constituted person. A person 
must come to perceive the fulfilment of duties as part of who she is (Ignatieff 1984: 51-53;
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Walzer 1997: 104—106). That is, the existence of communities provides a real tangible 
incentive to act on duties, as the intrinsic connection between members in a specific 
community creates a we that breaks down the barrier of egoism and makes moral behaviour 
possible (Miller 1995: 57, 66; Sandel 1992; for a discussion of the essential creation of a we, 
see Mouffe 2005: 14-15, 19). The sense of a we hence fulfils a pivotal role by connecting 
particular individuals’ ends with a collective end. This connection means that sharing within a 
community does not become a question of serving others, but ultimately also constitutes a part 
of serving one’s personal ends. In the absence of a sense of a community, on the other hand, 
individuals are reduced to mere ends, as they will have to contribute to ends which they are 
not part of (Sandel 1982: 78-81, 143-144; Miller 1995: 66; Miller 1988: 651; Sandel 1992: 
22-24).
This means that part of the socialisation process that makes individuals moral beings involves 
creating an attachment to, and a sense of obligation towards, the well-being of fellow 
members, and to the community as a whole (MacIntyre 1981: 219-220; Sandel 1992: 23). 
Aristotle aptly and succinctly described this connection between associations, the 
development of fellow-feeling, and ultimately the applicability of justice: “And the extent of 
their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists 
between them.” (Aristotle 1998: Book VIII 1159b25)
The notion that morality presupposes a sense of fellow-feeling, and that the sense of fellow- 
feeling within communities must therefore be preserved, in turn, leads to the key 
communitarian notion of partiality. That is, the special attachment to fellow members 
includes forming special ties and a sense of duty towards other members, and such ties can 
only be upheld if membership in the community confers a right to such partial treatment 
(Tamir 1993: 96-102, 115-116; Meilaender 2001: 99-100; Miller 1995: 65). The basis for 
partiality is thus that a community based on mutuality can exist only if individual members 
can expect that their specific commitment to other members will be reciprocated. Or put 
slightly differently, any sense of community would be put into question and eventually 
disappear if members did not reciprocate in their moral actions in acting partially towards 
each other (Miller 1995: 65-66; Miller 1988: 650). Such reciprocal partiality between 
members also feeds back to and reinforces the sense of living in a shared community, and 
bolsters social cohesion by making the notion of a we tangible. The upshot of this is that not 
only does a community have a right to treat members and non-members differently (according
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to what its particular social meanings prescribe), it has a duty to do so; a community must 
treat members with partiality in order to maintain itself as a community and the existence of 
communities is a pre-condition for the existence of justice.
In sum, the communitarian rationale is based on the idea that communities are essential for 
justice. Individuals can only make sense of themselves, the question of what justice is and 
what obligations they have inside a particular community; justice comes into being through 
members’ associative interactions within a bounded community of shared understandings. 
The connection between individuals and communities as mutuality constitutive is also what 
makes it possible for individuals to come to see their individual interests as part of the 
interests of a larger collective. The existence of such a moral community pre-supposes shared 
constitutive social meanings, and community membership implies and generates preferential 
treatment. That is, only if members share a sense of justice, and in general can trust that other 
members will pay special attention to their needs, can a moral community based on solidarity 
be sustained.
The question of what rights someone is owed, in general, must always be asked 
retrospectively, in light of what community she belongs to; and the question of what a 
community (or any of its members) owes another person must depend on whether that other 
person is a member of the community or not. The fact that justice cannot exist without 
bounded communities, where membership makes an intrinsic normative difference, means 
that communities have a right to uphold and sustain themselves as exclusive entities. The 
communitarian outlook and rationale can hence be said to be based on the ideas that: 
membership in the nation is what confers rights on individuals and nations have a right to 
maintain themselves as particular communities and exclude non-members from the rights 
that members enjoy, due to the fact that the existence of particular bounded communities is a 
pre-condition fo r  the existence o f reciprocal schemes o f collaboration-based justice.
The Nature o f a Communitarian Political Community
The communitarian rationale translates into a particular view of the political community as the 
political embodiment of a shared culture, made up of shared social meanings. Nation-states are, 
from this perspective, charged with expressing, reproducing and protecting the nation’s 
particular values, way of life and members. This means that nation-states cannot be neutral in
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terms of the ends they pursue, or remain neutral between members and non-members (Tan 
2004: 110; Smith 1991: 155):
A m ong histories and cultures, the nation-state is not neutral; its political apparatus is an engine for 
national reproduction. National groups seek statehood precisely in order to control the means o f  
reproduction. (W alzer 1997: 25)
This means that the very notion of a nation-state is based on the idea that the state exists in 
order to protect a particular community, and not simply to uphold law and order:
It is  clear therefore that the state is not an association o f  people dw elling in the same place, 
established to prevent its members from committing injustices against each other, and to promote 
transactions. Certainly all these features must be present i f  there is  to  be a state; but even the 
presence o f  every one o f  those does not make a state ipso  fa c to . The state is an association  
intended to enable its m embers, in their households and kinships to live w e ll: its purpose is a 
perfect and self-sufficient life. (Aristotle 1992: Book III 1280b29, em phasis in the original)
The state is not sim ply an instrument o f  force and coercion but a locus o f  shared understandings. A  
state is m ore than an instrument ensuring civil peace; it is a wider network o f  shared ethical idea 
and beliefs. A  state is ultimately a m eeting o f minds, since it depends on a com m on cultural 
history and a sense o f  civic identity. (Smith 1991: 233)
This also means that a legitimate constitution is anchored in the culture or Sittlichkeit of a
nation, and not based on any abstract universal notion of justice (Buchwalter 2001: 213). In 
Hegel’s words:
. . .  the constitution o f  any given nation depends in general on the character and developm ent o f  its 
self-consciousness. In its self-consciousness its subjective freedom is rooted and so, therefore, is  
the actuality o f  its constitution. The proposal to give a constitution -  even  one or more or less  
rational in content -  to a nation a p r io r i  would be a happy thought overlooking precisely that 
factor in a constitution which m akes it more than an ens rationis. H ence every nation has a 
constitution appropriate to it and suitable for it. (Hegel 1967: § 274)
Nation-states are hence intrinsically particularistic, and if they were not to put the interests of 
their members first, they would contradict their raison d'etre and would act illegitimately 
(Gibney 2004: 200-201). In order to fulfil its function as the protector of a particular nation, 
the nation-state must clearly have the right to pursue its internal ends without any external
interference. The basic political implication of the communitarian rationale is thus that
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communities must enjoy absolute national sovereignty if they are to be able to constitute 
schemes of justice, given that such schemes must be particular and inter-communal (Tamir 
1993: 69-77; Miller 1995: 81-99; Walzer 1980: 211, 228; Walzer 1983: 31-63; Gibney 2004: 
24-25; Benhabib 2004: 40-41) 41
Walzer succinctly makes the communitarian case for national sovereignty vis-a-vis other 
states: ‘Toleration is an essential feature of sovereignty ... Sovereignty guarantees that no one 
on that side of the border can interfere with was is done on this side.” (Walzer 1997: 19, 
emphasis in original) And Hegel aptly describes the intrinsic value of sovereignty in internal 
terms, while berating the idea that sovereignty could be traded for reasons of expediency:
Those w ho talk about the ‘w ish es’ o f  a collection o f  people constituting a more or less autonomous 
state with its own centre, o f  its ‘w ishes’ to renounce this centre and its autonom y in order to unite 
with others to form a new w hole, have very little know ledge o f  the nature o f  collection or o f  the 
feeling o f  selfhood which a nation possess in its independence. (H egel 1967: § 322)
The connection between the communitarian rationale and national sovereignty can, in more 
philosophical terms, be broken down into three closely related points. One, moral claims are 
valid only given a particular context, and thus justice can only be served if particular 
communities have the right to follow their own social meanings; communal sovereignty is 
thus a pre-condition for justice. Two, a nation has the right to protect or safeguard its specific 
way of life, as this particular way of life is vital to its members’ sense of self or identity as 
well as their ability to co-exist in harmony as moral beings. Three, the vital need to prioritise 
members requires communal sovereignty, and without the right to treat members partially, 
communities could not establish themselves as moral reciprocal schemes characterised by 
mutual trust and solidarity among members; hence communal sovereignty is essential as it 
enables the partial treatment of members.42
41 M any communitarians further hold that political com m unities have a p rim a  fa c ie  right to statehood (Tamir 
1993: 74— 76; M iller 1995: 8 1 -1 1 8 ). The important political connection between nationhood and statehood is, 
however, founded on instrumental grounds, whereas the basic right to com m unal sovereignty is  an extension o f  
the intrinsic moral value o f  com m unities. That is, statehood is not seen as an intrinsic good but as a precondition  
for effectively  safeguarding com m unities’ existence and independence. The fact that nationhood has a public and 
political elem ent to it does not change this fact, since public participation in national culture and politics does not 
pre-suppose a sovereign nation-state, whereas the security o f  this right does (M argalit 1990: 4 5 0 -4 5 3 ). That said, 
a specific territory can constitute a part o f  a com m unity’s self-understanding (W alzer 1983: 44; Tamir 1993: 7 4 -  
76).
42 It is important to stress that com m unities do not have a right to self-determination or sovereignty sim ply by 
virtue of, c m - only if, they represent a com m unity based on ethnicity; it is the mutual recognition o f  belonging to a
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The essence of a communitarian political community is thus that it is sovereign, but also that 
it stands in a special relationship to its members, and that these members stand in a special 
relationship to one another. This partial nature of the communitarian political community is 
pivotal to understanding the nature of rights in a communitarian political community. As 
Arendt succinctly puts it, membership in a nation is what gives the individual the ‘right to 
have rights’ (Arendt 1968: 296-302; see also Miller 1995 for a similar position). Or as Walzer 
puts it:
M en and wom en do indeed have rights beyond life  and liberty, but these do not follow  from our 
com m on humanity: they fo llow  from shared conceptions o f  social goods; they are local and 
particular in character. (W alzer 1983: xv)
A communitarian nation-state is hence characterised and legitimised by the fact that it enables 
its members to live according to their particular and shared social meanings, and ensures their 
reproduction (Walzer 1981: 314; Walzer 1997: 25). This means that a communitarian political 
community derives its legitimacy from popular sovereignty (Mouffe 2005: 83-84). The 
communitarian perspective hence inverts the relationship between national and individual 
self-determination, compared to cosmopolitanism. The fact that nations have an absolute right 
to self-determination means that they have a right to decide the nature of their political 
system. This means that not all communitarian political communities must be democracies, 
and if they are they are very different kinds of democracies than cosmopolitan political 
communities. Democracy is not, from the communitarian perspective, based on the right to 
partake in the decisions that affect autonomous individuals’ lives, but is instead based on a 
community’s right to national self-determination. It is the nation’s right to determine its own 
fate collectively that constitutes the normative basis for any communitarian democracy. This, 
in turn, means that the right to participate in the democratic process is based on membership 
in the community, and not some abstract notion of personhood. That is, the idea of democracy 
pre-supposes a nation and there can be no democracy in the absence of a demos. Democracy 
is from this perspective not an individual right to participate in the decisions that affect the 
individual but it is about creating a connection between members and their community and 
participating in the community’s collective governance; democracy is educational and 
participatory, i.e. about reinforcing and maintaining the connection between individual
com m unity that shares certain social m eanings and a sense o f  mutuality over time that distinguishes a political 
com m unity or nations from other associations (M iller 1995: 112-113).
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members and the nation; it is not about individual rights. This relates to that political 
institutions are considered to be formative not neutral from a communitarian perspective. That 
is, while cosmopolitanism is based on the notion that political institutions ought to be neutral 
and treat individuals impartially, communitarianism is based on the notion that political 
institutions foster a sense of community and loyalty among the nation’s members (Hegel 
1967: 314-315; Muller 2002: 163).
Such a perception of democracy also reconnects to the notion that sharing and showing 
solidarity are only possible in a community; only if people feel that the democratic process, at 
least to some extent, is about competing ideas for a common communal good will minorities 
respect the democratic process. Liberal Danes accept that they constitute a minority in 
Denmark -  they perceive that their interests are taken into account in Danish democracy, even 
though they might prefer another set of policies; Danes as a nation would, however, not 
accept being a minority in Germany even if the formal democratic rules afforded them no less 
influence as individuals, because they perceive that their interest as Danes cannot be protected 
by Germans. In other words, this sense of belonging to a nation is necessary for individuals to 
accept the unavoidable compromises involved in any democratic process (Mill 1975: 382; 
Weiler 1995).
Communitarianism, like cosmopolitanism, only becomes fully comprehensible in light of the 
specific communitarian notion of culture.43 The communitarian perspective perceives of 
culture as a discrete and encompassing phenomenon (Gibney 1999: 172; Margalit 1990: 443- 
447). That is, cultures make up whole and discemable blocks (Tamir 1993: 8; Walzer 1983: 
28-31; Walzer 1997: 91). People thus live their lives within particular national communities, 
and a meaningful distinction between Spanish and Dutch culture can be made. This, in turn, 
means that members of one nation would struggle to make a life for themselves outside their 
nation. The communitarian take on culture is: (a) obviously a precondition for the notion that 
individuals are intertwined with particular and distinct communities; and (b) a precondition for 
the validity of national sovereignty, as nation-states derive their legitimacy from representing 
distinct and particular national communities.
43 It is noteworthy that these two com peting notions o f  culture go  to the heart o f  the difference between  
communitarianism and cosm opolitanism .
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In sum, a political community based on the communitarian rationale is the expression and a 
defender of a particular nation. This means that the communitarian political community 
cannot be neutral in regards to the ends it supports. Nor can it be neutral between members 
and non-members: it must uphold and embody the nation’s particular social meanings and put 
the interests of its members first. It is imperative that nations be allowed to maintain 
themselves as bounded communities based on their own cultures, where membership in the 
nation makes an intrinsic normative difference -  the nation, as a moral sphere, enables people 
to live just and fully human lives; and it is this function that any communitarian political 
community’s right to absolute national sovereignty ultimately rests on.
This means, in conclusion, that the conflict between the communitarian and the cosmopolitan 
rationales is fundamental and cuts very deep. The question is not which moral norms ought to 
be applied. Rather, the question is what rights are based on and subsequently who is to be 
considered a rights holder. The fact that certain communitarian political communities 
recognise individual autonomy and equality as their basic moral principle does not resolve the 
tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales. The real question is: who 
holds these rights and why? Translated to liberal nation-states, the question becomes: do 
rights hold among equals so that all who share in the equal status of citizenship have the same 
rights; or do persons hold rights as equals, in which case all individuals, non-citizens and 
citizens alike, have the same moral standing. From a communitarian perspective rights hold 
among equals, and a person holds rights as a member, not as a human being: “We are not bom 
equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee 
ourselves mutually equal rights.” (Arendt 1968: 301) By contrast, from the cosmopolitan 
perspective all individuals hold equal rights, as equals, on the basis of being autonomous 
individuals.
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Chapter Three 
Consistent Approaches to Non-citizens’ Rights
Three consistent approaches to non-citizens’ rights
I believe in the right o f  every living human being, without distinction o f  colour, race, sex or 
professed b e lie f  or opinion, to liberty, life and subsistence, to com plete protection from ill- 
treatment, equality o f  opportunity in the pursuit o f  happiness and an equal voice in the collective  
governm ent o f  mankind. (W ells 1940: 101)
* * *
It seem s that a man w ho is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities w hich make it possible for 
other people to treat him as a fellow -m an. . . .  Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere 
existence, is not given us, but is the result o f  human organisation insofar as it is guided by the 
principles o f justice. W e are not bom  equal; we becom e equal as members o f  a group on the 
strength o f  our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. (Arendt 1968: 3 0 0 -3 0 1 )
This chapter is the final theoretical chapter. It is dedicated to cashing out three coherent 
approaches to the question of non-citizens’ legal standing, based on the cosmopolitan and the 
communitarian rationales. To retain expositional clarity, both rationales will be applied 
separately to all rights. These two approaches are here called the strong cosmopolitan and 
communitarian approaches. It can also be said, in general, that the scope for combining the 
rationales is limited; the possibility of withholding rights on the communitarian rationale, 
without giving rise to inconsistencies, is severely circumscribed as soon as rights are provided 
on the cosmopolitan rationale, and vice versa.
It is, however, possible to combine the two rationales into a consistent approach, even if the 
two rationales are incompatible in that individual self-determination and collective self- 
determination cannot reign supreme simultaneously. The third approach, which is here 
entitled the weak cosmopolitan approach44 is based on the fact that it is not inconsistent to
44 It could alw ays be debated w hy the third coherent approach outlined in the thesis should be called weak  
cosm opolitanism , rather than weak communitarianism or som ething else. There are tw o reasons w hy the term  
weak cosm opolitanism  is  used in this thesis. First, according to the weak cosm opolitan approach, the 
cosm opolitan rationale enjoys lexical priority over the communitarian rationale. This m eans that the 
cosm opolitan rationale constitutes an umbrella under w hich limited communitarian rights can be accommodated. 
In this sense the cosm opolitan rationale controls the communitarian rationale and therefore it is more natural to
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deploy the two rationales on different levels;45 indeed, many cosmopolitans hold that only 
rights that concern individuals’ most fundamental needs are to be based on the cosmopolitan 
rationale, for example. Cosmopolitanism can hence be seen both as a substitute for as well as 
a complement to communitarianism (Heater 1990: 8; Caney 2005: 28, 65). That is, it is not 
inconsistent to hold that rights that are basic or fundamental to an individual’s ability to live 
an autonomous life are to be based on equal concern for all individuals, whereas rights that 
are not basic or fundamental to an individual’s ability to live an autonomous life is to be based 
on communal membership (Miller 1998: 166-167).
This means that the strong cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches simply are based on 
that the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales respectively are applied on all levels 
and with regard to all rights; by contrast, the weak cosmopolitan approach is based on the idea 
that rights that are basic in terms of exercising autonomy are universal and should be based on 
the cosmopolitan rationale, but rights that are not basic to the exercise of individual autonomy 
should be based on the communitarian rationale. A distinction between basic and non-basic 
rights is clearly central to the nature of, and a prerequisite for the possibility of, the weak 
cosmopolitan approach. Miller coined the phrase weak cosmopolitanism, and he has 
succinctly described how the weak cosmopolitan perspective, while clearly a cosmopolitan 
perspective in the wider sense, differs from strong cosmopolitanism, using the key distinction 
between basic and non-basic rights:46
A ccording to the strong version, the cosm opolitan perspective just is the moral point o f  v iew . A ll 
moral principles must be justified by show ing that they give equal weight to the claim s o f  
everyone, which m eans that they must either be directly universal in their scope, or i f  they apply 
only to a select group o f people they must be secondary principles w hose ultimate foundation is  
universal. The w eak version, by contrast, holds only that morality is cosm opolitan in part: there are
call the perspective w eak cosm opolitanism  rather than weak communitarianism or som ething else. Second, the 
choice o f  name sim ply reflects that this perspective already is labelled weak cosm opolitanism  by M iller, w ho has 
done m ost to develop this approach, albeit he seem s not to be com mitted to it (M iller 1998).
45 The attentive reader w ill note that no weak communitarian perspective is presented. This is  not a consequence 
o f  the fact that no such approach exists or that it cannot be constructed. Indeed when the thesis’ theoretical 
framework w as originally developed, a w eak communitarian perspective was included. This perspective
was based on W alzer’s and M iller’s notion that specific communitarian rights can be com bined with universal 
rights based on biological needs (W alzer 1983; M iller 1995). The reason for not including this weak  
communitarian perspective in the final thesis is sim ply that the jurisprudential debates in the empirical case 
studies are not influenced by this perspective. This m eans that the weak communitarian account is  superfluous as 
far as this thesis is concerned, given that the thesis is based on an internal coherence analysis and does not aim at 
identifying all available positions or the best normative position.
46 The fact that M iller coined the term and described the nature o f  w eak cosm opolitanism  does not mean that he 
is committed to this position. W hether or not M iller is  com m itted to the weak cosm opolitan perspective is at any 
rate irrelevant to this thesis.
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som e valid principles o f equal consideration with universal scope, even though there may also be 
independent, nonderivative, principles with more restricted scope. A ccording to weak  
cosm opolitanism  then, w e m ay ow e certain kinds o f  treatment to all other human beings regardless 
o f  any relationship in which w e stand to them, w hile there are other kinds o f  treatment that w e ow e  
only to those to whom  w e are related in certain w ays, with neither sort o f  obligation being  
derivative o f  the other. (M iller 1998: 166-167)
What should concern even  weak cosm opolitans, however, are societies w hich cannot guarantee 
their m embers’ fundamental rights - societies which fail to protect basic freedom s o f  expression  
and association, or w hich cannot provide adequate food, education, or m edical care. (M iller 1998:
179)
The difference between weak and strong cosmopolitanism is thus that the weaker form holds 
that the universal individual right to autonomy trumps particular social meanings and national 
sovereignty only in very specific circumstances, namely when rights that are essential to the 
exercise of individual autonomy are on the line. The universal right to autonomy is hence seen 
as a right to adequate autonomy. Galloway has aptly described this key distinction between 
when a right should be based on the cosmopolitan rationale or alternatively on the 
communitarian rationale:
It is a standard o f  adequacy  which distinguishes those in need from those w h o are not. A  person 
w ho has the opportunity to make an adequate number o f  significant choices about the direction o f  
her life is to be distinguished from the person who has only a few  choices available or w ho has 
many trivial options. W hile a person m ay have few er choices available than another, I argue that 
w e may nevertheless decline to hold that she is in need, i f  w e hold that a threshold o f  adequacy has 
been meet. (G allow ay 1993: 298, em phasis in original)
Held’s three-fold categorisation of harm is also helpful in terms of making the distinction 
between basic and non-basic rights and their connection to individual autonomy more 
tangible. According to this categorisation, individuals can be considered to suffer serious 
harm if their lives are in danger owing to their basic needs not being met, as when people are 
deprived of their right to subsistence and/or security; individuals can be seen as suffering 
substantial harm if their life choices are seriously restricted so as to severely undermine their 
ability to exercise autonomy, as when people are deprived of their right to freely express 
themselves or are deprived of the basic education needed to function in their society. Finally, 
individuals can be said to suffer moderate harm if particular choices or options are not open to 
them. This includes access to particular lifestyles or to more than basic material resources 
(Held 2004: 99-100).
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The weak cosmopolitan perspective would then grant universal protection from serious and 
substantial harm, as these levels of harm undermine the basic ability of an individual to live 
an autonomous life. The weak cosmopolitan approach would not, however, grant individuals 
the universal right to protection from moderate harm, as this level of harm still leaves people 
with the basic ability to live self-determining lives. Another way of thinking about weak 
cosmopolitanism, which is second nature to jurists, is to see individuals as simultaneously 
holding certain particular rights as members or citizens (status civitatis) and certain limited 
universal rights simply as persons (status personae) (Bader 1997b: 182).47 In more practical 
terms, it can be said that the right to security, the right to subsistence and fundamental rights 
to personhood, i.e. universal rights that are essential to the basic exercise of autonomy, are 
universal rights according to the weak cosmopolitan perspective (Gibney 1999: 178; 
Shacknove 1988: 144; Bader 1997a: 40-^1; Rawls 1999: 65).48
The weak cosmopolitan perspective thus creates room for national sovereignty by deploying a 
weaker notion of individual autonomy than the strong perspective requires. This means, seen 
from the perspectives of communities/nations, that they, as co-operative or ethical 
communities, have a right to national sovereignty -  but only within the boundaries set by 
basic universal rights (Tan 2004: 11; Miller 2000; Miller 1998, for similar normative 
perspectives on immigration, see Gibney 1986: 30-31, 103-104; Gibney 2004: 231-240.) 
What makes the weak cosmopolitan perspective distinctly cosmopolitan all the same is its 
insistence that national sovereignty must be restricted in order to protect all individuals’ basic
• t 49nght to autonomy.
47 It should be pointed out that there are som e clear parallels betw een weak cosm opolitanism  and Kant’s p o litica l  
philosophy. Kant envisaged a cosm opolitan system  where all persons as autonom ous individuals would have 
certain rights including the right to hospitality. This included the right to sojourn in other states and not to be 
turned away i f  that would lead to the destruction ( U ntergang ) o f  the person. This cosm opolitan right did, 
however, not include the right to becom e a m ember or to be treated as a full m em ber (Linklater 2002: 276; 
Benhabib 2004: 49— 69; Kant 1991b: 105— 108). R aw ls’ later work can also be seen as a form o f  weak  
cosm opolitanism  although R aw ls’ account seem s to suffer from inconsistencies stem m ing from his reluctance to 
accept the primacy o f  liberal values whilst insisting that certain liberal rights must be provided universally  
(Rawls 1999: 40 , 58 , 112— 113).
48 It is  noteworthy that R aw ls sees these universal rights as an independent subset o f  liberal rights (R aw ls 1999: 
65— 68). H ow ever, the right to private property and the rudimentary notion o f  freedom  o f  conscience are rights 
that defend the individual from over intrusive social m eanings, i.e. these rights pre-suppose a liberal notion o f  
autonomy and are neither com patible with nor necessary for all system s o f  social co-operation; to argue, as 
Rawl’s does, that only form s o f  social co-operation that defend basic autonomy are universally acceptable 
sim ply begs the question. At any rate the w eak cosm opolitan perspective must encom pass more than rights that 
are a pre-conditions for any social association, i.e. security and subsistence, because an individual could have 
these rights and be left with no ability to  exercise autonomy.
49 The weak cosmopolitan perspective is not another kind o f  liberalism but shares the cosm opolitan hallmark o f  
putting equal em phasis on equality and individual autonomy, albeit in a trimmed dow n version. This m eans that
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This means that the perception of equal universal rights based on individual autonomy 
remains the core moral notion of the weak cosmopolitan perspective; the right to individual 
autonomy is indeed reduced in order to create room for particular social meanings and 
national sovereignty, but only in a limited way: the essence of individuals’ right to autonomy 
cannot be encroached upon. That said, the cosmopolitan rationale is not deployed at all levels 
as in the strong cosmopolitan perspective, and the universal rights are hence fewer albeit they 
enjoy lexical priority. The details and nature of the weak cosmopolitan perspective will 
become more tangible as the weak cosmopolitan approach to the treatment of non-citizens is 
described in more detail below. It should also be remembered that the only concern here is 
what a weak cosmopolitan approach to non-citizens’ rights looks like; what is to be 
considered a basic or non-basic right in general is of no interest here.
It is time to describe the three consistent approaches to the treatment of non-citizens in detail. 
This will be done by cashing out the strong and weak cosmopolitan approaches over the five 
realms of rights that were described in chapter one. This will be followed by the 
communitarian approach.
Cosmopolitanism and the Right of Admission
This section will commence with a detailed discussion of the admissions realm as the issue of 
admission brings many of the general key arguments, which also are applicable in the other 
realms, to the fore. It is clear that states must be impartial when dealing with non-citizens’ 
requests for admission, i.e. the interests of citizens and non-citizens must be given equal 
consideration (Gibney 2004: 59). This follows from the dictum that “Freedom of movement is 
an important liberty in itself and a prerequisite for other freedoms.” (Carens 1994: 144 for a 
similar position see; Dowty 1987: 11-19) The first part of this assertion, that freedom of 
movement is a right in itself, reconnects to the etymological roots of the ancient Greek and 
Latin words for freedom, eleutheria and libertas, where the word freedom refers to the 
opposite condition of being tied down or shackled (Cranston 1973: 31-33; Dowty 1987: 11- 
12). This notion of freedom was also used by Hobbes: “Liberty, that we may define it, is
the tw o cosm opolitan perspectives grant universal rights on the sam e grounds and according to the sam e criteria. 
The difference being that w eak cosm opolitanism  recognises few er rights as universal since the notion o f  
autonomy -  which engenders the universal rights -  is weaker. The point being that all other rights, from the 
weak cosm opolitan approach, are particular -  i.e. founded on the communitarian rationale -  and not based on 
any other version o f  liberalism. This can be compared with, for exam ple, G allow ay’s account where certain 
rights are based on a contractarian notion (G alloway 1993).
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nothing else but an absence of the lets and hindrances of motion... the more ways a man can 
move himself, the more liberty he hath.” (Hobbes 1949: 109-110)
It is, however, misleading from a cosmopolitan perspective to simply equate freedom with the 
ability to physically move around. Or rather, the right to free movement is devalued if it is 
turned into a simple question of individuals’ right to “ ... go here [sic] they want.” (Carens 
1994: 144) The right to free movement is, from a cosmopolitan perspective, a basic right by 
virtue of being an intrinsic and essential part of the ability to autonomously shape one’s life -  
and this in two ways. One, free movement is an intrinsic part of exercising other freedoms 
that are essential for an autonomous life. The right to pursue and make autonomous choices 
regarding education, occupation, spouse, lifestyle and so on presuppose or potentially involve 
the right to free movement (Whelan 1988: 8). Two, freedom of movement also fulfils an 
important function in that it secures other individual rights. That is, in the absence of the right 
to free movement -  the clearest example being incarceration -  an individual has no control 
over her life and under these circumstances all freedoms turn into privileges (Shue 1980: 19- 
43, 78-82).50
Thus the right to free movement takes its place among the universal individual liberties, 
mainly, as a right that in turn makes the right to live an autonomous life possible and hence 
secures other rights (Nett 1971: 218-219; Shue 1980: 19-43, 78-82). The above argument 
applies to free movement in general, but also to free movement between political 
jurisdictions. Security, job opportunities, education, marriage plans are all things that can 
prompt people to move, within as well as beyond national borders. That said, it is clear that 
the extent to which freedom of movement is limited will affect its impact on individuals’ 
ability to exercise autonomy. National borders are, however, morally arbitrary from the strong 
cosmopolitan perspective.
The fact that movement between borders is referred to as migration, a word that carries a 
somewhat negative connotation, and movement within borders mobility, a word that carries 
positive connotations, is a red herring, from this perspective. This means that restricting free 
movement over national borders violates the impartiality criterion: it is not based on equal
50 Freedom o f  m ovem ent is not considered a basic right in that it is both an intrinsic part o f  the exercise o f  all 
other rights and a pre-condition for the safety o f  a ll rights. However, free m ovem ent is a basic right in that it is  
an essential part o f  enjoying many other rights and a pre-condition for the safety o f  many other rights. The 
important point in this context is that no autonomous life would be possible without this right.
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concern of all. This follows from the observation that barring non-citizens from entry 
interferes with their ability to freely exercise autonomy and thus puts them in a disadvantaged 
position, on the morally arbitrary ground of lacking communal membership. From the 
cosmopolitan perspective, free movement within as well as between political jurisdictions is, 
therefore, a basic universal right that all individuals hold as autonomous persons. The 
centrality of this right also means that it enjoys lexical priority, and it can therefore only be 
restricted with reference to other basic rights (Whelan 1988: 8-9).
The implication of this is that individuals have a strong prima facie right to free movement, 
but states can restrict this right on grounds of conflicts with other basic liberties. It follows 
from the impartiality criterion that all such state decisions must be acceptable to all as 
autonomous individuals, i.e. no one can be expected to sacrifice her autonomy for the sake of 
others. At the same time, the right to free movement can be restricted if it undermines the 
autonomy of other individuals (Beitz 1983: 597-599; Galloway 1993). This means that states 
have the right to restrict immigration, but all restrictions must be based on equal concern for 
all individuals as autonomous beings, and not on morally arbitrary grounds such as skin 
colour or communal membership (Baubock 1994).
This leaves open the possibility of restricting admissions in order to protect individuals who 
live in the state’s jurisdiction, and to avoid any ruptures in the nation’s basic social fabric in 
such a way that its basic economic structures, or other preconditions for individual autonomy, 
are undermined (Habermas 1996a: 512; Ackerman 1980: 95). This includes restrictions based 
on the need to prevent criminal activity, but does not allow restrictions on free movement as 
additional punishment for previous crimes. (For a discussion of the difference between 
preventing non-citizens’ from committing new crimes and bestowing additional punishment 
for already committed crimes, see the discussion of the Civil Rights Realm below.)
In terms of classes of individuals that seek admission, they can be divided into four basic 
categories: one, refugees fleeing acute and grave dangers; two, economic immigrants seeking 
better economic, educational or cultural opportunities;51 three, family members seeking to be 
reunited with their families; and four, co-nationals who are not citizens (legal members) of the
51 This group thus includes immigrants w ho seek out better opportunities, o f  which increasing their econom ic  
opportunities is the m ost com m on aim but not the only one.
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nation-state.52 Refugees have a right to admission as their ability to live an autonomous life, 
or indeed any life, ipso facto will be threatened if they are denied admission. This right does 
not hold only for political refugees, as it is not the source of the threat (provided that the 
refugee is not personally culpable) but the potential harm to the individual as an autonomous 
person that constitute the basis for the right to admission; it makes no difference if the refugee 
is fleeing political persecution, a natural disaster, serious diseases or famine (Pogge 1997: 15). 
The fact that refugees have a universal individual right to admission also means that 
discrimination on the grounds of membership, ethnicity or perceived connection to the nation 
constitutes a blatant contradiction of the impartiality criterion (Scanlan 1988: 84).
Non-citizens who want to be admitted in order to be reunited with their families also have a 
right to admission (Carens 1994: 157-158). The cosmopolitan argument for a right to family 
unity is based on the notion that the right to a private sphere is essential to persons’ 
functioning as autonomous individuals, and recognition of that the family constitutes the core 
of this sphere (Beitz 1983: 598). The right to a private sphere is not a limitation of the 
impartiality criterion in the sense that persons can disregard other individuals’ equal right to 
concern in matters regarding family; the right to a personal sphere instead recognises that the 
impartiality criterion is based on respect for equal autonomy, and that this includes the right to 
family life as an essential part of any autonomous life. This therefore means that all residents, 
not only all citizens, have a right to family reunification (Beitz 1983: 597-599).53
Economic immigrants have a right to be admitted, as the ability to pursue different 
opportunities is an important part of living a self-determining life; since this is a right which 
individuals’ hold equally, no distinctions can be made on grounds of skill, education or 
financial situation (Habermas 1993: 149). Adoption of a policy allowing only skilled or rich
52 In terms o f  priority o f  admission it can be said that refugees fleeing acute grave dangers have the highest level 
o f  priority, follow ed by people seeking to be united with their fam ilies. Econom ic immigrants, seeking better 
opportunities and co-nationals are not prioritised groups. T his fo llow s from the fact that the only rules 
compatible with the impartiality criterion is that priority is given to individuals w ho risk suffering the m ost 
serious harm as a consequence o f  being denied entry (D agger 1985: 440, 447; N agel 1991: 66— 71; H eld 2002b: 
63). It is , moreover, noteworthy that no normative solution exists in cases where it is  unavoidable that som e 
individuals’ basic right to autonomy will be encroached upon. Such cases sim ply constitute an unavoidable 
tragedy, from the cosm opolitan perspective.
53 The fact that the right to entry is based on individual autonomy means that it in principle extends to close  
friends as w ell as fam ily m embers. An individual’s essential private sphere does not necessarily only consist o f  
fam ily members. The focus here w ill, how ever, be on fam ily members, for three related reasons. One, this group 
is alm ost universally accepted as the m ost important in this respect. This follow s from that fam ily ties tend to be 
closer and o f longer duration than m ost friendships. T w o, it is much easier to discern fam ily m embers than close  
friends. Three, one and tw o explain w hy the fam ily figures so prominently in the legal discourses, which  
ultimately are the concern in this thesis (Krieken2001: 119).
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people to immigrate whilst barring poor and unskilled people from entry might benefit a state, 
but so would a policy of expelling poor and unskilled residents; the point being that both 
would violate the impartiality criterion.
Co-nationals are, of course, covered by the general right to admittance. The fact that 
membership in a given community, cultural or ethnic group is not recognised as a basis for 
moral priority, however, means that this group has no special standing. Nor can non-citizens 
from liberal states be given priority over non-citizens from illiberal states, on the basis that the 
admission of non-citizens from illiberal states might undermine the political institutions that 
uphold individual rights. Such a policy is incompatible with the impartiality criterion, as 
cosmopolitanism is founded on the idea that all individuals have the ability to participate in a 
cosmopolitan political order. A system that is supposed to be able to secure universal 
acceptance and transcend particular ethical-cultures cannot discriminate on the grounds that 
certain individuals do not have experience of a particular culture (Baubock 1994: 92-101; 
Habermas 1996a: 513).
The question of which of these classes of individuals the weak cosmopolitan approach is 
committed to admit can partly be inferred from the above. Refugees and family members have 
a right to admission, as they will suffer serious and substantial harm, respectively if not 
admitted, i.e. their basic ability to exercise autonomy would be undermined if they were not 
admitted (Perry 1995: 102-103; Gibney 1986: 125-126). Refugees’ existence, not to mention 
their ability to live a basic autonomous life, would be undermined were they to be denied 
entry. It also follows from the above that the weak cosmopolitan perspective -  like the strong 
cosmopolitan perspective, and for analogous reasons -  is committed to treating all refugees 
equally, independently of whether they are refugees fleeing from political persecution, famine 
or natural disasters. Non-citizens who seek admission for the purpose of family reunification 
also have a universal right to entry, as their basic right to autonomy would be encroached 
upon if they were denied the right to live with their families.54 It would be possible to exercise 
some level of autonomy while separated from one’s spouse or children. But this would entail 
substantial harm for an individual, as a person’s family constitutes an essential part of her life
54 It is noteworthy that fam ily members o f  citizens in addition to this universal right have a right to admission as 
they are members o f  the com m unity from the weak cosm opolitan perspective (see the communitarian 
perspective below).
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plan. Families are in addition often also a crucial part of the support that individuals need to 
pursue their life plans (Gibney 1986: 129-130; Carens 1994:157-158).55
Economic migrants do not have a right to admission from a weak cosmopolitan perspective. 
This follows from the fact that it is not a basic right to seek or obtain better economic 
opportunities as such: individuals can live autonomous lives as long as they have adequate 
opportunities available to them. It should be pointed out in this context, however, that a 
person who has no or virtually no economic opportunities open to her, and lacks the 
possibility of earning a livelihood, is deprived of her basic right to exercise autonomy (but 
such a person would have a right to be admitted as a refugee under the weak cosmopolitan 
perspective). Co-nationals are not seen as having a right to admittance on the strength of their
55 G alloway argues that non-citizens do not have a right to entry to join persons they have becom e em otionally  
dependent on, i f  the dependency, at least partly, is a consequence o f  a choice the person w illingly  made. 
Galloway likens the choice o f  developing em otional attachment to a choice o f pursuing a particular carrier which  
necessitates access to a particular state, and argues that non-citizens cannot w illingly put them selves in a position 
o f  dependency and then have a right to admittance. This argument is based on that autonomy is seen as being as 
much about living with once choices as it is  about being bailed out (Galloway: 1993: 298). This argument is not 
compatible with strong cosm opolitanism  as it w ill put a heavier burden on certain individuals on the morally 
arbitrary ground that they have chosen to marry outside their community. N or does it hold as a weak  
cosmopolitan argument in that, it cannot be deem ed a non-basic right due to its voluntary nature. A  person, w ho  
chooses to put herself at risk for the thrill or the hell o f  it, does not necessary have a basic right to assistance. 
There are, how ever, tw o fatal problems with G allow ay’s argument. It is, first o f  all, doubtful i f  developing  
emotional ties can be seen as a choice in the same w ay as taking the risk o f  clim bing a mounting or even the 
choice to pursue a particular carrier. This as the developm ent o f  emotional ties involves a com plex w eb o f  social 
and physical factors that m ost people feel is beyond their control. It would be strange to upbraid a person for not 
finding love in a way one might blame a person for not working hard enough to achieve necessary qualifications 
needed in the labour market or for risking her life to clim b a high mountain. This is not to say that econom ic  
decisions, for exam ple, are totally within peop les’ control and that question o f  love lies totally beyond it. People  
cannot be held fully responsible for the course their professional lives take and people can certainly, to som e  
extent, affect their em otional life , but the tw o spheres are qualitatively different. This means that the right to  
fam ily unity hardly can be demoted from the status as a basic right on the ground that it is  a choice that a person 
could have refrained from making. Secondly, even i f  people could be held morally responsible fa -  their 
emotional dependencies, there is a difference, between the fam ily spheres and m ost other choices. T o freely  
choose to pursue the partner o f  one’s choice, without consideration o f  membership status is  an absolutely  
fundamental right. T o freely choose a carrier, for exam ple, is also an important part o f  individual freedom , but it 
is possible to restrict this right without encroaching on the core o f  a persons’ autonomous life , provided that 
som e econom ic opportunities are available. There is a qualitatively difference between state action that interferes 
with a person’s professional life  and a person’s fam ily life. To be dism issed from one’s post can sim ply not be 
compared to be separated from one’s family.
Gibney also denies that all individuals have a universal right to fam ily reunification. H e, however, conditions 
his argument on the premise that the separation must have been voluntary in the first place, holding that admitted 
refugees but not guest workers must have the right to bring their fam ilies (Gibney 1986: 142).
This argument seem s to run up against the lim its o f  when a choice is free or w hen a free choice carries moral 
weight. I f  the conditions for a choice is  unreasonable then, at least, the part o f  the agreement which pertains to 
the unreasonable condition carries no moral w eight and is not morally binding. Thus admittance cannot be made 
dependent on that the fam ily cannot join the immigrant since this right is a basic right in the first place, or at least 
any such part o f  the agreement will be invalid. I.e. it seem s questionable to argue that refugees have a right to  
bring their relatives, even i f  the relatives are not in danger, since the right to fam ily reunification is a basic right 
and at the sam e time hold that w aving this important right is a fair condition for adm ission in general.
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right to individual autonomy, as the desire to live with kith and kin (as opposed to family) is 
not connected to their ability to exercise autonomy.56
Cosmopolitanism and Civil Rights
Civil rights are a set of fundamental rights that enable individuals to exercise autonomy by 
protecting them from arbitrary intervention by the state (and other individuals). Civil rights 
limit what a state can do to an individual and also provide individuals with procedural rights 
that ensure that any potentially valid state action fulfils the impartiality criterion. That is, 
legitimate state action must conform to rules that ensure that individuals have a general right 
to defend their interests, including the right to have their cases tested under fair conditions 
while ensuring that the state minimises any necessary infringements. Civil rights embody the 
notion that individuals have a universal right to self-determination, which all states must 
respect and protect, and the idea that this applies as much to citizens as non-citizens.
Non-citizens are, moreover, entitled to civil rights in deportation cases. This follows from that 
deportation is analogous to other criminal cases, in that deportation cases are brought against 
persons who are suspected of breaching the law, and a negative outcome for the accused 
results in punishment. The penal nature of deportation is plain, as to be uprooted from one’s 
life, home, job, education and family clearly constitutes punishment. To deport, exile or 
banish a person as way of punishment is after all a longstanding tradition. Deportation has, 
moreover, historically been considered as one of the most severe forms of punishment 
available to the state, and was largely used as a way of handling dangerous criminals in the 
absence of prisons (Stimson 1953: 205-207). Madison concluded as much, well over two 
hundred years ago: “if a banishment of this sort [of a residing non-citizen] be not a 
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to 
which the name can be applied.” (Madison 1799)
The penal nature of deportation also means that states cannot simply add deportation to a 
sentence, or deport a non-citizen after she has served her normal sentence. To do so would 
mean that non-citizens were being punished more severely than citizens for a given crime, and 
this is a clear violation of the impartiality criterion. Criminals can, however, be deported in 
order to serve their sentences in the state that holds their administrative responsibility; as an
56 Co-nationals do, how ever, have this right on the communitarian rationale but it should be noted that a 
community, largely, has the right to define w ho is a co-national.
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alternative to that the offender serves the sentence within the jurisdiction where the crime was 
committed. A person can also be deported if she poses a risk to the community, but only if the 
harm caused to the individual by such deportation is proportional to the potential risk she 
poses.
In general, the more serious the crime and the less harm deportation will cause a given 
individual, the more appropriate as a means of safeguarding the public deportation becomes. 
Deportation is thus a valid instrument for preventing criminal activities in the same way that a 
court can impose restraining orders on relevant individuals to prevent criminal activity. What 
is important, from the cosmopolitan perspective, is that no one is punished twice, or more 
severely, based on lack of membership, and that individuals are not deported on grounds that 
do not relate to impeding future criminal activity on their part. This also means that 
deportation must be based on evidence, not mere suspicion, and conform to the due process of 
law, just as other penal procedures.
The fact that civil rights are basic individual rights means that the weak cosmopolitan 
perspective includes these rights among the universal rights that all individuals enjoy (King 
1983: 530). Civil rights are part of the minimum rights required to live a basic autonomous 
life. Individuals who are .denied the right to free speech and conscience, barred from owning 
property, or not afforded protection from arbitrary intervention in person or property, are 
deprived of their basic ability to exercise individual self-determination. That said, non-citizens 
cannot be included in all civil rights on par with citizens. Non-citizens’ right to equality 
before the law must be restricted solely to those rights that are regarded as universal from the 
weak cosmopolitan perspective; to afford non-citizens full equal law protection would simply 
undermine the possibility of upholding any particular rights based on membership.
There could, furthermore, be exceptions to non-citizens’ inclusion in civil rights if one or 
several specific civil rights could be deemed not to be a basic prerequisite for the exercise of 
individual autonomy. The right to freely choose one’s profession can, for example, be 
restricted without undermining individuals’ basic ability to exercise autonomy, if and only if 
some kind of employment or social provision is made available to all individuals (King 1983: 
530). This kind of restriction is clearly not trivial, but it does not mean that it would encroach 
on the very essence of individuals’ right to self-determination as would restrictions on 
individuals’ right to self-expression. It is after all accepted that not every person will be able
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to work in her profession of choice, due to qualities inherent in the person or restrictions 
imposed by the market or the state.
This is clearly sometimes perceived as a loss and causes much disappointment, but it is not 
perceived as a loss comparable to being denied the right to self-expression, to live with one’s 
family, to continue to live in one’s abode, or to protection against the arbitrary confiscation of 
individuals’ property. Strong cosmopolitanism takes it for granted, of course, that all persons 
should have a right to compete for jobs on an equal footing. It is an entrenched right that all 
citizens have in liberal states. There are, however, many rights that are entrenched for citizens 
in liberal states, and which are universal according to the strong cosmopolitan perspective, 
that are not essential to the right to exercise basic autonomy.
Cosmopolitanism and Political Rights
The only procedure for collective decision-making that is compatible with due respect for 
individuals as self-legislative persons is one where all have an equal say over collective 
decisions. The impartiality criterion, furthermore, demands that all individuals must have an 
equal say independently of their wealth and/or communal membership (Habermas 1993: 147). 
This means that the right to participate in the political process cannot be withheld from non­
citizens. On the contrary, the effectiveness and legitimacy of democracy is dependent on that 
non-citizens who are affected by the decisions are given the right to participate in the political 
process. To deny non-citizens access to the democratic process would create an unacceptable 
disjunction between the forces that affect individuals’ ability to control their lives and the 
political structures that are meant to empower them (Held 1995: 145-158,267-286).
Political rights fall squarely within the prerogative of members from the weak cosmopolitan 
perspective, as the lack of political rights does not deprive individuals of their basic ability to 
exercise autonomy. This argument can appear controversial. This is not because the exercise 
of political rights is usually seen as an essential part of an autonomous life -  it is perfectly 
possible to live an autonomous life without voting or standing for election. Political rights are, 
however, sometimes held to be essential for the securing of other rights. Shue has, for 
example, argued, in an influential book, that the right to participate in the political process is a 
basic right, as all other rights are only securely held, i.e. are enjoyed as rights and not mere 
privileges, if they are backed up by democratic institutions (Shue 1980: 74-78).
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The first thing to notice about this argument is that Shue readily admits that his argument does 
not hold in theory. There is no theoretical connection between political rights and the right to 
security, for example. Shue, however, argues that only political participation will guarantee 
other basic rights in practice (Shue 1980: 86-87). This argument indeed enjoys some general 
empirical support (Caney 2005: 83). Shue’s general argument cannot, however, be simply 
translated or transferred to the question of non-citizens’ political rights. That is, denial of non­
citizens’ political rights does not mean that a state has thereby become a dictatorship. Hence 
the issue is not one of whether basic rights are secure in dictatorships but whether non­
citizens’ basic rights are secure in democracies where they do not have a right to vote.
It is very possible that Shue would hold that his general argument does not apply in this 
particular case. Indeed, if his argument is based on the idea that it is the existence of 
democratic institutions as such, and not a groups’ ability to block attacks on their rights that 
guarantee basic rights, then his argument would no longer be valid in this case. There are, 
moreover, good empirical reasons for not deploying Shue’s general argument in this case. 
That is, most democratic states in practice do deny non-citizens political rights, but uphold 
other basic rights for non-citizens. This has much to do with the fact that most democracies 
are Rechtsstaaten (states ruled by law). That is, they have political institutions that guarantee 
basic rights for all, often by putting them beyond even the power of the majority of the 
people.
This points to a general weakness in Shue’s argument: he neglects the wider context that 
secures rights and focuses on the right to partake in elections, ignoring the important role that 
a state’s political institutions, legal system and political culture play in underpinning 
individual universal rights. All absolute power corrupts absolutely, and democratic power is 
no exception. At any rate, there are no theoretical or empirical grounds for holding that 
denying non-citizens political rights means that their basic rights will be encroached upon as a 
consequence. Thus, there are no grounds for bestowing non-citizens with political rights from 
a weak cosmopolitan perspective.
Cosmopolitanism and Social Rights
Free movement in conjunction with access to social rights can arguably strain welfare 
regimes, but the cosmopolitan perspective offers no general possibility for closing state 
borders or national welfare systems to non-citizens. Restricting access to social rights for non­
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citizens can seem laudable from the inside, but it is clearly a breach of the impartiality 
criterion (Carens 1992: 41-42; Gibney 1999: 171-172). To exclude non-citizens from social 
rights is tantamount to establishing a feudal order. That is, an order where citizens hold a 
birthright to privileged treatment (Carens 1992: 41-42).57
This issue is more complex from a weak cosmopolitan perspective. All individuals have a 
paramount interest in receiving basic education, basic social provisions and emergency 
medical treatment. A person who is deprived of these rights is deprived of her basic ability to 
live an autonomous life. This means that basic social rights must be afforded to non-citizens 
from a weak cosmopolitan perspective. Equal access to a free university education, elaborate 
social provisions and full medical coverage may be desirable for all individuals, but these 
rights are not essential to ensure the ability to exercise basic autonomy. Non-basic social 
rights should hence be based on the communitarian rationale according to the weak 
cosmopolitan perspective. To regulate social rights in a discretionary manner is moreover an 
important right for a sovereign nation. This is not least true given that modem state legitimacy 
is derived as much from protecting citizens socially and economically as it is derived from 
providing physical protection; to this we can add the communitarian argument explicated in 
the previous chapter that partial treatment of citizens and a sense of reciprocity are essential to 
maintaining a particular community (Bader 1997a: 46-47; Shacknove 1988: 144; Perry 1995: 
105; Gibney 1999).
Cosmopolitanism and the Right to Naturalisation
From the strong cosmopolitan perspective, there can be no general restrictions on the right to 
naturalise, since abiding in a state simply equals membership of that state (Carens 1989: 46).58 
The right to naturalisation is thus analogous to the way in which federal citizenship carries 
with it a right to acquire local citizenship within a federation. Thus naturalisation only has the 
administrative function of recognising that a person can exercise her right to local
57 That said, states have, the above withstanding, the right to restrict immigration if  it threatens to undermine the 
basic social and econom ic structures o f  a state. A  state can also put in place certain lim ited residence 
requirements since social rights in general are provided where an individual abodes. (See the Naturalisation 
Realm for a further discussion.) Finally, it is  com patible with the impartiality criterion to make social rights 
dependent on the w illingness to contribute to the system , i f  and only i f  everyone is  provided with a the 
opportunity to contribute to the system. This fo llow s from that individuals have a right not to be arbitrarily 
excluded and to be given the sam e concern but not the right to free ride on others.
58 This also m eans that double m embership is not an obstacle to  naturalisation from a cosm opolitan perspective. 
A  person w ho has a strong connection to tw o places ought to enjoy membership in both places. This reflects the 
cosm opolitan idea that citizenship ought to be neither exclusive nor unitary. This is a lso w hy cosm opolitans 
argue that local membership must be com plem ented with regional and a universal citizenship (H eld 1995).
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membership; i.e. it is recognition of the fact that the individual resides in the state, and hence 
qualifies for all rights that require her being a local resident. The relevance of local 
membership or citizenship does not stem from the intrinsic importance of such membership, 
but from the necessity of a functional division between jurisdictions. States divide the right to 
levy some taxes and the responsibility for providing certain public goods and social rights, for 
example.
This prima facie right to exercise local membership is, however, conditioned upon the 
willingness of an individual to become a functional member of a given society, and this 
includes learning the language. Thus a basic language requirement for naturalisation is 
compatible with the impartiality criterion. This follows from that acquiring a basic command 
of one of the dominant languages in a state is necessary in order to be a functioning member 
of a given state, and the requirement to be a functioning member is not an arbitrary condition 
as it affects all individuals’ ability to exercise autonomy. An immigrant cannot be expected to 
possess this knowledge when admitted, but it can be expected that she acquires it once a 
reasonable amount of time has passed; if this turns out not to be the case, it would be 
reasonable to withhold the right to naturalisation until this requirement is fulfilled.
It should be pointed out in this context that natural bom citizens, in most states, are under an 
obligation to learn an official language as a key component of their compulsory education. 
This said, citizens are not excluded from membership if they fail to do so. A straight 
comparison between citizens and non-citizens cannot, however, be made in this context. To 
fail to learn to communicate in the language of instruction in one’s native land is not seen as a 
choice, but a failure that is caused by social and/or cognitive problems, for which the 
individual is not held responsible. This might also be the case for certain groups of non­
citizens who are elderly or have learning disabilities, but non-citizens who choose not to learn 
an official language can be denied citizenship. This follows from the fact that they have 
chosen not to become functioning members of the community, and willingness to be a 
functional member is not an arbitrary condition; to deny membership on this ground is hence 
compatible with the impartiality criterion.
It is often simply assumed, even by strong cosmopolitans, that a prior criminal record would 
disqualify an individual from naturalisation (See for example Habermas 1993: 146). 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the impartiality criterion only allows for this under specific
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circumstances. Individuals who have committed crimes and have been punished for them 
generally regain their basic individual rights upon their release from the penal system. It 
follows from the impartiality criterion that this must hold for citizens and non-citizens alike. 
Thus, non-citizens cannot be deprived of their right to acquire membership in the community 
where they abide simply in virtue of having a criminal record -  at least not if other (citizen) 
ex-criminals are not deprived of comparable rights permanently.59
A state has the right to take measures to uphold liberal institutions, as these are essential to all 
individuals’ ability to exercise autonomy. This means that it is valid, from a cosmopolitan 
perspective, to deny non-citizens who are hostile to basic cosmopolitan values the right to 
naturalise (Habermas 1993: 147). This right to denial is, however, limited in two ways. One, 
no individual can be denied the right to naturalise simply by virtue of their descending from 
an illiberal culture. Cosmopolitanism is based on the notion that people, as autonomous 
beings, have a right to be treated individually, and hence they cannot be denied rights solely 
due to membership in different collectives. The universal foundation of cosmopolitanism also 
means that the presupposition is that all can become functioning members of a cosmopolitan 
society. Two, mere indifference or scepticism towards basic liberal values cannot disqualify a 
person from the right to naturalisation, as citizens only are barred from engaging in behaviour 
that constitutes direct hostility towards liberal values.60
The right to naturalisation is not a universal right according to the weak cosmopolitan 
perspective. This follows from the fact that the right to naturalise is not a pre-condition for
59 Citizens are perpetually punished for their crim es in certain states, by a permanent lo ss  o f  their right to vote for 
exam ple, and the treatment o f  ex-felons can always be discussed but non-citizens cannot be singled out for 
additional punishment sim ply by virtue o f  lacking membership in a particular nation (See Chapter four Section  
III for a more detailed discussion).
60 C ole argues that even this restriction is incom patible with the impartiality criterion since natural bom  citizens 
are allow ed to be as illiberal as they wish (C ole 2000: 144— 145). C o le’s argument is at least partly based on 
erroneous empirical facts, as the tw o national case studies in this thesis demonstrate. The German B asic Law  
specifically curbs the freedom s o f  people w ho are hostile to the essential values in the Basic Law. Liberal 
freedom s cannot be used to overturn the system  and article 9  and 21 outlaw parties and associations that want to 
impair the constitutional freedom  and dem ocracy. The freedom o f academ ic teaching is also limited to people 
w ho do not try to subvert the constitutional order, article 5, and individuals w ho combat the free political order 
forfeit their right to freedom  o f  speech, article 18. Germany is thus expressively a com bative dem ocracy were 
neither non-citizens nor citizens have a right to be as illiberal as they see fit. The U .S . Constitution contains no 
similar articles but the Supreme Court has upheld several laws that lim it freedom s for individuals w ho seek  to 
undermine a free society. T his includes exam ples like the law s that banned syndicalism  and com m unism , laws 
which both w ere held constitutional by the Supreme Court (Currie 1994: 214— 215; see article 4 0  o f  the Irish 
Constitution for another exam ple and see the German case study for a more detailed argument). That is, there is 
no reason in theory for liberal societies to slip into the relativist trap, nor d o  liberal societies in practice do so. 
The fact that there are relative few  law s restricting actions against the liberal order in liberal nation-states is 
arguably due to a lack o f  need for these law s and not due to a lack o f  authority should such need arise.
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being able to exercise autonomy on a basic level, and this in turn means that, from a weak 
cosmopolitan perspective, states have the right to allocate citizenship on a discretionary basis.
Undocumented Residents
As described earlier, states retain the right to deny entry and to deport non-citizens according 
to the cosmopolitan perspective, albeit the grounds for doing so are restricted. This does not, 
however, mean that undocumented residents lack rights in general. Individuals who have 
broken the law retain certain rights, the most important of these being the right to procedural 
due process. An essential feature of due process is that crimes must have a statute of 
limitations (see the U.S. case study for a more detailed discussion of the concept of due 
process of law). There are several reasons for applying statutes of limitations but the key 
normative argument is based on the notion that individuals would not have a reasonable 
chance to pursue and plan their lives if they could indefinitely be prosecuted for past wrongs 
(Rubio-Marin 2000: 88-89).
That said, particularly heinous crimes do not have a statute of limitations in certain liberal 
nation-states. There is, fortunately enough, no need to discuss the issue of whether all crimes 
ought to have a statute of limitations here, as violations of the immigration law in any case 
cannot be said to be on par with the crimes that are considered beyond pardon in certain 
liberal nation-states, such as murder and genocide. That is, any violation of other persons’ 
rights and any damage caused to the community as an effect of violating immigration laws are 
nowhere near serious enough to warrant their inclusion among the exceptions to the general 
rule of that crimes have statutes of limitations. This means that there are time constraints on 
states’ rights to deport undocumented residents, so that undocumented immigrants must, after 
the statute of limitations has expired, be treated as legal residents. Undocumetned immigrants 
are, furthermore, entitled to basic social rights and other civil rights, as these rights hardly can 
be withheld from any person, and as they, at any rate, are not denied to other transgressors of 
the law. It is also noteworthy that undocumented residents who are minors cannot be held 
criminally responsible for breaking the immigration laws, just as minors cannot be held 
criminally responsible in other cases.
Undocumented residents also hold the rights listed above from the weak cosmopolitan 
perspective. These include the right to due process of law, the right to be treated equally 
compared with other offenders and the right to a statute of limitations on transgressions of
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immigration law. This follows from the fact that a denial of these rights undermines a 
person’s basic ability to exercise autonomy. Denial of a fair trial and to indefinitely live with 
the threat of deportation undermine a person’s basic ability to exercise autonomy, as any 
person living under these conditions can have her life plan destroyed by deportation or 
incarceration at any time. Undocumented residents also have basic social rights and other civil 
rights, as these are basic rights that all individuals are entitled to as autonomous persons.
In sum, the strong cosmopolitan perspective assumes that non-citizens and citizens alike 
should have an equal right to concern, in all spheres. This means that citizens and non-citizens 
have the same rights. The question of non-citizens’ rights becomes slightly more complex 
from the weak cosmopolitan perspective. In terms of admission, only refugees and family 
members have an individual right to be admitted from this perspective. The weak 
cosmopolitan perspective furthermore affords non-citizens basic social rights and civil rights
-  save for the full right to equality before the law and the right to freely choose their 
profession. Non-citizens are, however, denied political rights, more elaborate social rights and 
the right to naturalisation from the weak cosmopolitan perspective. This is because these 
rights are not essential to the ability of exercising basic autonomy.
It is worthy of note that a symmetric relationship between the right to individual autonomy 
and national sovereignty emerges from the weak cosmopolitan perspective. This is a 
consequence of the fact that rights which are fundamental to the basic exercise of autonomy -  
such as civil rights, the right to refugee protection, family reunification and basic social rights
-  do not stand at the centre of nation-states’ right to self-determination. Correspondingly, 
rights that stand at the centre of nation-states’ right to national self-determination, such as 
political rights, the right to control the labour market, the right to control the bulk of social 
spending and the right to membership (naturalisation) are not crucial for the basic ability to 
exercise individual autonomy.
Communitarianism and the Right to Admission
The analysis below will, as was the case with the above analysis of the two cosmopolitan 
perspectives, commence with a more detailed examination of the right to admission, for 
analogous reasons.61 It is plain that nation-states, on the communitarian perspective, have a
61 Special attention w ill be given to W alzer’s account in Spheres o f  Justice as this is the m ost elaborate and 
sophisticated communitarian account o f  this particular issue. T o what extent W alzer has shifted his position is o f
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general right to regulate immigration in accordance with their particular social meanings, as 
Hegel tersely put it: “Permission to enter a state or leave it must be given by the state; this 
then is not a matter which depends on an individual’s arbitrary w ill...” (Hegel 1967: § 75 
Additions)62
This is a right that nation-states hold on two grounds. First of all, non-citizens have no 
independent or universal moral platform from which they could demand admission. This is a 
simple consequence of the fact that the communitarian rationale is based on the notion that no 
universal vantage point of justice exists. Thus, all moral claims for admission must be based 
on the particular nation-state’s internal social understanding of justice. That is, all claims for 
admission must be made from the inside, as it were.
Secondly, the right to control admission is crucial for nation-states’ ability to maintain 
themselves as particular political communities. A nation-state perceived as a particular 
community, upholding the values and the special relationship between its members, cannot 
survive without the right to control admission: open borders clearly would mean a loss of 
control over the body politic. The right to entry does not therefore, from a communitarian 
perspective, hinge on the need or desire of the individual who wishes to enter, but rather 
depends on that person’s relation to the nation-state that she wishes to be admitted to.
This works much like the decision of a club to accept a person as a member: it is entirely a 
matter of the club's desire to accept or not accept the applicant. A club has no obligation to 
non-members, and indeed loses its character as a distinct community if it allows persons to 
join on terms it does not recognise as its own (Walzer 1983: 31-63; Gibney 2004: 28, 31-32). 
In Walzer’s words:
But the right to choose an adm issions policy is more basic than any o f  these [state rights], for it is
not m erely a matter o f  acting in the world, exercising sovereignty, and pursuing national interests.
At stake here is the shape o f  the com munity that acts in the world, exercises sovereignty, and so
no concern here as his account in the Spheres o f  Justice sim ply is used to draw out a coherent communitarian  
perspective on non-citizens’ right to admission.
2 It should be noted that this thesis does not deal with the right to exit a state as this right very seldom  has been  
denied non-citizens. It is a lso noteworthy that citizens’ as w ell as non-citizens’ right to leave a state is a w ell 
established part o f  international law that the U .S . and Germany respect and apply. Article 13 o f  the Universal 
Declaration o f  Human Rights stipulates that: “Everyone has the right to freedom  o f  m ovem ent and residence  
within the borders o f  each state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his ow n, and to return to 
his country. It is o f  note that the Declaration contains no equivalent right to immigrate.
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on. A dm ission and exclusion are at the core o f  communal independence. They suggest the deepest 
meaning o f  self-determination. W ithout them, there could not be any com m unities o f  character, 
historically stable, ongoing associations o f  men and w om en with som e special com mitm ent to one 
another and som e special sense o f  their com m on life. (W alzer 1983: 6 1 -6 2 , emphasis in original)
Nation-states do, however, have obligations, in terms of admission, towards members. A 
nation-state is the representative of a nation, and as such it has an obligation to protect the 
nation’s particular social meanings as well as its members. This means that members always 
have a right to admission, for nation-states’ sovereignty is based on their claim to safeguard a 
particular way of life for a particular people. That is, the perception of the state as an ethical 
community intrinsically intertwines the notion of communal membership with the right of 
admittance (Tamir 1993: 127-137).63 Once again, in Walzer’s words:
Greeks driven from Turkey, Turks from G reece, after the wars and revolutions o f  the early 
twentieth century, had to be taken in by the states that bore their collective names. W hat else  are 
such states for? They don’t only preside over a piece o f  territory and a random collection  o f  
inhabitants; they are also the political expression o f  a com m on life  and (m ost often) o f  a national 
“fam ily” that is  never entirely enclosed within their legal boundaries. (W alzer 1983: 42)
It should be noted that the social understanding of who is a member is part of a particular 
nation’s shared understandings; nations hence retain basic control of admissions, but the fact 
that it is not legal membership but communal/national membership that bestows rights from 
the communitarian perspective does create an obligation to admit members who are not 
citizens. Nations cannot thus, first of all, deny admission to recognised members. More 
importantly perhaps, nations cannot deny members’ families admission. This follows because 
communities are stable historical associations where membership is passed from one 
generation to the next, not ad hoc associations; hence members’ families are ipso facto 
members. Parents stand at the very centre of the constitutive social process discussed in the 
previous chapter; the family hence constitutes the foundation or the core of the nation, and is 
in this sense prior to the nation.
A nation is hence like a family in two senses. One, members have moral obligations to people 
they have not chosen or explicitly consented to be associated with. (This is also partly why 
nationality is constitutive.) Two, national membership is inherited and passed from parents to
63 This said, claim s to membership must be based on shared understandings o f  w ho is a member.
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their offspring (Walzer 1983: 41, 62; Meilaender 2001: 157, 179-183; Gibney 2004: 26; 
Miller 1995: 23-24).64 The fact that it is membership in the community, and not the universal 
right to an autonomous sphere, that engenders the right to admission for family members 
means that only members have a right to have their families admitted. That is, this right does 
not extend to non-members who are long-term residents.
The fact that the nation only has obligations towards members means that refugees who are 
non-members have no right to admission. A nation is simply free to admit refugees or not, as 
it sees fit. In Walzer’s words:
O nce again, com m unities must have boundaries; and how ever these are determined with regard to  
territory and resources, they depend with regard to population on a sense o f  relatedness and 
mutuality. R efugees must appeal to that sense. One w ishes them success; but in particular cases, 
with reference to a particular state, they may w ell have no right to be successful. (W alzer 1983:
50)
Walzer argues that a nation’s right to deny refugees admission does not include the right to 
deport asylum seekers who have been able to reach the shores of a safe nation-state (Walzer 
1983: 51). Walzer offers one instrumental argument for this exception: the number of 
refugees that are able to file for asylum inside a given state is smaller than the total number of 
refugees, which makes the problem more manageable (Walzer 1983: 50-51).
This argument carries little weight on its own. After all, this holds true for any (arbitrary) 
divisions of a given population. The key question is that of whether the distinction between 
refugees on the inside and refugees on the outside is a morally relevant distinction. Walzer 
tries to argue for such a difference by appealing to the distinction between direct harm and 
passive harm, and argues that to expel asylum seekers who have entered a given state would 
involve actively harming helpless individuals whereas denying them entry would not (Walzer 
1983: 50-51).
This argument hardly holds water. First of all, the premise that other refugees are not actively 
harmed clearly only holds if the refugees make no unsuccessful attempt to cross the border. 
To shoot unarmed refugees as they try to pass a state’s border clearly involves as much direct
64 The exact scope o f w ho is a fam ily member must be decided by the specific social understandings o f  what 
constitutes a fam ily in a given nation-state.
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harm to innocent people as deporting refugees who face certain death in the receiving country. 
Second, this distinction between passive and active harm (a version of the act-omission 
distinction) cannot carry the weight of this argument, for two reasons. One, the act-omission 
distinction suffers from the inherent weaknesses of basing a key normative claim on a 
normatively void distinction; to omit to act, when one has the ability to act, is as much a 
moral choice as to choose to act (Singer 1988: 119-120). Two, and most importantly here, 
there is no need, and indeed no ground, from a communitarian perspective, to differentiate 
between non-members who are physically inside the community and non-members who are 
outside the community.
A community’s right to decide over non-citizens’ survival must depend on social/cultural -  
not physical -  location, from a communitarian perspective. That is, mere physical presence 
cannot engender universal rights that people on the other side of the fence lack (Miller 1995: 
139). Indeed, Walzer himself seems to hesitate:
W hy mark o ff the lucky or the aggressive, w ho have som ehow  managed to make their way across
our borders, from all others? Once again, I don’t have an adequate answer to these questions.
(W alzer 1983: 51)
Walzer’s argument hence appears to be inconsistent, and he offers no clear argument for why 
certain refugees enjoy universal protection (Gibney 2004: 34). The reason for belabouring this 
point is that it has an important general implication in that it demonstrates that Walzer’s (and 
other communitarian thinkers’) attempt to ad hoc insert universal cosmopolitan constraints on 
particular communities are incompatible with the communitarian perspective; and this also 
has implications for the political rights and naturalisation realms. Nation-states have a right to 
exercise national sovereignty according to their particular social meanings from a 
communitarian perspective; this means that no universal obligations based on non-members’ 
perceived needs exist. That is, non-citizens have no right to admission, or anything else, 
regardless of the severity of their predicament.
This follows because from the communitarian perspective, moral obligations are not 
perceived of as universal and individual, but particular and inter-communal. The important 
point here is that from the communitarian perspective, communities can only be criticised 
from the inside. Any attempt to argue that non-citizens have a universal right to equality or to 
be afforded certain rights collapses under pressure from the communitarian rationale’s
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epistemological starting point.65 The fact that members of many communities feel that non­
members should not have the same rights as members, or that communities must be partial to 
their members, simply settles the issue from a communitarian perspective (Doppelt 1978: 15; 
Carens 2000: 24-28, 33, 37).
Communitarianism and Civil Rights
Civil rights embody particular social meanings based on individuals’ equal right to self- 
determination. That is, civil rights are not universal rights, from a communitarian perspective, 
but are a particular set of rights that members hold on the strength of having, as Arendt puts it 
‘become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves 
mutually equal rights’ (Arendt 1968: 301). This means that civil rights, where applicable, are 
based on membership, and do not extend to non-citizens as a universal right would. Thus, if 
non-citizens are granted civil rights on a communitarian rationale, these rights must ultimately 
be based on the non-citizens’ connection to the community and not on their universal right to 
exercise autonomy. That is, civil rights depend on membership even if they are linked to the 
ability to exercise autonomy, and are hence inter-communal rights.
Communitarianism and Political Rights
Political rights lie at the heart of national sovereignty, as they are essential to communal self- 
determination and protection of communities’ particular social meanings. Thus members of 
political communities “ ...avoid if they possibly can, sharing it [political power] with anyone 
else.” (Walzer 1983: 31) The fact that the political process is a communal affair means that it 
is up to a given community to decide on its political system. Communities need hence not be 
democracies, but if they are, they are democracies in the literal sense of the word. That is, 
democracy from a communitarian perspective is about the connection between members and
65 It should be noted, in W alzer’s defence that he, at one point, partly tries to ground the universal right to equal 
citizenship in the use o f  territory (W alzer 1983: 42— 48, 61— 63). Nations need territories but have not created 
them and thus have no right to mistreat non-members that rightfully abode in the land. This argument explains 
w hy a com m unity holds no sw ay over non-members already present in their territories. Such people must be 
given the option to join, according to the social norms o f  the new nation-state or to form another nation-state. 
This since they are not bound by another nation’s social m eanings and no nation has an intrinsic right to a certain 
territory.
H ow ever, this qualification o f national self-determination cannot apply to admitted non-members. This would  
be an unwarranted infringem ent on communal self-determination and mean that only certain democratic regim es 
have full sovereignty over their territories, i.e. can admit foreigners according to their ow n social m eanings. It 
cannot be the case that the existence o f  foreigners generates a com mitm ent to a specific liberal form o f  
dem ocracy. Indeed from a communitarian perspective foreigners do not have the right to dem ocratic citizenship  
and their existence does not im ply the moral need for democracy. W alzer’s solution to the moral dilemm a caused  
by transnational m obility is in this respect cosm opolitan, in that it seem s to try to solve this problem by adopting 
a universally acceptable system .
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the community and the purpose of the democratic process is thus to jointly express a 
collective will. It is not about individuals’ rights to partake in the political process as self­
determining individuals.
This also means, as a consequence, that non-members have no right to participate in the 
process. Indeed, the process losses its legitimacy if non-members participate, as the process 
then no longer represents the (pure) collective expression of a particular nation. This means, 
from an individual perspective, that it is a person’s right as a member to jointly exercise 
collective self-determination which gives her the right to participate in the democratic 
process, not her ability for self-determination (Rubio-Marin 2000: 202). Democracy is about 
collective, and not individual, self-determination from the communitarian perspective and 
democracy therefore cannot be separated from the notion of nation {demos).
It is noteworthy that Walzer argues that national self-determination entails a right for all 
residents to participate in the political process:
For these rights [to national self-determination] are to be exercised only by the com munity as a 
w hole (even if, in practice, som e national majority dominates the decision making) and only with  
regard to foreigners, not by som e members with regard to others. N o  com m unity can be half- 
metic, half-citizen and claim  that its admissions policies are acts o f  self-determination or that its 
politics is democratic. . . .  [this] is not communal freedom but oppression. (W alzer 1983: 62)
This claim that all residents or citizens must have an equal standing -  a notion that smacks of 
universal liberalism -  seems to be a grave and fundamental infringement on national self- 
determination (Carens 2000: 33; Gibney 1986: 10-11). Walzer is perhaps partly basing this 
argument on the ground that members of a community need to feel a sense of mutual 
obligation and special connection. While this argument makes sense prima facie it does not 
stand up to scrutiny. The fact that communities have a right to be ruled by their particular 
social understandings means that democracy cannot be imposed as a universal rule even for 
members and even less for non-members. Any such universal claim of equality is 
incompatible with the communitarian rationale. What would such a universal right to equality 
be based on from a communitarian perspective? Indeed the claim that nation-states have a 
right to absolute sovereignty but that they must grant all an equal say conflates two different 
and incompatible notions of communal self-determination (Meilaender 2001: 155-171).
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The communitarian notion of self-determination refers to communities’ right to be governed 
according to their own beliefs, whatever those beliefs happen to be. This is the notion Walzer 
embraces when he claims that:
A ll distributions are just or unjust relative to the social m eanings o f  the goods at stake. (W alzer 
1983: 9  em phasis added)
One characteristic above all is central to m y argument. W e are (all o f  us) culture-producing 
creatures; w e m ake and inhabit meaningful worlds. S ince there is no w ay to rank and order these  
worlds with regard to their understanding o f  social goods, w e do justice to actual men and w om en  
by respecting their particular crea tion s.. . .  Justice is rooted in the distinct understandings o f  places, 
honors, jobs, things o f  all sorts that constitute a shared w ay o f  life. T o override those 
understandings is (a lw ays) to act unjustly. (W alzer 1983: 314 em phasis added)
The second notion of self-determination is sometimes called internal self-determination, and 
refers to a universal democratic perception of self-determination, where political power is 
exercised jointly through equal citizenship (Meilaender 2001: 164). This is the notion of self- 
determination Walzer deploys when he writes, ‘no community can be half-metic, half-citizen 
and claim that its admissions policies are acts of self-determination or that its politics is 
democratic, this is not communal freedom but oppression’(Walzer 1983: 62). This notion of 
self-determination is clearly not based on the idea that a particular understanding of honours 
is the basis for the legitimate exercise of communal sovereignty. It is therefore incompatible 
with the communitarian rationale.
Communitarianism and Social Rights
Social rights must be understood in their specific cultural context and social distributions are 
just according to their specific inter-communal meanings (Walzer 1983: 6-9):
Bread is  the staff o f  life , the body o f  Christ the sym bol o f  the Sabbath, the means o f  hospitality, 
and so  on. C onceivable, there is a limited sense in which the first o f  these is primary, so that if  
there are twenty people in the world and just enough to feed  the twenty, the primacy o f  bread-as- 
staff-of-life would yield  a sufficient distributive principle. But that is  the only circumstance in 
w hich it w ould do so; and even there w e can’t be sure. I f  the religious uses o f  bread were to 
conflict with its nutritional uses -  i f  the gods demanded that bread be baked and burned rather than 
eaten - it is by no m eans clear which use would be primary. H ow , then, is bread to be incorporated
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into the universal list? The question is even harder to answer, the conventional answers less  
plausible, as w e pass from necessities to opportunities, powers, reputations, and so on. These can 
be incorporated only i f  they are abstracted from every particular meaning -  hence, for all practical 
purposes, rendered m eaningless. (W alzer 1983: 8)
This means that non-members have no universal individual right to social provisions; as all 
such rights must be sanctioned by specific social meanings. The fact that universal (or rather, 
general) social provisions cover all citizens does not mean that non-citizens are equally 
entitled. Social rights are, in general, part of the inter-communal cooperative scheme of 
justice that gives a distinct and tangible meaning to membership. This perspective is best 
captured by Miller’s rhetorical question: “Why should an immigrant Turk in Holland be 
provided with benefits that are not provided for Turks in Turkey?” (Miller 1995: 139) Social 
rights are not a question of universal need but of local meanings and the sense of mutual 
obligation that holds between members of a particular community, and on the communitarian 
view it is not physical but cultural location that determines what a person is entitled to in this 
sphere.
Communitarianism and the Right to Naturalise
The right to control admission and to restrict civil, political and social rights to members is 
important from the communitarian perspective. These rights have a direct bearing on a nation­
state’s ability to maintain itself as a particular community, and on its ability to exercise 
national self-determination. As important as it is to control these things, the right to control 
naturalisation is even more fundamental. From the communitarian perspective, the right to 
control naturalisation is primus inter pares, as naturalisation equals membership, and with 
membership comes the right to hold rights.66
This means that non-members do not have a right to naturalisation, including those non­
citizens who are bom in the country and/or are long-term residents. Living in the country 
might, or might not, be considered to be a sufficient or a key aspect of obtaining membership 
in a given nation, depending on the particular social meaning of membership in that nation. 
As Aristotle aptly described the communitarian position in this regard:
66 It is  noteworthy that W alzer holds that foreign residents cannot be denied citizenship indefinitely. This 
universal right to naturalisation is incom patible with the communitarian rationale, just as W alzer’s claim s that 
there is a universal right to asylum  and political rights (W alzer 1983: 61; Benhabib: 2004: 119). The inconsistent 
combination o f universal and particular rights plagues much o f  W alzer’s work and can be detected in his earlier 
work as w ell (Caney 2005: 196— 199).
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W ho is a citizen? A nd, w hom  should w e call one? Here too there is no unanimity, no agreement as 
to what constitutes a citizen; it often happens that one w ho is a citizen in a dem ocracy is not a 
citizen in an oligarchy. . . .  N or does mere residence in a place confer citizenship: resident 
foreigners and slaves are not citizens, but do share dom icile in the country. . . .  A  citizen, therefore, 
w ill necessarily vary according to the constitution in each case. (Aristotle 1992: Book III 
127 4 b 3 2 -l2 7 5 a 3 4 )
The right to naturalise hence depends on a nation’s specific collective notion of when 
someone becomes a member. The fact that people bom on American soil becomes citizens in 
the U.S. has no relevance in terms of who should become a citizen in other nations, and it 
does not mean that Japan, Israel or Germany have to abandon their perception of what renders 
a person a member in their nations.
Members’ families must, however, have the right to naturalise. This can, at face value, appear 
counterintuitive. Why must children of members be considered communal members when this 
is not the case for non-citizens bom in the community; why should jus sanguinis be a 
universal principle when jus soli is not? The imperative for all communities to include an 
element of jus sanguinis follows from the nature of communities as stable constitutive 
associations that exist over time. Nations would simply not be communities in the essential 
sense required by communitarianism if membership were not inherited, or if nations recreated 
themselves as a new community every few years.67 Some form of the jus sanguinis principle 
must hence be part of a communitarian nation’s naturalisation law, as long as ‘nations are the 
political expression of a common life that never is entirely enclosed within their legal 
boundaries’ (Walzer 1983: 42). This, of course, also means that communal members (in the 
relevant sense) who are not citizens have a right to naturalise.
Undocumented Residents
Undocumented residents like other non-members, lack rights from a communitarian 
perspective. There are no universal rules for the procedures for detecting and punishing 
undocumented residents, and nation-states enjoy absolute discretion in this area, as part of 
their right to national self-determination. That is, there can be no universal restrictions on the 
nature of the treatment of undocumented residents from the communitarian perspective.
67 If only one sex  or both can confer membership can o f  course vary from com m unity to com munity, the 
important point here is that m embership must pass from one generation to the next in order to create stable 
historical associations that are constitutive in the communitarian sense.
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In sum, the communitarian rationale is based on the notion that communities constitute 
particular inter-communal moral spheres. This means that non-citizens can claim no universal 
rights. All rights that non-citizens hold are based on the fact that non-citizens are seen as full 
or partial members, and all attempts to smuggle in universal cosmopolitan rights via the 
backdoor, as it were, fail as described above. A nation-state does, however, have obligations 
towards non-citizens who are members of the nation. This follows because nation-states 
derive their right to collective self-determination from the fact that they represent particular 
nations. It is hence nations that have the right to sovereignty, not states. This means that non­
citizens who are communal members have the same right as citizens. A nation-state thus has 
responsibilities as well as rights, but the responsibilities pertain to its members.
This concludes the theoretical part of the thesis. The next two chapters constitute the case 
studies. These chapters are devoted to deduce the normative rationales behind non-citizens’ 
actual legal standing in the U.S. and Germany and to analyse the internal normative 
consistency of these two countries’ treatment of non-citizens.
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Chapter Four 
The Case of the U.S.
A  traveller in Europe becom es a stranger as soon as he quits his own kingdom ; but it is  otherwise 
here. W e know, properly speaking, no strangers; this is  every person’s country; the variety o f  our 
soils, situations, clim ates, governments, and produce, hath som ething which must please  
everybody. (Crevecoeur 1976: 29)
* * *
[ . . .]  Providence has been pleased to g ive this one connected country to one united people -  a 
people descended from the sam e ancestors, speaking the sam e language, professing the same 
religion, attached to the sam e principles o f  government, very similar in their manners and custom s, 
and w ho, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and 
bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence. (M adison 1999: N o. 2 
Jay)
Section I
The tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales is woven into the 
social fabric of the U.S. The notion that rights exist a priori, and belong to all individuals as 
equally entitled, self-determining persons, has always coexisted with the notion that the U.S. 
is a particular nation, where the members are joined in a social compact and collectively 
exercise national sovereignty in their own interest:
The tw o ideas o f  popular sovereignty and human rights have shaped the normative self- 
understanding o f  constitutional states up to the present day. With the first idea w e postulate that 
members o f  a democratic com munity are governed by them selves collectively; with the second, 
that they are governed by law and not by m en. This is  no less true for the United States than for 
any m odem  constitutional regim e. (Habermas 1994: 1)
This normative tension, moreover, goes to the heart of American alienage jurisprudence, and 
the overriding question, in this regard, is what non-members’ constitutional standing is:
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W as the Constitution only a compact establishing a governm ent to secure the individual rights o f  
the people creating it? Or since they believed that all m en, everyw here ‘are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights,’ did the framers intend to create a government that would  
secure and respect the unalienable rights o f all human beings, including those in their m idst not 
party to the contract, and human beings in other societies upon whom  their new  governm ent might 
im pinge? (Henkin 1985: 31, Henkin is quoting from the Declaration o f  Independence)
The answer to this question will emerge below, but it is important to clarify that the normative 
tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales is pervasive, and that the 
issue of non-citizens’ legal standing constitutes a normative balancing act:
For the United States, the immigration issue is always particularly difficult because tw o com peting  
values lie  at the core o f  the American legal history and culture . . .  N ot surprisingly; the U .S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area o f noncitizens’ rights illustrates this dichotom y between  
the celebration o f  im migrants’ personhood and the denial o f  equal status for noncitizens. (Romero 
2 0 0 1 :1 7 4 -1 7 6 )
The presence of this normative tension has not escaped scholars and much has been written on 
the topic (for a historical approach see Nafziger 1983: 835; Legomsky 1997: 100-109; Smith 
2001: 2; Neuman 1991: 927-938; Neuman 1993a: 249; Schuck 1998b: 20-21; Schuck 1998a; 
Weissbrodt 1992: 2-3; for the existence of the tension in contemporary legal discourse see 
Meilaender 2001: 116-123; Schuck 1998b: 19-81; Romero 2001: 174-176; Vialet 2002: 13; 
Schuck 1984: 1-3; Heller 2001: 211-212; Henkin 1987: 855; Henkin 1985; for the connection 
between political theory and the legal discourse see Whelan 1983: 447, 449-450; Schauer 
1986: 1505, 1507; Wu 2001: 62; Aleinikoff 1998; Bosniak 1994; Schuck 1984; Neuman 
1994; Schuck 1998b: 24; Heller 2001; Neuman 1991; Wright 1994; Nafziger 1983; 
Legomsky 1997: 21; Gimpel 1999: 307-308; Chin 2001a: v; Joppke 2001b: 261). Nor has the 
presence of this normative tension in this area escaped the notice of the Supreme Court 
(henceforth in this chapter the Court): “The decisions of this Court with regard to the rights of 
aliens living in our society have reflected fine, and often difficult, questions of values.” (Foley 
v. Connelie (1978): 294) It is thus clear that the normative tension between universal 
individual rights and national self-determination is very central to the issue of non-citizens’ 
legal standing, and “in what follows, we shall see that these two different ideological threads 
-  the one denying that a society owes aliens any obligation to which it does not consent, the 
other affirming the existence of certain obligations to aliens owed simply by reason of their
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humanity -  are woven throughout the fabric of immigration law.” (Schuck 1998b: 24; see also 
Gimpel 1999: 307-308; Joppke 2001b: 261)
The normative tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales can, 
symptomatically enough, be traced to the very first federal immigration policy, the 1798 Alien 
and Sedition Acts, and the constitutional debate that followed it. In this debate the 
Jeffersonians, including Madison, stressed the universal language of the Constitution. More 
specifically, they argued that non-citizens were persons and thus could invoke the protection 
of the Constitution, and that the Acts were therefore unconstitutional. The federalists, on the 
other hand, argued that non-citizens were not parties to the Constitution, and that only 
Americans were protected by the Constitution, and the Act therefore was constitutional. 
Neither side in this debate won an outright victory, and it was instead moderate federalists -  
like Chief Justice John Marshall -  who gained ground. The moderate federalists defended the 
Acts, while still claiming that non-citizens held certain rights under the Constitution (Neuman 
1991: 927-938; Scaperlanda 1997: 1601-1604).68
The normative essence of the debate around non-citizens’ legal standing remains the same to 
this day and the moderate federalists’ intermediary position resonates with the current 
alienage jurisprudence in the U.S. (Henkin 1987: 855; Nafziger 1983: 835; Legomsky 1997: 
100-109; Smith 2001: 2). It is of note, however -  the overall stability of the normative tension 
withstanding -  that the two rationales have dominated the political and legal discourse at 
different times. The cosmopolitan rationale dominated the attitude towards non-citizens in the 
U.S. during the country’s first century:
The liberalism o f  A m erica’s first century conceived o f  persons as autonomous, self-defining  
individuals possessing equal moral worth and dignity and equally entitled to society’s 
consideration and respect. This entitlem ent was in principle universally shared, a natural right 
deriving not from the particularities o f  on e’s time, place or status, but from one’s irreducible 
humanity. . . .  [This] Liberal ideology w as reflected in a policy o f  essentially open borders, one that 
strongly encouraged, indeed actively recruited, mass immigration to the United States. (Schuck  
1998b: 20)
The cosmopolitan rationale is, furthermore, evident in some congressional acts and treaties 
from this time, and it has also left lasting imprints on alienage jurisprudence, as will become
68 The Sedition and A lien Friends A cts included sunset clauses and expired in 1800 and 1801 (Neuman 1991: 
927).
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evident below (Burlingame Treaty art. V; Expatriation Act). That said, the cosmopolitan 
notion never stood unopposed, and not even the U.S.’s initial policy of open borders was as 
unambiguous as popular belief would have it. The fact is that many states restricted entry on 
health grounds and banned paupers and convicts from entry (Neuman 1993a: 249; Schuck 
1998c: 213; Weissbrodt 1992: 2-3).
Moreover, the strength of the cosmopolitan notion soon faded. As the U.S. transformed itself 
into a nation-state that successfully competed with other nation-states in the international 
arena, a new conception of non-citizens’ legal standing gained ground. This notion was based 
on the values of national sovereignty, and it emphasised the interest of the nation and its 
members (Schuck 1998b: 23; Legomsky 1997: 100-101; Schuck 1984: 20-23). The Court 
started to deploy this new ideology in unambiguous terms during the end of the 17th century, 
and it remains a fundamental part of U.S. law today; see the plenary power doctrine below 
(Nishimura Ekiu v. United States et al. (1892): 659; Fong Yue Ting v. United States et al. 
(1893): 711; for this historical development see Whelan 1983: 448). This means that the 
tension between the cosmopolitan and communitarian rationales has been present from the 
very beginning. Both rationales have gone through periods where they have been more or less 
dominant but the nature of alienage jurisprudence has always been that these two rationales 
co-exist and to some extent must accommodate each other (Meilaender 2001: 116-123; 
Schuck 1998b: 19-81; Romero 2001: 174-176; Vialet 2002: 13; Schuck 1984: 1-3; Heller 
2001: 211-212; Henkin 1987: 855).
The Connection between the Normative Rationales and Law
In order to see in more detail how this tension is created, it is first necessary to look at the 
basic structure of the Constitution. The Constitution lays down a legal framework that is 
meant to ensure individual autonomy by restricting the government’s power. The 
government’s power is restricted, in general, by the fact that it only holds specified powers. 
That is, the Constitution limits the government’s powers in a basic way, by not creating an 
absolute sovereign body.
This constitutional structure and its inherent limitation of the government’s power led some of 
the founding fathers to argue that no extra protection of inalienable a priori rights was 
needed. The government simply had no right to infringe upon these rights in the first place, as 
the government held no powers that were not expressly granted to it in the Constitution.
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However, as is well known, a Bill of Rights (the ten first amendments) defending these 
inalienable rights was soon added to the Constitution. The Bill of Rights was intended to 
make the implicit protection of individuals’ right to liberty explicit, so as to ensure that the 
new federal government would not encroach on individuals’ inalienable rights.
That the Bill of Rights is seen as protecting general a priori rights to individual self- 
determination; that it was not creating specific rights for specific individuals is made clear by 
the ninth amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” (U.S. Constitution amend. 9) A 
further step to shore up the universal right for individuals to exercise autonomy on the basis of 
equality was taken after the Civil War, when the thirteenth and the fourteenth amendments 
were enacted to ensure that no states violated individuals’ inalienable rights to freedom 
(Fleiner-Gerster 1990: 20, 30; Goodwin-Gill 1990: 151-152, 166; Aleinikoff 2003: 114-115; 
Aleinikoff 2002b: 179; Kay 1998: 16-22).69
Parts of the Constitution are thus derived from, and connected to, the longstanding 
cosmopolitan tradition that stretches from Stoicism to natural law philosophy to modem 
cosmopolitanism (Henkin 1979: 409, 411; Rumble 1979; Cole 2003: 11-12). 
Cosmopolitanism is also present in the Declaration of Independence (Konvitz 2001: 38-40): 
“We hold these truth to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.” (The Declaration of Independence)70 The protection of the universal 
individual right to self-determination was, and remains, a central feature of the U.S. 
constitutional order, and the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment rest on the 
cosmopolitan rationale (Henkin 1979: 409, 411; Rumble 1979; Cole 2003: 11-12).
The fact that individual a priori rights enjoy a prominent place in the Constitution does not, 
however, resolve the tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales. 
Firstly, the Constitution and its amendments refer both to citizens, persons and the people as 
holders of basic rights to freedom; the question of exactly who hold these inalienable rights
69 The thirteenth amendment outlaws slavery and the fourteenth provides all persons with the right to equal 
protection under the law in all states.
70 The Declaration o f  Independence does, how ever, contain the normative tension o f  interest here and the very 
last lines, for exam ple, read w e m utually pledge to each other our L ives, our Fortunes and our sacred 
Honor.” (Declaration o f  Independence)
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can therefore be seen as a somewhat moot point (U.S. Constitution see especially art. 1 sec. 2 
cl. 2-3; art. 2 sec. 1 cl. 5; amend. 1,4, 5, 6, 9, 14). Secondly, the federal government has been 
given extra-constitutional powers to regulate immigration, which puts into question the extent 
to which the Constitution protects non-citizens (Schauer 1986: 1508-1510; Aleinikoff 1990: 
19-21; Neuman 1991: 912, 917, 927; Maltz 1996: 1143-1144; Neuman 1996: 52-60).
Hence, the question of non-citizens’ legal standing cannot be answered simply by referring to 
the Constitution. Indeed, two opposing case law doctrines, reflecting the constitutional 
ambiguity and the normative tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian 
rationales, have evolved since the 17th century in the U.S. The two doctrines are known as the 
plenary power doctrine and the aliens’ rights doctrine. These doctrines are still considered 
valid or good law. Indeed, non-citizens’ constitutional and general legal standing can only be 
understood in light of these two doctrines. The normative rationales behind these two case law 
doctrines in fact correspond to the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales, as will be 
described in detail below (Scaperlanda 2001; Bosniak 1994: 1055, 1059-1064; Aleinikoff 
1990; Chin 2001a: xiii; Joppke 2001b: 343-344; Hull 1983b: 220-234; Scaperlanda 1993; 
Chin 2001b; Kelly 2001: 9-24; Romero 2001; Taylor 2001; Joppke 2001a: 39-40; Henkin 
1985: 13).
The Plenary Power Doctrine
The plenary power doctrine first saw the light of day in the Passenger cases,71 when the Court 
established that the states could not regulate immigration since this interfered with the federal 
government’s right to regulate commerce; other enumerated federal powers were also referred 
to. It is important to note that the Court was concerned with federal vs. state jurisdiction at 
this point, rather than the issue of immigration as such (Legomsky 1984: 273-275; Legomsky 
1987: 180-183; Weisselberg 1995: 940-943; Smith v. Turner & Norris v. The City of Boston 
(1849)). A few years later, the Court explicitly ruled that the federal government, in contrast 
to the states, had the right to regulate immigration. The Court’s ruling here was analogous to 
its earlier one in the Passenger cases, in that the federal government was deemed to possess 
this right as part of its explicit or enumerated right to control commerce with foreign nations 
(Edye v. Robertson (1884): 591-592).
71 The Passenger cases dealt with the issue o f  immigration tax. The question w as whether or not a state had the 
right to levy  a tax on immigration, or if  this w ould violate the com m erce clause which grants the federal 
government the prerogative over com m erce that is not internal to states.
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A very significant shift took place in the first Chinese exclusion case. In this case, the Court 
did not invoke the commerce clause or any other enumerated constitutional power. Instead, it 
held that it was an inherent right of all independent sovereign nations to control immigration. 
The plenary power doctrine was thus disconnected from any enumerated constitutional power, 
and instead held as a general and inherent power embodied in national sovereignty 
(Legomsky 1987: 180-192; Weisselberg 1995: 944-947; Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (1889); 
Legomsky 1997: 24-25; Henkin 1985: 25). This so-called sovereignty theory has since been 
the foundation of the plenary doctrine in a long line of Court cases (Legomsky 1987: 184).
It was clear after the first Chinese exclusion case that the federal government, by virtue of 
representing a sovereign nation, had a right to control immigration. It was, only in 1892, 
however -  when the right to detain non-citizens, as part of enforcing immigration laws, was 
challenged -  that the Court established that the federal government’s right to control 
immigration was extra-constitutional (Nishimura Ekiu v. United States et al. (1892); Henkin 
1985: 12, 26-27).72 The basis for the government’s extra-constitutional power in this area is 
not grounded in the Constitution -  indeed it is difficult to see how it could be, as the 
Constitution does not bestow this discretionary power over non-citizens, and only grants the 
federal government the right to enforce a uniform naturalisation policy. The plenary power 
doctrine is instead based on international inter-state law doctrines that provide all sovereign 
nations with the power to exclude and deport non-citizens (Grosh 1974: 1079; Verdeja 2002: 
91; Scaperlanda 1993: 969—972; Aleinikoff 1990: 11— 12; Chin 2001b: 178— 179; Joppke 
2001a: 39; Weisselberg 1995: 939—940, 1014; Legomsky 1997: 7—8; U.S. Constitution art. 
1 sec. 8 cl. 4). This extra-constitutional foundation of the plenary power doctrine is highly 
significant, because where national sovereignty goes the rule of law cannot follow (Legomsky 
1987: 194— 195; Weissbrodt 1992: 50—55; Hesse 1959: 1586, 1609).
The plenary power doctrine is a slightly unusual doctrine in that it is a legal doctrine of legal 
deference. It gives the political branches (the legislative and executive branches) of the 
federal government absolute discretion over the treatment of non-citizens, by virtue of its 
representing the sovereign nation. This means that non-citizens have no inherent or 
constitutional rights but only the privileges that the political branches grant them: “They [non­
72 It should be noted that the Court has later held that extra-constitutional powers based on national sovereignty  
are subject to certain constitutional lim its (Henkin 1985: 26).
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citizens] are guests asserting ‘privileges’ rather than ‘members’ asserting ‘rights’.” (Rubio- 
Marin 2000: 139)
Non-citizens are therefore not relevant to the courts in their function of upholding rights since 
non-citizens are not parties to the law, i.e. right holders (Legomsky 1984: 269—270; Hahn 
1982: 975—977; Aleinikoff 1990; Scaperlanda 1993: 973; Foley v. Connelie (1978); Mathew 
v. Diaz et al. (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952): especially Justice Frankfurter 
concurring; Joppke 2001b: 265; Rosberg 1977b: 316—318; Weisselberg 1995: 939; Schuck 
1998b: 29—31; Taylor 2001: 170— 175; Wu 2001: 69—71; Verdeja 2002: 91—92). The 
negative effect this doctrine has had on non-citizens’ rights is well captured by Bosniak: 
“Broadly speaking, the plenary power doctrine allows the government to subordinate the 
interests of aliens to the perceived interest of the nation.” (Bosniak 1994: 1061) The legal 
basis and implications of the plenary power doctrine also reveal much about its normative 
rationale.
The first key normative element of the plenary power doctrine is that it places the treatment of 
non-citizens outside the constitutional framework, and provides the citizens of the community 
with the right, as a sovereign nation, to pursue their collective good at the expense of non­
citizens’ individual rights. The question, then, is: what underlies this notion of national 
sovereignty? The fact that the political institutions enjoy plenary power and are shielded from 
any external or higher order of law, and in this respect constitute a law unto themselves as the 
representatives of a sovereign nation, strongly indicates that the doctrine rests on the 
communitarian rationale (Weisselberg 1995: 950—951; Aleinikoff 1990: 12; Rubio-Marin 
2000: 139-140; Scaperlanda 2001).73
A closer analysis of the Chinese exclusion cases -  two key plenary power doctrine cases -  
confirms this. In these cases, the Court argued that in affairs affecting foreign nations, the
73 This discretionary power, ipso fa c to , cuts both ways. It can thus appear, at face value, as if  the federal 
government could deploy this plenary power to uphold som e cosm opolitan rights. H ow ever, this w ould be to 
misconstrue the nature o f  the plenary power doctrine. The plenary power doctrine is a doctrine o f  judicial 
deference. Thus its deploym ent means that the federal government is exercising discretion. That is, any rights 
defended under this doctrine can be changed retroactively, and are not guaranteed by the courts. This kind o f  
right does not com e with the security that enables individuals to autonom ously plan their lives (Fong Y ue Ting v. 
United States et al. (1893); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952)). The fact that the federal governm ent can pre­
empt state legislation, both to protect and exclude non-citizens from rights, is a slightly different issue. The point 
here is that if  the federal government bestow s a right on non-citizens then this must be based on a statute not on a 
discretionary right to control non-citizens.
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federal government must have the right to exercise national sovereignty74 in order to 
safeguard its independence (Fong Yue Ting v. United States et al. (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. 
U.S. (1889)). The notion of exercising national sovereignty in order to safeguard the nation 
has two meanings. It relates, on the one hand, to territorial security (Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States et al. (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (1889)). However, the term national sovereignty 
also includes the right and need to preserve the community or the nation. In Aleinikoff s 
words: “Sovereignty meant more than control of borders. It also implied a power to construct 
an ‘American people’ through adoption of membership rules.” (Aleinikoff 2002b: 13-14) 
That is, the Court, in constructing the plenary power doctrine, has gone beyond the right to 
territorial self-defence and argued that a nation’s right to sovereignty includes the right to 
defend its existence as a particular self-defined nation and to pursue its members’ welfare:
The right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class o f  aliens, absolutely or upon certain 
conditions, in war or in peace, being an inherent and inalienable right o f  every sovereign and 
independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its w elfare ... (Fong Y ue Ting v.
United States et al. (1893): 711)
The conceptual marriage between nation and absolute sovereignty, which is central to modem 
nation-states, is clearly expressed here (Evans 1991: 190). The Court has also explained what 
the source and the corresponding limit to national sovereignty is:
‘The jurisdiction o f  the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. A ny  
restrictions upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would im ply a diminution o f  its 
sovereignty to the extent o f  the restriction, and an investment o f  its sovereignty to the sam e extent 
in that pow er which could im pose such restriction. A ll exceptions, therefore, to  the full and 
com plete pow er o f a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent o f  the 
nation itself. They can flow  from no other legitim ate source.’ (Chae Chan Ping v. U .S . (1889):
604, the Court is here approvingly quoting C hief Justice Marshall)
The normative rationale behind the plenary power doctrine is thus straightforward. Non­
citizens must submit to the will of the American nation; or else the American nation will not 
be absolutely sovereign, as it will be submitting to an external or alien power, and this is not 
acceptable, since the nation is the sole legitimate source of its own laws. The right to wield 
plenary power or exercise absolute sovereignty hence rests on the nation’s rights to self- 
determination, and this means that non-citizens can make no higher appeal than to the
74 It is noteworthy that the term state  sovereignty is never used.
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political branches of government, which constitute the expression of popular sovereignty 
(Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (1889): 602-603). The right of national self-determination hence 
trumps the universal values embodied in the Constitution. The question, then, is who has the 
right to define the nation. That is, who holds the right to communal formation, i.e. where does 
the power to form a sovereign nation lie? The Court has provided a clear answer to this 
question:
‘Every Society possesses the undoubted right to determine w ho shall com pose its members, and it 
is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war.’ ‘It m ay always be questionable whether a resort 
to this pow er is warranted by the circumstances, or what department o f  government is em powered  
to exert it; but there can be no doubt that it is possessed by all nations, and that each m ay decide 
for itse lf  when the occasion arises demanding its exercise’ (Chae Chan Ping v . U .S . (1889): 607, 
here the Court quotes Mr. Marcy approvingly)
N or can it be doubted that it is the inherent right o f every independent nation to determine for 
itself, and according to its own constitution and law s, what classes o f  persons shall be entitled to 
its citizenship (United States v. W ong Kim Ark (1898): 668)
The exclusion o f  aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in the democratic 
system  but a necessary consequence o f the com m unity’s process o f  political self-definition. Self- 
governm ent, whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining the scope o f  the 
com m unity o f the governed and thus o f  the governors as well: A liens are by definition those 
outside o f  this com munity. (Cabell et al.v. Chavez-Salido (1982): 4 3 9 -4 4 0 )
The Court has also explicitly linked the government’s right to treat non-citizens 
discretionarily with the fact that it represents a particular nation and that its members have the 
right to communal self-determination:
Citizens are the members o f  the political com munity to which they belong. They are the people 
w ho com pose the com m unity, and w ho, in their associated capacity, have established or submitted 
them selves to the dom inion o f  a government for the promotion o f  their general welfare and their 
protection o f their individual as w ell as their collective rights. (United States v. Cruikshank et al. 
(1875): 549)
The phrase “the people o f  the United States” is synonym ous with “citizens”, both describing the 
political body w ho, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and w ho hold 
the power and conduct the government through their representatives. (B oyd v. State o f  Nebraska:
150 (1892), see also; M inor v. Happersett (1874))
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The idea here is thus that a political community like the U.S. is constituted by a distinct and 
particular people/nation. This notion, in turn, gives rise to the idea that membership is not a 
morally arbitrary fact. The nation is created by the people for the people; thus with 
membership comes the right to be of moral concern and to hold rights; and the flipside of this 
right is that the nation has the right to treat non-citizens discretionarily. The moral 
significance of membership -  and non-citizens’ lack thereof -  thus ultimately explains why 
non-citizens lack legal standing according to the plenary power doctrine, and why the Court 
has ruled that (Pergler 1928: 136-137, 155; Romero 2001: 169-187; Schuck 1998b: 33):75
This right [to expel non-citizens] is based on the fact that, the foreigner not making a part o f  the 
nation, his individual reception into the territory is  a matter o f  pure permission, o f  simple 
tolerance, and creates no obligation. (Fong Y ue Ting v. United States et al. (1893): 708, here the 
Court is approvingly quoting Ortolan)
The normative foundation behind the plenary power doctrine is thus ultimately that the U.S. 
has a right to political/communal formation as an independent nation, and with this comes the 
right to treat non-members discretionarily, and to subordinate their interests to the interests of 
the nation; it is to this end that the plenary power doctrine provides the representatives of the 
nation plenary power over non-citizens (for the most elaborate jurisprudential analysis of the 
connection between communal formation and the plenary power doctrine, see Scaperlanda 
2001). This is something that has not escaped legal scholars:
T o account for the privileged status that federal alienage classifications enjoy in classical 
immigration law , w e must look, I suspect, neither to the alien’s condition nor to the Constitution’s 
t e x t  Rather, the explanation can be found in the classical tradition’s self-consciously political 
definition o f national com m unity and in its norm o f  extraordinary judicial deference to that choice. 
(Schuck 1998b: 34)
And Scaperlanda notes, in relation to the outcome of a particular plenary power doctrine case, 
that “Values of communal formation and protection... proved determinative.” (Scaperlanda
75 A  quick look at the historical backdrop to the plenary pow er doctrine further underscores this conclusion. The 
plenary pow er doctrine grew out o f  the anti-Asian law s, which gave the governm ent the right to exclude  
uncivilised people from the American nation. The birth o f  the plenary pow er doctrine and its foundation is thus 
historically rooted in the notion o f  intrinsic differences between com m unities, in this case racial differences 
(Schuck 1998b: 33, Scaperlanda 2001; Chin 2001b: 119; A lein ik off 2002b: 2 3 -2 4 , 31).
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2001: 114) Scaperlanda has also elaborated on the normative roots of the plenary power 
doctrine, and what the normative rationale behind it represents in practical terms:
The plenary doctrine, rooted in the nineteenth century conceptions o f  absolute sovereignty, today 
stands for that proposition that members o f the political com m unity have a right superior to any 
claim ed by a noncitizen to fashion rules governing the adm ission, exclusion  and expulsion o f  
noncitizens. (Scaperlanda 1997: 1595)
In sum, the plenary power doctrine is a doctrine of judicial deference that provides the 
political representatives of the nation discretionary powers over non-citizens. This 
discretionary right rests on the communitarian rationale, since it is based on the notion that the 
U.S. has a right to political formation and the right to pursue its collective interest at the 
expense of non-members by virtue of constituting a particular community. This right to 
plenary power, then, in the end rests on the idea that membership is prior to rights 
(Scaperlanda 1993: 969-975, 1001; Nafziger 1983: 822-823; Aleinikoff 1990; Scaperlanda 
2001: 101, 112,117, 158, 163; Heller 2001: 216; Martin 1983: 195-201).76
The Aliens’ Rights Doctrine
It may seem as though the plenary power doctrine undermines the notion of a tension between 
the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales in this context. However, as Aleinikoff 
points out: “Constitutional law... has never adopted the view that, as non-members, aliens are 
wholly beyond the purview of the Constitution.” (Aleinikoff 1990: 18) Shuck makes a similar 
point, but emphasises that the plenary power doctrine has been the dominant force:
76 The extra-territorial argument, occasionally  deployed in plenary pow er exclusion  cases, holds that the law of  
the U .S . does not extend beyond its borders; hence non-citizens are not protected by it (Legom sky 1984; 
Scaperlanda 1993). This argument is worth special attention, since it at face value could indicate that the Court 
relies on a functional rather that intrinsic difference between members and non-citizens in plenary power cases.
This argument must, how ever, be seen in light o f  the fact that it depends on a legal fiction, nam ely the fiction  
o f  non-citizens being outside the U .S . when they apply for entry (Hahn 1982). (The fact that non-citizens are 
legally outside, and not physically  outside, or in any other w ay outside the control or jurisdiction o f  the U .S ., 
points to the fact that this argument is based on the intrinsic difference that m embership m akes, rather than on 
functional grounds relating to the practical exercise o f  authority. It is after all the U .S . that exercises its authority 
over these individuals on its ow n territory, so  no functional reason for excluding non-citizens exists. This 
conclusion is further underpinned by the fact that the Constitution applies to the U .S .’s governm ent when it is 
exercising its authority over its own citizens abroad (Hahn 1982; Reid v. Covert (1957); R oss v. McIntyre 
(1891)). Reid v. Covert explicitly  stated that citizens are entitled to full legal protection when the U .S .’s 
government reaches out to punish them abroad. That is, the issue is not -  in the case o f  citizens -  one o f  territory, 
but one o f  w ho is exercising authority, whereas the opposite principle som etim es is applied to non-citizens (Reid  
v. Covert (1957)).
The fact that non-citizens’ ties to the U .S . affect the legal protection they receive when w ishing to re-enter the 
U .S . further underscores the fact that membership, and not physical presence, is what m akes the difference in 
these cases (W eisselberg 1995; Chin 2001a; Landon v. P lasencia (1982)).
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It is true that aliens w ere not w holly excluded from constitutional protection. A s early as 1886, for 
exam ple, the Supreme Court strongly affirmed that the Constitution safeguards a ll  individuals 
within the United States, including aliens, from invidious discrimination by the states. Less than 
twenty years later, the Court ruled that even an excludable alien was entitled to at least a minimal 
form o f  administrative due process. But while these holdings demonstrated that the universalistic 
character o f  traditional liberalism retained som e force during the classic  period, [the period when  
the U .S . abandon its open borders policy and developed the plenary pow er doctrine] they hardly 
defined an expansive national community. (Schuck 1998b: 27, em phasis in original)
In fact, the plenary power doctrine has, almost from the start, co-existed with the aliens’ rights 
doctrine (Taylor 2001: 133, 175).77 The aliens’ rights doctrine, as the very name implies, 
holds that certain constitutional rights are truly universal and therefore cannot be nullified by 
the plenary power doctrine -  and hence these rights cover non-citizens. The thrust of the 
aliens’ rights doctrine stems from the parts of the Constitution that most clearly aim at 
upholding a priori rights to individual autonomy, particularly those constitutional rights that 
are formulated in terms of persons. These rights constitute parts of the Bill of Rights and the 
fourteenth amendment, which, as discussed above, were conceived of as a priori rights to 
individual self-determination that all human beings have an equal and universal right to, 
simply as persons. The Court has thus in part based its alienage jurisprudence on the 
cosmopolitan rationale (Martin 1983: 175-178; Scaperlanda 2001: 106-109; Romero 2001: 
173; Kelly 2001: 14-18; Taylor 2001: 133; Joppke 2001a: 39). This means that non-citizens’ 
inherent rights are protected even against the federal government, representing the sovereign 
people/nation, in certain cases (Bosniak 1994: 1095-1096; Rubio-Marin 2000: 178).
The aliens’ rights doctrine has a less elaborate history than the plenary power doctrine, and its 
core is constituted by two cases (Scaperlanda 2001: 113). The first case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
established that the fourteenth amendment protects non-citizens. This means that states are 
constitutionally prohibited from depriving non-citizens of their basic individual rights to 
liberty, and that non-citizens enjoy protection from invidious discrimination vis-a-vis states 
(Taylor 2001: 175; Kelly 2001: 15). The Wong Wing case established that the federal 
government is constitutionally prohibited from depriving non-citizens of the right to due 
process of law and a fair trial, as laid down in the fifth and the sixth amendments (Taylor 
2001: 176; Kelly 2001: 15; Wong Wing et al.v. United States (1896); Henkin 1985: 16). As 
will become clear below, the fifth and the fourteenth amendments stand at the heart of
77 It should be noted that this doctrine som etim es is referred to as the personhood doctrine or the Y ick W o  
tradition (Romero 2001: 173; Scaperlanda 2001; 133; Bosniak 1994: 1060-1061; Scaperlanda 1993: 989).
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individuals’ right to liberty and equal concern, and these two cases are crucial in that they 
establish that there is a limit to the government’s power over non-citizens -  at least in certain 
areas.
The very nature of the rights that these amendments protect gives a strong indication that the 
normative rationales behind these rights are cosmopolitan. Indeed, a closer look at the core 
aliens’ rights cases confirms this. The Yick Wo case involved Chinese launderette operators. 
The Court mentioned in passing that the U.S. had a treaty obligation to treat Chinese citizens 
on par with U.S. citizens, but the case was ultimately about the interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment. Thus the case was about non-citizens in general, and not only about Chinese 
citizens specifically:
The questions w e have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore, are to be treated as 
involving the rights o f  every citizen o f  the United States equally with those o f  the strangers and 
aliens w ho now invoke the jurisdiction o f  the court. (Y ick  W o v. Hopkins (1886): 369)
The Court’s ruling was based on the grounds that the enforcement of the statute in question 
constituted a transparent attempt to discriminate against non-citizens, rather than a legitimate 
regulation of business, and that the plaintiffs’ fourteenth amendment rights therefore had been 
violated (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886): 365-368). The Court then quoted its established 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment:
[ . . .]  the fourteenth am endm ent... ‘undoubtedly intended, not only that there should be no arbitrary 
deprivation o f  life  or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation o f  property, but that equal protection and 
security should be given to all under like circum stances in the enjoym ent o f  their personal and 
civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness, and acquire and 
enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts o f  the country for the protection o f  
their persons and property, the prevention and redress o f  wrongs, and the enforcem ent o f  contracts; 
that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits o f  any one, except as applied to the same 
pursuits by others under like circumstances: that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than 
are laid on others in the sam e calling and condition; and that, in the administration o f  criminal 
justice, no different or higher punishment should be im posed upon one than such as is prescribed  
to all for like offences. (Y ick  W o v. Hopkins (1886): 3 6 7 -3 6 8 )
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The Court thus held that non-citizens, under the fourteenth amendment,78 have an individual 
universal right to be equal before the law, that all individuals have a right to invoke the 
protection of the law and that all persons are ‘equally entitled to pursue their happiness’ (Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins (1886): 367). The Court made it very clear that these rights were universal in 
nature and that the petitioners’ lack of membership in the community was irrelevant to their 
right to legal protection:
The rights o f  the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings o f  which they com plain, are no less  
because they are aliens and subjects to the emperor o f  China. . . .  The fourteenth amendment o f  the 
constitution is not confined to the protection o f  citizens. It says: ‘Nor shall any state deprive any 
person o f  life  liberty, or property without due process o f  law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection o f  the law s.’ These provisions are universal in their application, to  
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any difference o f  race, o f  color, or 
o f  nationality. (Y ick  W o v. Hopkins (1886): 3 6 8 -3 6 9 )
It should be noted that the first aliens’ rights doctrine case pertained to the fourteenth 
amendment, which only applies to states. The doctrine was, however, soon expanded to the 
fifth and the sixth amendments, which apply to the federal government.
Applying this reasoning [that the term person is not confined to citizens] to the fifth and the sixth  
amendments, it must be concluded that all persons within the territory o f  the United States are 
entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to  
answer for a capital or other infam ous crime, unless presentment or indictment o f  a grand jury, nor 
be deprived o f  life , liberty, or property without due process o f  law . (W ong W ing et al. v. United  
States (1896): 238)
The aliens’ rights doctrine thus extends to the federal government. It circumscribes both the 
federal government’s and the states’ discretion over non-citizens.79 The universality of, and 
inclusion of all non-members in, certain constitutional rights -  in particular, rights bestowed 
on persons in the Constitution -  has been reiterated and re-confirmed by the Court on several 
occasions (Trauax v. Raich (1915): 39; Plyler v. Doe (1982): 210):
78 It should be noted that the first section o f  the fourteenth amendment pertains to U .S. c itizens’ right to be 
citizens o f  the state where they reside, and establishes that ‘no state shall abridge the rights o f  U .S . citizens’ 
(U .S. Constitution amend. 14). The amendment then talks about all p e r so n s’ rights to  life  liberty and property, 
the due process o f  law and the equal protection o f  law s. It is  this latter part o f  the amendment that the Court is 
referring to in this case.
79 The difference, in terms o f  application, between the fourteenth amendment and the B ill o f  R ights is, however, 
significant -  because the fact that states do not constitute nations has im plications for their right to circumscribe 
non-citizens’ rights to equal concern qua  individuals. This w ill be discussed in more detail below .
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In concluding that “all persons within the territory o f  the United States,” including aliens 
unlawfully present, m ay invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions by the 
Federal Government, w e reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Am endment was 
designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries o f  a state. (Plyler v. D oe (1982): 212)
U se o f  the phrase “within its jurisdiction” thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the 
understanding that the protection o f  the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or 
stranger, w ho is subject to the law s o f  a State, and reaches into every com er o f  the State’s territory.
That a person’s initial entry into a State or into the United States, was unlaw ful, and that that he 
m ay for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the sim ple fact o f his presence within a State’s 
territorial perimeter. (Plyler v. D oe (1982): 215)
Even one w hose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that 
constitutional protection. (M athew v. D iaz et al. (1976): 77, the Court here refers to the fourteenth 
and fifth amendments and approvingly cites W ong W ing v. U .S . and Sung v. U .S .)
These rulings do not rest on the fact that non-citizens are members of some sort, or on some 
level, of the U.S., but hold that even ‘strangers and aliens’ have these rights (Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins (1886): 369). The fact that the Fong Yue Ting ruling establishes that non-citizens 
have certain constitutional rights even though they remain ineligible for citizenship and can be 
deported at will, and that illegal immigrants are included in this protection, further 
underscores this point (Fong Yue Ting v. United States et al. (1893); Maltz 1996: 1151-1154; 
Plyler v. Doe (1982); Barbier v. Conally (1884); Wong Wing et al.v. United States (1896)). 
Neuman has succinctly summarised the universal meaning that these amendments have been 
given and the implications of this for Congress’ power over non-citizens:
Thus the Court held even Congress to the approach based on the mutuality o f  legal obligation, and 
confirmed that nonmembership in the social com pact does not deprive individuals present within  
the United States and subject to the law s o f  the concom itant right to the protection o f  the 
fundamental law o f  the land. (Neuman 1996: 63)
A closer look at this doctrine also shows that these universal rights ultimately are based on the 
cosmopolitan rationale:80
80 T w o slightly contradictory historical facts further support this conclusion. One, these rights were granted to 
‘Chinamen’ after the 1882 Chinese Exclusion A ct, which barred further Chinese immigration and stipulated that 
Chinese people were ineligible for citizenship (M altz 1996: 1149; Smith 2001: 4; Chin 2001b: 1 32-135). It is  
against this historical backdrop that the expression ‘even aliens’, with the connotation o f  som eone utterly
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It is , indeed quite true that there must always be lodged  somewhere, and in som e person or body, 
the authority o f  final decision; and in m any cases o f  mere administration, the responsibility is  
purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal o f  the public judgem ent, exercised  
either in the pressure o f  opinion, or by means o f the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to  life, 
liberty and the pursuit o f  happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those 
m axim s o f  constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victories progress o f  the race 
in securing to men the blessings o f  civilization under the reign o f  just and equal law s, so  that, in 
the fam ous language o f  the M assachusetts bill o f  rights, the government o f  the com m onwealth  
‘m ay be a governm ent o f  law s and not o f  m en.’ For the very idea that one man m ay be com pelled  
to hold his life, or the m eans o f  living, or any other material right essential to the enjoym ent o f  life, 
at the mere w ill o f  another, seem s to be intolerable in any country where freedom  prevails, as 
being the essence o f  slavery itself. (Y ick W o v. Hopkins (1886): 370)
. . .  all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness, and acquire and enjoy property;
. . .  they should have like access to the courts o f  the country for the protection o f  their persons and 
property, the prevention and redress o f  wrongs, and the enforcement o f  contracts; . . .  no 
impedim ent should be interposed to the pursuits o f  any one, except as applied to the same pursuits 
by others under like circumstances: (Y ick  W o v. Hopkins (1886): 367)
The reference to Massachusetts’ Bill of Rights is significant, as the Court’s rulings in these 
cases must be seen in light of the underlying philosophy of Bills of Rights in U.S. 
jurisprudence. Individuals have, from the beginning of U.S. jurisprudence, been seen as 
holding universal and a priori rights to individual autonomy. Basic individual freedoms are 
not created by the government or the Constitution, but the Constitution in general, and the Bill 
of Rights and the fourteenth amendment in particular, exist to ensure that these universal and 
a priori rights to individual autonomy are respected (Henkin 1979: 409, 411; Rumble 1979; 
Cole 2003:11-12).
The Court’s decision to limit the political branches’ discretionary power over non-citizens so 
as to uphold non-citizens’ ‘fundamental rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, 
considered as individual possessions under the reign of just and equal laws’, must be 
understood in this context (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886): 370). In sum, the aliens’ rights 
doctrine must thus be said to rest on the cosmopolitan rationale. This conclusion is based on 
the idea that equal personhood in itself, independent of membership, entitles all individuals to
unfamiliar, foreign and disconnected should be read. Tw o, the abolition o f  slavery had rem oved the m ost severe 
im pedim ent to a universal application o f  the Constitution (Neum an 1996: 62).
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certain rights in order to exercise individual self-determination on equal terms; and these 
rights lie beyond the power of popular sovereignty (Schuck 1998b: 27; Heller 2001: 203-204, 
211, 216; Hull 1983a: 228; Neuman 1991: 941-943; Maltz 1996: 1158).81
In conclusion, the two case law doctrines correspond to the cosmopolitan and the 
communitarian rationales, and the tension between these two rationales pervades the legal 
discourse around non-citizens’ legal standing in the U.S.:
Ultim ately, it appears that that the tw o lines o f  cases are not part o f  a coherent w hole, but rather 
reflect conflicting strands in our constitutionalism: one concerned with affirming the importance o f  
membership in a national community; the other pursuing a notion o f fundamental human rights 
that protects individuals regardless o f their status. (A lein ikoff 1990: 19)
81 It should be noted that a minority o f  the Court at one point seem ingly attempted to undermine the aliens’ rights 
doctrine by arguing that non-citizens needed to have established a substantial connection with the U .S . in order 
to enjoy constitutional protection.
This attempt took place in the Verdugo-Urquidez case. This case deals with the fourth amendment, which  
protects the people, not persons, against unreasonable searches and seizures. Rehnquist, the former ch ief Justice, 
writing for the Court, dism issed the defence’s claim  that the accused was protected by the Constitution in general 
in a sw eeping statement; in so  doing he argued that the cases relied upon, am ong them Y ick W o and W ong  
W ing, w ere inapplicable:
These cases, however, establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory 
of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country. ... Respondent is an alien who has had no 
previous significant voluntary connection with the United States, so these cases avail him not. (Unites States v. Verdugo- 
Urquidez (1990): 271, emphasis added)
If a substantial connection with the U .S ., which goes beyond the fact that the U .S. is exercising its authority over  
the non-citizen, is a pre-condition for enjoying any constitutional protection, then the a liens’ rights doctrine is no  
more. Rehnquist’s communitarian reading o f  the Constitution w as, however, explicitly  refuted by a majority o f  
the justices (Neuman 1991; Scaperlanda 1991; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990); see K ennedy’s 
concurring opinion, which explicitly rejects the limited interpretation of the term people; see a lso Stevens, who  
concurred in the judgm ent, but also rejected the idea that a substantial connection to the U .S. w as necessary for 
enjoying fourth amendment protection, and the protection o f the B ill o f  Rights in general.)
The fact that the substantial connection requirement w as only endorsed by a minority is natural, g iven  that 
the Court, in a long series o f  cases, has held that all non-citizens enjoy the protection o f  the constitution, arguing 
that ‘strangers and aliens’ enjoy the same protection as citizens and that the notion o f  jurisdiction is connected to 
when power is exercised over a non-citizen and not to the defendant’s connection to the legal com m unity (Plyler  
v. D oe (1982); W ong W ing et al.v. United States (1896)). Even in Traux v. Raich, where the issue o f  being a 
lawful inhabitant arises, it on ly does so in relation to the federal prerogative to regulate immigration (Torao  
Takahasshi v . Fish and Gam e Com m ission (1948); Traux v. Raich (1915)). This m eans that the claim  in the 
Verdugo-Urquidez is  unsupported and fundamentally at odds with a core constituent o f  alienage jurisprudence 
(Scaperlanda 1991; Taylor 2001). It is thus hardly surprising that the Court reconfirmed its universal 
interpretation o f  certain parts o f  the Constitution, after the Verdugo-Urquidez case. The Court held in 2001, 
eleven years after the Verdugo-Urquidez case, that “ . . .  the Due Process Clause [o f  the fifth amendment] applies 
to all “persons” within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is law ful, unlawful, 
temporary or permanent.” (Zadvydas v. D avis (2001): 693)
In sum, Rehnquist’s attempt at re-interpreting the aliens’ rights doctrine w as a reminder that the exclusive  
communitarian reading o f  the Constitution which underlay the defence o f  the A lien and Sedition Acts o f  1798, is 
alive and well; this view  w as, how ever, at no point accepted by the majority o f  the Court and remains dicta  
(Henkin 1996: 307; Rubio-M arin 2000: 155; H eller 2001: 203 -204; Scaperlanda 1991: 2 1 3 -2 4 3 ).
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Contrasting sharply with plenary pow er and the m embership cases, the personhood tradition 
[another name for the aliens’ rights doctrine] takes seriously constitutional claim s made by  
noncitizens, recognizing that noncitizens are “persons” entitled to constitutional protection. . . .  The 
personhood cases rest on the proposition that sharing “our com mon humanity, noncitizens are 
protected by all guarantees o f  the Constitution.” (Scaperlanda 1997: 1 5 9 6 -1 5 9 7 , Scaperlanda is 
quoting Fileld's dissent in Fong Yue Ting v. U .S .)
This tension in the alienage jurisprudence runs very deep and it is an extension of a similar 
tension in the Constitution. The tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian 
rationales in U.S. alienage jurisprudence hence ultimately reflects the dual nature of U.S. 
constitutionalism:
Sovereignty o f  the people im plies self-governm ent by the people, directly or through chosen  
representatives. But every individual retains som e o f his or her original autonom y as ‘rights’ which  
are protected even against the people and their representatives. Our constitutionalism , then, has 
two elements: representative government and individual rights. (Henkin 1979: 408)
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Section II
The second section of this case study is dedicated to deducing the normative rationales behind 
the 17 rights listed in the first chapter. This task will be accomplished by building on the 
analysis of the two case law doctrines and the nature of the Constitution that has just been 
carried out in Section I. In practical terms, it can be said that the task will be undertaken one 
realm at the time. This means that the law as it applies to the specific rights in one realm will 
be outlined, where after the normative rationales that underlie these laws will be deduced. 
This process will then be repeated until all five realms have been analysed.
The Admissions Realm
Only immigrants who fall within one of three admissions categories are currently admitted to 
the U.S. These categories are: labour immigrants, family immigrants and refugees (Legomsky 
1997: 99; Carliner 1990: 61; Studies 2002; Committee 2004). The system for admission of 
labourers is fairly complicated, but labour immigrants can be subdivided into three specific 
categories: workers with extraordinary abilities, workers who hold advanced degrees or the 
equivalent, and workers who can perform skilled labour. All three categories are subjected to 
numerical limits. The additional requirements that no qualified native worker can fill the 
position and that the hiring of a non-citizen does not adversely affect the wages of native 
workers in the same field applies to the second and third categories (INA 203 (b), 212 (a) (5) 
(A-C); Legomsky 1997:172-174; Boswell 1992: 347).82
Family immigration is sub-divided into four categories (Legomsky 1997: 131; INA 201 (b), 
203 (a-d)). The first sub-category is for citizens’ immediate family members -  defined as 
spouses, parents and children of U.S. citizens; the second sub-category is for spouses and 
unmarried children of permanent residents; the third sub-category is for married children of 
U.S. citizens and the fourth sub-category is for brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens. There is 
no numerical limit on the first sub-category, but the other three are restricted numerically 
(Boswell 1992: 347-348; Nedzel 1997: 135; INA 201 (b), 203 (a-d)).
82 There are also special provisions for so-called special immigrants. Special immigrants are people w ho have 
work/worked for the U .S . government or certain international organisations and persons w ho are m inisters o f  
religion. A  specific provision for immigrants w ho are w illing to make a considerable investm ent in the U .S . also  
exists (Legom sky 1997: 201— 204; A lein ikoff 1998: 378; INA 101 (a) 27; 203 (b) (5)).
There is, moreover, a specific diversity category, and its aim is to increase the number o f  immigrants from low  
adm ission countries. Applicants for this sub-category are selected randomly, by lot from selected countries, but 
there are som e minimal educational/skill provisions, and applicants must be adm issible in general (IN A  203 (c); 
B osw ell 1992: 348; Legom sky 1997: 204 -2 0 5 ; N edzel 1997: 136 -137 , for general admissibility see below ).
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The U.S. offers four different kinds of relief for refugees: asylum, refugee status, withholding 
of removal (non-refoulement), and Torture Convention relief. All these forms of relief are 
derived from humanitarian international law (Anker 1999: 2). The difference between asylum 
and refugee status is mainly geographical. The difference lies in the fact that asylum seekers 
are present in -  or at the border of -  the U.S., whereas overseas refugees apply and are 
screened for political asylum abroad (Legomsky 1997: 750-751; Bruno 2002; INA 207-208). 
That is, both groups must demonstrate that they are political refugees, defined as individuals 
who have ‘a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion’ (INA 101 (a) (42).
There is an overall annual limit for the number of admitted overseas refugees set by the 
President, who also decides on the allocation between different countries and regions. The 
overseas refugees are then selected according to three criteria, which are distinct from their 
refugee status, albeit the first criterion is concerned with the urgency of resettlement. The 
other two criteria relate to political and family connections to the U.S. respectively 
(Legomsky 1997: 760-765; Bruno 2002; Bureau of Population 2002). Asylum seekers must 
also demonstrate that they are entitled to political asylum, but no numerical limit applies to 
asylum seekers.83
Asylum seekers and overseas refugees, however, have no right to be granted political asylum. 
That is, asylum is not a statutory right for persons who fulfil the criteria (Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987); Immigration and Nationality Act 208). 
There are, moreover, a number of statutory bars to receiving asylum. Individuals who have 
participated in persecutions; people who are convicted or seriously suspected of a particularly 
serious crime; people who are involved in terrorist activity; people who on reasonable 
grounds can be considered to endanger the security of the U.S., are barred from receiving 
asylum (INA 208 (b)).
The discretionary power over the granting of political asylum does not cover the two other, 
more basic, forms of relief. That is, non-refoulement is a statutory right that protects a refugee
83 Save for individuals w ho seek  asylum in order to avoid persecution in the form o f  coercive population policies 
(INA 207 (a) (5)). It should be noted, how ever, that U .S. immigration judges had ruled that general coercive  
population policies did not constitute persecution, as opposed to targeted policies o f  this nature. That is, 
Congress added this group to the list, but also added a numerical restriction (Representatives: 1996: (1)).
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from being sent back to a country where her ‘life or freedom would be threatened in that 
country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion’ (Immigration and Nationality Act 241 (b) (3)). There are also a 
number of bars to non-refoulement. The bars to non-refoulement are more or less the same as 
in the case of asylum, only defined slightly more narrowly. The crime committed must be of a 
more serious nature, the suspicion of committed crimes must be stronger, and only individuals 
who have actually taken part in terrorist activities, rather than being involved as members or 
supporters of terrorist organisations, are excluded from non-refoulement (Legomsky 1997: 
768-769; Anker 1999: 6,459-460; INA 241 (b) (3)).
The Court has, moreover, ruled that a refugee must be able to establish a stronger likelihood 
of persecution in order to obtain non-refoulement relief than for receiving asylum. The 
standard applied in non-refoulement cases is that the risk of persecution is more likely than 
not rather than the well-founded fear of persecution standard that applies in asylum cases 
(Anker 1999: 6; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987)). The 
Torture Convention also provides refugees with a statutory right not to be deported to a 
country if there are substantial grounds for believing that they might be subjected to torture 
there. The substantial grounds standard has, in the U.S., been interpreted as being equivalent 
to the standard applied in non-refoulement cases. The level of protection does differ, however, 
as no bars from protection exist in torture relief cases (Anker 1999: 6, 419, 510-511, 518- 
519, 570; Barnett 2002: 4-5; Cohen 1998: 517-518). Refugees who flee natural disasters or 
famines do not meet the persecution criteria under U.S. law. These kinds of refugees can 
apply for temporary protected status -  which protects them from being removed from the U.S. 
Temporary protected status is, however, not a statutory right and a denial is not judiciable 
(Legomsky 1997: 941-946; INA 242; 244).84
Immigrants from the three main categories outlined above (labourers, family members and 
refugees) must not only fulfil the conditions for one of the described categories, they must, 
moreover, fulfil a number of general admissibility criteria (Legomsky 1997: 290). These 
criteria are numerous, and non-citizens can be deemed inadmissible/excludable on various 
economic, political, health, criminal, quasi-criminal and moral grounds (Boswell 1992: 25). 
More specifically, individuals are deemed inadmissible if they ‘have a communicable disease
84 It is also noteworthy that refugees no longer can be paroled into the U .S . en m asse, but only on an individual 
basis (A lein ik off 1998: 509 -5 1 0 ; IN A 212 (d) (5 » .
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of public health significance’ (INA 212); suffer from certain mental or physical disorders; are 
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude; have multiple criminal convictions; are known 
traffickers of controlled substances; have entered illegally; have entered in order to engage in 
prostitution or commercialised vice; are drug addicts; or are likely to become public charges. 
Reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism, or voluntary membership of a totalitarian 
political party, is also grounds for being deemed inadmissible. Non-citizens whose presence 
would damage U.S. foreign policy are also inadmissible (Nedzel 1997: 137; Legomsky 1997: 
290-320; INA 212).85
Admission to the U.S. furthermore requires a visa, although citizens from a selected group of 
countries are exempted from this requirement.86 A visa is not a right of entry, and the visa 
regime constitutes a pre-check whereby consular personnel abroad screen non-citizens to 
ensure that they are admissible. The visa regime is further shored up by so-called carrier 
sanctions and, occasionally, by further pre-inspection by immigration officers at designated 
foreign ports (Nafziger 1991: 9-12; Gibney 2003: 6; INA 212). The carrier sanctions make 
companies that carry those non-citizens to the U.S. who do not hold the required travel 
documents -  such as a passport and a valid visa -  liable to pay fines (Christian 1999: 216, 
227-231; Gibney 2003: 6).
The effort to ensure that only admissible non-citizens reach the U.S., furthermore, includes 
interdiction on the high seas. These missions are carried out mainly by the Coast Guard 
outside U.S. territory, and the missions’ purpose is to prevent illegal immigrants and asylum
85 O verseas refugees are exem pted from certain o f the inadmissibility criteria. Overseas refugees do not need to 
obtain a labour certificate, demonstrate that they are not likely to becom e public charges, or be in possession  o f  
valid travel docum ents in order to be admitted. M ost other grounds for exclusion can be waived, if  the Attorney  
General so  chooses, save for exclusion grounds related to security. O verseas refugees m ay also bring their 
spouses and children to the U .S ., (and the sam e exceptions apply to fam ily m embers). A  person w ho is granted 
refugee status m ay also obtain permanent residency status after a year (Legom sky 1997: 7 6 0 -7 6 1 ; Anker 1999: 
4; Bruno 2002: 1; IN A  207 , 208, 209 (a)). Asylum  seekers are already in the U .S ., and the issue thus becom es 
one o f  what bars them from obtaining this status (see statutory bars for asylum above).
Individuals w ho are granted asylum  can apply for permanent residency after a year, on the sam e conditions as 
overseas refugees. A  numerical restriction, however, exists on the number o f recognised asylum seekers w ho can 
receive this status each year. This m eans that it m ay take more than one year to obtain this status for recognised  
asylum  seekers. R ecognised asylum  seekers are entitled to bring, as overseas refugees, their spouses and 
unmarried children to  the U .S . (IN A  209  (b); Anker 1999: 4 -5 , 562; Bruno 2002).
The status o f  persons w ho have obtained non-refoulem ent relief is similar to the status o f  asylum  seekers. 
H ow ever, individuals w ho have obtained non-refoulem ent relief cannot adjust their status to permanent 
residency, and they can be rem oved to a safe country (Anker 1999: 564; Shusterman 2004).
86 A few  states are on the visa waiver list. The pre-condition for being on the w aiver list is  that less than 2% o f  
previous visa applications from these states have been rejected during the last tw o years, that the non-visa p olicy  
is reciprocated, and that passports from the country are machine-readable (Christian 1999: 217).
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seekers from reaching the shores of the U.S. Immigration officers do sometimes screen 
passengers for refugee status, but the Coast Guard has, since 1992, under a presidential 
Executive Order, had the right to interdict vessels carrying non-citizens without determining 
their refugee status (Guard 2006: 7; Palmer 1997; Sale v. Haitian Centers Council (1993); 
Executive Order 12807; Gibney 2003; Legomsky 1998: 122-123).
The Rationale(s) Behind the Admissions Realm
At the heart of the plenary power doctrine lies the idea that the U.S. as a sovereign nation has 
the absolute right to control admission, in its own interest:
This Court has repeatedly em phasized the “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power o f  
Congress more com plete than it is over” the admission o f  aliens. (F iallo  v. B ell (1977): 792, the 
Court is here approvingly quoting O ceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan)
The specific provisions regulating labour immigration fit very well with the general 
communitarian thrust behind the government’s right to regulate admission in the interests of 
the nation. Labour immigration in the U.S. is clearly designed to further the interest of the 
U.S., and labour immigrants in no way possess a universal individual right to seek their 
fortune in the U.S.87 This normative thrust can be deduced straight from the text of the Act:
(A ) In general. - V isas shall be made availab le... to qualified im migrants w h o ... w ill substantially 
benefit prospectively the national econom y, cultural or educational interests, or the welfare o f  the 
United States, and w hose services in the sciences, arts, professions, or business are sought by an 
em ployer in the United States. (IN A  203 (2))
The statute in itself hence clearly reveals that labour immigration is intended to serve the 
interest of the U.S. (Aleinikoff 1998: 351, 378; Boswell 1992: 411). The more specific
87 Individuals in the first em ploym ent-based sub-category are not subjected to the labour certification rules (for 
labour certification see b elow ). H ow ever, the adm ission o f  these individuals must, in order for them to be 
deem ed to have extraordinary abilities, ‘substantially benefit prospectively the United States’ (IN A  203 (1)).
The skilled workers are meant to benefit the U .S. more indirectly by providing skilled labour: " ... for which  
qualified workers are not available in the United States.” (IN A  203 (3) (i))
The special immigrants program covers many m inor groups, but the com m on denominator is that they have a
pre-existing relationship with the U .S. Exam ples include people w ho have served with the U .S .’s armed forces,
have been adopted by U .S . citizens, or been em ployed by N ATO  etc (IN A  101 (27)).
The investm ent program also clearly states that the condition for adm ission is that the U .S. as a country 
benefits from the investm ent, and the benefit to the immigrant and her fam ily is explicitly  subtracted from the 
equation (IN A  203 (A ) (5)).
D iversity immigrants are admitted as to moderate the under-representation o f  certain low  admission countries. 
The admittance o f  this group is not related to the labour market, but these immigrants nevertheless need to m eet 
a minim um  threshold o f  sk ills (IN A  203 (c)).
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conditions for labour immigration are also replete with references to the national interest, 
such as that it must be certified that native workers are not available for the jobs in question, 
and that the working conditions of native workers are not adversely affected by the hiring of 
non-citizens, for example (INA 212 (5) (A); Legomsky 1997: 290). The fact that labour 
immigration is intended to serve the interest of the U.S. as a nation -  and not a right non­
citizens hold as equally entitled individuals -  was highlighted in Congressional debates 
pertaining to immigration, both in 1990 and 1996 (Calavita 1992: 74—76; Representatives 
1996). In 1996, the House of Representatives also outlined the general rationale behind 
admitting labourers, and explicated whose interest such immigration is to serve:
The entitlem ent theory, which seeks to fit immigration policy to the demands o f  those w ho w ould  
like to immigrate to the United States, has made it increasingly difficult to  establish a p o licy  that 
selects immigrants according to their ability to advance our national in terest.... The key to legal 
immigration reform is stating clear priorities that reflect the national interest. H.R. 2202  [the bill in 
question] will better match the attributes o f  immigrants w ith the needs o f  the Am erican econom y, 
by increasing the number o f  v isas available for h ighly-skilled and educated immigrants and by  
decreasing the proportion o f  immigrants admitted without regard o f  their level o f  skill and 
education. (Representatives 1996: Title V)
The right to family reunification is a slightly more complex issue. The right to family 
reunification was originally seen as a natural right, but one that could be limited by Congress, 
courtesy of the plenary power doctrine (Guendelsberger 1988: 7-11). The Circuit Court D in 
Oregon held, in a case that later explicitly was upheld by the Court, that (United States v. Gue 
Lim (1900)):
[ . . . ]  a Chinese merchant w ho is entitled to com e into and dwell in the United States is  thereby 
entitled to bring with him, and have with him, his w ife and children. The com pany o f  the one, and 
the care and custody o f  the other, are his by natural rights; and he ought not be deprived o f  either, 
unless the intention o f  con gress to  d o  so  is c le a r  an d  unm istakable. (In re Chung T oy H o and 
W ong C hoy Sin (1890): 400 , em phases added)
The Court endorsed this qualification, and hence found no difficulty in upholding Congress’s 
right to restrict family reunification (Yee Won v. White (1921); In re Chung Toy Ho and 
Wong Choy Sin (1890)). The strength of the plenary power doctrine is very clear in this 
context. The Court has, on several different constitutional grounds, protected the right to 
family unity (Guendelsberger 1988: 64—66). The Court has, for example, held that zoning
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laws that ban extended families from living in certain areas are unconstitutional on fourteenth 
amendment grounds (Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977)). However, when the right to 
family reunification clashes with the right to exclude based on the plenary power doctrine, the 
latter prevails (Guendelsberger 1988: 44—51; Kelly 2001: 5-6). The Court has, as described in 
section I, made the reason for this clear:
‘The jurisdiction o f  the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu sive and absolute. . . .  A ll 
exceptions, therefore, to the full and com plete power o f  a nation within its ow n territories, must be 
traced up to the consent o f  the nation itself. They can f lo w  from no other legitim ate so u rc e / (Chae 
Chan Ping v. U .S . (1889): 604, the Court is  here approvingly quoting C h ief Justice M arshall)88
This means that a family cannot be forced to move from one neighbourhood to another, but 
the government can keep a family that consists of at least one non-citizen separated 
(Guendelsberger 1988: 64—66). The Court makes the ultimate rationale for this disparity very 
clear in Fiallo v. Bell:
And we observed recently that in the exercise o f  its broad pow er over immigration and 
naturalization, “Congress regularly makes rules that w ould be unacceptable if  applied to Citizens.”
(Fiallo v. B ell (1977): 792, here the Court approvingly quotes M athew v. D iaz)
The communitarian thrust of the plenary power doctrine is, moreover, evident in the specific 
provisions regulating family immigration. The preference system in this area is clearly 
constructed around the idea that closeness to U.S. citizens generates more favourable 
treatment. The same level of family connection generates different rights, depending on 
whether the person to be joined is a citizen or not. Thus, it is not the strength of the individual 
claim, but the closeness of the claimant to the national community that determines their place 
in the queue, and only family members of citizens have an unlimited right to admission for the 
purpose of family reunification (Kelly 2001: 49-50). The nation’s right to exercise 
sovereignty in its own interest simply outweighs the universal constitutional rights to family 
unity in other cases. Kelly sums up this point succinctly: “The rights enumerated in Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland have quiedy joined the ranks of constitutional rights disregarded in 
U.S. immigration law.” (Kelly 2001: 51)
88 The Court has even ruled that U .S . citizens do not have a constitutional right to have their alien spouses or 
biological children admitted, albeit they currently have a statutory right to have their children and spouses 
admitted (Fiallo v. B ell (1977); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952)).
116
The communitarian thrust behind the restriction on labour and family immigration is also 
evident in the exclusion/inadmissibility grounds that serve to ensure that the interest of the 
nation is preserved. Some of these grounds are related to security, but many stem from the 
national community’s wish, as represented by the Congress, to keep undesirable non-citizens 
out (see the inadmissibility grounds listed above). Boswell captures the basic rationale behind 
these exclusion grounds well:
The grounds for exclusion are based upon a strong concern that certain people should not be 
allow ed to com e to this country. . . .  The quasi-criminal or moral grounds are designed to prevent 
entry o f  persons w hose behaviour is contrary to the norms o f  society as established by Congress 
when it passed the A ct. . . .  The grounds for exclusion  should be view ed as an expression by this 
country o f  which it does not like, abhors, or otherwise feels should not be allow ed to becom e a 
part o f  this society. It is, by om ission, an expression o f  the kind o f  people w ho m ight make up a 
perfect society. W hen studying these substantive grounds, it must be understood that from a legal 
standpoint, every nation has been recognised to have the absolute right to allow  only those people  
whom  it w ishes to allow  to enter the country. It should also be remembered that these grounds for 
exclusion do not apply to U .S. citizens. (B osw ell 1992: 24—26)
Congressional powers in this area are almost absolute, and normal constitutional limitations 
do not apply, courtesy of the plenary power doctrine (Aleinikoff 1998: 446). The Court held, 
in Kleindienst v. Mandel, that although a first amendment right89 was involved, the 
government needed only to provide ‘a facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ for its desire 
to exclude the non-citizen (Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972): 770). The political branches’ 
discretionary power, as the representatives of the sovereign nation, reaches its zenith in the 
area of admission and expulsion, and ‘Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to Citizens’ in these cases (Mathew v. Diaz et al. (1976): 79-80).
The U.S. also controls access to its shores via its visa regime and interdiction. These policies 
constitute part of the communitarian-based admissions control regime. The visa regime 
simply constitutes an extra control mechanism for ensuring that the inadmissibility criteria are 
enforced. The visa regime hence rests on the same communitarian rationale as the 
inadmissibility criteria. The fact that the visa regime constitutes an element of the 
communitarian-based right to exclude non-citizens is further underscored by the fact that the
89 The right to  freedom o f  speech/conscience.
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plenary power doctrine prevents attempts to make visa decisions appealable (Nafziger 1991: 
11, 30-35). The general purpose of interdiction is also to ensure that unwanted immigrants do 
not reach the U.S. The more particular rationale for interdictions is clear from the Coast 
Guard’s official explanation of the policy:
Interdicting migrants at sea means that they can be quickly returned to their countries o f  origin  
without the costly  processes required i f  they successfully entered the U .S . The Coast Guard 
supports the national Policy to promote safe, legal, and orderly migration. Dlegal immigrants can 
costs [sic] U .S . taxpayers b illions o f  dollars each year in social services. In addition to relieving  
this financial burden on our citizens, the Coast Guard’s efforts help to support the use o f  legal 
migration system . (Guard 2006)
The fact that interdiction is pursued in the interest of the nation is furthermore reflected in the 
development of this policy. All non-citizens were originally screened for refugee status at sea 
or at Guantanamo Bay, but this system came under pressure in 1992, as tens of thousands 
Haitians took to the sea in a desperate effort to reach the U.S. This increased number of boat 
refugees left the U.S. with a choice: it could either screen these people in the U.S., or they 
could be repatriated via interdiction without screening. The U.S. opted for the latter choice. 
The fact that the U.S. made the opposite choice when it was Cubans in the water, although the 
number of Cuban migrants was substantially larger, further underscores the fact that this 
policy is based on the perceived national interest (Palmer 1997: 1573-1579).90
In sum, labour immigrants and immigrants seeking family reunification do not have a 
universal right to admission. Their right to entry is subordinated to the national interest, and 
pre-entry policies in terms of visas and interdictions ensure that no unwanted immigrants 
reach the shores of the U.S.
The U.S. has a long-standing tradition of providing refugees with political asylum, and this 
tradition remains unbroken to this day. The underlying normative rationale has, however, 
changed fairly recently. The refugee admissions program that preceded the 1980 Refugee Act 
only granted asylum to refugees fleeing communist regimes and regimes in the Middle East. 
This meant that geopolitical factors trumped refugees’ individual levels of need under the pre- 
1980 regime (Legomsky 1997: 760; Vialet 2002: 13, 23-26; Hull 1985: 116-122). This
90 The U .S . brokered a deal with Cuba under which Cubans could apply for refugee status at the U .S . Interest 
Section in Havana. The U .S . further allow s a relatively large number o f  Cubans to settle in the U .S . every year 
(Palmer 1997: 1578).
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system changed with the 1980 Refugee Act. This act was designed to comply with, and was 
based on, the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (henceforth the 
Geneva Convention).
The Refugee Act emphasises that the individual merits of claims, and not geographic or 
ideological grounds, should be determinative, although connection to the U.S. and 
geopolitical concerns still play a role in the admission of overseas refugees (Bureau of 
Population 2002: 5; Barnett 2002: 1; Hull 1985: 121; Gibney 2004: 152, 157-158).91 Traces 
of the old refugee policy can thus still be found in the new act. The 1980 Act is, nevertheless, 
a very significant step towards a refugee regime based on international humanitarian law 
principles, as laid down in the Geneva Convention. This is most clearly evident in the 
handling of asylum claims made in the U.S., where there is no foreign policy bias.
To further unravel the normative rationale behind the 1980 Act, it is necessary to look at the 
normative foundation of the Geneva Convention, on which the 1980 Act is based. The 
Geneva Convention does not enumerate specific injures that qualify as persecution. It is 
instead intended to work as a broad framework that protects basic universal rights that are 
fundamental to human dignity, such as the right to minimal economic resources and freedom 
of expression/conscience, for example. The right to human dignity or the individual right to 
autonomy is protected by providing asylum to persons whose life and liberty are threatened 
on the arbitrary grounds of race, religion, nationality membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion (Anker 1999: 171-266).
The concept of human dignity is ultimately based on the cosmopolitan rationale, and traces its 
origins to cosmopolitan thought in general, and in particular to Kant’s notion that no person
91 The first selection criterion is based on refugees’ individual need for resettlement. This leads to a greater 
diversification o f  resettled refugees compared to the pre-1980 regime. However, the President still decides which 
refugees are o f  special humanitarian concern to the United States. Connection to the U .S . and its foreign policy  
hence still counts. This could, o f  course, be taken to mean that the U .S . sim ply chooses to pay special attention to 
individuals w ho becom e refugees due to its foreign policy. However, this provision is a remnant o f  the pre-1980  
policy, and it som ewhat undermines the idea that the individual needs o f  the refugee should be solely  
determinative by including general foreign policy goals in the selection process (IN A  207 (a) (3); Hull 1985: 
119— 122; Bureau o f  Population 2002: 5).
In conclusion, the 1980 A ct is less focused on the national interest and more on universal humanitarian 
concerns, but it still retains a clear elem ent o f  the former. This means that the shift towards a neutral/impartial 
refugee regim e, where individual need trumps any connection to the U .S ., is clear but incom plete (Hull 1985: 
119-122).
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should be reduced to a means so as to deprive them of their ability to live as an autonomous 
person (Dicke 2002; Starck 2002: 179-187). As one international jurist puts it:
What is meant by “respect” for “intrinsic worth” or “inherent dignity” o f  a person? . . .  One general 
answer to our question is suggested by the Kantian injunction to treat every human being as an 
end, not as a m eans. . . .  The first [implication o f  the injunction] is that high priority should be 
accorded in political, social and legal arrangements to individual choices in such matters as beliefs, 
w ay o f  life , attitudes and the conduct o f  public affairs. (Schatter 1983: 849)
It must, of course, be remembered that only non-refoulement is a statutory right in the U.S. It 
is, however, of note, and indicative of the change away from the notion of plenary power in 
refugee law, that the federal government used to have a discretionary right to expel bona fide 
refugees, but non-citizens currently have a statutory right to remain if deportation is more 
likely than not to put a refugee’s life and liberty at risk due to any of the enumerated grounds 
in the 1980 Act (Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987): 429). 
This means that political refugees who reach the shores of the U.S. are afforded the right to 
protection on the cosmopolitan rationale.
The Civil Rights Realm
Non-citizens enjoy the right to freedom of speech and conscience. The Court has explicitly 
established that permanent residents enjoy this right under the first amendment (Bridges v. 
California (1941); Bridges v. Wixon (1945)). The Court has not explicitly ruled on the legal 
standing of other groups of non-citizens in this regard. Legal commentators, including the 
American Law Institute, however, assume that the right to freedom of speech and conscience 
extends to all non-citizens (Aleinikoff 2000: 150; Ciment 2001: 514-515; Heller 2001: 204; 
Henkin 1985: 16; Needelman 1997: 361; Institute 1987: 244; Rubio-Marin 2000: 131, 134). 
This assumption is bolstered by the fact that non-citizens in general enjoy the protection of the 
Bill of Rights (Bowie 1954: 675; Institute 1987: 243-244, 248; Henkin 1996: 284-285, 294).
Non-citizens also have, in general, the right to acquire and hold property. This right is 
guaranteed on a basic level by the fifth amendment, which protects all persons from being 
deprived of life, liberty and property and stipulates that nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation (Ciment 2001: 515; Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United 
States (1931); Carliner 1990: 191-197). (The fourteenth amendment contains a very similar 
clause in relation to states.) Limited restrictions do, however, exist on non-citizens’ rights to
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invest in nuclear plants, broadcasting, oil or mineral fields, defence contracts, merchant 
shipping, air commerce and banking (Carliner 1990: 191-197; Ciment 2001: 515; Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins (1886); Institute 1987: 255).92
The right to freely choose one’s profession is a more complicated issue. Non-citizens who are 
admitted to the U.S. as immigrants do, in general, have access to the labour market, including 
public, private and self-employment, and enjoy some protection from invidious discrimination 
in this sphere. This right does not apply to undocumented residents and asylum seekers 
(Aleinikoff 2002a: 71-74, 90). Non-citizens who are legally in the U.S. are, furthermore, 
protected against discrimination from the states in this area under the fourteenth amendment’s 
due process clause (Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission et al. (1948); Trauax v. 
Raich (1915); Grosh 1974: 1088-1091).
There are, however, exceptions to non-citizens’ right to seek state employment under the so- 
called political-function exception. This exception gives the states a right to bar non-citizens 
from working in professions that are central to states’ political formation, despite the 
fourteenth amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses (Hull 1985: 41-46; Koh 
1985: 60-87; Sugerman v. Dougall (1973); In re Griffiths (1973); Foley v. Connelie (1978); 
Ambach v. Norwick et al. (1979); Cabell et al.v. Chavez-Salido (1982); Bernal v. Fainter et 
al. (1984)). Non-citizens’ protection from discrimination by the federal government under the 
fifth amendment’s due process clause is, in general, weaker than the protection they enjoy 
under the fourteenth amendment, see below (Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong et al. (1976): 46- 
48; Hull 1985). The federal government has, moreover, taken advantage of its greater leeway 
to discriminate against non-citizens, and excludes non-citizens from most federal jobs 
(Ciment 2001: 511-512; Carliner 1990: 187-188; Henkin 1996: 296; Rubio-Marin 2000: 3).93 
Private employers, on the other hand, are not allowed to discriminate on the grounds of
92 The federal governm ent has the right to regulate non-citizens’ right to acquire land but has not exercised this 
right. It should, furthermore, be noted that there are som e state restrictions on owning land (and liquor licenses). 
The constitutionality o f  the state’s restrictions are, how ever, unclear due to the developm ent o f  non-citizens’ 
protection under the fourteenth amendment (Carliner 1990: 191-197; Ciment 2001: 515; Institute 1987: 247, 
255).
93 The Court ruled, concerning federal em ploym ent, in Hampton v. M ow Sun W ong, that the Civil Service 
C om m ission could not bar non-citizens from federal jobs, but it assumed that the federal government had that 
right (Hampton v. M ow  Sun W ong et al. (1976)). President Ford issued an E xecutive Order, in the national 
interest, that excluded non-citizens from many federal jobs, after the Hampton v. M ow  Sun W ong case (Carliner 
1990: 1 8 7-188). The low er courts a lso upheld this restriction once it was promulgated by the President 
(A lein ikoff 2002b: 153). It should be noted that the constitutionality o f  this order remains unclear. The 
government is  assumed to have this right in general but specific laws could still be unconstitutional i f  they are 
too broad and do not correspond to a legitim ate state interest, for example.
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alienage,94 and non-citizens are protected from racial, sexual and religious discrimination by 
private employers (Aleinikoff 2002a: 74; Hull 1985; INA 274B (a)).
Non-citizens enjoy the right to protection from (arbitrary) intervention in person and property. 
The fourth amendment protects non-citizens’ right to be secure in their ‘persons, houses, 
papers and effects and against unreasonable searches and seizures’, within the territory of the 
U.S. The Constitution, and federal statute,95 also provides non-citizens with the right to 
habeas corpus -  a legal writ ordering an official to bring a detained person before a court to 
show the reasons for the detention (Bosniak 1994: 1060-1061, 1100-1101; Heller 2001: 203- 
204; Ciment 2001: 514—515; Henkin 1985: 16; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States (1973); 
Rubio-Marin 2000: 155; Rasul et al.v. Bush et al.(2004); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
(1990); U.S. Constitution art. 1 sec. 9 cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. 2241 (a), (c) (3), see also below and the 
fifth amendment for procedural protection).
Non-citizens have the right to equality before the law (protection from invidious 
discrimination). They explicitly enjoy this right vis-a-vis states under the fourteenth 
amendment (Henkin 1985: 16; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886); Institute 1987: 246; Henkin 1996: 
294). The U.S. Constitution does not, however, contain an equal protection before the law 
clause, as such, in regards to the federal government. The fifth amendment, however, includes 
a due process of law clause, which has come to be read as largely equivalent to, or as 
encompassing, both the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection and due process of law 
clauses. This broad or general protection vis-a-vis the federal government constitutes part of 
the development of substantive due process protection, whereby the Court deploys the due 
process clause in the fifth amendment to protect individuals’ rights in general, and to ensure 
the overall fairness of laws.
Substantive due process, therefore, does not refer to specific enumerated rights or procedural 
rights, but is a concept that ensures fair play and individual rights, in general (Dworkin 1996: 
72-73; Ogus 1990: 128-129, 147; Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977): 501-502). This 
protection can take the form of striking down statutes that are incompatible with individual 
freedom in general, or statutes that infringe on individuals’ freedom by discriminating against
94 The exception being i f  the com pany has less than three em ployees or i f  tw o applicants are equally qualified; in 
the latter case alienage can be used as a tiebreaker (Hull 1985; A lein ik off 2002a: 74; IN A  274B  (a)).
95 A  recent change to the federal law , however, m eans that so-called  illega l com batants w ho are non-citizen are 
excluded from the right to habeas corpus  under federal law (M ilitary C om m issions A ct sec. 7).
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a certain group of individuals (Hampton v. Mow; Sun Wong et al. (1976): 100-101). This 
means that a constitutional right to equal protection under the law exists in the U.S. vis-a-vis 
the federal government; non-citizens are, on a general level, included in this right under the 
fifth amendment (Henkin 1985: 16; Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong et al. (1976): 100-103; 
Institute 1987: 246). Non-citizens’ right to protection against invidious discrimination is, 
however, limited vis-a-vis the federal government (and to some extent against the states, see 
the political-function exception).
This is a consequence of the fact that substantive due process does not bar the government 
from making distinctions between different individuals when legislating; it only demands that 
all persons similarly situated shall be treated equally.96 This is the snag: non-citizens do not 
enjoy substantive due process protection when the issue of alienage means that they are 
differently placed in relation to citizens; i.e. alienage is often considered a valid ground for 
discrimination, and is hence not seen as an invidious discrimination ground. That is, non­
citizens often are seen as differently placed than citizens, and non-citizens only enjoy a very 
basic substantive due process protection under the fifth amendment -  although it should be 
noted that legal arguments in this area tend to assume equality and argue for valid exceptions 
(Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong et al. (1976); Institute 1987: 246; Henkin 1996: 294).
Non-citizens do, nevertheless, have the right to a fair trial and the right to seek legal redress 
(open and fair access to courts and procedural due process rights) under the fifth and sixth 
amendments. The enumerated rights of these amendments guarantee all persons procedural 
due process, or the right to a fair trial. Non-citizens also have the right to sue in federal and 
state courts (Wong Wing et al.v. United States (1896); Ex parte Kumezo Kawato (1942); see 
also Yick Wo; Bosniak 1994: 1060-1061, 1100-1117; Heller 2001: 203-204; Ciment 2001: 
514-515; Schuck 1998a: 269-270; Carliner 1990: 197; Institute 1987: 232, 258; Dumbauld 
1957: 92; 28 U.S.C. 1343; 42 U.S.C. 1983).
Non-citizens do not have the right to secure residency and can be deported on several 
grounds. These grounds include being inadmissible upon entering, breaking the conditions for
96 The Court also deploys different standards in these cases. The Court requires that the governm ent demonstrate 
a com pelling necessity, and that the law be narrowly tailored if  the law  infringes on fundamental freedom s or i f  
the classification is suspect, e .g . based on race or gender. H owever, the government only needs to demonstrate 
that a classification bears a fair relationship to a legitim ate public interest if  the interest involved  is not 
fundamental or the classification not suspect (P lyler v. D oe (1982): 2 1 6 -2 1 8 ).
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admittance, committing a crime of moral turpitude, or other crimes subsequent to entry, 
including stalking, child abuse, child neglect and domestic violence; becoming a drug addict 
or seriously adversely affecting U.S. foreign policy; some additional security related provisos 
are also grounds for deportation (INA 237). The procedural protection is, moreover, weak in 
this area as deportation (and detention for the purpose of deportation) is not a criminal 
proceeding and is not considered penal in nature (Boswell 1992: 43-44; Schuck 1998b: 34— 
39; Carlson v. Landon (1952); Galvan v. Press (1954)).
This means, first of all, that actions that could not constitutionally be criminalised can, and 
are, used as grounds for deportation (Henkin 1985: 12); secondly it means that the basic legal 
protections that apply in criminal cases (generally speaking, the right to procedural due 
process or a fair trial) do not apply in deportation cases. This includes the protection from ex 
post facto laws (retroactive laws) and the right to counsel. Grounds for deportation also lack 
statutes of limitations (Boswell 1992: 43-44, 70; Galvan v. Press (1954); Aleinikoff 1998: 
718-720, 832; Legomsky 1997: 460-461; Schuck 1998b: 31-35; Weissbrodt 1992: 66, 170- 
171; INA 240 (b) (4) (A)).97 Non-citizens are not left totally without legal protection in 
deportation cases and the Court has established that non-citizens are entitled to a fair hearing, 
to prove mistaken identity for example (Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding et al. (1953): 596-598; 
Landon v. Plasencia (1982): 33-34; Institute 1987: 256-257).
The Rationale(s) Behind the Civil Rights Realm
The aliens’ rights doctrine is based on civil rights and the notion that non-citizens’ individual 
rights trump national sovereignty when basic individual rights to liberty are at stake. The 
notion that basic individual liberties are universal and sacrosanct is, in general, connected to 
the notion that individuals are endowed with certain rights that the government has not 
created, nor has the right to infringe upon. The core notion of U.S. constitutionalism that the 
aliens’ rights doctrine draws upon is that no individual is rechtlos or lacks legal standing, just 
because they are not members of the community. The very notion that some individuals, 
albeit non-members, should be considered rechtlos sits very uncomfortably with the notion of 
the universal individual right to freedom that is so central to the U.S. Constitution. As quoted 
above, the Court held that ‘the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or 
the means of living, or any other material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
97 Three deportation grounds -  public charge, alien sm uggling and crimes o f  moral turpitude -  have statutes o f  
limitations (INA 237).
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will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the 
essence of slavery itself (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886): 370).
Non-citizens’ right to be recognised before the law is protected both by basic constitutional 
law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which applies in the U.S. 
since 1992. There is, moreover, a general presumption of universal equality based on equal 
personhood in U.S. constitutional law, and this assumption is particularly strong in the civil 
rights realm, where the aliens’ rights doctrine and its cosmopolitan rationale is also most 
prevalent (Neuman 1995: 1442-1443; Plyler v. Doe (1982); Wong Wing et al. v. United 
States (1896); Aleinikoff 2002b: 151-152; Aleinikoff 2003: 114-115; Henkin 1996: 294). 
More specifically, it can be said that the protection of basic in<z//c«able individual liberties is 
centred on the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments), as discussed previously, and non­
citizens enjoy the protection of the Bill of Rights in general (Bowie 1954: 675; Institute 1987: 
243-244, 248; Henkin 1996: 284-285, 294).
It can be said more specifically that the Court has deployed the universal right to individual 
self-determination as the normative foundation for the right to free speech and conscience, 
though the argument based on this right’s importance in terms of the democratic process also 
figures in this context (Smith 1985: 108-113; Cole 2003: 218; First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti (1978): 783):
The makers o f  our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favourable to the pursuit o f  
happiness. They recognised the significance o f  m an’s spiritual nature, o f his feelings and o f his 
intellect. . . .  T hese are the rights that appellant [sic] is asserting in the case before us today. He is  
asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases -  the right to satisfy his intellect and 
em otional needs in the privacy o f his hom e. . . .  I f  the First Am endment m eans anything, it m eans 
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or what film s he m ay watch. Our w hole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought o f  giving  
governm ent the pow er to control m en’s minds. . . .  Nor is it relevant that the obscene materials in  
general, or the particular film s before the Court, are arguably devoid o f  any ideological content. 
(Stanley v. Georgia (1969): 5 6 4 -5 6 6 )
The first amendment protects this inalienable right in blanket terms: Congress simply ‘shall 
make no law’ prohibiting the freedom of speech and free exercise of religion (U.S.
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Constitution amend. I).98 When it comes to non-citizens’ legal standing in this regard, the 
Court has explicitly established that they are included in this right. As mention earlier, this 
ruling pertained to permanent residents, but it is also assumed to apply to all non-citizens, and 
the Court’s argument did not rely on a distinction between different groups of non-citizens. 
The Court did, instead, invoke the universal language of the aliens’ rights doctrine:
But once an alien law fully enters and resides in this country he becom es invested with the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected 
by the First and Fifth A m endm ents and by the due process clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment.
N one o f  these provisions acknow ledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They  
extend their inalienable privileges to all ‘persons’ and guard against any encroachment on those 
rights by federal or state authority. Indeed, this Court has previously and expressly recognized that 
Harry Bridges, the alien, possesses the right to free speech and free press and that the Constitution  
w ill defend him in the exercise o f  that right. (Bridges v. W ixon (1945): 161 concurring op in ion)99
Non-citizens’ right to acquire and hold property also constitutes part of their inalienable rights 
as persons, and this right is central to the cosmopolitan thrust of the aliens’ rights doctrine. As 
quoted above the Court stated in Yick Wo that ‘all persons should be equally entitled to 
pursue their happiness, and acquire and enjoy property; they should have like access to the 
courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and 
redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts’ (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886): 367-368). 
This rationale was reiterated in the second key aliens’ rights doctrine case: “... even aliens 
shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.” (Wong Wing et al. v. United States (1896): 238; for the right to sue, see ex parte 
Kumezo Kawato and Yick Wo)
98 It should be noted that the Court has alw ays accepted exceptions to this ban although the wording in itself, 
strictly speaking, seem s to preclude any exceptions (Sm ith 1985: 9 2 -1 1 9 ).
99 It is  noteworthy that the word persons is used even though the first amendment talks about the people. This 
points to the fact that the Court does not m ake a distinction between the personal rights o f  the fifth, sixth and 
fourteenth amendments on the one hand and the term people in the first and fourth amendments on the other, but 
construes o f  all these rights as universal, and as part o f  the constitutional protection that all non-citizens enjoy. It 
is a lso noteworthy that freedom  o f speech has been upheld vis-a-vis  states under the fourteenth am endm ent’s due 
process clause as an intrinsic part o f  basic individual freedom  (Stim son 1953: 219; Schneider v. State o f  N ew  
Jersey (1939)). The fourteenth am endm ent’s due process and equality before the law clauses are seen as 
guaranteeing the B ill o f  Rights in all states, and it is thus plausible to argue, as at least one scholar does, that 
freedom  o f  speech, in the absence o f  the first amendment, would be protected by the fifth am endm ent’s due 
process clause as a basic liberty (Institute 1987: 238 , 255; Dworkin 1996: 73; A lein ikoff 2002b: 42; Fiske v. 
State o f  Kansas (1927)).
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Moreover, the right to sue in court is explicitly held by all persons under current statutory law 
(28 U.S.C. 1343; 42 U.S.C. 1983). The right to acquire and hold property also includes 
protection from arbitrary state intervention. The Court invoked the same universal language of 
individual rights when establishing that non-citizens’ property is secure from confiscation by 
the state under the fifth amendment:
The Fifth Am endm ent g ives to each owner o f  property his individual right. The constitutional right 
o f  ow ner A  to com pensation when his property is taken is irrespective o f  what m ay be done 
som ew here e lse  with the property o f  owner B . A s alien friends are embraced within the terms o f  
the Fifth Am endm ent, it cannot be said that their property is subjected to confiscation here because 
the property o f  our citizens m ay be confiscated in the alien’s country. (Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States (1931): 4 9 1 -4 9 2 )
It is clear here that it is not the nationality of the owner but the individual right to property 
that matters. The fact that other nations may not heed individuals’ inalienable right to their
private property does not, as the Court states, give the government of the U.S. the right to
infringe on this right; to do so would be unconstitutional.
Non-citizens’ right to freely choose their own profession is a more complicated issue. The 
Court has held that the right to freely choose one’s profession is a crucial part of non-citizens’ 
basic individual right to self-determination and that the fourteenth amendment protects non­
citizens from discrimination in this context:
It requires no argument to show  that the right to work for a living in the com m on occupations o f  
the com m unity is the very essence o f  the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose 
o f  the [fourteenth] Am endm ent to secure. If this could be refused so le ly  upon the ground o f  race or 
nationality, the prohibition o f  the denial to any person o f  the equal protection o f  the law s would be 
a barren form o f  words. (Trauax v. Raich: 41 (1915), the Court later upheld this ruling -  In re
Griffiths (1 9 7 3 ))100
The above quote obviously contains the universal language of the aliens’ right doctrine. The 
Court has nevertheless carved out an exception to this fourteenth amendment protection that 
allows states to exclude non-citizens from jobs that are related to a state’s political functions:
100 It should be noted the Court in this latter case added arguments that were based on partial membership, thus 
leaving the normative rationale som ewhat obscure.
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The rationale behind the political-function exception is  that within broad boundaries a State may  
establish its ow n form o f  governm ent and limit the right to govern to those w ho are fully-fledged  
m embers o f  the political com munity. Som e public positions are so  c lose ly  bound up with the 
formulation and implementation o f  self-governm ent that the State is  permitted to exclude from  
those positions persons outside the political community. “The exclusion o f  aliens from basic 
governmental processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system  but a necessary consequence  
o f  the com m unity’s process o f  political self-definition. Self-governm ent, whether direct or through 
representatives, begins by defining the scope o f  the com munity o f  the governed and thus o f  the 
governors as w ell: A liens are by definition those outside o f this com m unity.” (Bernal v. Fainter et 
al. (1984): 221, the Court is here approvingly quoting Cabello v . C havez-Salido (1982))
The states are hence given a right to infringe on non-citizens’ right to equal protection qua 
persons and to ban them from certain professions that are linked to communal formation; this 
is a right that private employers, in general, do not have. The basis for this exception is clear, 
and it is based on the states’ right to political self-definition. The cosmopolitan rationale of 
equality, based on the equal rights of individuals, hence runs up against the communities’ 
right to political formation. The result in this instance is that non-citizens are given a general 
right to be treated with equal concern and to freely choose their profession, but an exception is 
made in cases where the states can show that a job goes to the heart of communal formation. 
The political-function exception is thus based on the notion that the right to political 
formation can override non-citizens’ right to equal protection of the laws, but the right to 
political formation, vis-a-vis non-citizens in general is reserved for the federal/national 
government.
It will be analysed below how the federal government has much more latitude in terms of 
denying non-citizens equal protection of the laws, qua individuals, due to its role as the 
national government. It suffices to say in this context that the federal government’s right to 
and actual restriction of non-citizens’ access to federal jobs is much greater than that of the 
states, and that this right is based on the same communitarian rationale as the political- 
function exception. It is also plain, by a reverse analogy, why private employers do not have 
the right to discriminate against non-citizens. Private employers can simply not make the 
appeal to communal formation, and hence the presumption of equality prevails in their case.
Non-citizens enjoy the right to be secure in person and property. The fourth amendment 
provides non-citizens with protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, as part of their 
universal individual right to self-determination:
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It is  not enough to argue, as the Government, that the problem  o f  deterring unlawful entry by  
aliens across long expanses o f  national boundaries is a serious one. The needs o f  law  enforcem ent 
stand in constant tension with the Constitution’s protections o f  the individual against certain 
exercises o f official power. . . .  ‘These (Fourth Amendment rights), I protest, are not mere second- 
class rights but belong in the catalog i f  indipensable [sic] freedom s. (A lm eida-Sanchez v. United  
States (1973): 2 7 3 -2 7 4 , the Court is here approvingly quoting Justice Jackson)
This is a clear example of where the government’s discretionary right to control immigration 
is limited by the universal individual and inalienable rights secured by the Bill of Rights.101 
That the cosmopolitan rationale underlies this right is underscored by the fact that it protects 
non-citizens who are illegally in the U.S. (Bosniak 1994: 1060-1061, 1100-1101; Heller 
2001: 203-204; Ciment 2001: 514-515; Henkin 1985: 16; Rubio-Marin 2000: 155). Non­
citizens’ right to habeas corpus has been upheld as a universal individual right to liberty that 
the government has no right to infringe upon. The Court has held that non-citizens have an 
individual right to habeas corpus in immigration-related detentions. The Court interpreted (in 
line with the tradition of interpreting statutes as constitutional) the statute in question as not 
allowing indefinite detention of non-citizens who could not be deported, noting that:
A  statute permitting indefinite detention o f  an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.
The Fifth Am endm ent’s Due Process Clause forbids the Governm ent to “depriv[e]” any “person 
. . .  o f  . . .  liberty . . .  without due process o f law ” .. .  But [the Court notes certain constitutional 
rights are not available to non-citizens outside the U .S .’ territory] once an alien enters the country, 
the legal circum stances changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the 
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is law ful, unlawful, temporary or 
permanent. (Zadvydas v. D avis (2001): 6 9 0 -6 9 3 , the Court is here quoting the fifth amendment)
101 N on-citizens’ fourth amendment protection was put in question by the ruling in the Verdugo-Urqiiidez case. 
This case did, how ever, not undermine non-citizens’ right to fourth amendment protection in the U .S . It is, 
furthermore, unclear i f  non-citizens are not protected outside the U .S . or i f  searches outside the U .S. sim ply are 
not unreasonable in the absence o f a warrant, due to the practical d ifficulties o f  obtaining a warrant abroad. 
Justices K ennedy and Stevens, in their tw o separate concurring opinions, im ply that full constitutional protection  
does not apply abroad. They also, however, rely on the argument that it is  not practically feasible to obtain a 
warrant abroad and that a search without a warrant abroad therefore is  not unreasonable; in other words, the 
fourth amendments applies, but is not violated. This m eans that it is  unclear i f  a majority supports the idea that 
the fourth amendment does not protect non-citizens abroad; nor is  it clear that citizens are protected abroad (See  
Blackm un’s dissent and K ennedy’s concurring opinion for the latter point.) T his m eans that all that can be said at 
this point is that non-citizens abroad, w ho have no established substantia] connections with the U .S ., do  not 
enjoy the full protection o f  the fourth amendment (Henkin 1996: 307; Rubio-M arin 2000: 155; H eller 2001: 
203— 204; Scaperlanda 1991: 243). It a lso  remains unclear on what grounds non-citizens are excluded, as tw o o f  
the five justices that supported the decision explicitly  rely on the argument that the fourth amendment has not 
been violated as it is  not practically feasible to  obtain warrants for searches abroad. This m eans that the 
restrictions on non-citizens’ fourth amendment protection could rest on functional grounds as w ell as 
membership grounds.
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The Court explicitly refers to Yick Wo in this case, and establishes that the aliens’ rights 
doctrine limits even the government’s right to control immigration, as certain basic 
constitutional rights to individual liberty are universal and apply to all persons. The Court 
here explicitly holds that in the limited case of the right to be secure in one’s person, no 
person is rechtlos or illegal. The Court also recently -  in relation to the so-called illegal 
combatants held at Guantanamo Bay -  outlined the universal nature of habeas corpus and 
stated that the protection it provided applied to:
‘all cases where any person m ay be restrained o f  his or her liberty in violation o f  the constitution, 
or o f  any treaty or law o f  the United States’ (Rasul et al. v. Bush et al. (2004): 2692, the Court is 
here quoting A ct o f  Feb. 5 ,1 8 6 7 , ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.)
The Court also stated that the scope of habeas corpus is universal as it is the exercise of 
power, not membership that yields the right to habeas corpus:
[ . . .]  the writ o f  habeas corpus does not act on the prisoner w ho seeks relief, but upon the person 
w ho holds him  in what is  alleged to be unlawful custody (Rasul et al. v. Bush et al. (2004): 2695, 
the Court is here approvingly quoting its ruling in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court.)102
Non-citizens have a general right to equality before the law. This right, however, differs 
substantially between the federal and the state levels. That is, non-citizens enjoy this right 
under the fourteenth amendment -  the political-function exception notwithstanding -  but non­
citizens only enjoy this right to a limited degree under the fifth amendment (Henkin 1985: 
17). There is, of course, a textual difference between the fourteenth and the fifth amendments. 
Both amendments stipulate that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, but only the fourteenth adds the somewhat more specific 
statement ‘nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’ (U.S. 
Constitution amend. 5, 14).
102 It should be noted that the Court in this case, withstanding all its em phasis on the universal nature o f  a right to 
habeas corpus, did not rule on the constitutionality o f  depriving illegal combatants o f  the said right. The Court 
instead ruled on the narrower grounds o f  non-citizen illegal combatants’ statutory federal right to h abeas corpus  
and ultimately based its decision on that Congress had shown no intent to make any distinction betw een non­
citizens’ and citizens’ statutory right to habeas corpus. Congress has subsequently show n such intent (M ilitary 
Com m issions A ct sec. 7). It remains to be seen o f  this Act is constitutional or i f  the fifth amendments due 
process clause encom passes a constitutional right to habeas corpus. A s the law stands today, how ever, future 
non-citizen illegal combatants lack a statutory right to habeas corpus.
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Citizens, however, enjoy virtually the same substantial due process protection under the two 
different amendments. A law that banned black people from federal jobs would undoubtedly 
be struck down as unconstitutional under the fifth amendment’s due process clause, regardless 
of the fact that it does not contain an equal protection of the law clause. Indeed, the Court has 
held that racial segregation was unconstitutional in the District of Columbia -  albeit the 
fourteenth amendment does not apply there, since it is not a state -  under the fifth 
amendment’s due process clause (Rosberg 1977b: 288-289; Dworkin 1996: 73; Needelman 
1997: 356; Institute 1987: 238; Henkin 1996: 279).
The difference between non-citizens’ due process protection vis-a-vis states and the federal 
government instead stems from the federal government’s prerogative to regulate immigration 
in the collective interest of the nation. This makes it a legitimate and normal part of the 
federal government’s job to make distinctions on the grounds of alienage. The right to 
regulate immigration, in turn, stems from the federal government’s right to communal 
formation, which ultimately underlies the federal government’s right to discriminate against 
non-citizens:
The federal governm ent can constitutionally adopt alienage classifications that a state could not, 
because it can offer justifications based on the exercise o f  the broad power o f national se lf­
definition. (Motomura 1994: 209)
The clearest example of this is the difference between Mathews v. Diaz and Graham v. 
Richardson. In these cases, the Court has ruled that states cannot discriminate against non­
citizens in administrating welfare policies, whereas the federal government can. The 
explanation for this difference is clear:
Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned there is little, i f  any, basis, for treating persons who are 
citizens o f  another State differently from persons w ho are citizens o f  another country. Both groups 
are noncitizens as far as the State’s interest in administrating its welfare program is concerned.
Thus, a division by a State into subcategories o f  United States citizens and aliens has no apparent 
justification, whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and 
normally legitim ate part o f  its business. (M athew v. D iaz et al. (1976): 85)
The point here is that the difference between the fifth and the fourteenth amendments’ due 
process clauses, in relation to non-citizens, does not depend on their textual disparity; nor are 
the readings of the two amendments at odds with one another. The difference simply stems
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from the fact that the federal government defines and protects the national community and the 
states do not, by and large, partake in this process of national formation. The Court made this 
point succinctly in one of the key plenary power doctrine cases: “For local interests the 
several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relationship with 
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.” (Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.: 606 
(1889))
This, in turn, means that the full protection of the fifth amendment is not provided to non­
citizens, since the plenary power doctrine gives the federal government the right to take 
decisions pertaining to non-citizens that would be unconstitutional if applied to citizens; the 
plenary power doctrine weakens non-citizens’ constitutional protection to equal protection of 
the laws, as it were. That the communitarian rationale underlies this difference in substantive 
due process protection is underscored by the fact that the states’ limited right to discriminate 
against non-citizens is tied to their limited role in political formation. The Court has made it 
very clear that the states’ right to discriminate against non-citizens is based on the 
communitarian rationale:
It would be inappropriate, however, to require every statutory exclusion o f  aliens to clear the high  
hurdle o f  “strict scrutiny” because to do so  would “obliterate all the distinctions between citizens 
and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic value o f  citizenship.” The act o f  becom ing a citizen is 
more than a ritual with no content beyond the fanfare o f  ceremony. A new  citizen has becom e a 
m ember o f  a Nation, part o f  a people distinct from others. The individual, at that point, belongs to 
the polity and is entitled to participate in the process o f  democratic decisionm aking. Accordingly, 
w e have recognized ‘a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its 
democratic political institutions’, as part o f  the sovereign’s obligation ‘to preserve the basic 
conception o f  a political com m unity’. (Foley v. Connelie: 2 9 5 -2 9 6  (1978), the Court is here 
approvingly quoting first N yquist v. M auclet and then Sugerman v. D ougall)
The fact that non-citizens enjoy substantive due process protection only to a limited extent 
means that non-citizens are not as equal as citizens are before the law. Or rather, that alienage 
is seen as a legitimate ground for treating individuals differently in many cases. However, the 
fact that non-citizens are recognised as persons before the law means that there are limits to 
what they can be deprived of on the basis of alienage; and non-citizens do enjoy basic equal 
protection under the fifth amendment (Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong et al. (1976): 1448-1449;
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Neuman 1995). Exactly where this line goes and where the limited substantive due process 
protection kicks in is not clear, but for a stated limit see the social rights realm.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the aliens’ rights doctrine has secured procedural due 
process rights (the right to a fair trial) and the right to seek legal redress for non-citizens. That 
is, non-citizens have the right to defend themselves as equally entitled individuals in the 
courts. As the Court put it, ‘even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other 
infamous crime, unless presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law’ (Wong Wing et al.v. United States (1896): 
238). Non-citizens’ right to a fair trial, and its universal rationale, was also recently reiterated 
by the Court in a case concerning the illegal combatants held captive at Guantanamo Bay. The 
Court held, on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, that:
W e have assumed, m oreover, the truth o f  the m essage implicit in that the charges - - v iz., that 
Hamdan is a dangerous individual w hose beliefs, if  acted upon would cause great harm and even  
death to innocent civilians, and w ho would [sic] act upon those beliefs i f  given an opportunity. . . .
But in undertaking to try Hamden and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound 
to com ply with the Rule o f  Law that prevails in this jurisdiction. (Hamdan v. Rum sfeld (2006): 
2 7 9 8 )103
The right to deport non-citizens, on the other hand, falls squarely within the boundaries of the 
plenary power doctrine and is the prerogative of the political branches. Non-citizens hence do 
not hold a constitutional right to be secure in their abode. The reason behind the lack of 
constitutional protection in this area stems from the fact that deportation proceedings are not 
considered criminal proceedings and they are not seen as penal in nature. The rationale behind 
this is that the U.S., as a sovereign nation, has the right to control whom it harbours, as part of 
its right to communal formation (Schuck 1998b: 34—39; Boswell 1992:43^14; Carlson v. 
Landon (1952); Galvan v. Press (1954)). The Court has explained the nature of deportation 
grounds in the following terms:
That is  what it [Congress] has done here. It has established classes o f persons w ho in its judgm ent 
constitute an elig ib le list for deportation, o f  whom  the Secretary is directed to those he finds to be 
undesirable residents o f  this country. . . .  Our history has created a com m on understanding o f  the
103 It should be noted that this case refers to m ilitary tribunals and not civilian courts.
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words ‘undesirable residents’ which g ives them the quality o f  a recognized standard. (M ahler et al. 
v. Eby: 4 0  (1924))
The specific grounds for deportation that the political branches have established also reads as 
a list over what the national community deems to be undesirable qualities, rather than a list of 
criteria that aims at protecting the residents of the U.S. (Legomsky 1997: 377). The special 
provision for crimes involving moral turpitude (a term that refers to crimes that are 
intrinsically morally wrong) is especially telling in this respect. The term is fairly open-ended 
and is measured by ‘common understandings and practices’ (Weissbrodt 1992: 172). The fact 
that non-citizens who have not committed a crime, like drug-addicts, can be deported, further 
underscores the fact that the community’s right to exclude non-citizens goes beyond the right 
to safeguard the nation (Aleinikoff 1998: 721, 726, 734).
The great level of discretion enjoyed in this area is enhanced by the fact that deportation cases 
are not seen as criminal but as civil proceedings, putting the standard procedural safeguards 
provided for criminal cases out of play. This distinction, which is of great importance, reflects 
the idea that deportation of non-citizens is not seen as punishment; it is simply a refusal, by a 
sovereign nation, to harbour individuals deemed undesirable. The Court has clearly 
established that the political branches have a discretionary right to exclude and deport non­
citizens:
It is thoroughly established that Congress has pow er to order the deportation o f  aliens w hose  
presence in the country it deem s hurtful. The determination by facts that might constitute a crime 
under local law is not a conviction o f  crime; it is sim ply a refusal by the government to harbour 
persons whom  it does not want. (Bugajew itz v. Adam s (1913): 592)
The Political Rights Realm
The U.S.’s electorate is made up of the states’ constituencies. This means, by implication, that 
the states have the power to decide if non-citizens are to have the right to vote in federal 
elections (U.S. Constitution art 1 sec. 2; amend. 17; Raskin 1993: 1419-1420; Rubio-Marin 
2000: 135). States are, however, not free to restrict suffrage as they see fit. The Constitution 
sets certain basic criteria. No citizen can be denied the right to vote on account of race (colour 
or previous condition of servitude), sex, or failure to pay poll tax or other taxes; nor can 
citizens over the age of eighteen be denied the right to vote on account of age (U.S. 
Constitution amend. 15, 19, 24, 26). The federal government has also made it a legal offence
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for non-citizens to vote in federal elections, if not authorised by a state to do so (18 U.S.C. 
611).
Non-citizens have historically, in some states, had the right to vote in federal elections. That 
said, no state has since 1926 allowed the participation of non-citizens in federal or state 
elections (Aleinikoff 2000: 151; Rosberg 1977a: 1099-1100; Raskin 1993: 1397).104 Non­
citizens are also constitutionally banned from standing for Congress and the Presidency.105 
Non-citizens are, moreover, excluded from many high federal offices (Hull 1985: 30; Rubio- 
Marin 2000: 133-134; U.S. Constitution art. 1 sec. 2 cl. 2, art. 1 sec. 3 cl. 3, art. 2 sec. 1 cl. 
5).106
The Rationale(s) Behind the Political Rights Realm
The states’ right to bar non-citizens from voting stems from the fact that this restriction is not 
seen as contravening non-citizens’ right to equality before the law under the fourteenth 
amendment. The states, as described, have very limited possibilities to discriminate on the 
grounds of alienage, due to the universal interpretation of the due process and equal protection 
clauses in the fourteenth amendment. The Court has nevertheless, as described above, carved 
out an exception based on the states’ limited right to political formation. The political- 
function exception allows states to reserve for citizens jobs that lie at the heart of communal 
formation. The Court has deployed the same rationale to uphold the states’ right to exclude 
non-citizens from voting (Henkin 1985: 17; Henkin 1996: 310; Institute 1987: 245, 253; 
Rubio-Marin 2000: 149-150; Sugerman v. Dougall (1973); Neuman 1992: 290). States thus 
avoid any substantial scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment in areas which pertains to 
their, and in this case by implication, the national, right to communal formation. This is 
analogous to how the federal government has a right to use alienage classifications as part of 
U.S.’s right to communal self-determination in spite of the fifth amendment’s due process 
clause. The rationale behind this position is very clear:
104 N on-citizens are allow ed to vote in som e local elections (A lein ikoff 2000: 151; Raskin 1993: 14 2 9 -1 4 3 0 ). It 
is noteworthy that permanent residents count against congressional representation although they have no right to 
vote (Raskin 1993: 1424: Rosberg 1977: 1109).
105 There is a seven years’ citizenship requirement for eligibility to stand for election to the H ouse o f  
Representatives, and nine years for the Senate. And only natural bom  citizens can becom e Presidents (U .S . 
Constitution art. 1 sec. 2 cl. 2 , art. 1 sec. 3 cl. 3 , art. 2 sec. 1 cl. 5).
106 The judiciary is an exception to this general rule (Hull 1985: 30).
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It [the fact that states only need to provide som e rational explanation for alienage classifications in 
these cases] is  no more than recognition o f  the fact that a democratic society is  ruled by its people.
Thus, it is clear that a State m ay deny aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective o ffice, for these 
lie  at the heart o f  our political institutions. . . .  In sum, then, it represents the choice, and right, o f  
the people to be governed by their citizen peers. . . .  The essence o f  our holdings to date is that 
although w e extend to aliens the right to education and public welfare, along with the ability to 
earn a livelihood and engage in licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved for citizens.
(Foley v. C onnelie (1978): 2 9 6 -2 9 7 )
It is clear that the notions of democracy and political rights are based on the communitarian 
rationale. Non-citizens’ individual right to self-determination does not extend to participation 
in the political process that affects their lives. Political rights are hence not perceived as 
something all individuals hold as equally entitled autonomous persons, but something that is 
reserved for members of the nation/demos. Political rights are thus based on the notion of the 
existence of a distinct nation that exercises democratic power as a collective (Martin 1983: 
198-200).107 It is noteworthy in this respect that the amendments that curb the states’ power 
to exclude people from the ballot explicitly refer to citizens. Furthermore, there seems to be 
agreement among scholars that all state constituencies are based on an exclusive concept of 
the people, and that non-citizens are not excluded because of practical constraints, for 
example (Raskin 1993: 13-97-1417; Rosberg 1977a; Rubio-Marin 2000: 132-136).108
The rationale behind excluding non-citizens from political office follows the same 
communitarian rationale that explains non-citizens’ exclusion from the ballot and jobs that 
pertain to communal formation (see the analysis of the limits of non-citizens’ protection under 
the fifth amendment). This exclusion is, moreover, backed up by constitutional provisions that 
ban non-citizens from standing for Congress and the Presidency. The rationale behind the 
constitutional amendments that require that high political officials are citizens is also 
communitarian in nature. This will become clear when the rationale behind the right to 
naturalisation has been deduced. It suffices to say, at this point, that the notion behind
107 It should be noted that it is unlikely that the Court w ould strike down a state law that re-instated non-citizens’ 
right to vote, given the history o f  non-citizen suffrage. The fact that the Court has ruled that alienage is a 
perm issib le , and then arguably not a necessary, ground for excluding non-citizens from the ballot further 
strengthens this argument. Furthermore, the federal law  banning non-citizens from voting explicitly  does not 
challenge states’ ability to  enfranchise non-citizens (Raskin 1993: 1417-1431; Rubio-Marin 2 000:134-135; 18 
U .S.C . 611).
108 It w as com m on for states to include all residing property ow ning white m en in the ballot and to exclude 
wom en, black people and the property-less. N ow adays all non-citizens are excluded, whereas all non-criminal 
citizens are included. National membership has thus replaced the triplet o f  sex, race and property qualification  
(Raskin 1993: 1 397-1417).
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naturalisation, and thus the right to be a political representative, is centred on being accepted 
as a full member of an equal but exclusive national community.
The Social Rights Realm
Non-citizens used to be eligible for public benefits on more or less the same terms as citizens. 
This condition of general equality radically changed in 1996 with the passing of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Welfare Reform Act) and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). These reforms 
severely erode non-citizens’ eligibility for public benefits. Non-citizens are currently 
ineligible for most of the four main public benefits programs -  TANF, SSI, The Food Stamp 
Program and Medicaid.109 These restrictions are particularly severe for those labelled as 
unqualified immigrants -  a group that includes undocumented residents, asylum seekers and 
recipients of temporary protection status.110
That said, non-citizens were not deprived of all their social rights, and all non-citizens are still 
entitled to emergency medical care (save for conditions related to an organ transplant) 
immunisations, school meals, short-term non-cash in-kind emergency disaster relief, and 
services providing assistance that are necessary for the protection of life and safety, and which 
are provided without the individual determination of each recipient’s need. The latter includes 
soup kitchens, crisis counselling, short-term shelters, and earthquake relief for example; nor 
does receiving these basic social provisions render non-citizens deportable on grounds of 
becoming public charges (Martin 2002: 225-226; Schlosberg 2000: 27-28, 53-54; 
Needelman 1997: 350-351; Abriel 1995: 1606-1607; Means 2004: Appendix J-17, 19; Fix
109 The T A N F  program (temporary assistance to needy fam ilies) provides support to needy children and certain 
other fam ily members. The SSI program (supplementary security incom e) provides cash payments to aged and 
disabled persons. The M edicaid program provides health coverage for people w ho receive support from TA N F  
and SSI. The Food Stamp program provides low -incom e families with benefits in order to enable them to 
purchase food  (Martin 2002: 2 3 0 -2 3 1 ).
110 N on-citizens’ access to these four major social programs is very limited in general, but depends largely upon 
whether the non-citizen is a refugee or not (refugees include individuals w ho are granted non-refoulem ent relief) 
(Kasich 1996; Martin 2002: 23 0 -2 3 1 ; Forum 2003). Permanent residents are barred from SSI, TA N F, the Food  
Stamp Program (this bar does not include children) and Medicaid. (States can, if  they so  choose, grant permanent 
residents T A N F  and M edicaid after five years. H ow ever, permanent residents w ho have worked for 4 0  quarters 
are, after five years (non-citizens can be credited with their spouse’s or parents’ em ploym ent record) eligib le for 
SSI and the Food Stamp Program. R ecognised refugees are eligible for SSI, M edicaid and the Food Stamp 
Program for seven years, and for T A N F for five  years. Refugees are also given refugee m edical assistance for 
eight m onths i f  they do not qualify for M edicaid. A sylum  seekers and undocumented immigrants do not qualify 
for any o f  these programs (Fix 1997: 3; W enzel 1997: 543-545; A lein ikoff 2002: 90; M eans 2004: Appendix J -  
12-16). Congress did backtrack to a limited extent in 1997, and this means that slightly more generous rules 
apply to immigrants w ho arrived before August 22  1996. Permanent residents w ho arrived prior to this date are 
eligible for food stamps after five  years and SSI i f  they were already on the rolls or subsequently were disabled  
(A lein ikoff 2002: 90; M eans 2004: Appendix J—1 2 ,1 4 ) .
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2004; Wenzel 1997: 543; see 8 U.S.C. 1611). Non-citizens are also entitled to primary and 
secondary education (Plyler v. Doe (1982): 3; Morse 2003; Rubio-Marin 2000: 165; Wenzel 
1997: 534, 545; Needelman 1997: 350). This means that non-citizens are entitled to the right 
to subsistence, the right to basic health care and the right to basic education; but that they are 
excluded from the right to enjoy welfare provisions on an equal basis, the right to higher 
education and the right to comprehensive health care.
The Rationale(s) Behind the Social Rights Realm
It is clear in general that: “The main social thrust of the immigration laws is prophylactic, 
aiming to exclude from entry those who might burden transfers programmes aimed at 
citizenship [sic].” (Heller 2001: 207) The same communitarian rationale also underlies the 
exclusion of non-citizens from most social rights once they are inside the U.S. (Heller 2001: 
216). Congress also explicitly referred to the long tradition of ensuring that non-citizens 
should not make any claims on public welfare when enacting the 1996 reform. Congressman 
Riggs, perhaps most clearly, outlined the rationale behind this legislation (Nedzel 1997: 134; 
Senate 1996; Means 2004: Appendix J—1, 12; 8 U.S.C. 1601):
S o that is  the m essage that w e are sending here, and we are clearly stating to our fellow  citizens
that w e really are going to put the rights and the needs o f  American citizens first. (Representatives
1 9 9 5 :H 3412)
The communitarian rationale is further evident in the Court’s rulings in this area. The current 
exclusion of non-citizens from most social provisions had been given a constitutional green 
light as part of the discretionary power that the federal government enjoys under the plenary 
power doctrine. It was established in Mathews v. Diaz that the federal government could 
exclude non-citizens from the nation’s bounty under the plenary power doctrine. And ‘in the 
exercise of its broad power over naturalisation and immigration, Congress regularly makes 
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens’ (Mathew v. Diaz et al. (1976): 79-80). 
That the right to exclude non-citizens from the national bounty stems from the federal 
government’s right and responsibility for communal formation is underscored by the fact that 
the states are banned, under the fourteenth amendment, from excluding non-citizens from 
social provisions (Bosniak 1994; Mathew v. Diaz et al. (1976); Aleinikoff 2002b: 166; 
Graham v. Richardson et al. (1971)). The area of social rights thus clearly illustrates how the 
government’s plenary power over non-citizens extends beyond safeguarding the nation and 
also gives the government the general right, as the representative of a sovereign nation, to
138
pursue the interests of its own citizens at the expense of non-citizens (Aleinikoff 2002b: 167- 
168).
The 1996 reform did, however, leave non-citizens with some social rights as mentioned 
earlier. Non-citizens have the right to primary and secondary education and the social 
provisions necessary for the protection of life or safety. The Plyler ruling protects 
undocumented residents’ right to basic education on fourteenth amendment grounds. The 
Court stated, in the Plyler case, that education was not a fundamental constitutional right and 
that undocumented residents did not constitute a suspect class given their illegal status. This 
meant that the state did not need to provide a compelling reason for discrimination (Plyler v. 
Doe (1982)).
The Court, however, argued that education was much more than a mere benefit, and the high 
cost to children not receiving education meant that discrimination could not be rational unless 
it furthered a substantial state goal; the state’s aim of reserving its limited recourses to lawful 
residents was not accepted as a substantial state goal given the cost of illiteracy, both to the 
directly affected children and to the society in general (Plyler v. Doe (1982): 223-225). The 
decision hence rests on what the dissent aptly described as a ‘quasi-fundamental-rights 
analysis’ (Plyler v. Doe (1982): 244). The Plyler case was thus a clear reminder of that: 
“Courts are expositors of a constitutional tradition that increasingly emphasizes not the 
parochial and the situational, but the universal, transcendant [sic] values of equality and 
fairness imminent in the due process and equal protection principles.” (Schuck 1984: 58)
That said, the Court assumed that the federal government could explicitly bar undocumented 
residents from basic education (Plyler v. Doe (1982): 254-255). Congress, after the Plyler v. 
Doe ruling, as part of the 1996 welfare reforms, has in fact taken an explicit position on this 
issue, to the effect that the Plyler ruling should be left intact. Congress has thus explicitly 
stated that it wants the Court’s ruling to stand (Representatives 1996: Part 1; Rubio-Marin 
2000: 165). There is no comparable connection to a Court ruling when it comes to the basic 
social provisions granted to non-citizens. All the same, the fact that non-citizens are 
recognised as persons before the law, or have legal standing qua persons under the 
Constitution, means that they, even as criminals, are at the very least included in the right to 
emergency medical care and to protection by the police (Neuman 1995: 1448-1449).
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The federal government’s right to exclude non-citizens from the national bounty in the 
Mathew v. Diaz case was also conditioned upon the idea that such exclusion did not deprive 
non-citizens of life, liberty or property without due process of law under the fifth amendment 
(Mathew v. Diaz et al. (1976)). That is, non-citizens’ right to substantive due process would 
kick in at some point, and the current legislation explicitly includes all non-citizens in 
programs that are ‘necessary for protection of life and safety’ (Schlosberg 2000: 27-28; 
Means 2004: Appendix J-19; see 8 U.S.C. 1611 (b) (1)). Congress also, in making these 
exceptions to the general rule of excluding non-citizens from social rights, referred to 
emergencies or compelling reasons, and stated that humanitarian principles prevail in limited 
circumstances (Gimpel 1999: 89; Reform 1997: 35). In sum, non-citizens are eligible for very 
few social rights, but they enjoy the right to basic education, emergency medical care and 
provisions necessary for life and safety simply as self-determining individuals.
The Naturalisation Rights Realm
Non-citizens must fulfil several criteria in order to be eligible for naturalisation, including 
demonstrating basic knowledge of English, the U.S.’s history and its political system. Non­
citizens who advocate or teach communism or resistance against organised government or are 
affiliated with a communist or a totalitarian party are also ineligible for naturalisation. Non­
citizens must also have been legal permanent residents for five years, be of good moral 
standing, and renounce all allegiances to other sovereigns in order to naturalise (INA 311- 
313,316).
The Rationale Behind the Naturalisation Rights Realm
The federal government’s right to regulate naturalisation in the interest of the nation is central 
in U.S. alienage jurisprudence. This right is also more direct than many of the powers that the 
political branches have been given under the plenary power doctrine, as the right to establish 
‘a uniform rule of naturalisation throughout the U.S.’ is an enumerated constitutional power 
(U.S. Constitution art. 1 sec. 8 cl. 4). This right lies at the heart of communal formation, and 
the plenary power doctrine in part originated in it. Thus, the power to naturalise is linked to 
the very core of the notion that U.S.’s government has the right to treat non-citizens 
discretionarily. The Court has said as much:
The Constitution authorizes Congress ‘to establish an uniform Rule o f  Naturalization’, and w e
may assume that naturalization is  a privilege, to be given or withheld on such conditions as
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Congress sees fit. (Schneiderman v. United States (1943): 131, the Court is here quoting U .S . 
Constitution art. 1 sec. 8 cl. 4)
The Court has thus held that the government can set any criteria it sees fit as conditions for 
naturalisation (United States v. Macintosh (1931); Rosberg 1977b: 317; Rubio-Marin 2000: 
1 7 4 ) itt rpjie current roa(j to naturalisation is also cobbled with communitarian requirements. 
Non-citizens must, first of all, have been accepted as permanent residents, and this involves 
overcoming many communitarian-based hurdles for admission, as described earlier. Non­
citizens must then fulfil another similar, but stricter, set of criteria in order to naturalise, as 
also described above.112
It is clear that acts that are legal but fall short of being deemed desirable traits render 
individuals ineligible for citizenship. The good character provision, which is open-ended, is 
but the clearest example of this, and it clearly reveals the government’s intention to bar 
individuals who in general are seen as undesirables from citizenship (Aleinikoff 1998: 52- 
53). Many of the more far-reaching ideological exclusion grounds, covering teaching and 
being affiliated with non-desirable political ideologies, that were removed from the 
inadmissibility list in 1990, remain prerequisites for naturalisation (Neuman 1994: 255; 
compare the criteria above with the criteria for inadmissibility). It is thus clear that the right to 
control naturalisation rests on the communitarian rationale.113
111 It should be said that the administrative officers w ho handle the naturalisation process have not been given the 
right to deny naturalisation on individual grounds. H ence, e lig ib le non-citizens have, at least a d e  facto , statutory 
right to naturalisation. H ow ever, the federal governm ent has a discretionary right to set the criteria that the 
officers are to enforce (Neum an 1994: 246, 252; Rubio-Marin 2000: 133, 174).
112 Recognised refugees do not have to jum p through all the hoops, since they can adjust to permanent resident 
status without demonstrating that they are not likely  to becom e public charges, gain a labour certification or 
possess valid documentation. They must, how ever, com ply with other criteria such as not being drug addicts, not 
having com mitted crim es o f  moral turpitude or carrying certain dieses (INA 209).
113 The residency requirement is, furthermore, supposed to guarantee not only familiarity with the U .S. but also 
to ensure that a loyalty to the nation has developed (W eissbrodt 1992: 299 -3 1 6 ). The need to renounce any other 
allegiances m oreover demonstrates that this attachment is seen as an exclusive one, albeit the renunciation need  
not lead to de-naturalisation in order to be valid (L egom sky 1997: 1053-1054).
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Section III
The final part of this chapter is dedicated to outlining the U.S.’s overall normative position in 
terms of non-citizens’ legal standing, so as to identify the normative commitments inherent in 
this position. This will be followed by an analysis where internal inconsistencies, in relation 
to the commitments inherent in the U.S.’s overall normative position, are identified in order to 
pinpoint what is required to achieve a normatively consistent approach to non-citizens’ legal 
standing in the U.S.
The Normative Position o f the U.S.
The notion that individuals are endowed with universal a priori rights as autonomous 
individuals is woven into the basic structure of the U.S.’s political and legal fabric. This 
notion is famously present in the Declaration of Independence, and it underlines much of the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, the development, or establishment, of federal control over 
immigration soon gave rise to the plenary power doctrine. The Court cobbled together this 
doctrine, initially by stretching several enumerated constitutional rights; but in the end the 
Court relied on the international inter-state law principles of absolute national sovereignty, 
which give the U.S. government the right to pursue its self-defined interest and put the interest 
of its citizens first. It is to this end that the Court provides the government with plenary power 
to regulate non-citizens’ legal standing by largely deferring the issue to the political branches.
The political branches have also used this power to forge a legal system that mainly aims at 
promoting the interest of the U.S. at the expense of non-citizens’ individual rights. That said, 
the fact that the Constitution largely rests on a cosmopolitan foundation has also left lasting 
imprints on alienage jurisprudence in the U.S.; it was not long after the creation of the plenary 
power doctrine that the Court drew a clear line in the sand, in terms of the extent to which 
non-citizens’ universal right to equal concern as self-determining individuals could be 
ignored. The Court established that non-citizens enjoy the protection of the fifth, sixth and 
fourteenth amendments, and in doing so the Court created the aliens’ rights doctrine. The 
Court has furthermore extended these universal rights to include the Bill of Rights.
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The aliens’ rights doctrine is built on the notion that there are limits to what even a legitimate 
democratic government can do to non-members, because basic rights to individual autonomy 
are sacrosanct. As the Court stated some 120 years ago: “For the very idea that one man may 
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any other material right essential to 
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country 
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.” (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886): 
370) The treatment of non-citizens in the U.S. is hence an area where the presence of the 
tension between the communitarian and the cosmopolitan rationales is strongly felt. This 
tension is more specifically located at the interface between the federal government’s plenary 
power to treat non-citizens discretionarily -  stemming from its right to communal formation -  
and individuals’ universal rights as free and self-determining individuals -  stemming from the 
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. A closer look at this seemingly contradictory 
situation reveals, however, that the normative tension between the cosmopolitan and the 
communitarian rationales has found a reasonably consistent solution in the U.S.114
The federal government has the power to regulate admissions, political rights, social rights 
and naturalisation in the national interest, and it currently does so in a way that largely 
excludes non-citizens from rights in these areas. Non-citizens do, nevertheless, enjoy most 
civil rights, some very basic social rights, and the right to protection as political refugees -  as 
equally entitled self-determining individuals. This means that the sovereignty of the people 
does not reach to the inner locus of individual liberty and that there are limits to the extent to 
which the U.S. disregards the rights of non-citizens (Henkin 1990: 385). What emerges here is 
clearly not a strong cosmopolitan perspective, because non-citizens, in general, are not treated 
with equal concern qua autonomous individuals; but nor is it a communitarian perspective, as 
non-citizens, in limited but distinct areas, enjoy universal rights simply as autonomous 
individuals. What emerges here instead is, broadly speaking, a weak cosmopolitan 
perspective, where the nation to a large extent prioritises its members and safeguards its right 
to national formation, but at the same time affords non-citizens’ basic universal rights to self- 
determination, on the basis of equal personhood.
114 The notion that the Court’s alienage jurisprudence com bines a defence o f  universal individual rights and a 
right to communal formation in a coherent fashion is  not entirely new . Scaperlanda has argued that the Court 
consistently invokes the plenary power when questions o f political formation are at stake and the aliens’ rights 
doctrine when they are absent (Scaperlanda 2000).
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In more detail, it can be said that the U.S. controls admission to its territory in its national 
interest, with the exception of refugee protection. Non-citizens are, on the other hand, 
afforded most civil rights simply as persons. The right to equality under the law is, however, 
limited so as to create room for the U.S. to put the interests of its citizens first in areas that are 
important to national self-determination. This includes, for instance, the right to reserve jobs 
that are related to communal formation to citizens. This right to exclude non-citizens from 
areas that lie at the heart of communal, formation is also carried over to the political rights 
realm, where rights are based on membership. Membership is also a precondition for most 
social rights, but non-citizens enjoy the right to subsistence, emergency medical care and 
basic education as equally entitled persons. The nation, finally, controls the right to 
membership in the interest of the nation. The weak cosmopolitan perspective is expressed in 
such a legal system, where the nation in general has a right to pursue its own self-defined 
interest, and yet also owes non-citizens certain universal rights that are essential for the 
exercise of individual autonomy. The U.S.’s treatment of non-citizens is in fact clearly, in 
general, in line with the weak cosmopolitan perspective. Important inconsistencies can, alas, 
be identified, and it is time to analyse these inconsistencies in detail.
Normative Inconsistencies
In the case of admissions, the absence of a cosmopolitan-based refugee policy in the U.S. 
used to give rise to a glaring normative inconsistency. That is, there was an inconsistency 
between the universal rights that all non-citizens enjoyed inside the U.S. and the refusal to 
protect non-citizens who suffered from a denial of these very same universal rights in other 
countries. The 1980 Refugee Act removed this contradiction to a significant extent. The 
codification of the Geneva Convention rests on the same cosmopolitan rationale as the 
amendments in the Constitution that protect all individuals’ basic right to self-determination. 
The U.S.’s treatment of non-citizens is also much more coherent after these two normatively 
related bodies of law have been joined.
That said, the inconsistency in this area has only been partly removed, for the U.S.’s refugee 
regime is under-inclusive. The 1980 Refugee Act protects more than individuals’ right to 
physical survival, as described earlier. The Refugee Act, however, limits its protection to 
individuals who are persecuted. This means that individuals whose lives are in danger due to
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natural calamites or lethal diseases (for example) lack protection.115 The U.S. arguably 
recognises that a basic commitment to universal rights means that other grounds, besides the 
ones listed in the Act, give rise to the need for protection. This category of refugees can, after 
all, apply for temporary protected status. The problem is that this yields no right to protection, 
and is an absolutely discretionary, non-justiciable, decision to protect, or not to protect, non­
citizens’ basic universal rights.116
The inconsistency here thus arises because certain threats to basic individual autonomy are 
singled out as worthy of protection, whereas refugees whose basic autonomy is undermined 
by other, equally serious threats, are left without a right to protection. If the U.S. cannot 
refuse an individual basic nutrition or emergency shelter, then why can an individual be 
expelled to a country where such conditions await? It is incompatible with the U.S.’s basic 
commitment to individual universal rights to fail to protect all individuals under its 
jurisdiction from threats to their lives and core individual rights, regardless of the specific 
nature of the threat. There is no normatively consistent ground for granting one group of 
refugees a statutory right to protection on the cosmopolitan rationale, while only holding out 
the possibility of a discretionary privilege to protection to another equally deserving group of 
refugees.117 The Refugee Act removed the moral arbitrariness of only extending protection to 
certain nationalities, but it retained the equally arbitrary rule of only protecting refugees 
whose lives are in danger for the right reason, as it were.
The U.S.’s visa and interdiction policy gives rise to a further inconsistency in this area.118 The 
problem does not lie with the existence of a visa regime or with the policy of interdiction; 
these methods are a legitimate part of controlling admission and compatible with a 
commitment to upholding non-citizens’ right to basic autonomy. The problem is that refugees
115 An additional inconsistency arises insofar as individuals are not granted protection because they are not 
covered by any o f the enumerated grounds in the 1980 Act.
1,6 R efugees must also be adm issible, save for obtaining a labour certification and being in possession o f  valid 
travel documentation, in order to receive temporary protected status. The Attorney General can w aive m ost other 
grounds for inadmissibility. H ow ever, conviction o f  crim es o f  moral turpitude and drug offences, unless very 
minor, and inadm issibility on security grounds result in a statutory bar from  temporary protected status (INA  
244).
117 There is no need to grant non-citizens the right to stay permanently, or to becom e members, from the weak  
cosmopolitan perspective. The right to non-refoulem ent suffices, but it must be coupled with a right to be secure 
in one’s abode once the refugee has established herself in the U .S. (More w ill be said on the universal right to be 
secure in on e’s abode in conjunction with the analysis o f  the laws regulating deportation.)
118 The im pact on refugees o f  the expedited removal system, implemented in 1996, has caused m uch concern. 
This procedure does, how ever, give all non-citizens the right to apply for asylum  before a com petent officer, and 
the right to appeal a negative decision, albeit under a fast-tracked process (Cooper 1997: 1521-1524; Siskind  
2006: 2; IN A  235 (1) (B )).
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are impeded, and some stopped, from seeking protection. Executive Order 12807 is specially 
designed to remove the legal obligation to protect refugees; that this was one of the main 
purposes of the order is emphasised by its last sentence: “Nor shall this order be construed to 
require any procedures to determine whether a person is a refugee.” (Executive Order 
12807)119
The visa regime is also partly designed to keep refugees from gaining access to the U.S. Only 
countries that produce a large number of asylum seekers and overstayers face visa 
requirements. This means that the visa regime is, in part, designed to keep asylum seekers out. 
It also impedes refugees’ efforts to reach the U.S. in general by making it necessary for them 
to fulfil a number of requirements that are not grounds for denying them refugee protection 
once they have reached the U.S. (Christian 1999: 223-224; Gibney 2003: 5). It should be 
pointed out that overseas refugees can apply to be resettled in the U.S. via the UNHCR, and in 
some cases at consular missions, but the acceptance of overseas refugees is discretionary 
(State 2004: 6-7). Overseas refugee admission is, moreover, numerically restricted and only 
applies to certain selected groups. That is, this form of protection is not a universal right, but a 
glimmer of hope. The contradiction here is clear. The U.S. actively impedes non-citizens’ 
ability to seek the universal refugee protection it upholds within the U.S., and its rationale for 
doing so is to lower the cost to the nation, while the cost to the individual refugees is totally 
disregarded.
An additional inconsistency, alas, also plagues the current refugee regime. While the right to 
non-refoulement is a statutory right in the U.S., it does not cover all individuals. The terrorist 
provisions and the general security provisions are compatible both with the Geneva 
Convention and the cosmopolitan rationale, in that a nation can deny an individual protection 
if she endangers the lives of other persons under its jurisdiction. The problem lies with the 
particularly serious crime provision. This provision bars all individuals who have committed 
an aggravated felony and been sentenced to five years imprisonment120 -  this includes non­
violent crimes -  from non-refoulement relief.
119 It should be pointed out that Coast Guard vesse ls som etimes have immigration officers on board, w ho screen
non-citizens for refugee status (Guard 2006).
120 In instances in which the sentence is less than five years, the Attorney General has discretionary powers to
decide i f  the crime is o f  a particularly serious nature (INA 241 (b) (3) (C)).
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This bar is relatively new (it applies from 1997), and the problem is that is does not allow for 
the balancing of the interest of the refugee with security considerations. The bars on the right 
to non-refoulement in the Geneva Convention, on the other hand, were adopted to prevent 
criminals from seeking refugee status, but they balance the severity of the crime against the 
interest of the refugee (Anker 1999: 429-461; INA 241 (b) (3)).121 Non-refoulement is not 
intended to create a safe haven for criminals. A refugee who has committed a serious crime 
may, of course, be punished, or be deported to serve her sentence in her home country if her 
basic universal rights can be guaranteed in that country. A state’s interest in protecting the 
people under its jurisdiction can also outweigh an individual refugee’s interest in not being 
deported. But a refugee cannot be denied basic protection if she poses no threat to individuals 
under the jurisdiction of the U.S., and the fact that a person has committed theft or burglary 
cannot be said to establish a level of threat that would justify deportation, given that the threat 
to the refugee is of the gravest kind.
Thus, the statutory exclusion of persons who have committed relatively minor and non-violent 
offences is incompatible with a commitment to basic universal individual rights, and probably 
the Geneva Convention (Anker 1999: 460). This problem is aggravated both by the fact that 
the limit for statutory exclusion is very low in relation to the possible danger to the refugee, 
but also by the fact that a very high likelihood of persecution needs to be demonstrated in 
non-refoulement cases. The more likely than not criterion, i.e. at least 51 % risk of 
persecution, is not compatible with the equal concern of all individuals as autonomous 
persons, given the severity of the risk that the refugee faces. The respect for the persons as 
self-determining individuals would after all make it unacceptable to send an accused to 
prison, in criminal cases, if it simply was more likely than not that she was guilty. It should be 
remembered of course that in criminal cases there is at least a chance that the accused is guilty 
of a crime. The potential refugee, on the other hand, is at most guilty of being a mala fide 
refugee.
It seems strange, moreover, that a refugee must meet a higher standard of proof in non­
refoulement cases than in asylum cases, given that non-refoulement is a more basic form of 
protection. This state of affairs is both mitigated and, in a way, worsened by the adoption of
121 It is  noteworthy that Germany has deem ed the need to take non-citizens’ interests into consideration in 
deportation cases to be a constitutional necessity (Neuman 1990: 48 -5 8 ; Federal Government Com m issioner for 
Migration 2004: 34; Kantstroom 1993: 190-193; Rubio-Marin 2000: 211; see also the German case study).
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the Torture Convention. There are no bars to protection under the Torture Convention. This 
means that the inconsistency stemming from denying certain individuals protection on 
insufficient grounds does not arise in this case. The same standard of proof, more likely than 
not, is nevertheless also applied in Torture Convention cases. This standard is not acceptable 
in non-refoulement cases in general, and even less so when the refugee runs the risk of being 
subjected to torture.
The admissions realm suffers from yet another inconsistency. The Court has stated that family 
unity is a very basic and natural, or a priori, right. It is, furthermore, noteworthy that both 
overseas refugees and recognised asylum seekers have the right to bring their families, 
without demonstrating that the whole family qualify as refugees. This, at the very least, 
indicates that the U.S. is unwilling to make refugee protection dependent on surrendering the 
right to family reunification. Nevertheless, only citizens have an unlimited and absolute right 
to family reunification; non-citizens wishing to join their families in the U.S. must pass the 
communitarian admissibility hurdles, although refugees are exempted from some criteria and 
only family members of U.S. citizens do not face numerical restrictions. Family members can 
be denied entry on grounds like drug addiction, poverty, or having committed crimes of moral 
turpitude, for example (INA 212).
There is thus no universal right to be admitted for the purpose of family reunification in the 
U.S., but only an inter-communal right holding between citizens. This state of affairs is 
incompatible with a commitment to basic universal rights.122 It is not, contrary to the Court’s 
ruling, compatible with a commitment to basic universal rights to let Congress withhold such 
rights from non-citizens. Because a person’s family constitutes an intrinsic part of her 
autonomous life, basic respect for all individuals as autonomous persons include respecting 
their fundamental interest in living with their families. This then means that the laws 
regulating family immigration are inconsistent with the U.S.’ general commitment to 
respecting non-citizens’ basic rights as autonomous persons. It could be argued that restricting 
the family members’ right to come to the U.S. does not deprive the family of the right to be 
united. The family simply has to unite in the country of which they are citizens. However this 
would, even on the benign assumption that the whole family share one nationality or would be
122 This is also incompatible with the communitarian rationale, as people -  w ho must be considered members 
through fam ily connections -  are not provided with an absolute right to admission. This m eans that only citizens 
are seen as full members -  for reasons analysed in chapter three, this is  incom patible with the communitarian 
perception o f  com munity and membership.
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received in another country, deprive individuals of their right to remain in their abode, which 
is another basic universal right. Or perhaps more precisely, it would force individuals to 
forsake either their basic universal right to remain in their abode or their basic universal right 
to live with their family. (For the right to be secure in one’s abode see below.)
The civil rights realm is characterised by an overall consistency, but a glaring inconsistency 
arises in the relation to the right to secure residency.123 Non-citizens can be deported 
discretionarily and on almost any ground, including certain grounds that could not 
constitutionally be criminalised. The lack of most key procedural due process rights in 
deportation cases, and the fact that deportation grounds can be invoked retroactively, further 
add to the government’s level of discretion in this area, as do the general absence of statutes 
of limitations.
Individuals, who have no universal right to admittance, as family members and refugees do, 
can be excluded on communitarian grounds according to the weak cosmopolitan perspective. 
The right to exclude generates a right to deport, insofar as the latter is a way of enforcing the 
former. However, individuals’ interest in remaining dramatically increases as they establish 
themselves in the country.124 The issue is not one of when a person is to be counted as a 
member -  this is to be decided by the community -  but that the ability to exercise basic 
individual autonomy is strongly connected to the right to remain in the society where one 
resides. Thus, once an individual has established herself in the U.S., she has a right to be 
secure in her abode. This right does not provide non-citizens with immunity from deportation 
once they have come to reside in the U.S. The U.S. has a right to deport non-citizens in order 
to protect the people under its jurisdiction, as long as the deported person’s interest in 
remaining is weighted against the states’ interest in protecting other individuals under its 
jurisdiction. In sum, the commitment to non-citizens’ right to exercise basic autonomy is
123 It should be pointed out that non-citizens’ lack o f  fourth amendment protection outside the U .S . could give  
rise to  an inconsistency. The U .S . is exercising authority abroad by deploying its own law enforcem ent officers 
in other countries, and this m eans that non-citizens cannot, in principle, be denied the same protection, just as is 
the case when the U .S . law enforcement officers act against them inside the U .S . That said, it m ight not be 
practically feasible to afford non-citizens or citizens the same legal protection abroad, because the level o f  
effective authority might not be sufficient to this end. Should citizens and non-citizens alike be afforded weaker 
protection on such functional grounds, then no normative inconsistency arises. The legal situation in this area is 
unfortunately unclear, as the grounds for denying non-citizens’, and possib ly  citizens’, fourth amendment 
protection outside the U .S . was not made clear in the Verdugo-Urquidez case (United States v. Verdugo- 
Urquidez (1990)). It is  thus not possible to pursue this point further.
124 Banishment was after all the customary alternative to a death sentence in both Athens and R om e (Stimson  
1953: 205).
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incompatible with the discretionary deportation of resident non-citizens, as deportation causes 
serious harm to individuals’ ability to exercise self-determination.
That the right to be secure in one’s abode is a basic individual right also means that even the 
limited right to deport should be checked by the same procedural safeguards as are available 
in criminal cases; the stakes are, after all, not lower. The lack of procedural due process 
protection hence makes the inconsistency caused by discretionary deportations more severe. 
The question of statutes of limitations is especially pertinent, because it puts into question the 
right to deport undocumented residents independently of how long they have lived in the 
U.S.125 The point is not that the violation of immigration laws does not constitute a punishable 
crime, or that undocumented residents cannot be deported within a reasonable time after their 
entry. The point is that only the severest of crimes do not have statutes of limitations, and 
violation of immigration laws cannot and is not seen as a crime of this calibre. Thus a statute 
of limitations, after which a breach of the immigration laws is not punishable, and the non­
citizen gains a right to be secure in her abode, is required to uphold all individuals’ basic 
rights to self-determination.
A potential counterargument is to claim that non-citizens who are in the U.S. illegally have 
ipso facto forfeited all rights, including basic procedural rights, or that an undocumented 
resident as a persona non grata has no rights. This argument, however, sits very 
uncomfortably with the fact that convicted felons retain many basic rights (Reich 1991: 246); 
alienage jurisprudence clearly recognises all non-citizens under the jurisdiction of the U.S. as 
having legal standing and possessing the same right as citizens in a court of law. The fact is, 
of course, that the U.S. government’s discretionary right to deport does not rest on the notion 
that a violation of immigration statutes is such a heinous crime that all the rules that apply to 
most criminals can be dispensed with, or that undocumented residents totally lack legal 
standing. This discretionary right instead rests on the fact that deportation is not recognised as 
a criminal process that is punitive in nature, hence the questions of protection from state 
intervention does, to a large extent, not arise.
This state of affairs is, however, incompatible with a basic commitment to universal 
individual rights. The threat of being removed from one’s abode for any retrospectively
125 It is interesting in this respect that deportation grounds had statutes o f  limitations until 1952 (Legom sky 1997: 
4 6 0 -4 6 1 ).
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invoked reason, without basic procedural rights, simply undermines the ability to lead an 
autonomous life, and constitutes punishment.126 This fact did not escape one of the founding 
fathers:
If the banishment o f  an alien from a country into w hich he has been invited, as the asylum m ost 
auspicious to his happiness; a country where he m ay have formed the m ost tender o f  connexions, 
w here he may have vested his entire property, and acquired property o f  the real and permanent, as 
w ell as the m ovable and temporary kind; where he enjoys under the law s a greater share o f  the 
blessings o f  personal security and personal liberty than he can elsew here hope fo r ,...p f  a 
banishment o f  this sort be not a punishment, and am ong the severest o f  punishments, it w ill be 
difficult to im agine a doom  to which the name can be applied. (M adison 1799)
It is fair to say that the Court has acknowledged the point Madison made well over two 
hundred years ago. The Court has, in principle, recognised that the right to be secure in one’s 
abode is a basic right, and that deportation therefore constitutes punishment and hence should 
be accompanied by the procedural safeguards that apply in criminal cases. The Court has, 
alas, always come down on the side of tradition:
If due process bars Congress from enactments that shock the sense o f  fair play -  which is the 
essence o f  due process -  one is entitled to ask whether it is not beyond the power o f  Congress to 
deport an alien w ho w as duped into jo ining the Communist Party, particularly when his conduct 
antedated the enactment o f  the legislation under which deportation is sought. And this because 
deportation, as this Court has said in N g Fung H o v. W hite, deprive a man ‘o f  all that m akes life  
worth liv in g’; and, as is has said in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan ‘deportation is a drastic measure and 
at tim es the equivalent o f  banishment or ex ile ’. In light o f the expansion o f  the concept o f  
substantive due process as a limitation upon all powers o f  Congress, even the war pow er much 
could be said for the v iew , w ere w e writing on a clean slate, that the D ue Process Clause qualifies 
the scope o f  political discretion heretofore recognised as belonging to Congress in regulating entry 
and deportation o f  aliens. And since the intrinsic consequences o f deportation are so  close to 
punishment for crim e, it might fairly be said also that the ex post facto Clause, even  though 
applicable only in punitive legislation, should be applied to deportation. But the slate is not clean.
[ . . .]  (Galvan v. Press (1954): 5 3 0 -5 3 1 )
That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residency is a practice that bristles with 
severities. But it is  a weapon o f  defence and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power
126 It is noteworthy in this respect that undocumented immigrants who have not com mitted a crime, normally are 
granted indefinite leave to remain in the U .K . after 14 years, regardless o f  the fact that they have been residing in 
the country illegally  (Shutter 1995: 209).
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inherent in every sovereign state. Such is  the traditional pow er o f the Nation over the alien and w e  
leave the law on the subject as w e find it. (Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952): 5 8 7 -5 8 8 )
The Court hence clearly bases its decisions on tradition. The Court recognises both that 
deportation is a very severe infringement on individuals’ right to self-determination and that 
the Constitution’s protection of individuals’ right to self-determination in principle should 
apply. The reference to tradition does not, of course, do anything to remove the normative 
inconsistencies that arise from discretionary deportations. The U.S. must afford all 
longstanding residents a right to secure residency in order not to contradict its commitment to 
non-citizens’ basic right to self-determination. To provide non-citizens with the right to 
defend their freedom against the state on the same terms as citizens in criminal cases, but to 
expose non-citizens to absolute state discrimination when considering their right to remain in 
their domicile, is simply inconsistent. The latter right is, after all, as central to individuals’ 
right to live autonomous lives as the former.
Conclusion
The question of non-citizens’ legal standing looks like a Gordian knot, created by liberal 
nation-states’ dual commitment to universal individual autonomy on the one hand and 
national autonomy on the other hand. The U.S. is clearly strongly committed to both values 
but, after the underlying normative rationale behind the treatment of non-citizens in the U.S. 
has been unpacked, it appears that the normative rationales complement each other 
sufficiently to make up an overall consistent weak cosmopolitan perspective.
That said, some very important and glaring inconsistencies remain. The adherence to basic 
universal values is not compatible with depriving individuals, whose basic rights are 
threatened, of protection on the grounds that they do not suffer for the right reasons, or that 
they have committed minor crimes. Nor are the visa regime and interdiction policy, or the 
standard of proof that refugees need to meet to be admitted, compatible with the U.S.’s 
commitment to uphold non-citizens’ basic right to self-determination. The commitment to 
basic universal individual rights is also incompatible with denying individuals the right to 
family reunification and denying them the right to be secure in their abode.
It is perhaps noteworthy that all these inconsistencies are found in immigration law, i.e. that 
area of the law relating to admissions and expulsions. This area constitutes the locus of the 
plenary power doctrine, and is where the idea that the nation has unlimited power over non­
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citizens reaches its zenith. It is the unlimited reign of the communitarian rationale in this area 
that creates these inconsistencies, by putting the universal rights laid down in the Constitution 
out of play in certain areas. This means that a limited, but distinct, rollback of the plenary 
power doctrine is required if the U.S. is to achieve a normatively consistent approach to the 
treatment of non-citizens that is compatible with the U.S.’s commitment to upholding non­
citizens’ basic right to autonomy.
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Chapter Five 
The Case of Germany
Human dignity is inviolable. T o respect and protect it is  the duty o f  all state authority.
The German people therefore acknow ledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis o f  
every community, o f  peace and o f justice in the world. (Basic Law 1 (1 -2 ) )
W e -  the old states o f  the old Europe -  are classic nation-states. W e create our identity not by 
com m itting to an idea, but by belonging to a particular nation (Volk). (Schauble, W olfgang (H om e  
Secretary) 1993: 53)
Section I
Germany was not bom out of a revolution aiming at establishing a republic based on universal 
values; nor did a European monarch create the notion of a German nation. Germany was, 
instead, created from below and the notion of a specific German cultural nation predates the 
German state (Kantstroom 1993: 172; Geddes 2003: 93). This historical fact had a great 
impact on the perceived essence of the German nation-state, as Brubaker explains:
T his prepolitical German nation, this nation in search o f  a state, w as conceived  not as a bearer o f  
universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial com m unity -  as an 
irreducible particular Volksgem einschaft. On this understanding, nationhood is an ethnocultural, 
not a political fact. Comparisons betw een German and French understandings o f  nationhood go  
back in their basic lines, to the early nineteenth century. They w ere first formulated by German 
intellectuals, w ho sought to distance them selves from the a lleged ly  shallow  rationalism and 
cosm opolitanism  o f  the Enlightenment and the French Revolution through a historicist celebration  
o f  cultural particularism. (Brubaker 1992: 1)
The communitarian notion of a Volksgemeinschaft, a sense of shared descent and/or cultural 
affinity, still constitutes an intrinsic part of the discourse around non-citizens’ legal standing 
in Germany (Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1992: 173). The Romantic idea of a
Volksgemeinschaft is, it should be said, not the only normative notion that has influenced the
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nature of the German political community. The Prussian empire, the Abraham of a succession 
of modem German states, was founded in the Romantic era, but it contained a strong 
reformist and state-centred element.
Like most other German states, Prussia based its nationality law on the principle of jus 
domilici or the notion of domicilium facit subditum -  residence makes the subject. This means 
that Prussia initially had a functional approach to membership where domicile, and not 
cultural membership, decided privileges and obligations (Geddes 2003: 94; Brubaker 1992: 
9-10, 67). This approach was, however, later abandoned in favour of the jus sanguinis 
principle (membership through descent/blood) as the desire to create a more homogenous 
state (and the wish to exclude non-desirables) grew stronger (Green 2000: 108). The Prussian 
empire thus transformed itself from being master and caretaker over a given territory to being 
master and caretaker of a specific nation/people. The main principle behind German 
citizenship law has also, until very recently, been that membership in the state 
(Staatsangehorigkeit) pre-supposes membership in the nation (Volkszugehdrigkeit) (Brubaker 
1992: 50-52, 63, 67, 69, 70-71).127
It is important to note, the above notwithstanding, that the cosmopolitan notion that non­
citizens have rights qua individuals was never present in Prussia, or in any other coeval 
German state. The prevailing notion in Germany, historically speaking, was that non-citizens, 
however defined, had no rights but only privileges that could be withdrawn at will (Fahrmeir 
2000: 152, 196, 209). The essence of this approach to non-citizens’ rights is brought to the 
surface by a historical contrast between German and English law in regards to non-citizens’ 
access to poor relief:
In all German states, foreigners were excluded from public poor relief. . . .  In England, Scotland 
and Ireland, by contrast, foreigners were considered ‘casual poor’, and had a right to relief 
wherever they happened to be. . . .  Lord Ellenborough ruled that... ‘the law  o f  humanity, which is  
anterior to all positive law s, ob liges us to afford them relief, and to save them  from starving.’ 
(Fahrmeir 2000: 171, Fahrmeir quotes Lord Ellenborough)
127 That said, the state-centred approach, emanating from Prussia, where territorial presence was the key criterion 
for membership, w as never totally abandoned (Brubaker 1998: 1 45 ,148; G eddes 2003: 94).
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The absence of cosmopolitan rights is also very evident in early German constitutional law. 
The constitutional document128 of 1849 rejected the universal ideas of natural rights and saw 
rights as encapsulating a positive relationship between a specific state and its members. The 
list of fundamental rights in the 1849 constitutional document hence did exclude non-citizens 
(Steinberger 1990: 205-206, 210-211; Neuman 1990: 77-78; Kommers 1995: 302).
The 1867 Constitution of the North German Federation, as well as the 1871 Constitution of 
the German Empire, also lacked any Bill of Rights, and did not protect universal individual 
rights. The Weimar Constitution of 1919 did contain a Bill of Rights, but it excluded non­
citizens from many rights; nor did the Weimar Constitution invest the judiciary with the 
power to enforce basic rights, and its Bill of Rights was not conceived of as laying down 
universal inalienable rights (Steinberger 1990: 205-206, 210-211; Neuman 1990: 77-78; 
Kommers 1995: 302).129 The absence of cosmopolitan rights in early German 
constitutionalism is very important -  not least, somewhat ironically, because the absence of 
cosmopolitan rights in early German constitutional law paved the way for their current 
centrality. After Germany’s total collapse at the end of the Second World War, Germany had 
to reinvent itself and create a new political and legal system. The cosmopolitan tradition, and 
Kant’s philosophy in particular, became central to this restoration, as it had not been 
compromised by history, and represented an antidote to the disaster that had gone before it 
(Fletcher 1984: 178; Kommers 1989: 312).
The Basic Law -  a normative reorientation
The Basic Law of 1949 constitutes the cornerstone of the new German state130 that emerged 
from the rubble of the Third Reich. The Basic Law was designed to prevent the re-emergence 
of an aggressive, totalitarian and collectivist state; it was designed to be ‘dictatorship-proof, 
to borrow Schmitt’s apt phrase (Schmitt 2000: 151). This meant that absolute restrictions on
128 The 1849 Constitution w as never put into practice, but it had a great im pact on future German Constitutions 
(Hucko 1987: 10).
129 Early German constitutions w ere hence hardly bulwarks for universal individual rights. T hey did, however, 
contain the seeds o f  som e universal individual rights, and partly heralded later developm ents in German 
constitutional law (Steinberger 1990: 2 0 5 -2 0 6 , 210 -2 1 1 ; Neuman 1990: 7 7 -7 8 ; Kommers 1995: 302).
130 The B asic Law contained tw o alternatives for German unification, the adoption o f  a new  Constitution or an 
extension o f  the B asic Law. The five East German states opted, with the consent o f  the western states, for the 
latter alternative. This means that the Basic Law o f  1949, as it now stands, constitutes the B asic Law  for the 
united Germany. The legal solution to the unification where the former East German state (G DR) ceased to exist 
and the areas that use to make up G DR were incorporated into the legal entity o f  Germany (FRG) meant that the 
whole body o f  W est German law becam e the law in the former east, although certain law s w ere subject to 
qualifications and transitional periods set down in specific treaties (Basic Law 146 and Preamble; Johnson 1995: 
136; Kantstroom 1993: 299).
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state authority and an unambiguous endorsement of universal individual rights, for the first 
time, became the hallmark of the German state (Steinberger 1990: 213; Kommers 1999a: 1- 
2). The basic thrust of this new legal order can be identified in the first article of the Basic 
Law:
Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is  the duty o f  all state authority.
The German people therefore acknow ledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis o f
every com munity, o f  peace and o f  justice in the world. (B asic Law 1 (1 -2 ) )
The placement of the first article is hardly coincidental: it is the key to the Basic Law, and 
constitutes a legal meta-framework for the lawful and legitimate exercise of state authority in 
Germany. The first article is followed by a number of enumerated basic rights that are 
intended to uphold human dignity, and for which the first article constitutes the overture. (The 
specific content and the more precise nature of these rights will be described below.) This 
system of rights (the first article and the following enumerated rights) is then completed or 
backed up by article 19 -  which states that (Kommers 1999a: 1-2; Sontheimer 1993: 213— 
214; Currie 1994: 10-11, 274; Bowie 1954: 621; Basic Law 2-19): “In no case may the 
essence of a basic right be encroached upon.” (Basic Law 19 (2)) Article 19 also grants any 
person the right to challenge a violation of a basic right in the courts.
This means that at the heart of the Basic Law lies a system of rights that is devised to uphold 
human dignity; these rights are recognised as inviolable and as something that all state 
authority must protect and respect. A look at the historical backdrop to the Basic Law reveals 
that human dignity, and the enumerated rights that are intended to uphold it, are conceived of 
as objective values. The Basic Law not only generally strengthened the notion of individual 
basic rights, compared to the Weimar Constitution, but it also inverted the order of supremacy 
between popular sovereignty and constitutional basic rights. The Basic Law thus explicitly 
rejects the Weimar Constitution’s principle of parliamentary supremacy, where all laws were 
‘up for grabs’, to borrow a phrase from Waldron (Waldron 1999: 302; Goerlich 1988: 49-50, 
64; Karpen 1983: 57; Ipsen 1983: 111-112; Kommers 1989: 170-171; Joppke 1998b: 284; 
Hucko 1987: 69-70; Gibney 2004: 88).131
131 It should be noted that two-thirds o f  members o f  parliament had to be present, and two-thirds o f  those present 
had to agree to suspend a constitutional right or provision under the W eim ar Constitution, unless there was a 
state o f  em ergen cy ... (Schm itt 2000: 147, 158).
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Germany is hence not only a Rechtsstaat (a state ruled by law), in the limited sense of being 
governed by explicit fixed laws adopted in accordance with stipulated procedures: the 
adoption of the Basic Law has transformed Germany into a state where the supreme law of 
the land cannot be overturned by any individual, ruler, organisation, or even the popular will. 
The Rechtsstaat created by the Basic Law constitutes a suprapositive and absolute ethical 
order that limits all state authority, including authority wielded by legitimate democratic 
institutions. This is the profound legal implication of the fact that the Basic Law reversed the 
relationship between democratic legitimacy and constitutional legitimacy (Kommers 1999b: 
94-96; Joppke 1998b: 284; Kommers 1989: 170-171; Karpen 1983: 57; Ipsen 1983: 111- 
112; Klein 1983:21-22).
This means that the founders of the Basic Law deliberately broke with the tenets of legal 
positivism, where rights are created by law and only hold for citizens or recognised subjects. 
The founders clearly conceived of the basic rights as universal and prior to the state, and they 
made this clear in the first article: “The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basis o f every community, of peace and of justice in the
world.” (Basic Law 1, emphasis added) It is also natural, from this perspective, that the Basic 
Law does fiot lay down or establish basic rights, but stipulates that all state authority must 
respect and protect the a priori right to human dignity and the rights that follow from it (Diirig 
1988: 13; Kommers 1989: 308; Schmitt 2000: 148; Kommers 1999a: 1-3; Kommers 1997: 
33).
The fact that human dignity, and the rights that follow from it, constitute objective and 
universal rights has also been made clear by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German 
constitutional court, hereafter in this chapter the Court):
It is equally true, how ever, that the B asic Law is not a value-neutral document. Its section on basic 
rights establishes an objective order o f  values, and this order strongly reinforces the effective  
pow er o f  basic rights. (BVerfG E 7, 198a (1958): 363)
Justice Benda describes the same fact in a similar fashion:
The concept o f  human dignity claim s necessarily universal validity, applying to every human 
being regardless o f  race, color, citizenship or any other factor. It a lso must claim  validity in any
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time; it is either valid no matter how the circumstances m ay change, or it is  not valid at all. (Benda 
1999: 43)
This notion of objective universality is further emphasised by article 79, called the eternity or 
perpetual clause (Ewigkeitsgarantie). This clause makes amendments that infringe on article 
1, and some other key articles, inadmissible.132 The eternity clause constitutes a freezing of 
history, and it underscores the centrality, universality and the inviolability of the value of 
human dignity as well as the basic rights that flow from it (Steinberger 1990: 205-214; 
Kommers 1999a: 3; Diirig 1988: 12, 15-16; Klein 1983: 34). The objective nature of human 
dignity and the basic rights that flow from it is also reflected in the fact that the Basic Law 
withholds certain rights from the enemies of freedom. Articles 9 and 21 ban parties and 
associations that try to impair constitutional freedom and democracy, and articles 5 and 18 
state that a number of basic freedoms are forfeited if they are used to combat the free and 
democratic order, for as the Court points out (Currie 1994: 214-215; Bowie 1954: 624; Hucko 
1987: 75; Kommers 1989: 222, 230; Schmitt 2000: 151; Kommers 1980: 680-681; Hogwood 
2004: 2-3, 15):133
This Constitution is not value free; it regards certain values as fundamental and ... charges the state 
with their protection (Article 1). [The Constitution] takes measures to protect against threats to  
these values and institutionalizes special procedures to ward o ff attacks on the constitutional order;
[in sum ], it creates a militant dem ocracy (Article 2 (1), 9 (2), 18, 20  (4), 21 (2), 79  (3), 91 , 98  (2)). 
(BVerfG E 39, 334 (1975): 234)
The fact that the German legal system is based on the notion of a universal objective right to 
human dignity has important implications for the normative status of the German state. The 
fact that human dignity is recognised as a transcendental value means that the state is not a 
value in itself, but rather an institution that derives its value from respecting and upholding 
human dignity. It also means that there are absolute limits to state action and sovereignty. The 
notion of an absolute right to human dignity was a deliberate move to curb the notion of the 
dignity of the state and to reverse the order of the dignity of the state and the dignity of the
132 It should be pointed out that article 79  is  read by som e constitutional experts as only restricting the 
amendment process, and not the content o f  another superseding Constitution, in accordance with article 146 
(Neuman 1992: 2 7 0 -2 7 1 ). Other constitutional experts, is should be said, seem to be o f  the opinion that article 
19 exem pts the basic principles o f  the Basic Law from change under any circumstances (H ucko 1987: 70; Starck 
2002: 188).
133 It should be noted that the notion o f  a militant democracy means that individual rights can be infringed upon, 
but that such infringements m ay not undermine the essence o f basic rights, as no government action m ay do so  
(Basic Law 19).
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human being. This move was clearly the result of the derailment of the Third Reich and its 
strong emphasis on the dignity of the state (Klein 1983: 16; Kommers 1999b: 107; Kommers 
1997: 41; Frowein 2002: 123; Klein 2002:146).
The notion of human dignity as a universal value, furthermore, gives rise to a special 
connection between national and international law in Germany:
The general rules o f  public international law are an integral part o f  federal law . They take 
precedence over statutes and create rights and duties for the inhabitants o f  the federal territory.
(Basic Law 25)
This means that the general rules of public international law (over and above the possibility of 
incorporating international treaties into domestic law under article 59 (2) of the Basic Law) 
constitute an integral part of the German legal system. The general rules of public 
international law are, moreover, superior to all domestic German law -  save for the Basic 
Law. Recognised international law that falls outside the definition of general rules of public 
international law is furthermore directly applicable in Germany. This form of international 
law can, however, be contravened by federal law, but the Court has further strengthened the 
standing of international law by establishing that legislation in general is to be seen as 
intended to be compatible with international law.
The fact that the German legal system is constructed to be compatible with, and connected to, 
international law -  so as to bridge the German state to an international community based on 
universal values -  also means that applicable international law covers non-citizens in 
Germany. This is evident not only from the explicit connection made in article 25, but also 
from the fact that the central concept of human dignity in the Basic Law corresponds to the 
concept of human dignity and human rights in modem humanitarian international law 
(Neuman 1990: 80; Schuster 2003: 183; Goetz 1995a: 24-25; BVerfGE 1481/04 (2004)). The 
Court has recently described the nature of the special relationship between the Basic Law and 
international law in the following:
The B asic Law is intended to achieve com prehensive com mitm ent [sic] to international law , cross- 
border cooperation and political integration in a gradually developing international com m unity o f  
democratic states under the rule o f  law. (BVerfG E 1481/04 (2004))
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The Cosmopolitan Nature of the Basic Law
It is thus far clear that the Basic Law derives from the notion of the existence of a 
suprapositive legal order that connects the German state to a universal world order. It is also 
clear that this notion leads to the Basic Law limiting the exercise of all state authority by the 
need to respect and protect human dignity. To fully uncover the cosmopolitan nature of the 
Basic Law, the concept of human dignity must be analysed further. As the second article of 
the Basic Law strongly indicates, the concept of human dignity is chiefly concerned with 
individuals’ ability to self-determination (Klein 1983: 16; Goerlich 1988: 58; Klein 2002: 
149):
Everyone has the right to free developm ent o f  his personality insofar as he does not violate the 
rights o f  others or offend against the constitutional order or moral law.
Everyone has the right to life  and physical integrity. The liberty o f the individual is inviolable. 
Intrusion on these rights may be made only pursuant to statute. (Basic Law 2 (1 -2 ))
It is of note that the original drafting of article 2 (1) -  ‘every person is free to do or not to do 
what he wishes’ -  which captures the notion of individual self-determination in an even more 
straightforward manner was replaced for linguistic and not for legal reasons according to the 
Court (Currie 1989: 358-359). This means that the individual has the right to be treated as an 
independent end and not as a means by the state or by others. The Court has adopted the 
theory of objects in order to develop standards that protect and respect human dignity. This 
theory relates back to Kant’s theory of the Kingdom of Ends, and is based on the notion that 
all individuals have rights as autonomous beings (Klein 2002: 150):
It is  contrary to human dignity to make the individual the mere tool o f  the state. The principle that 
“each person must always be an end in h im se lf’ applies unreservedly to all areas o f  the law; the 
intrinsic dignity o f  the person consists in acknowledging him as an independent personality. 
(BVerfGE 45, 187a (1977): 314)
The primary purpose o f the basic rights is to safeguard the liberties o f  the individual against 
interferences by public authority. They are defensive rights o f  the individual against the state...
This value system , w hich centers upon dignity o f  the human personality developing freely within  
the social com munity, must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all 
spheres o f  law (public and private). (BV erfG E 7 , 198a (1958): 363)
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The state violates human dignity when it treats persons as mere objects. . . .  The state has no right 
to pierce the [protected] sphere o f  privacy by thoroughly checking into personal matters o f  its 
citizens. [It] must leave the individual with an inner space for the purpose o f  the free and 
responsible developm ent o f  his personality. (BVerfGE 2 7 ,1  (1969): 307)
A bove all, law s must not violate a person’s dignity, which represents the highest value o f  the Basic  
Law; nor m ay they restrict a person’s spiritual, political, or econom ic freedom  in a w ay that would  
erode the essence o f  [personhood]. (BVerfGE 6, 32 (1957): 327)
Klein has captured the normative rationale behind the concept of human dignity in the Basic 
Law aptly:
Its [the B asic L aw ’s] core is the liberty o f  the individual which derives from  the dignity o f  man 
and from his right to self-determination, i.e. his right to decide on the pursuit o f  happiness for 
him self. Liberty is vested in man by nature: consequently the constitution is laid down to  
guarantee liberty, not to grant it. (Klein 1983:16)
The fact that the core of the Basic Law is concerned with the protection of individual 
autonomy can be seen even more clearly if the fundamental structure of the Basic Law is 
further unpacked. The first article lays down the objective value of human dignity; the second 
article then gives substance to the concept of human dignity by connecting it to the right to 
free development of an individual personality; and these two articles make up a unified whole 
that protects individuals’ right to self-determination:
The human dignity clause is alm ost always read in tandem with the general liberty interests 
secured by the personality, inviolability, and right-to-life clauses o f Article 2. The relationship 
between Article 1 and Article 2 is  sym biotic; all their provisions nourish and reinforce one 
another. (Komm ers 1989: 305)
The second article is then followed by enumerated specific basic rights (Johnson 1995: 133). 
These rights are meant to further guarantee the right to individual self-determination. This 
means that the first articles constitute a unified system where article 1 and 2 are to be read 
together and uphold an absolute right to human dignity, understood as the right to individual 
autonomy, and this right is then backed up by enumerated rights to this end. The Court has 
described this basic structure in the following way:
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The general personality right, as laid down in Article 2 (1) in tandem with Article 1 (1), serves to 
protect these values -  along with other more specific guarantees o f  freedom -  and gains in 
importance i f  one bears in mind m odem  developm ents with their attendant dangers to the human 
personality. (BV erfG E 6 5 ,1  (1983): 333)
The fact that all these pieces (articles 1, 2 and the enumerated basic rights) constitute an 
integrated system can clearly be seen by the function of article 2, which in a sense constitutes 
the heart of this system of rights. The second article not only substantiates the first article, it 
also functions as a catch-all article. That is, the Court can invalidate laws even if no specific 
enumerated basic right is infringed upon, by referring to the general right to free development 
of an individual personality, as stipulated in article 2. That is, the second article ensures 
justice on the basis of individual concern, and works as an ultimate guarantee of the fairness 
of government action for all individuals -  much in the same way as the due process and equal 
protection clauses in the U.S. Constitution (Currie 1989: 335-336; Rubio-Marin 2000: 
189).134 In conclusion, the core of the Basic Law joins together or connects specific individual 
basic rights with the respect for human dignity perceived as the right to live an autonomous 
life (Kommers 1989: 305); and ‘the basic rights and many other provisions show that the 
cornerstone of the Basic Law is to respect the choices of the individual’ (Siebert 1993: 292).
The right to an autonomous life is also seen as a right that individuals hold equally, and the 
right to equal concern in fact constitutes part of the overall system guaranteeing individuals 
the right to self-determination. The right to equality follows immediately after article 2, which 
guarantees individual autonomy:
All persons are equal before the law.
M en and wom en shall have equal rights.
N o  one m ay be disadvantaged or favoured because o f his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, 
his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions. (Basic Law 3 (1 -2 ))
That is, the notions of freedom and equality constitute an interrelated value system where all, 
as autonomous individuals, are seen as deserving of an even-handed treatment or chance 
(Wurtenberg 1988: 69-70; Karpen 1983: 74—75). This is, of course, already indicated in the 
second article, which states that individual freedom is limited by the freedom of other
134 It should be noted that there are other clauses in the Basic Law that have been deployed for this purpose, see 
article 3 and 14 for exam ple.
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individuals. Furthermore, the right to equality before the law in general, and the concept of 
the Rechtsstaat in particular, reconnect to the idea that all persons have a right to equal 
concern as autonomous individuals (Goerlich 1988: 63; Wurtenberg 1988: 83).
It can be said that the Basic Law generally focuses on values -  as a notion that encompasses 
but goes beyond rights. This focus on values means that the state’s requirement to respect and 
protect human dignity encompasses positive obligations as well, and the state must provide all 
individuals with the basic requirements needed for the exercise of individual autonomy. This 
entails creating a social order where the basic rights in the Basic Law can be exercised 
effectively, including the duty of providing all individuals with minimal material resources. 
The specific wording protect has not been the major impetus behind establishing that the state 
has positive obligations; this obligation has instead been derived from an overall 
interpretation of the Basic Law drawing on several articles including the so-called social state 
provisions in articles 20 and 28 (Sozialstaat provisions), as well as the notion of the rule of 
law.
The Court has, for example, interpreted the social state provisions as entitling all persons to 
some level of basic social assistance. That said, no specific social entitlement has been 
derived directly from these provisions, and the Court has, in general, left the legislative 
branch with a great deal of discretion in deciding on the extent and nature of the positive 
obligations that the Basic Law gives rise to (Currie 1994: 15-16, 21; Karpen 1983: 74-75; 
Kunig 1988: 201-202; Kommers 1989: 248-249; Neuman 1990: 40; Kommers 1999b: 107- 
108, 120). This, nevertheless, means that the Basic Law goes beyond negative rights and 
creates a legal obligation for the state to protect, and not only respect, individuals’ ability to
v
exercise self-determination:
This obligation [referring to article 20 and the social state clause] is the m odem  trend o f the B asic  
Law, w hich looks beyond classical liberalism . The social state clause im poses an obligation on the 
State not only to respect the dignity o f  man and safeguard his individual rights, but also to ensure 
the creation o f  the m ost equitable social conditions possib le , in which the individual can develop  
that dignity and exercise those rights. (Sontheim er 1993: 215)
The Basic Law’s focus on the value of individual autonomy as something entailing, but going 
beyond negative rights, is in turn closely connected to the perception, not to say the 
epistemological assumption that autonomous persons are social and not atomistic beings:
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The morality o f  duty and the principles o f  human solidarity im plicit in this statement [referring to  
the Court’s description o f  the im age o f  man in the B asic Law] and reflected in parts o f  the Basic 
Law bear clear imprint o f  Kantian moral theory... Human dignity, in the eyes o f  the Court, 
requires a caring and sharing society marked by understanding and reciprocity am ong individuals 
in the presence o f  definite values. Individuals are to be seen and appreciated in their concrete 
reality and respected for what they actually represent in their familial and personal lives. These 
propositions, in short, add up to the Kantian injunction that human persons are to be treated as 
ends in them selves, not m eans. (Komm ers 1989: 313)
This perception of the autonomous individual as a social actor also has implications for the 
role of the state. The state needs, on the one hand, to be limited, so as to not encroach on 
individuals’ sacred private sphere; but the state must, on the other hand, ensure that all 
individuals have the ability to exercise self-determination (Kommers 1989: 245-246; 
Kommers 1997: 47). There is, thus, a need to balance or weigh individuals’ rights against 
each other. This balancing act constitutes an essential part of the constitutional system in 
Germany. It is implied already in the Basic Law’s second article -  ‘everyone has the right to 
free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others’ (Basic 
Law 2). The Court has also on numerous occasions elaborated on the nature of this balancing 
act:
The right to free developm ent o f  on e’s personality and human dignity safeguard for everyone the 
sphere o f  autonom y in w hich to shape his private life  by developing and protecting his  
individuality. . . .  H ow ever, according to the constant practice o f  the Federal Constitutional Court, 
not the entire sphere o f  private life  enjoys the absolute protection o f  the above-mentioned  
fundamental rights. I f  an individual in his capacity as a citizen living within a com munity enters 
into relations with others, influences others by his existence or activity, and thereby im pinges upon 
the personal sphere o f  other people or upon the interests o f communal life , his exclusive right to be 
master o f his ow n private sphere m ay becom e subject to restrictions, unless his sacrosanct 
innermost sphere o f  life  is  concerned. (BV erfG E 35, 202 (1973))
This freedom  within the meaning o f  the Basic Law is not that o f  an isolated and self-regarding  
individual but rather [that] o f  a person related to and bound to the com munity. In light o f  this 
com m unity-boundedness it cannot be “in principle unlimited”. The individual must allow  those 
lim its on his freedom  o f action that the legislature deem s necessary in the interest o f  the 
com m unity’s social life; yet the autonom y o f  the individual has to be protected. (BVerfG E 45,
187b (1977): 316)
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The im age o f  man under the Basic Law is not that o f  an isolated, sovereign individual; rather the 
B asic Law resolves the conflict between the individual and the com munity by relating and binding 
the citizen to the com m unity but without detracting from his individuality. (BV erfG E 4 , 7a (1954):
215)
Like all basic rights, the guarantee o f  liberty in Article 5 (3) (1) is based on the Basic Law ’s image 
o f  man as an autonom ous person w ho develops freely within the social com munity. (BVerfG E 30,
173 (1971): 310)
I f  one sees in this constitutional right [article 2 (1) the right to personal self-determination] a 
com prehensive guarantee o f  freedom o f  action, such a freedom  can, in principle, exist only to the 
extent that it neither violates the rights o f  others, nor the constitutional order, nor morality. The 
im age o f  man in the B asic Law is not that o f  an isolated, sovereign individual. On the contrary, the 
B asic Law has resolved the tension between the individual and society in favour o f  coordinated  
and interdependence with com m unity without touching the intrinsic value o f  the person. (BVerfGE  
4, 7b (1954): 250)
The Basic law thus clearly recognises that individuals’ rights can come into conflict. The 
Basic Law’s solution to this problem is based on its view of the autonomous individual as a 
social co-operator who has a right to individual freedom, but also an obligation to respect 
other individuals’ equal right to freedom. This means that individuals must accept limits on 
their personal freedom so as to guarantee the equal concern of all, as individual autonomy is 
not a fully private affair but partly functions in a social context (Karpen 1988: 96; Klein 1983: 
18-19; Kommers 1997: 37). This solution clearly does not mean that some unfortunate 
individual’s good can be sacrificed on the altar of the common good. The idea is that 
individual rights sometimes must yield to the interests of other individuals and society as a 
whole, but that this never can lead to a situation where the essence of individual rights is 
encroached upon (Kommers 1997: 45-48). (The Court has developed a sophisticated 
mechanism to this end -  see the proportionality principle below.)
In sum, the normative essence behind the Basic Law bears a close similarity to modem 
cosmopolitanism. The belief in a pre-existing moral order and the notion that state authority is 
limited is carried over from the Christian natural law tradition to Kantianism, where the 
notion of human dignity is substantiated and cashed out as the right to equal individual 
autonomy. The notion of equal right to individual autonomy then takes a further step in the
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direction of modern cosmopolitanism (or reconnects to Kant),135 where more attention is paid 
to ensuring the conditions under which all individuals have an actual ability to exercise 
individual autonomy.
This leads to an increased focus on societies’ obligations to protect individuals’ ability to 
exercise autonomy, and not just to uphold negative rights. Or to put it differently, it leads to a 
focus on the value of individual autonomy as something that entails, but goes beyond, the 
negative right to exercise individual self-determination. It is thus clear that the normative 
essence of the Basic Law rests on the cosmopolitan rationale, and in particular entails Kant’s 
universal concept of an equal and mutual right to individual autonomy. This is furthermore 
underscored by the fact that the Basic Law’s concept of human dignity is connected to 
international law, where the concept of human dignity carries strong Kantian connotations 
(Benda 1999: 36-37; Schatter 1983; Dolzer 1993: 372). Indeed, the concept of human dignity 
in the Basic Law draws directly on Kant and his notion of the Kingdom of Ends, as well as on 
other key cosmopolitan sources (Fletcher 1984: 178):
In seeking to advance human dignity as a constitutional value, both court and commentators have 
relied on three politically significant sources o f  ethical theory in postwar Germany -  namely, 
Christian natural law , Kantian thdught, and social democratic thought. A s noted in an earlier 
chapter, w e find these influences present in the constitutional text as a w hole. (Komm ers 1989:
312)
The Basic Law and Communitarianism
The Basic Law, for all its focus on cosmopolitan rights, also contains a strong commitment to 
the notion of popular sovereignty (Kommers 1999b: 96; Kruger 1999: 343). Article 20 states 
that: “All state authority emanates from the people.” (Basic Law 20 (2)) This means that the 
existence of a particular self-defined people constitutes the legitimate basis for state authority, 
and the right to exercise state authority rests with the German people (see the political rights 
realm below). The Court has described this multi-faceted constitutional order in the following:
[The order com prises of] at least the fo llow ing basic principles: respect for human rights as made 
explicit by the B asic Law, especia lly  the right to life  and the free developm ent o f  the person, the 
sovereignty o f  the people, the separation o f  pow ers...(B V erfG E  2, 1 (1952): 152)
135 It can alw ays be discussed to what extent the focus on the ability to actually exercise individual autonomy 
effectively w as present in Kant's moral and political philosophy; or whether this developm ent in m odem  
cosmopolitanism  stems more from social democratic sources.
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The principle of popular sovereignty is thus also central to the Basic Law, as it constitutes the 
foundation for the legitimate exercise of state authority; this, of course, does not alter the fact 
that all state authority is limited by a suprapositive legal obligation to respect human dignity. 
The centrality of the principle of popular sovereignty is reflected in the fact that it enjoys the 
protection of the eternity clause. The fact that great significance is also attached to the notion 
of popular sovereignty means that membership in the nation or body politic is of great 
importance, and that citizenship confers a special status. This is highlighted by the fact that 
only Germans enjoy the protection of some of the basic rights stipulated in the Basic Law. 
That is, the Basic Law contains a distinction between human rights or rights for everyone 
(Jedermanrtrechte or Menschenrechte) and rights for Germans (Deutschenrechte) (Joppke 
2001b: 348-349; Rubio-Marin 2000: 186-188; Kantstroom 1993: 168-170).136
[...] citizenship expresses the basic relationship between the group o f  m em bers legally  bound and 
the com m unity o f  the German state. Out o f  citizenship derives a constitutional status whereby  
som e rights, and the guarantees for equal enjoyment o f  som e others, are reserved for Germans. 
(BVerfG E 83, 37a (1990): 204)
The Court has also clarified that membership is not a functional concept, but refers to 
membership in the particular German nation, which holds the right to define itself:
Other provisions o f  the Basic Law that relates to “the people” are unequivocal in [identifying] the 
body politic as the German people: the Preamble declares that it is the German people w ho  
adopted the B asic Law by virtue o f  their constituent power; Article 33  (1) and (2) guarantee every  
German in every Land  the sam e political rights and duties; A rticles 56  and 64 require the federal 
president and members o f  the cabinet to swear that they w ill dedicate their efforts to the w ell-being  
o f  the German people. .. .  This does not mean that the legislator is unable to influence the 
com position o f  “the people” under Article 20  (2). The B asic Law em pow ers the legislator to set 
conditions for gaining or losing citizenship status (see Articles 73  [2] and 116) and thereby to 
establish the criteria for membership in the body politic. (BVerfG E 83, 37b (1990): 198)
It is hence the particular German people who hold the right to exercise state authority and 
national sovereignty; or put differently, the legitimacy of the German state is based on the fact
136 The concept o f  German rights in the Basic Law does not preclude non-citizens from  being provided with the 
same rights under statutory law , and non-citizens enjoy the right to freedom  o f  assem bly and freedom  o f  
association under federal law , for exam ple. That is, the B asic Law lim its the constitutional protection o f  these 
rights to Germans, but it does not invalidate an extension o f these rights to non-citizens (Interior 2005d: 48).
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that it represents a particular nation (Brubaker 1998: 139; Kantstroom 1993: 169-170). The 
German constitutional framework thus combines the notion of that rights are bestowed 
universally on all individuals as autonomous persons on the one hand, and on the other, the 
idea that a nation-state, as the representative of a particular nation, has a right to pursue the 
interest of its members, and to exercise national sovereignty to this end.
The German legal system clearly gives lexical priority to individual autonomy, as all state 
authority must protect and respect the right to individual self-determination. That said, the 
general right to exercise state authority rests with the people; the nation can, thus, within the 
universal limitation set down in the Basic Law, exercise national sovereignty. That is, popular 
sovereignty is not the ultimate or highest value, but it covers by far the widest area (Goerlich 
1988: 58). This constitutional system -  where the right to individual autonomy, as a 
suprapositive legal obligation, cohabits with the right to national autonomy -  can be 
summarised in terms of jurisprudence as follows:
Gesetz, which refers to  statutes, represents the will o f  the people (i.e ., the democratic w ill), 
whereas Recht suggests a normative “law state” that im poses limits on the w ill o f  the majority. 
(Kommers 1999b: 96)
The Basic Law's Direct Legal Implications for Non-Citizens
The first thing to note, in regards to the direct legal implications for non-citizens of this 
constitutional system, is that the universal individual rights in the Basic Law, in general, do 
cover non-citizens. Non-citizens (including undocumented residents) are protected by the 
three first key articles (the right to human dignity, the right to individual autonomy, and the 
right to equality) and most of the other enumerated basic rights; the fact that the Basic Law 
constitutes a system that is universal in nature, furthermore, provides non-citizens with a 
general legal foundation from which they can claim rights and challenge legislation (Goerlich 
1988: 47; Currie 1994: 12; Bowie 1954: 624; Neuman 1990: 38, 79; Joppke 2001b: 349-350; 
Rubio-Marin 2000: 187; Sinn 2005: 17).
It can be said, on a more specific level, that the wording ‘all state authority must respect and 
protect human dignity’, and the general universal thrust of the Basic Law, have the important 
implication of removing the possibility of placing the issue of non-citizens’ rights outside the 
remit of the Basic Law (Basic Law 1). This means that a legal doctrine of deference (such as
169
the plenary power doctrine) is fundamentally incompatible with the Basic Law (Joppke 1999:
18).137 The Court has, furthermore, interpreted article 2 as a supplementary human right, 
allowing non-citizens to challenge restrictions on their rights by invoking the general right to 
the free development of a personality (Hailbronner 1999: 49); non-citizens have thus acquired 
certain rights that normally are reserved for Germans under the auspices of this superior 
universal right to individual self-determination. The key notion behind the inroads into rights 
normally reserved for Germans is that as an individual comes to live in Germany, her ability 
to exercise individual autonomy becomes tied to Germany, and this further restricts the 
number of rights that can be denied to her (Rubio-Marin 2000: 208-212; Joppke 2001a: 46- 
47; Kommers 1989: 170-171).
The second thing to note, in this context, is that the universal individual rights in the Basic 
Law constitute directly applicable law, and the Basic Law mandates the creation of a Federal 
Constitutional Court to uphold these rights. The Court explicitly holds the right to judicial 
review of the constitutionality of legislation, as well as over other forms of public authority.138 
This means that article 1 of the Basic Law, as its third clause stipulates, constitutes more than 
a general and lofty commitment to human dignity: it works as a check on all exercise of all 
public authority (Kommers 1999a: 1-3; Diirig 1988: 13; Neuman 1990: 38; Kommers 1980: 
674; Basic Law 1, 92-93). The normative idea of respecting human dignity is thus transmitted 
or transformed, via the Basic Law, into a legal reality that makes this norm actionable -  in 
principle even on the supranational level (through the connection with international law).
The above amounts to a robust legal defence of non-citizens’ right to individual self- 
determination, but it should be noted in this context that the Court seemingly has made access 
to additional protection under article 2 -  albeit based on the universal right to autonomy -  
dependent on legal residence (Rubio-Marin 2000: 215). Nor do the inroads that non-citizens 
have made under the aegis of article 2 amount to a collapse of the distinction between human 
rights and rights for Germans (Ossenbiihl 1993: 252, 275; Joppke 1999: 18-19).
137 It should, however, be noted that the Court provides the Government with a fair amount o f  discretion over 
foreign affairs, but the connection between immigration and such affairs is not assumed, as is often the case in 
the U .S . (Neuman 1990: 69— 70).
138 It is noteworthy that the Court never had to establish its right to judicial review  (as its U .S . counterpart did), 
and that its jurisdiction spans som e non-constitutional areas. The Court is not, is  should be m entioned, the 
highest court o f  appeal for m ost non-constitutional issues. The highest courts o f  appeal for this kind o f  cases are 
five specific federal courts (Neuman 1990: 3 8 -3 9 ; Kommers 1997: 10).
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It should, furthermore, be noted in this respect that equality before the law only bans unequal 
treatment based on what the Court holds to be arbitrary differences (Rubio-Marin 2000: 191; 
Neuman 1990: 65). The fact that the German people have a right to national self- 
determination also means that alienage is not always seen as an arbitrary distinction (Currie 
1989: 363-364; Ipsen 1983: 129-130; Currie 1994: 322-324). More specifically, the Court 
has held that non-citizens do enjoy a general right to equality before the law, but the ban on 
distinctions on the basis of a person’s homeland does not cover non-citizens (Neuman 1990: 
65; Kantstroom 1993: 191-192; Rubio-Marin 2000: 191). This means that non-citizens, on 
the one hand, are entitled to equality before the law as they are (at least in part) recognised as 
equally entitled legal subjects; but alienage is, on the other hand, also perceived as a valid 
classification ground, and this means that there is a chink in non-citizens’ legal armour.139 
(The details of this will emerge in the civil rights realm.)
The fact that non-citizens are protected by article 2 -  the general right to individual self- 
determination -  also gives rise to legal protection in the form of inclusion in the procedural 
rights that are inherent in the German constitutional system. These procedural rights are 
intended to ensure that the values in the Basic Law are upheld throughout the legal process. 
The key concept in this regard is the principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit (accordance with the rule 
of law). The main, or overall, principle behind the concept of Rechtsstaatlichkeit is that the 
state must respect and protect individuals’ right to self-determination by making the legal 
process transparent and predictable, and by upholding all individuals’ right to equality before 
the law. This is intended to ensure that all individuals have an equal ability to plan their lives 
and pursue their particular aims (Currie 1989: 353-354, 358-363; Currie 1994: 18-20, 309- 
310, 318-320; Rubio-Marin 2000: 189-190; Kantstroom 1993: 191; Notes 1986: 316; 
Kommers 1997: 36, 46; Basic Law 1, 3, 19).
The basic principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit is embodied in article 19 of the Basic Law. This 
article provides all individuals with basic procedural due process rights in cases where their 
basic rights are infringed upon -  including the right to challenge infringements on their 
liberties in a court of law. The principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit in the German constitutional
139 This chink in or limitation o f  non-citizens’ legal armour lies at the heart o f  Germany’s (and the U .S .’s) effort 
to balance individual and national autonomy. The final legal arbitration, in particular cases, between these tw o  
values in relation to non-citizens’ rights often boils down to the question o f  whether alienage is a legitim ate 
classification ground, or whether the non-citizen, as an equally entitled individual, has the right to be treated on 
par with citizens.
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system, however, stretches beyond this basic notion of procedural due process: it includes 
rules that are intended to make sure that the state does not ride roughshod over individuals’ 
rights in cases where there is a legitimate need to limit individuals’ rights (Currie 1989: 353- 
354, 358-363; Currie 1994: 18-20, 309-310, 318-320; Rubio-Marin 2000: 189-190; 
Kantstroom 1993: 191; Notes 1986: 316; Kommers 1997: 36, 46; Basic Law 1, 3, 19).
The Court has established that the principle of proportionality -  which is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Basic Law -  constitutes part of the principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit. The 
principle of proportionality is cashed out much in the same way as the concept of substantive 
due process in the U.S. That is, any restriction on liberties must be adapted or tailored to a 
specific and legitimate end, and the restriction must be necessary to that specific end; the 
burden imposed on the individual, furthermore, cannot be too onerous, and the legislature 
must choose the least burdensome means from the individual’s point of view when infringing 
on individual liberties (Currie 1989: 353-354, 358-363; Currie 1994: 18-20, 309-310, 318— 
320; Rubio-Marin 2000: 189-190; Kantstroom 1993: 191; Notes 1986: 316; Kommers 1997: 
36, 46; Basic Law 1, 3, 19).
The principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit has developed into a comprehensive system that ensures 
that all individuals’ rights are protected throughout the legal process, while at the same time 
allowing for the necessary balance of interests between different individuals and society at 
large. The fact that even basic rights are balanced against each other thus does not mean that 
the basic rights are void. The proportionality principle (in conjunction with the general right 
to autonomy under article 2) is a key legal instrument in this respect, as it is devised to set an 
upper limit on -  and to control -  the state’s ability to circumscribe individuals’ rights. This 
principle provides the Court with the ability to ensure the fairness or justice of all state 
authority. It will also become evident below that non-citizens hold several important rights 
under the principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit in general, and under the principle of proportionality 
in particular (Currie 1989: 353-354, 358-363; Currie 1994: 18-20, 309-310, 318-320; 
Rubio-Marin 2000: 189-190; Kantstroom 1993:191; Notes 1986: 316).
In sum, the issue of non-citizens’ legal standing boils down to a balance between individual 
and national self-determination (Joppke 2001b: 349-350; Rubio-Marin 2000: 189-192, 195, 
219-220). The current treatment of non-citizens in Germany reflects a balance between 
national and individual autonomy. That is, the idea that the German nation -  as a particular,
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bounded self-defined social sphere -  has the right to self-determination constitutes the basis 
for its sovereignty. This national sovereignty is, however, circumscribed by individuals’ 
universal right to self-determination qua persons, which all state authority must respect as 
well as protect (Joppke 2001c: 16-17; Rubio-Marin 2000: 227; Boswell 2003: 79-80; 
Kurthen 1995: 914, 918, 928; Schuster 2003: 189-190; Kantstroom 1993: 159-160, 209). As 
Kommers puts it: “The problem facing judicial interpreters is that they confront a 
constitutional text that enshrines the values of both universalism and particularism.” 
(Kommers 1999b: 104, for a similar statement by the Court see; BVerfGE 1481/04 (2004))
* * *
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Section II
It is now time to unearth the normative rationales behind the 17 specific rights identified in 
chapter one in the German context, and to look at how the balance between the cosmopolitan 
and the communitarian rationales is played out in Germany.
The Admissions Realm
The right to admission is limited to non-citizens who fall into the three main categories of 
labour, family and humanitarian immigrants. The new Immigration Act, which came into 
force in 2005, does contain several targeted provisions for labour immigration -  although a 
general ban on recruiting foreign labour is in force in Germany, and labour immigration 
requires approval of the Federal Employment Agency (Immigration Act 18; Interior 2005f:
19). In more detail, it can be said that a foreigner may be admitted for the purpose of self- 
employment if she invests a sufficient amount of capital in Germany, where ‘overriding 
economic interest or special regional needs apply’ and ‘the activity is expected to have 
positive effects on the economy’ (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung flir Migration 2005: 
Foreigners’ Rights; Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 12; Office 2005: 
2; Immigration Act 21).140
Highly qualified non-citizens may also be granted the right to settle in Germany, with the 
approval of the Federal Employment agency, on the assumption that the non-citizen will not 
require state funds and that she will be able to integrate into German society (Immigration Act 
19; Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 11; Beauftragte der 
Bundesregierung flir Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights; Office 2005: 2).141 Moreover, the 
Federal Employment Agency’s approval is, in general, dependent on the condition that the 
recruitment of non-citizens does not result in any adverse consequences for the German 
labour market, and that no German workers or foreigners entitled to preferential access to the
140 These criteria are in general seen as fulfilled  i f  at least 1000000 €  is  invested and ten jobs created 
(Immigration Act 21).
141 H ighly qualified is defined as: scientists with technical know ledge, teaching personnel in prominent positions, 
and specialists and executive personnel w hose salaries are at least tw ice that o f  the ceiling  for the statutory health 
and insurance scheme. This group is also an exception to the general rule that non-citizens are not granted a 
settlement permit from the outset (Immigration A ct 19).
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labour market are available (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 10; 
Immigration Act 39).142
A fundamental distinction is made between EU citizens and so-called third-country nationals 
(between Unionsburger and Drittstaatenangehdriger), and EU citizens’ legal standing is 
regulated by a specific section of the Immigration Act. All EU citizens who wish to work as 
employees or self-employed persons, who wish to undertake vocational training, or who wish 
to consume services also have the right to reside in Germany -  as do EU citizens who are not 
gainfully employed but have adequate health insurance and sufficient means of subsistence 
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights; Federal 
Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 21-22, 24; Freedom of Movement Act/EU 
2-4; Sorensen 1996: 114—115).143
Non-citizens have a general or a prima facie right to family reunification under the 
Immigration Act:
The residence permit to enable [sic] foreigners to be joined by foreign dependents so  that they can  
live as a fam ily (subsequent immigration dependents) shall be granted and extended to protect 
marriage and the fam ily in accordance with Article 6 o f  the Basic Law . (Immigration A ct 27)
This general right to family reunification is, as the above quote shows, directly linked to the 
protection of family life as one of the universal individual rights enumerated in the Basic 
Law. The Court, however, ruled in 1987 that the right to family life does not extend to an 
absolute right of entry for the purpose of exercising the right to family unity. The right to 
family reunification under the Immigration Act is also conditioned on the assumption that 
foreign sponsors do not depend on social welfare for maintaining foreign dependents, or other 
foreigners living in their households,144 and that they can provide adequate living space 
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: Foreigners’ Rights; Federal
142 O nly the first, more general, requirement ‘adverse consequences for the labour market’ applies to adm ission  
o f  highly qualified foreigners (Immigration A ct 19, 39 (5)).
143 It should be noted that the E U ’s ten latest members are temporarily excluded from this right, and that citizens  
from these countries still need authorisation from the Federal Employment A gency, on the sam e conditions as 
third-country nationals. That said, citizens from these member states have priority over third-country nationals, 
and they w ill gain the same right as other EU citizens in 2011 at the latest (Federal Government C om m issioner  
for M igration 2004: 21 -2 3 ; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: Foreigners’ Rights).
144 T his condition relates to the general requirement for admission stating that foreigners’ livelihood needs to be 
secure (Immigration A ct 5 ( 1 )  1).
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Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 15-16; Hailbronner 1999: 51; for the right to 
restrict family reunification on economic grounds see Council Directive 2003/86/EC 4; 
Immigration Act 5 (2), 27-29). The Court did, nevertheless, provide non-citizens with legal 
protection in this area, because it ruled that the more general test of proportionality must be 
met.145 The upshot of this ruling is that the German state has a recognised right to deny entry 
to individuals who seek family reunification; a denial of family reunification must, however, 
be measured against non-citizens’ interest in living with their families, i.e. a denial of family 
reunification must be proportional (Neuman 1990: 59-63; Joppke 1998b: 285-286; 
Kantstroom 1993: 191; Rubio-Marin 2000: 207-208; Hailbronner 1999: 51; BVerfGE 76, 1 
(1987)).
The right to family reunification in the Immigration Act, the above conditions 
notwithstanding, does cover the spouse and minor unmarried children. Other family members 
can only obtain the right to family reunification if they can demonstrate that a denial of this 
right would lead to ‘extraordinary hardship’ (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration 
2005: Foreigners' Rights; Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 14). This 
means that non-citizens’ spouses shall be admitted if the non-citizen holds a settlement permit 
or a residence permit as a recognised refugee,146 or has held a residence permit for five years, 
or if the marriage already existed at the point when the joining spouse arrived in Germany 
with the stay being expected to exceed one year (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur 
Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights; Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 
16; Knipping 1995: 292; Immigration Act 30).
The right to family reunification also states that minor unmarried children younger than 16 
years of age shall be admitted if both parents, or the parent holding the sole custody right has 
a residence or a settlement permit. Minor children over 16 years of age hold the same right, 
provided that they are able to speak German, or if it seems likely that the child successfully 
can be integrated into German society.147 The economic restrictions and the 16+ condition do 
not apply for recognised refugees (Interior 2004: 3; Federal Government Commissioner for
145 It is noteworthy that the Court rejected the idea o f  a quota system, as this would fail to  give sufficient 
consideration to individual cases and thus violate article 6 if  the Basic Law (Hailbronner 1999: 51).
146 M ost temporarily admitted refugees do not have the right to be joined by fam ily m em bers (Immigration Act 
2 8-29).
147 Children born in Germany by a foreign mother shall be granted a residence permit if  the mother holds a 
residence or settlement permit. Minor unmarried children may also be admitted in order to avoid hardship for the 
fam ily involved and the same applies to other dependents o f  foreigners (Immigration A ct 33).
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Migration 2004: 14-18, 32; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung flir Migration 2005: Foreigners’ 
Rights; Knipping 1995: 292; Council Directive 2003/86/EC 12; Immigration Act 30, 32, 
36).148
Non-citizens who are married to, or are the children of, German citizens, on the other hand, 
have an unconditional right to entry. (Minor unmarried German children also have the right to 
be joined by their parents, even if the parents are not German citizens). The general condition 
that the non-citizen’s livelihood is secure does not apply in these cases, and nor do the 
specific criteria for the right to family reunification. This means that Germans can be 
dependent on social welfare and/or incapable of providing sufficient living space, and still 
enjoy the right to family reunification; also, children over 16 joining a German citizens need 
not be able to speak German or be deemed likely to be able to integrate into the German 
society (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 15; Beauftragte der 
Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights; Interior 2005f: 36; Immigration Act 
28-29).149
EU citizens are also exempted from the restrictions on family reunification that apply to other 
non-citizens, and EU citizens have the right to be joined by their family members (This is in 
line with derivative EC law, see Neuman 1990: 59; Nascimbene 1996: 6; Hailbronner 1999: 
52). EU citizens’ right to family reunification covers spouses and children under 21, as well as 
relatives of the EU citizen or her husband in ascending and descending line for whom the EU
148 It is not entirely clear whether Germany com plies with the EC Directive on fam ily reunification. The directive 
states that refugees are exem pted from econom ic requirements for fam ily reunification, unless reunification is 
possible in another state with which the sponsor has links, or i f  the application for fam ily reunification is  not 
submitted within three m onths after the granting o f  refugee status (Council D irective 2003/86/EC  7, 12). The 
Immigration A ct states that children and spouses o f  refugees shall have the right to a resident permit 
(Immigration A ct 30  (2), 32  (1)). The Act, how ever, a lso says that the econom ic conditions for fam ily  
reunification ‘may be w aived’ for recognised refugees (Immigration A ct 29  (2) see also 30  (3)). The official 
explanation o f  these provisions hardly clarifies the situation:
The members of your [non-citizens] family may be refused a residence permit if you claim income support for the keep of 
your family members cm- the members of your household. However, this does not apply to those who are entitled to political 
asylum, Convention refugees and those who have been permitted to settle for humanitarian reasons. If you belong to one of 
these groups, the Aliens Department may allow your spouse or life-long partner and your underage children to join you 
even if you do not avail of sufficient accommodation space or are unable to give the assurance that you will be able to 
support them. (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 15 emphases added)
The German Governm ent has, however, stated -  in terms that can only be described as mangled -  that it is  its 
intention to abide by the directive (Interior 2004: 3). That said, the Federal Government Com m issioner seem s, in 
the end, to be o f  the opinion that it is within Germany’s discretion to deny refugees the right to fam ily  
reunification on econom ic grounds:
Convention Refugees now have a claim to family reunification with their children and spouses, provided that sufficient 
accommodation space is available and maintenance assured. Even if  this is not the case, the Aliens Department may at its 
discretion permit them to follow on. (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 32)
149 N on-citizens w ho are dependents o f  Germans are a lso entitled to take up work, and are in general entitled to 
obtain a settlem ent permit after three years, i f  there are no grounds for expulsion and the non-citizen speaks 
German (Immigration A ct 28).
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citizen or her spouse provides maintenance. This law applies to family members who 
themselves are third-country nationals (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: 
Foreigners' Rights; Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 7; Freedom of 
Movement Act/EU 3).150
Refugees are recognised as a distinct and privileged group in the Immigration Act 
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights).151 Non-citizens 
who seek entry as political refugees have a statutory right to admission:152 Non-citizens shall 
be granted a residence permit if they indisputably are recognised as having the right to 
political asylum. There is a right to political asylum both in the Basic Law153 and under the 
Geneva Convention154 -  previously called small (klein) asylum. The new Immigration Act has 
streamlined this double right to political asylum so that the two different provisions currently 
give the same level of protection and the same residence title (Interior 2005c: 2; Interior 2004: 
5; Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 13, 32; Immigration Act 22, 25, 
26, 60).155
150 It is o f  note that more generous rules apply to EU citizens than German citizens in this area.
151 Germany not only admits refugees w ho seek asylum , but also admits som e quota refugees and Jewish  
immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Jewish immigrants are no longer admitted as quota refugees, but are 
admitted on a case-by-case basis. H ow ever, priority is  given to fam ily reunification and cases o f  hardship; also, 
as o f 2006, Jewish immigrants w ill have to demonstrate a good command o f  German and that they are 
econom ically self-sufficient. The rationale behind the Jewish immigration is to preserve and strengthen the 
Jewish com m unities in Germany. Jewish immigrants have access to the labour market (Interior 2005d: 18, 5 6 -  
57; Cyrus 2005: 9). Quota refugees are not admitted on the same grounds as asylum  seekers, i.e. are not asylum  
seekers screened abroad, but are admitted ‘in the context o f  humanitarian r e lie f  under the A ct on M easures in 
Aid o f  R efugees Admitted under Humanitarian R elief programs (Interior 2005d: 105). N on-citizens can also  be 
granted temporary protection under the resolution by the Council o f the EU , and ‘shall then be granted a 
residence permit, unless there is serious reasons to suspect that the non-citizen is a risk to the security o f  
Germany or the general public due to conviction o f  a prison term o f  at least three years; or i f  the non-citizen has 
committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity; or a serious non-political crime 
outside Germany’ (Immigration A ct 24).
152 R efugees can also be admitted on discretionary grounds, and non-citizens m ay  be granted admission from  
abroad in accordance with international law or in urgent humanitarian needs (Immigration A ct 22).
153 Not all kinds o f  discrimination count as political persecution under this provision, and the treatment must 
ultim ately be seen as incom patible w ith human dignity. It is noteworthy in this respect that the term political 
persecution in the B asic Law, for historical reasons, includes persecution on racial and religious grounds (Currie 
1994: 273).
154 It should, furthermore, be noted that the definitions in the G eneva Convention are extended to cover  
persecution on the grounds o f  gender and persecution by non-state actors w ho control areas o f  a state as w ell as 
against other actors i f  the state or the de  fa c to  sovereign is unable or unw illing to offer protection from  
persecution (Immigration A ct 25, 60; Federal Government Com m issioner for M igration 2004: 32; Interior 2004: 
2; O ffice 2005: 2).
155 It is noteworthy that the resident permit for refugees is not permanent and that it can be revoked as soon as the 
threat to the refugee is rem oved. After three years, a check o f  the preconditions for revocation is carried out, 
after which the refugee receives a settlem ent permit if  the protection is not withdrawn. The refugee status can 
still be withdrawn after the settlem ent permit is granted (R efugees 2005: 16 -1 7 ). N on-citizens w ho are admitted 
on other humanitarian grounds m ay  be granted a settlement permit after seven years i f  the conditions for 
obtaining such permit are m et (Immigration A ct 26).
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Non-citizens also have a right to non-refoulement. The non-refoulement protection in 
Germany extends beyond the Geneva Convention and the Convention against Torture, as non­
citizens also enjoy protection under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (henceforth European Convention on Human Rights).156 This means, 
taken together, that non-citizens cannot be returned to a state where their lives or liberty are 
threatened due to race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political 
convictions; nor can they be returned to a state where a threat of torture, capital punishment, 
serious and concrete danger to refugees’ life, health or freedom exists (Cremer 1998: 64-68; 
Interior 2005f: 37-38; Interior 2006a: 3; Interior 2006c; Immigration Act 25, 60).
This right is not absolute, and non-citizens do not have a right to political asylum if they have 
been expelled on ‘serious grounds relating to public safety and law and order’ (Immigration 
Act 25 (1)); the prohibition against deporting refugees recognised under the Geneva 
Convention also does not apply when there are serious reasons for regarding the non-citizen 
as a security risk, a risk to the general public because of an unappealable sentence of no less 
than three years for a crime of a particular serious offence, or if the non-citizen has committed 
a crime against humanity, a war crime, a crime against peace, a serious non-political crime 
outside Germany, or if the non-citizen grossly breaches the obligation to co-operate with the 
German authorities (Cremer 1998: 64-68; Interior 2005e: 3; Interior 2005f: 54; Immigration 
Act 25 (3), 60).
The Government, furthermore, should not deport a non-citizen to a state where a concrete 
danger to his or her life and limb (health) or liberty’ exists, but it is within its discretion to do 
so unless this violates the Basic Law. Non-citizens who are at risk of torture or face the death 
penalty may not, on the other hand, be deported under any conditions, and the state’s overall 
discretion is in this area is limited by the fact that non-citizens enjoy the protection of the 
European Convention of Human Rights; non-citizens cannot be deported if it violates their 
rights under the said Convention, e.g. of their right to life, liberty, a fair trial, freedom of
156 Germany incorporated the European Convention o f  Human Rights into federal law in 1953, and the Court has 
ruled that the European Court o f  Human R ights’ decision also binds German courts and authorities; the 
Immigration A ct also stipulates that non-citizens shall not be deported in violation o f  the Convention  
(Immigration A ct 2 (5); BVerfG E 1481/04 (2004)).
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speech/conscience, or if their family life is threatened (Cremer 1998: 64—68; Interior 2005e: 
3; Interior 2005f: 54; Immigration Act 25 (3), 60).157
German law hence provides refugees with strong legal protections, but refugees do not have a 
right to choose to seek protection in Germany, and non-citizens can be deported to so-called 
safe third countries (Immigration Act 25; Basic Law 16a). The introduction of safe third 
countries consists of two different provisions that are regulated by different procedural rules. 
First of all, article 16a of the Basic Law has been amended and now includes a safe country 
provision:
Paragraph (1) [the right to political asylum ] cannot be invoked by a person w ho enters from a 
m ember country o f  the European Com m unities or from another third country in which application  
o f  the agreement Concerning the Rights and Fundamental Freedom is guaranteed. [ . . .  ] It w ill be 
presumed that a foreigner from such a state [safe country] is not persecuted, so  long as he does not 
present evidence justifying a claim  that, contrary to this presumption, he is persecuted on political 
grounds. (Basic Law 16a (1 -3 ))
This provision is based on a strong presumption of safety, and non-citizens who enter 
Germany from such a safe country have no right to seek political asylum or non-refoulement 
protection. The only protection non-citizens have from refoulement to such a safe country is 
that they can apply for protection from deportation to the country of their origin. But they can 
be deported to the safe country while their claim is pending, and only in exceptional cases can 
they seek protection from deportation to the safe country. The safety of these countries is, 
however, guaranteed by a normative ascertainment {normative Vergewisserung). The Court 
has furthermore laid down a number of conditions for the fulfilment of this normative 
ascertainment and a state’s qualification as safe can be challenged in court.158
157 N on-citizens w ho are afforded asylum  or non-refoulem ent protection are entitled to a residence permit -  
unless, in the case o f  G eneva Convention R efugees, the refugee ‘has been expelled on serious grounds relating to 
public safety and law  and order’ and in the case o f  refugees granted non-refoulem ent on other grounds, unless 
the refugee has com mitted a serious criminal o ffence, a crime against humanity or poses a risk to  the general 
public or Germany (R efugees 2005:16 -18 ; Interior 2006c; Immigration A ct 25 (1) -  (3 ), (5)). In cases where a 
resident permit is  not issued but deportation is not possib le ‘in fact or in law ’, the non-citizen receives a 
temporary suspension o f  deportation. But a residence permit ’is  to be issued’ i f  the deportation has been  
suspended for 18 months and the obstacle to departure cannot be expected to disappear in the foreseeable future 
(Immigration A ct 60a (2); Interior 2006b).
158 It is  noteworthy that E U  member states are deem ed safe a  p r io r i, as they must have im plem ented these 
provisions in order to becom e members. This a lso m eans that their classification as safe is not justiciable (N oll 
1997: 4 2 7 -4 2 8 ,4 5 1 ) .
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A safe state needs to be bound by the Geneva Convention (and its 1967 Protocol), the 
European Convention of Human rights, and provide procedures that allow all individuals to 
seek effective protection under these conventions. Nor is a state which returns non-citizens to 
states that does not fulfil these criteria considered as a safe country (Noll 1997: 424-429, 451; 
Asylum Procedure Act 26). It should, moreover, be noted that asylum seekers who are denied 
entry at the border retain their constitutional right of judicial review, and they have a right to 
enter Germany to pursue their appeals -  although the judicial procedure under this safe 
country provision is fast-tracked and affords the non-citizen weaker legal protection than in 
regular asylum cases (Kantstroom 1993: 197; Lambert 1995: 12, 26-27, 52-54; Council 
Directive 2003/9/EC 21; Basic Law 16a).
The second notion of safe countries, which is based on the Asylum Act, concerns the 
assessment of those individual applications for political asylum where an applicant can be 
deemed as being safe from persecution in a third state. In such cases, the assessment of safety 
is undertaken by the agency dealing with each individual claim. This provision gives non­
citizens the right to apply for political asylum, and it prevents immediate deportation. This 
means that a non-citizen has a right to have her case heard individually and that she has the 
right to stay in Germany while her case is pending. However, she will be denied protection if 
she has been provided with travel documents from a safe country, or if, before entering 
Germany, she resided in a safe country for more than three months, as she under these 
conditions will be seen as safe from persecution in that country (Noll 1997: 424— 425, 429; 
Interior 2005e: 2; Asylum Procedure Act 27).
Ultimately, unless the non-citizen can provide prima facie proof that her deportation will be to 
a state where the threat of political persecution cannot be ruled out with reasonable certainty, 
protection can be denied. It should be noted that the fact that these cases are tried individually 
means that not just countries that have undergone normative ascertainment or have signed the 
Geneva Convention can be deemed safe countries (Noll 1997: 424 -  425, 429; Interior 2005e: 
2; Asylum Procedure Act 27). It can be said, in terms of the general procedural process, that it 
is independent officials that handle asylum applications, and they have some discretion. The 
asylum seeker is given the opportunity to present her case in person, however, and negative 
decisions can be appealed to an administrative court (Interior 2005e: 2, 4; Schuster 2003: 215; 
Interior 2005f: 52, 54; Council Directive 2003/9/EC 21; Asylum Procedure Act 5).
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There are finally some conditions that non-citizens, in general, must fulfil in order to be 
admitted. These conditions include having a secure livelihood (not requiring public funds), 
not being liable to expulsion (see grounds for expulsion below) and not compromising or 
jeopardising the interest of Germany (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fiir Migration 2005: 
Foreigners’ Rights; Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004: 7, 20-21; Office 
2005: 1; Immigration Act 5, 7, 9). Non-citizens who are entitled to asylum or non-refoulement 
protection are exempted from the conditions of having a secure livelihood and not being liable 
to expulsion (Immigration Act 5 (3)).
Germany also has a visa regime in place, which aims at strengthening the control of the 
general conditions for entry. A visa is thus not a right of entry, but constitutes validation of a 
successful completion of a pre-screening process by German embassies. The visa system is 
further shored up by so-called carrier sanctions. These sanctions make companies that carry 
non-citizens -  who do not hold a passport and a valid visa -  to Germany liable to pay fines -  
unless the non-citizen is granted some form of humanitarian protection, in which case the fine 
is nullified under German law (Gibney 2003: 5; Interior 2005f: 33; d'Oliveira Jessurun 1991: 
179; Noll 2000: 173, 178; Office 2005; Embassy 2006b).
Admitted immigrants are subsequently provided with either a residence or a settlement 
permit. These two categories of permit are different in nature, and a non-citizen’s legal 
standing partly depends on which permit she holds (Office 2005; Immigration Act 4-5, 7, 9). 
The residence permit does not confer a permanent residence status, and its length and other 
conditions depend on the purpose of the stay. (That said, short-term visitors are not given 
residence permits but visas.) The settlement permit, on the other hand, is an unlimited 
residence title that cannot be made dependent on additional provisions, unless section 47 of 
the Immigration Act applies. This article bans non-citizens from engaging in political 
behaviour that leads to unrest, harms Germany’s foreign policy interests, or harms other 
substantial interests of the German state (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 
2004: 7; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung flir Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights; 
Immigration Act 7, 9).159
159 The general rule is that non-citizens acquire a residence permit, which then can be upgraded to a settlement 
permit i f  certain conditions are fulfilled. A few  selected immigrants are, it should be said, issued with a 
settlement permit from the outset (Immigration A ct 19). The general conditions for obtaining a settlement permit 
include: having been in a possession o f  a resident permit for five years, having a secure livelihood, five  years 
em ploym ent and contribution to statutory pension schem es (unless the non-citizen is unable to contribute due to
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The Rationale(s) Behind the Admissions Realm
The first thing to notice is that the Basic Law specifically refers to admission. Article 16a 
stipulates that politically persecuted persons have a right to asylum. This does not mean that 
non-citizens have a general right to admission. The Court has, on the contrary, on the basis of 
the existence of articles 16a and 11 (guaranteeing free movement for Germans), concluded 
that the founders of the Basic Law did not intend to create a general right to admission, in 
which case article 16a arguably would have been superfluous (Neuman 1990: 75; BVerfGE 
76, 1 (1987)). The Court thus established that only Germans and the politically persecuted 
have a constitutional right to enter and stay in Germany (Neuman 1990: 60).
The Court has also established that the right to control admission constitutes part of the 
legitimate exercise of the state authority invested in the German nation (Geddes 2003: 88). 
This means that the same dual approach that underlies the Basic Law’s general approach to 
non-citizens’ other rights also applies to the right of entry. The nation is seen as having the 
right to set the rules for admission in its own interest. However, it is also seen as having 
certain limited (but distinct) universal obligations towards non-citizens who seek refugee 
protection (and also to some extent towards people seeking family reunification). This dual 
approach is also echoed in Germany’s present Immigration Act, where Germany is 
simultaneously trying to safeguard the economic interests of its citizens and uphold universal 
basic rights for non-citizens (Interior 2005f: 30). The Act’s very first paragraph reads as 
follows:
It [the Act] enables and organises immigration with due regard to the capacities for adm ission and 
integration and the interests o f  the Federal Republic o f  Germany in terms o f  its econom y and 
labour market. At the same time, the A ct also serves to fulfil the Federal Republic o f  Germany’s 
humanitarian obligations. (Immigration A ct 1 (1))
This dual commitment has also been laid down by the Interior Ministry:
The Federal Governm ent’s new  policy on immigration is oriented on [sic] the fo llow ing key  
principles:
physical, psychological or em otional reasons), not being sentenced to a prison term exceeding six months, 
adequate know ledge o f  German, basic know ledge o f  the German society and possession o f  sufficient living  
space (Federal Governm ent Com m issioner for Migration 2004: 20; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung flir 
Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights).
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-  managing immigration in a more targeted w ay that takes Germany’s econom ic and societal
needs into account, and lim it future immigration. [...]
-  fulfilling humanitarian obligations derived from the constitution and a number o f
internationally binding conventions and agreements. (Interior 2005f: 6)
It is hence clear that Germany tries to accommodate and balance the cosmopolitan and the 
communitarian rationales in terms of the right to entry, and that this balancing act mirrors the 
structure of the Basic Law.
In more detail, it can be said that the admission of labour immigration clearly is intended to 
serve the interest of Germany. Non-citizens have no right to come to Germany to seek better 
economic opportunities. Labour admission is instead clearly based on the needs of the 
German economy, and made dependent on the condition that German citizens’ chances of 
finding employment are not diminished (Office 2005: 2). The German Government, as well as 
its official Immigration Commission, outlined the basic rationale behind this rule, in the 
following:
The primary objective o f  the immigration policy in relation to the labour market is to find qualified  
labour with a view  o f  creating additional em ployment opportunities for the domestic workforce. 
(Independent Com m ission on Migration 2001: 4)
On the contrary, said Mr Schily, [the former Home Secretary] immigration o f  highly qualified  
work force [sic] leads to new  investm ents and jobs. Between 20 000  and 30 00 0  new jobs have 
been created because o f  the 10 000  skilled persons who immigrated to Germany. (Interior 2005a: 1)
It is clear that the aim is to use labour immigrants as a tool for increasing the opportunities of 
the domestic workforce, and that labour immigrants are thus not seen as ends in themselves. 
The responsible minister, at the time, clarified this basic normative thrust behind the new 
Immigration Act:
[...] the new  act is about making immigration possible ‘where it really corresponds with our own  
interests’ and lim iting it and controlling it more effectively where there are cases o f  m isuse. The 
Immigration A ct w ill not put a strain on the German labour market. ‘B y  applying this process, no  
one w ill com e to our country to take up em ploym ent for which a local jobseeker has shown his/her 
interest’, stressed Mr Schily. (Interior 2005a: 1, the quotes are from the former Hom e Secretary Mr 
Schily)
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That the interest of Germans comes first is evidently part of this perspective:
The Federal Government is clearly giving German em ployees the first priority for job  and 
qualification opportunities. [...] The principle o f priority for German em ployees a lso applies with  
the new regulation on immigration. Foreign workers w ill only be placed in work i f  German 
workers cannot cover the demand. (Interior 2005c: 1)
This system is known as the Priority Principle (Vorrangsprinzip), and it is based on the 
principle that membership yields priority. It is noteworthy that not only members of the 
German nation, but also EU citizens, enjoy preferential treatment (Beauftragte der 
Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: Foreigners' Rights; Interior 2005f: 31):
This policy o f  restricting immigration o f  foreigners from  non-EU/EEA countries is also in the 
interest o f  freedom  o f  m ovem ent within the European Union which is enjoyed by workers from  
EU and EEA M ember States (w ho have priority over foreigners from third countries). (Interior 
2005d: 1)
The fact that the right to enter and reside in all EU member states is based on partial 
membership, and not on economic considerations, is underscored by the fact that this right no 
longer is reserved for EU workers alone but covers all EU citizens, provided that they have 
adequate health insurance and sufficient means of subsistence (Beauftragte der 
Bundesregierung fur Migration 2005: Foreigners’ Rights; Federal Government Commissioner 
for Migration 2004: 21-22; Sorensen 1996: 114-115; Interior 2005f: 76; Evans 1991: 190- 
191; Freedom of Movement Act/EU 2-4; Treaty Establishing the European Union 18). In 
conclusion, admission as a labourer depends on being a member of a set of exclusive 
particular nations. Non-citizens who are not EU citizens are only admitted insofar as this is 
beneficial to the members. The rationale behind the admission of labour immigrants is hence 
communitarian, in that the right to restrict labour immigration stems from the nation’s right to 
self-determination, and this right is deployed to serve the interest of the members.
It is clear, from the above, that EU citizens enjoy a privileged status in terms of entry. EU 
citizens, furthermore, enjoy a privileged status in general. It is therefore worth looking 
specifically at the rationale behind EU citizens’ privileged legal standing before continuing 
the analysis, as the same basic normative rationale for EU citizens’ privileged position
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reappears in the analysis that follows in the rest of this chapter. The first thing to notice is that 
EC law mainly, though not exclusively, confers rights on EU citizens (Hailbronner 1992: 65). 
The second thing to notice is that EU citizenship is an exclusive and membership-based status 
that confers a privileged standing in certain areas.
This exclusive membership is based on being a citizen of one of the member states of the EU. 
The Treaty Establishing the European Union clearly stipulates that the jurisdiction over 
nationality solely rests with the member states, and the right to EU citizenship pre-supposes 
membership in one of the member states (Joppke 2001b: 353-356; Joppke 1999: 27-37; 
Kurthen 1995: 931; Nascimbene 1996. 3; Sorensen 1996: 154—155; Treaty Establishing the 
European Union 17). This means that exclusion from, or loss of, national citizenship results in 
exclusion from EU citizenship. Thus EU citizenship constitutes an exclusive citizenship built 
on national membership/citizenship and the privileges that come with it depend on national 
inclusion and the fact that one’s nation is included in an exclusive scheme of mutual 
recognition (Meehan 1993: 7-8; Sorensen 1996: 48-51; Morris 2002: 16, 22):160
[ . . .]  one can be a European citizen only i f  one is o f French, Belgian or German nationality, for 
example. In its present shape, the Citizenship o f the European Union is thus, a sort o f  
complementary supra-citizenship which confirms the existence o f  the cultural and political 
identities corresponding to the M em ber States o f  the European Union. This renewal o f  nationalism  
explains the exclusion o f  extra-communitarian citizens legally residing in Europe from the 
Citizenship o f  the European Union. (M artiniello 1994: 35)
[ . . .]  EU citizenship does not break the association citizenship-nationality at all but renews it in a 
slightly different w ay. (M artiniello 2000: 3 5 4 -3 5 5 )
The other side o f  this extension o f  rights on the supranational level has, however, been increased  
efforts to police the external frontiers o f  the Union, to co-operate on internal security measures, 
and to maintain a distinction at the EU level between EU citizens and TC N s [third country 
nationals]. Post-national universalism encounters a European regional b loc that rests on  
Europeanised source o f  legal, political and social power. (Geddes 2000: 2 2 5 -2 2 6 )
160 It is interesting in this respect to note that the preamble to the Single European A ct pays tribute to the 
principles o f  liberty, equality and social justice, but that this has com e to be interpreted as referring to members 
only (Morris 2002: 22).
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The notion that EU citizenship is a form of exclusive associated membership, and that the 
preferential treatment that comes with it is based on membership, has also been confirmed by 
the German Government:
[...] analogous to national citizenship, citizenship in the Union is to be understood as a special 
bond between citizens and the European Union. [...] The right o f  EU citizens to enter and reside in 
a M ember State distinctly differs from that o f  third-country nationals. This reflects the progress 
made in Europe with regards to integration. (Interior 2005f: 7 6 -7 7 )
It is thus clear that the preferential treatment that EU citizenship confers ultimately is based 
on membership, and that EU citizens have been afforded partial membership in the German 
body politic.
The question of family immigration is somewhat more complicated than the issue of labour 
immigration. Non-citizens enjoy the right to marriage and family life under article 6 of the 
Basic Law: it is one of the enumerated human rights that protects individuals’ right to self- 
determination (Mach-Hour 1999: 2; Geddes 2003: 83):
In the sense o f classical rights, paragraph 2 and 3 o f  Article 6 are an acknowledgm ent o f  the 
freedom o f  the specific private sphere o f  marriage and family; it corresponds with a guiding idea 
o f  our Constitution; namely, the basically limited authority o f all public pow er to affect the free 
individual. (BVerfGE 6, 55 (1957): 497)
This right is further shored up by the European Convention on Human Rights, to which 
Germany is a signatory, and which entails a universal right to family life (Morris 2002: 16). 
The Immigration Act, as described above, also, specifically recognises a prima facie right to 
family reunification in relation to article 6 of the Basic Law. This means that the Immigration 
Act’s second purpose of upholding the humanitarian principles in the Basic Law and in 
international law covers the area of family immigration. That said, this right is limited, in cases 
where the sponsor is not a German or EU citizen, by economic conditions -  and this means that 
the rights to family reunification constitute a stratified system (Morris 2002: 109).
These restrictions on family reunification are economic in nature, and the purpose of these 
restrictions is to ease the financial burden of family immigration on Germany. The fact that 
only non-citizens’ right to be joined by family members must yield to the economic well-being
187
of Germany shows how communal priority clearly makes its presence felt in this area. It must 
be remembered, though, that there is a limit to communal priority in this area, as non-citizens 
can invoke the proportionality principle in family reunification cases. That is, the Court has 
recognised that there are two interests or rights at stake here: the individual’s right to family 
reunification and the nation’s right to control admission in its own interest. The Court has ruled 
that the nation has a right to restrict immigration even for the purposes of family reunification 
-  but only provided that this does not disproportionately and adversely affect non-citizens, in 
relation to the state’s legitimate interest of restricting entry.161 The upshot is that the Court has 
balanced the right to individual autonomy and the right to national autonomy, so as to create a 
limited and conditioned right to family reunification in Germany under article 6 of the Basic 
Law (Geddes 2003: 83).
Non-citizens’ right to political asylum is one of the enumerated basic rights that constitute part 
of right to human dignity and: “Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right to 
asylum.” (Basic Law 16 (a)) Protection for refugees is also afforded via Germany’s 
commitment to a number of international conventions, and the special connection between 
international law and German law means that these conventions create directly enforceable 
rights for non-citizens in Germany. Article 19, furthermore, ensures that these rights can be 
pursued in the courts.162
A closer look at the definition of political persecution underscores the point that the right to 
political asylum constitutes part of the overarching right to human dignity. The notion of 
political persecution is not defined in the Basic Law, but it has been defined by the courts -  
drawing on the Geneva Convention -  and it is based on the conviction that -  out of respect for 
the inviolability of human dignity -  no state has the right to harm or endanger the life, health or 
personal freedom of an individual ‘for reasons of political opinion, religion or characteristics 
inherent to his or her unique identity’ (Interior 2005f: 50). The German Government describes
161 The Court opted for an intermediate standard o f  review  in this area, review ing the legislation’s justifiability  
(V ertretbarkeit). This m eans that the Court did not choose the weak standard o f  ‘obvious constitutional d efects’ 
often applied in foreign affairs cases, but neither did it decide that the case called for heightened intensity  
scrutiny (Neuman 1990: 61— 63).
162 The fact that the principle o f  political asylum  is  laid down in the Basic Law is o f  great importance, since it 
gives non-citizens a direct, enforceable right vis-a -v is  the German state and lim its the national sovereignty over  
admission; it is also o f  note that this means that the Basic Law contains an article that only pertains to non­
citizens (Interior 2005d: 4 9 -5 0 ; Joppke 1997: 273; Knipping 1995: 268; Schuster 2003: 183, 186). The 
constitutional status o f  the right to asylum has tw o other im plications. One, no numerical limit can be applied, 
and tw o, applicants have a right to public assistance w hile their applications are pending (Martin 1994: 1 9 2 -  
193).
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the essence of political asylum, both in the Geneva Convention and the Basic Law, in the 
following:
The right o f  asylum  protects people in hopeless situations not because o f  their com mitm ent to 
certain political ideals, such as democracy or respect for human rights, but above all because o f  the 
general obligation to respect the inviolability o f  human dignity, as acknowledged in the Basic  
Law. (Interior 2005f: 51)
Germany’s commitment to, and ratification of, several international conventions also means 
that non-citizens enjoy a more comprehensive protection than the right to political asylum. 
They enjoy the right to non-refoulement on a number of grounds besides suffering directly 
from political persecution, and non-citizens are protected if their basic right to life, liberty and 
health is threatened. It is, of course, of note in this respect that the protection of refugees in 
Germany draws together the right to human dignity in the Basic Law and international human 
rights law. The first article of the Basic Law stipulates that ‘the German people acknowledge 
inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of 
justice in the world’ (Basic Law 1). The Basic Law makes this norm directly actionable by 
giving recognised norms in international law the status of directly applicable law in Germany, 
thus joining together two bodies of law that both aim at protecting human dignity. The 
universal normative thrust behind refugee protection is thus clear, and the right to protection in 
German law is clearly based on the cosmopolitan rationale.
Finally it should be said that Germany, as part of its exercise of national sovereignty, has put in 
place general restrictions on entry that apply to most non-citizens. These restrictions are clearly 
aimed at safeguarding the nation. The notion of safeguarding the nation is dual. These 
restrictions aim to protect members from dangerous non-citizens, but also to reduce the cost to 
the nation, by keeping non-citizens (who are seen as potential costs) from entering the country 
(Immigration Act 5, 55).
The Civil Rights Realm
All non-citizens in Germany enjoy the right to freedom of speech and conscience under the 
Basic Law (Goerlich 1988: 47; Basic Law 4, 5). The same goes for non-citizens’ right to hold 
and acquire property (Goerlich 1988: 47; Ossenbuhl 1993: 252, 269-270; Currie 1994: 271; 
Basic Law 13, 14, 104). The constitutional right to freely choose one’s profession and the
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right to seek employment in the civil service on equal terms is, however, reserved for 
Germans under the Basic Law.163 Non-citizens, moreover, do not have the right to become 
lifetime civil servants; this includes jobs in public nurseries and public transport (Aleinikoff 
2002a: 72; Neuman 1998: 249; Krajewski 1996: 375; Basic Law 12, 33).164 EU citizens are 
afforded better protection when it comes to the right to freely choose one’s profession. This is 
because EC law only allows member states the right to reserve public employment to 
nationals when it involves public exercise of power and responsibility for safeguarding the 
interest of the member states, all according to a narrow interpretation of public service 
(Meehan 1993: 88; Niessen 1996: 9; Guild 1996: 47).165
Non-citizens do, however, enjoy the right to be secure in their person and property under the 
Basic Law. This includes the right to be secure in one’s home and workplace and the right to 
habeas corpus (Goerlich 1988: 47; Ossenbuhl 1993: 252, 269-270; Currie 1994: 271; Bowie 
1954: 606; Basic Law 13, 14, 19 (4), 101, 103, 104). Non-citizens also have the general right 
to equality before the law. Non-citizens’ legal standing in terms of the right to equality before 
the law is, on a general level, similar to the right of equality before the law in the U.S., and as 
in the U.S., the judicial review or level of scrutiny is stricter when basic freedoms are 
involved (see the proportionality principle). Non-citizens in Germany, however, enjoy the 
same relatively strong protection on both the federal and the state levels, as there is no 
difference between the two levels in Germany in this regard (Neuman 1990: 65; Wurtenberg 
1988: 70-77; Kantstroom 1993: 192; Currie 1989: 367-368; Kommers 1997: 289-290).
This means that non-citizens enjoy a fairly robust right to equality before the law in Germany. 
That said, the Basic Law contains both a general equal protection clause and specific equal 
protection clauses for discrimination. Discrimination -  on the grounds of sex, disability (since 
1994), parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, political opinions or faith and religion 
-  warrants a higher level of scrutiny. The Court has, however, established that discrimination 
against non-citizens due to their nationality does not fall within the purview of the special
163 N on-citizens’ ability to set up a business in Germany is also limited, in that non-citizens must have achieved a 
secure resident status before they have a right to set up their own businesses (Faist 1996: 233).
164 A sylum  seekers do not have a right to  work, and m ay not work as long as they live in reception centres 
(maxim um  three m onths). But they can be granted a work permit after they leave the centres, i f  that is seen to be 
in the national interest (Bank 2000: 157— 158). Recognised refugees, on the other hand, have free access to the 
labour market (Interior 2004: 5 -6 ).
165 It is o f  note that the EC D irective on the status o f  long-term residents excludes em ploym ent that ‘entails even  
occasional involvem ent in the exercise o f  public authority’, from long-term  residents’ right to equal access to 
em ploym ent (Council D irective 2003/109/E C  11).
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equal protection clauses. This leaves non-citizens with a general right to equality before the 
law, especially in regard to basic rights, but the lack of citizenship does not constitute a 
suspect ground for discrimination that gives rise to stricter scrutiny. That said, non-citizens do 
enjoy a higher level of protection in Germany compared to the U.S., as the standard for what 
is seen as arbitrary or unreasonable in Germany is stricter (Neuman 1990: 65; Wurtenberg 
1988: 70-77; Kantstroom 1993: 192). EU citizens, in part, enjoy stronger protection in this 
area, as discrimination on the grounds of nationality is banned in areas covered by EC law 
(Sorensen 1996: 107; Guild 1996: 47;Treaty Establishing the European Union 12).
All non-citizens have a right to a fair trial with procedural safeguards, and the right to seek 
legal redress (Goerlich 1988: 47; Bowie 1954: 606; Basic Law 103, 104). Non-citizens, 
further, have the right to address public authorities, and the Court has established that all non­
citizens, under article 2 of the Basic Law, have the right to challenge statutory or 
administrative restrictions in the courts. The right to challenge infringements on rights is also 
specifically guaranteed by the Basic Law (Hailbronner 1999: 49; Benda 1981: 6; Goerlich 
1988: 47; Basic Law 17, 19 (4), 93).
Non-citizens do not have an absolute right to secure residency. They are vulnerable to 
expulsions on a number of grounds, some of which are mandatory. The latter includes 
receiving an unappealable sentence of a prison term of at least three years, or a two-year 
sentence under certain acts, e.g. the Narcotics Act; or receiving a custodial sentence for 
smuggling non-citizens to Germany (Interior 2005f: 59; Immigration Act 53). Non-citizens 
can also be deported in order to avert a special danger to the security of Germany, or to avoid 
terrorist threats, unless the grounds for prohibition of expulsion apply. (For grounds 
prohibiting expulsion see Immigration Act 60 (1-8) and below.) Deportation on special 
danger grounds must, it should be said, be based on facts (so-called evidence-based threat 
assessment), mere suspicion does not suffice and deportation on these grounds can be 
appealed, albeit only through a single appeal to the federal Administrative Court (Interior 
2004: 4; Interior 2005b: 2; Office 2005: 3; Immigration Act 58 (a)).
Another set of (similar) grounds will, moreover, generally result in deportation. This includes 
being sentenced to a two-year custodial sentence; smuggling non-citizens into Germany; 
dealing or aiding in dealings with narcotics; being part of a crowd participating in public 
disturbances of public safety, or partaking in violence against persons or property; or
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belonging to the leadership of banned organisations; or if justifiable facts lead to the 
conclusion that a non-citizen belongs to or supports166 an organisation which supports 
terrorism. However, expulsion based on membership or supportive acts in the past may only 
be used if they form the basis for a present danger (Office 2005: 3; Interior 2005f: 59; 
Immigration Act 54).
Non-citizens who threaten the free democratic order or the security of Germany may also be 
expelled, as may non-citizens who mislead the German immigration authorities. Finally, ‘a 
foreigner may be expelled if his or her stay is detrimental to public safety and law and order 
or other substantial interests of the Federal Republic of Germany’ (Immigration Act 55). This 
ground for expulsion is exemplified by breaking the rules for entry procedures, breaking the 
law (except in minor and isolated cases), breaking legal provisions or official decrees 
regarding prostitution, using narcotics and refusing treatment, endangering public health or 
being homeless for a long duration, claiming social welfare, inciting hate against a section of 
the population (intellectual incendiaries), and so on (Interior 2004: 5; Office 2005: 3; Interior 
2005f: 59; Immigration Act 55).
Deportation is thus not seen as incompatible with the Basic Law and its absolute protection of 
the right to individual self-determination. The Court has, however, ruled that deportation must 
meet the constitutional standards of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit).167 This means, for 
example, that deportation procedures need to be transparent, applied equally, and that there 
need to be effective judicial remedies against deportation. The Court has stated that non­
citizens cannot be deported en masse and that the constitutional principle of individual 
examination (Einzelfallprtifung) applies in this area, and that only a legally valid conviction
166 The use o f the term support has caused worries, since it could apply to a w ide range o f  actions. The exact line 
is to be drawn by the courts, and this task has as o f yet not been undertaken; but it is  clear that verbal support 
enjoys strong protection under the right to free speech (Zoller 2004: 478).
167 It is noteworthy in this respect that the state has the right to incarcerate non-citizens that it intends to deport, 
and that this does not amount to deprivation  o f  liberty in a legal sense, in which case a court w ould have to rule 
on the validity o f  such action according to the B asic Law (Basic Law 104 (2)). T o put non-citizens in custody  
awaiting deportation is instead seen as a restriction  o f  liberty, and such action does not require a court decision  
(Basic Law 104 (1)). The reason behind this classification is that the main purpose o f  the restriction is to  enforce 
the obligation to leave the country, not to  lock  up the non-citizen in a confined space. It still remains an open  
question, however, whether this distinction is constitutional i f  such incarceration lasts beyond the end o f  the day 
after the day o f  the apprehension (Cremer 1998: 70). The above in no w ay m eans that deportation is seen as 
outside the constitutional realm; it sim ply means that incarceration for the purpose o f  im m ediate deportation is 
not seen as equivalent to an arrest in a criminal case. This system  is based on a categorisation o f  infringements 
on liberty in the B asic Law and not on legal deference. This system  does, nevertheless, indicate that the 
execution o f deportation is seen as a legitim ate state prerogative that is not punitive in nature. It should a lso  be 
pointed out that deterrence is  still seen as a valid m otivation for deportation, as long as the principles o f  fairness 
and proportionality are m et (N otes 1986: 323).
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can constitute a ground for deportation -  a suspicion or charge will no longer suffice (Joppke 
1997: 238; Notes 1986: 322; Neuman 1990: 51-53).
The fact that the constitutional principle of the rule of law applies also means that 
deportations are subject to the proportionality test. The federal government thus has a right to 
set criteria for, and to deport non-citizens; but due consideration shall be given to the duration 
of lawful residence and to non-citizens’ personal, economic and other ties to Germany, as 
well as to the consequences for non-citizens’ families in Germany. The upshot of these rules 
is that the interest of the non-citizen must be balanced against the state’s interest in deporting 
her (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 2004:34—35; Neuman 1990: 48-74).168
There is no statute of limitations in regards to deportation, but the Immigration Act, in light of 
the applicability of the proportionality principle and an EC Directive, affords special 
protection against deportation for non-citizens who are long-term legal residents. This group 
includes: non-citizens who possess a settlement permit and have lawfully resided in the 
country for five years; non-citizens who are bom in Germany and hold residence permits or 
entered as minors and have five years of lawful residence; residence permit holders of five 
years who cohabit with a non-citizen in the two above categories; recognised refugees and 
non-citizens who cohabit with a German dependent or spouse/partner. Refugees can, 
moreover, only be expelled after all possibilities of appealing a decision against granting 
refugee protection have been exhausted (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration 
2004: 34; Council Directive 2003/109/EC 3, 4, 12; Cyrus 2006: 11; Immigration Act 50- 
57).169 This special protection from deportation means that a non-citizen may only be expelled 
on serious grounds pertaining to public security and law and order. Serious grounds are 
defined as the grounds for mandatory expulsion plus provisions dealing with terrorism, 
endangering the free and democratic order of Germany, and misleading the German 
immigration authorities (Office 2005: 3; Interior 2005f: 60; Immigration Act 56).
168 The proportionality principle also applies w hen a non-citizen challenges a deportation order under the right to 
fam ily life  -  article 6  o f  the B asic Law.
169 N on-citizens enjoying temporary protection, and their spouses and minor children, can only be expelled  if  
there are serious reasons for regarding the non-citizen as a risk to Germany’s security or the general public, due 
to a criminal conviction o f  at least three years for a crime o f  a particular serious offence; or i f  there are serious 
reasons to assume that the non-citizen has com m itted a crime against humanity; or a serious non-political crim e  
outside Germany (Immigration Act 56).
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EU citizens also enjoy strong protections against deportation, as their right to live in Germany 
only can be withdrawn on the grounds of public order, public safety or public health -  in 
accordance with the treaty of the European Union. A criminal conviction is not enough to 
meet these criteria: a current, real and sufficiently serious danger which affects a fundamental 
interest of society must exist; nor may deportation rest on anything but the EU citizen’s 
personal conduct (Niessen 1996: 9; Peers 1996: 46; Interior 2005f: 60, 78; Treaty Establishing 
the European Union 39 (3), 46 (1); Freedom of Movement Act/EU 6). Finally, it can be said, 
on the procedural level, that a non-citizen has, following a deportation order, the right to 
establish contact with a legal adviser, and has to be informed of her legal entitlements and the 
legal remedies open to her. This includes the right to appeal in a court of law. However, the 
new terrorist deportation orders that take immediate effect can only be appealed directly at the 
Federal Administrative Court (Interior 2005f: 60-61,68; Immigration Act 58 (a)).
The Rationale(s) Behind the Civil Rights Realm
The enumerated individual rights in the Basic Law, which uphold all persons’ right to 
autonomy, cover most of the civil rights analysed in this thesis. The Basic Law protects the 
right to free speech and conscience as two separate rights that serve to respect and protect 
individuals’ right to self-determination.170 The connection between these rights and self- 
determination can be detected in the very wording of the Basic Law:
Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion in speech, writing, and 
pictures and freely to inform him self from generally accessib le sources. Freedom o f  the press and 
freedom o f  reporting by means o f  broadcasting and film s are guaranteed. There shall be no  
censorship. (B asic Law 5 (1 ) )
Freedom o f  faith and conscience, and freedom  to profess a religion or a particular philosophy are 
inviolable. The undisturbed practice o f  religion is guaranteed. (B asic Law 4  (1 -2 ))
The Court has also directly linked the right to freedom of speech/opinion and the freedom of 
conscience to the free development of one’s personality (although the Court stresses that 
freedom of speech also plays an important role in the democratic process):
170 The fact that som e o f  the rights analysed here are enumerated while som e are covered by the more general 
right to individual freedom is o f  less importance. T his fo llow s from  the fact that the B asic Law constitutes an 
integrated system  that upholds human dignity, and nothing hinges upon whether a g iven  right is enumerated or 
not, as the enumerated rights are neither exhaustive nor given a special standing (Rubio-M arin 2000: 18 7 -1 9 1 ).
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Everyone should be able to say what he thinks, even i f  he is unable to offer verifiable reasons for 
his judgment. Article 5 (1 ) protects freedom  o f  opinion in the interest o f  individual self-realization  
as w ell as in the interest o f  the democratic process, for which it has constitutive significance. 
(BVerfG E 1423/92 (1994): 390)
The basic right to freedom o f  expression, the most im mediate aspect o f  the human personality in 
society, is one o f  the m ost precious rights o f  man. (BVerfG E 7 , 198b (1958))
In a state in which human dignity is  the highest value, and in which the free self-determination o f  
the individual is also recognized as an important com munity value, freedom  o f  belief affords the 
individual a legal realm free o f  state interference in w hich a person m ay liv e  his life  according to  
his convictions. [...] The freedom guaranteed in Article 4  (1) o f  the B asic Law, like all the 
fundamental rights, has as its point o f  departure the v iew  o f  man in the Constitution; i.e., man as a 
responsible personality, developing freely within the social community. (BV erfG E 32, 98  (1971):
450)
Religious freedom  under Article 4  (1) o f  the B asic Law guarantees the individual a legal sphere in 
which he m ay adopt the lifestyle that corresponds to his convictions. This encom passes not only  
the (internal) freedom to believe or not to believe but also the individual’s right to align his 
behaviour with the precepts o f  his faith and to act in accordance with his internal convictions. 
(BVerfG E 33, 23 (1972): 454)
The fact that the right to free speech and conscience encapsulates the right not to speak, not to 
inform oneself, and not to believe underscores the notion that the right to free speech and 
conscience ultimately is an individual right, which persons hold as autonomous individuals 
(Karpen 1988: 92-94; Kommers 1989: 372, 444-447; Kommers 1980: 685, 694). The 
connection between the right to freedom of speech and conscience and the right to individual 
autonomy becomes even clearer if one keeps in mind that these enumerated rights should be 
read in conjunction with the general right to freely develop one’s personality.
The right to hold and acquire property also constitutes part of the enumerated basic rights in 
the Basic Law, which serve to uphold the right to individual autonomy (Schuppert 1988: 108- 
110; Kommers 1989: 256-260; Ossenblihl 1993: 269-270; Basic Law 14). The Court has made 
the rationale behind this right very plain:
Property is an elem entary constitutional right that is c losely  connected to the guarantee o f  personal 
liberty. W ithin the general system  o f  constitutional rights its function is  to secure its holder a
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sphere o f  liberty in the econom ic field  and thereby enable him to lead a self-governing life . [...]
The guarantee o f  property is not primarily a material but rather a personal guarantee. (BVerfG E  
24, 367 (1968): 339)
The property guarantee is a fundamental right, which is intimately related to individual freedom.
In the total network o f  constitutional fundamental rights its function is  to  g iv e  the individual a free 
range within the area o f  proprietary interests and to enable the individual to shape his life  on the 
basis o f  responsibility. (BVerfG E 53, 257 (1980): 110)
The fact that the economic right to hold property is seen as part of the universal right to 
individual autonomy is further underscored by the observation that the general right to 
commerce and industry flows from the general right to individual freedom (Kommers 1989: 
247; Basic Law 2).171
The right to freely choose one’s profession and the right to seek public employment on equal 
grounds, however, are German rights. These rights hence pre-suppose German membership. 
That these German rights rest on the communitarian rationale is underscored by the fact that an 
exception to the rule that only German citizens can become civil servants can be made if there 
is a compelling public interest in hiring non-citizens (Rubio-Marin 2000: 212). That said, it 
should be remembered that most non-citizens who reside in Germany have a statutory right to 
take up employment and work in most professions. All non-citizens who hold a settlement 
permit or are recognised refugees have these rights and labour immigrants are admitted for this 
very purpose. Further, non-citizens joining German citizens, and non-citizens joining other 
non-citizens who have the right to take up employment, are also granted this right (Interior 
2004: 1, 5-6; Cinar 1999: 9; Immigration Act 9, 25, 28, 29).
Furthermore, and more importantly, non-citizens could hardly fully be deprived of the right to 
work, as this would violate their basic right to exercise individual autonomy. It is highly 
unlikely that the Court would not find a law that banned non-citizens from taking up 
employment altogether to be in violation of individual human dignity. This is because such law 
would make non-citizens totally dependent on others, reducing them to mere objects of the 
state. In other words, the general right to freedom would kick in at some point, even if certain
171 The fact that the rights discussed above constitute a part o f  the general constitutional right to individual 
autonomy means that the principle o f the rule o f  law applies, which sets lim its and procedural checks on any 
infringements on these rights (Currie 1989: 33 9 -3 4 3 ).
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jobs and the right to seek employment on equal grounds are legitimately reserved for Germans 
(Rubio-Marin 2000: 191). The Court has, after all, expanded the rights of non-citizens in other 
areas to cover some of the rights reserved for Germans under article 2, so as to ensure that non­
citizens’ basic right to individual autonomy is upheld.
Non-citizens’ rights to be secure in their persons and property constitute part of their universal 
human rights (Goerlich 1988: 46-48). The right to be secure in one’s person is derived from 
article 2, but it is reinforced by, and intimately connected to, the procedural rights laid down in 
articles 103 and 104 (limits on arrest, the ban on double jeopardy and the right to habeas 
corpus). The right to be secure in one’s property is one of the universal, enumerated rights that 
ensure individuals’ right to self-determination (Basic Law 14). The right to be secure in one’s 
person and property also constitutes part of the principle of rule of law (which is made explicit 
in relation to the states in article 28). This means that the government, even when entitled to 
infringe on this right, may not go further than necessary, under the proportionality principle. 
The Basic Law further defends non-citizens qua persons by upholding an absolute limit on the 
state’s ability to infringe on their basic rights to self-determination, under article 19 (2) (Currie 
1989: 335-336, 352-354).
Non-citizens are protected by the general right to equal protection before the law, since this is 
seen as intrinsically linked to the idea of their universal right to equal concern as autonomous 
individuals (Wurtenberg 1988: 70). The equal rights before the law protection is particularly 
strong where basic rights are concerned. That said, discrimination on the grounds of alienage is 
not banned, and the specific clause that protects against discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality/descent does not protect non-citizens. This system, whereby non-citizens in general 
enjoy a right to equality before the law while alienage still is seen as a valid ground for unequal 
treatment, follows naturally from the overall system of the Basic Law. That is, this level of 
protection reflects a recognition that nationality matters for a person’s legal standing, but also 
that all individuals have an absolute right to basic autonomy, and to equal concern regardless 
of their nationality.
The right to secure residency likewise reflects a balance between the right to individual and 
national autonomy. The list of grounds for deportation is replete with actions that are seen as 
merely undesirable, rather than constituting crimes or actions that might threaten other persons 
under the nation’s jurisdiction. Long-term residents do, however, enjoy protection from most
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of the grounds for deportation listed in the Immigration Act, and can only be deported on 
serious grounds pertaining to public security and law and order (provided that they have 
received their residency title legally). Additionally, non-citizens’ interest in remaining in their 
abode as autonomous individuals must always be weighted against the state’s interest in 
deporting them.
The normative rationale behind the provisions in the Immigration Act that protect long-term 
residents can be traced to a ruling of the Court. It was held in this ruling that deportation is not 
unconstitutional but that individuals are protected under article 2, which grants them the 
universal right to individual self-determination. This is a consequence of the fact that their 
ability to exercise individual autonomy progressively becomes linked to Germany. The Court, 
in this case, rejected the argument that deportation cases, by their very nature, often result in 
disadvantages for non-citizens, and that deportation would become too difficult if 
constitutional standards were to apply:
First, such a peculiarity o f  deportation orders could not lead to a diminution in the protection o f  
fundamental rights; rather, the significance o f  fundamental rights as the foundation o f  every  
human com munity [as declared in Article 1 o f  the B asic Law] must also be taken into account in 
the practice o f  deportation. (BVerfG E 35, 382 (1973): 53)
The principle of the rule of law in general, and the proportionality principle in particular, are 
devised so as to ensure that the state does not ride roughshod over individuals’ rights when 
exercising state authority, in this case when deporting non-citizens. This means that non­
citizens enjoy protection from deportation under the general right to individual self- 
determination, although this right is not absolute (Rubio-Marin 2000: 211; Neuman 1990: 48- 
58; Cremer 1998: 74; Kantstroom 1993: 190-193). That it is individuals’ right to self- 
determination that underlies long-term residents protection from deportation is underscored 
by the fact that it originally was the Court’s decision to apply the proportionality principle in 
deportation cases that gave rise to the current statutory protection in this area (Hailbronner 
1999: 53; Cinar 1999: 9; Neuman 1990: 49).
The Political Rights Realm
Non-citizens have never had the right to vote and stand for public office in national elections 
in Germany. Two states did grant non-citizens the right to vote and stand for public office at
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the state level.172 The Court, however, ruled this to be unconstitutional in 1990, on the 
grounds that the Basic Law reserves political rights for Germans on both the federal and the 
state levels (Marshall 1996: 250; Basic Law 33; BVerfGE 83, 37 (1990)). This ruling gave 
rise to a problem in relation to EU citizens, as under EC law they enjoy the right to vote and 
to stand for public office in municipal and EU parliament elections in any member state in 
which they reside (Treaty Establishing the European Union 19).173 The Basic Law has 
subsequently been amended as to render it compatible with EC law in this respect. This means 
that EU citizens have the right to stand for election and to vote in municipal and EU 
parliament elections, but no other non-citizens have any political rights (Neuman 1998: 273; 
Guild 1996: 47; Basic Law 28).
The Rationale(s) Behind the Political Rights Realm
The right to vote and the right to stand for public office are not listed as rights for Germans in 
the Basic Law. These rights are, in fact, not directly mentioned in the Basic Law. However, 
several articles touch on these issues; article 28 stipulates that the people have a right to elect 
representatives in the states, and article 38 stipulates that the Bundestag (the lower house) 
should represent the people. Article 54 states that only Germans are eligible for the 
presidency, and article 33 ensures equal eligibility for public office for all Germans. That said, 
none of these articles reserve the right to vote and stand for election only to Germans. Indeed 
the reason that most scholars include these political rights among the exclusive rights for 
Germans stems from the fact that political rights are seen as included in the Basic Law’s 
principle of democracy: “All state authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by 
the people through elections and voting [...]” (Basic Law 20 (2)) That is, political rights are in 
general seen as belonging to Germans, as those to whom the term people refers. In this 
context, therefore, people is understood as referring to the German people as constituting a 
particular demos (Rubio-Marin 2000: 187, 196-197; Neuman 1992: 269-272).
This interpretation of the term people (Volk) has, however, been contested by scholars, and 
different interpretations of the concept of popular sovereignty in the Basic Law have been put 
forward. Two main competing lines of argument about the meaning of the all state power 
emanates from the people clause have been put forward. The first holds that all who are
172 Only one o f  the statutes allow ed non-citizens to stand for election (Neum an 1992: 283).
173 It is noteworthy that the o ffice o f  m ayor can be reserved for citizens, and that elected non-citizens can be 
banned from partaking in the designation o f  delegates to national assem blies (M artiniello 2000: 365).
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affected by the state’s decisions should have an equal right in electing its leaders, thus 
disconnecting citizenship/membership and political rights. The proponents of this line of 
argument hold that this perception of democracy is the most congenial to the core value of the 
Basic Law, and they draw support from the fact that the Court often connects the values of 
individual autonomy and democracy. The counter position holds that the notion of popular 
sovereignty depends on the existence of a particular people, and can be described as the no­
democracy without a demos argument. This position draws its strength from the fact that the 
Basic Law clearly contains a notion of a particular German nation. The Basic Law’s preamble 
refers to the unity and self-determination of the German people, and the Basic Law reserves 
certain rights to Germans. This position makes political rights dependent on membership in 
the particular German nation (Rubio-Marin 2000: 199-203; Neuman 1992: 269-272, 276- 
282).
This debate was settled, in legal terms, in 1990, when the Court invalidated the two new 
federal statutes that granted non-citizens the right to vote and to stand for public office at the 
local level; in doing so the Court came down on the side of the no democracy without a demos 
side of this constitutional debate. The Court’s decision hinged upon the meaning of the term 
people or nation (Volk). The Court held that popular sovereignty could not be seen simply in 
the abstract, but must be seen as referring to a particular community which has the right to 
define itself and which is bound in unity. The term people must hence be seen as referring to 
the specific German people and political rights thus depend on citizenship (Neuman 1992: 
260, 284-291; Rubio-Marin 2000: 199-203; Neuman 1998: 273; BVerfGE 83, 37 (1990)). 
The Court outlined its core argument in the following:
There can be no democratic state without a body politic that is both subject to and object o f  the 
state authority vested in it and exercised through its organs. This does not mean that all state 
decisions must be approved by the people [affected by the decision]; rather it means that the 
subject o f  state authority must be a cohesive, unified group. .. .  [And] I f  the B asic Law conceives  
being [sic] German as necessary to being part o f  “the people” as the subject o f  state authority, then 
it must fo llow  that [being German] is a precondition o f  the right to vote, which is a direct exercise  
o f  state authority possessed  by the people. This does not mean that the legislator is unable to 
influence the com position o f  “the people” under Article 20  (2). The B asic Law em pow ers the 
legislator to set conditions for gaining or losing  citizenship status (see A rticles 73  [2] and 116) and 
thereby to establish the criteria for m embership in the body politic. (BVerfG E 83, 37b (1990): 198)
200
The Court thus established that the concept of democracy in the Basic Law does not allow for 
a decoupling of political rights and citizenship; in so doing the Court explicitly rejected the 
idea that being affected by the exercise of state authority yields the right to vote or to stand for 
election (Hailbronner 2002: 122; Benhabib 2004: 202-205):
It is incorrect to state that an increase in the population o f  foreigners within the FRG changes the 
constitutional concept o f  “the people” . Underlying this misperception is the concept that 
dem ocracy and the inherent concept o f  freedom  demand [complete] congruence between those 
w ho hold democratic rights and those w ho are subject to  state domination. This is the correct 
starting point, but it cannot elim inate the relationship between being German and being a member 
o f  the body politic, and thus vested with state authority. The B asic Law does not permit such a 
devolvem ent. (BVerfG E 83, 37b (1990): 198-199)
It is clear that the Court recognises the connection between autonomy and democracy. The 
Court, however, ruled that this connection between individual autonomy and democracy could 
not break or undermine the connection between the existence of a particular nation and the 
right to exercise state authority; this due to the fact that the Basic Law invests the power of 
exercising state authority in the German people. This decision gives the notion of democracy 
in the Basic Law a distinct meaning, and it draws a clear line in the sand by banning non­
citizens from participation in the election process. That is, the ruling does not simply mean 
that only Germans are constitutionally guaranteed the right to political rights: the ruling also 
deems a cosmopolitan perception of democracy unconstitutional. The implications of this 
decision for a valid democratic process are clear:
[...] the democratic principle within the meaning o f  the B asic Law is only satisfied i f  the election  
g ives effect so lely  to the w ill o f  the geographically limited portion o f  the people o f  the state, i.e ., is 
conducted by the Germans residing in the boroughs. Elections in which aliens are also entitled to 
vote cannot convey democratic legitim ation. (BVerfG E 83, 37c (1990): 287)
The Court built on this communitarian notion of democracy when it ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty. The Court held that the treaty was constitutional, on 
the grounds that the EU predominately is an organisation for inter-state co-operation and 
lacked Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e. lacks the ability to decide where power rests, and hence 
cannot enhance its own powers. The Court did, however, add that Germany could only 
surrender real sovereignty provided that the German nation’s right to self-determination was
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not thereby undermined, as state authority must stem from a specific nation. This, the Court 
stated, follows from articles 20 (establishing that all state power emanates from the people) 
and 38 (establishing the rules for democratic elections). The Court also indicated that such a 
transfer of substantial sovereignty depended on the future existence of a parallel European 
demos174 (Goetz 1995a: 23; Ress 1995: 59-62, 67-68; BVerfGE 89, 155a (1993)):
I f  the peoples o f  the individual states continue to provide democratic legitim ation through their 
national parliaments, then the principle o f  democracy lim its the extension o f  the European 
C om m unity’s pow ers and functions. The origin o f  state power in each member state is the people 
o f  that state. It fo llow s then, that the Bundestag must retain functions and powers o f  substantial 
importance [...] (BVerfG E 89, 155a (1993): 185)
[...] Article 38 prevents the legitim isation o f  state power through elections and popular control o f  
the exercise o f  power from becom ing m eaningless ow ing to the transfers o f  duties and 
com petences away from the Bundestag. O therwise, the principle o f dem ocracy rendered inviolable 
by Article 79  (3), in conjunction with Article 2 0  (1) and (2) [sic] B asic Law, w ould be violated. 
(BVerfG E 89, 155b (1993): 60)
The nature of the Court’s interpretation of the meaning of democracy in the Basic Law, and 
the implication of this interpretation, has been aptly summarised by both German and 
American constitutional scholars:
The Federal Constitutional Court, in contrast [to the U .S .], has recently confirmed the prevailing 
opinion that the FRG’s B asic Law im pliedly adopted a nationalist-communitarian version 
reflecting the historical developm ent o f  German Statehood. A lien suffrage is not com patible with 
dem ocracy within the meaning o f  the Basic Law. (Neuman 1992: 335)
Nationality remains rooted in the cultural concept o f ‘V olk ’; the Constitutional Court has declined  
to redefine this notion in the light o f  the multi-national character o f  m odem  German society, w ith  
the result that non-Germans can achieve political participation through the ballot box only by  
virtue o f  naturalisation. (G oetz 1995b: 164)
It should be pointed out that this does not indicate a radical new interpretation of the Basic 
Law based on a strict communitarian approach. To the contrary, these decisions are very
174 The Court also established that the fact that democratic legitim acy rests w ith the nations, and that the nations 
thus ultimately set the scope and lim its to the E U ’s exercise o f  power meant, in the German context, that the 
Court holds the ultimate right to  control the legality  o f  the EU decisions (R ess 1995: 6 2 -6 4 ).
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much in line with the dual structure of the Basic Law, where universal individual rights limit 
the exercise of state authority but do not constitute its source. The notion of democracy in the 
Basic Law does not rest on, or re-connect to, the principle of individual autonomy, but is 
derived from the principle of communal self-determination. Under the latter, the self-defined 
German people have a right to exercise state authority according to democratic principles. 
This explains why the ultimate normative rationale for excluding non-citizens from the ballot 
and to stand for public office is that non-citizens simply do not belong to the particular 
German people (Faist 1994: 59; Kommers 1999b: 100, 111-112; Benhabib 2004: 202- 
205).175
The Social Rights Realm
Germany has a fairly comprehensive system of social rights and the analysis below will only 
include the major social provisions: Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe), Rental Assistance 
(Wohngeld), Social Housing, Child Assistance (Kindergeld), Old Age Pension 
(Rentenversicherung), Unemployment Insurance (Arbeitslosenversicherung), Health Care and 
Health Insurance (Krankenversicherung), and Grants or Loans for Higher Education 
(.Ausbildungsforderung), and Primary and Secondary Education (Aleinikoff 2002b: 80-82).176
Territorial presence, not nationality, is the key principle for the distribution of social rights in 
Germany, and non-citizens are in general included in the social rights sphere. That said, there 
are minor differences based on nationality (Wenzel 1997: 540-541; Hailbronner 1998: 206; 
Geddes 2003: 90; Guiraudon 2000: 79). It can be said, on a more detailed level, that EU 
citizens and recognised refugees have a right to Social Assistance. By contrast, other legal 
non-citizens have limited access to Social Assistance, and asylum seekers only receive Aid to 
Subsistence in-kind. All legal non-citizens have access to Rental Assistance, Social Housing
175 E U  citizens’ political rights are a lso  connected to membership, and as associated members non-citizens have 
the right participate in local elections and the joint European elections, whereas the national level remains the 
sole prerogative o f  citizens.
176 The nature o f  som e o f  these programs m ay need further explanation. Social A ssistance is a form o f  means 
tested assistance for needy individuals, which can be received in cash or in-kind; Rental A ssistance is a means 
tested allow ance for accom m odation; Social H ousing is provided through state subsidised housing projects, 
which can only then be rented out to  persons on low  incom es; Child A ssistance is provided to fam ilies with  
children, Old A ge Pension is a contributory pension, which individuals w ho have worked for a certain amount o f  
time can apply for; Unem ploym ent Insurance is  a contributory insurance for individuals w ho have participated in 
the labour market and subsequently becom e unemployed; Health Care and Health Insurance provides medical 
coverage m ainly through contributory schem es via em ployers, but the state does provide certain groups with  
health care and health insurance; Primary and Secondary education constitute basic education provided by public  
means, whereas Grants or Loans for Higher Education are state financed grants for tertiary education (A lein ikoff  
2002b: 80 -8 2 ).
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and Child Assistance save for asylum seekers, who are housed in special accommodation and 
are ineligible for Child Assistance. Eligibility for Old Age pension and Unemployment 
Insurance depend on previous contributions, and all legal non-citizens are entitled to these 
provisions save for asylum seekers, who only are eligible for Unemployment Insurance 
(Aleinikoff 2002a: 80-82; Faist 1996: 251-258; for long-term residents' equal right to core 
social security and social assistance see also Council Directive 2003/109/EC 11).
The duration of other non-citizens’ access to Unemployment Insurance is also limited. Health 
Care and Health Insurance are provided to all legal non-citizens save for asylum seekers who 
only are eligible for emergency medical care. All legal non-citizens are entitled to Primary 
and Secondary Education, as well as to Grants or Loans for Higher Education (Aleinikoff 
2002a: 80-82; Faist 1996: 251-258; for asylum seekers’ right to education, health care and 
subsistence, see also Council Directive 2003/9/EC 10, 13, 15).177 This means that legal non­
citizens have a right to subsistence, the right to basic health care, the right to basic education, 
the right to comprehensive health care, the right to funding for higher education and, with 
minor exceptions, the right to a share of welfare provisions on an equal basis.
Undocumented residents constitute an important exception to this general rule of inclusion. 
Undocumented residents are, however, in theory entitled to emergency medical care and to 
social assistance in emergency cases (Morris 2002: 117; Faist 1995b: 186-187; Wenzel 1997: 
541-545; Faist 1996: 254-257; PICUM 2005: 1; Sinn 2005: 56; Kieser 2000: 6). That said, 
two statutes undermine these rights. The first of these holds that all public bodies ‘shall notify 
the competent foreigners authority forthwith if they obtain knowledge of the whereabouts of a 
foreigner who does not possess a required residence title or any other grounds for expulsion’ 
(Immigration Act 86-87). The question of which public authorities must verify non-citizens’ 
status is somewhat unclear, but legal experts argue that public bodies only have an obligation 
to contact the immigration authorities if they need this information to perform their task. 
Although this would arguably exclude social service providers such as teachers and doctors, 
in general all persons dealing with the financial aspects of providing social services are under 
an obligation to alert the immigration authorities, and hence cannot legally provide social 
services to non-citizens (Sinn 2005: 57; Immigration Act 86-87).
177 N on-citizens are not entitled to non-contributory provisions like Social A ssistance, Child A ssistance and 
Social H ousing i f  they entered the country with the intention o f  receiving these benefits. Furthermore receiving  
Social A ssistance m ay result in that resident permits w ill not be renewed and U nem ploym ent Insurance can be 
withdrawn for certain non-citizens after a year i f  they are deem ed unable to regain em ploym ent (Faist 1996: 252; 
W enzel 1997: 541).
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The second statute includes all persons, as it makes it a crime (punishable with imprisonment) 
in general to render assistance to (several) undocumented residents and to render any 
assistance that makes continued illegal residence (a crime in itself) possible (Sinn 2005: 57- 
59; Immigration Act 96). The combined effect, or the upshot, of these two statutes is that 
undocumented residents have no social rights, save for the social rights provided during the 
deportation process. This follows from that providers of social rights, in many cases, face a 
positive legal obligation to report non-citizens’ illegal status to the immigration authorities, 
and always face serious legal sanctions if they aid undocumented residents. This lack of social 
rights in turn means, as the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees points out, that:
[ . . .  even] medical care o f  illegally  resident immigrants has a predominantly charitable character
and that it depends on the com mitm ent o f  individual persons or charitable organisations. (Sinn
2 0 0 5 :5 7 )
The Rationale(s) Behind the Social Rights Realm
It is clear, momentarily ignoring undocumented residents, that non-citizens enjoy a wide 
range of social rights in Germany qua persons. Asylum seekers have least social rights but 
they are entitled to survival in conditions of human dignity under the Basic Law, which 
requires that asylum seekers’ human dignity, as individuals, be upheld. This includes, shelter, 
basic social provisions and medical care as well as basic education (Bank 2000: 159-162; 
Kieser 2000: 6-9).
Other non-citizens are better off, as they qualify for more social provisions, including full 
access to medical care, although different groups of non-citizens hold slightly different social 
rights depending on their specific status. Non-citizens’ general right to inclusion is reflected 
in the fact that non-citizens are covered by the social state principle. This principle obliges the 
state to provide all persons with basic social rights in order to guarantee the effective 
enjoyment of their universal right to self-determination. It should, of course, be remembered 
that the social provision principle has never been deployed in order to uphold a specific right, 
as discussed earlier. That said, all non-citizens enjoy basic social rights, and are guaranteed 
aid to subsistence, education and healthcare as part of their basic right to human dignity under 
the Basic Law (Thranhardt 1999: 31; Rubio-Marin 2000: 193-196; Guiraudon 2000: 79-85).
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Non-citizens have been awarded additional legal protection, in the social rights realm, with 
reference to the right to equality before the law. The Court has ruled that discrimination on the 
basis of alienage in social security schemes violates non-citizens’ right to equality before the 
law. The Court does provide political institutions with some leeway in these cases, but the 
Court’s protection of non-citizens’ rights in this area contrasts sharply with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision, in Flemming v. Nestor, which stated that such discrimination is valid unless 
‘patently arbitrary’ (Flemming v. Nestor (I960)). The notion behind the German protection of 
non-citizens in this area is that the political institutions may not have to grant non-citizens 
access to the labour market, but if they do, they are also under a legal obligation to ensure 
equality and fairness in terms of the social rights connected to the labour market. That is, this 
is another area in which the Court deploys the overarching right to individual freedom in 
article 2 (in conjunction with the right to equality) to ensure that non-citizens effectively 
enjoy the right to individual autonomy in a situation that the founders of the Basic Law did 
not foresee, i.e. the existence of a large number of residing non-citizens in the country (Rubio- 
Marin 2000: 193-196; Guiraudon 2000: 79-85; Joppke 1997: 275; Thranhardt 1999: 31; 
Neuman 1990: 68-72; Flemming v. Nestor (I960)).
The approach to undocumented residents in this area is very different and rests on the 
opposite rationale. The German state totally subordinates undocumented residents’ rights in 
this area to its right to control admission as a sovereign nation (Kieser 2000: 10-11). This 
means that:
[ . . . ]  a “state-control” approach, which regards illegal immigrants first and forem ost as a violation  
o f  applicable la w ... has been adopted by the Federal M inistry o f  the Interior and the state interior 
ministries. (Sinn 2005: 6)
This contrasts with the human rights approach, which ‘emphasises the rights of illegally 
resident migrants and demands that minimum standards of social protection’ be granted to 
undocumented residents (Sinn 2005: 6). The ultimate rationale behind the state control 
approach was made very clear when Germany added explanatory remarks to its ratification of 
the 1990 UN Rights of the Child Convention. This Convention provided undocumented 
residents with the right to education, but the German government undermined this right by 
adding some remarks to its ratification:
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On signing the Convention, however, the Federal Government has added som e explanatory 
remarks to the effect that no part o f  the convention could be interpreted in a w ay that w ould  
legalise illegal residence or infringe on the sovereign pow ers o f  the Federal Republic o f Germany 
to regulate migration inflow s and outflow s and differentiate between citizens and foreign  
nationals. (Sinn 2005: 16 -1 7 )
This communitarian approach also explains why Germany has refrained from ratifying the 
UN Charter on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families, as it is 
seen as providing undocumented migrants/workers with too many rights (Kieser 2000: 8).
The Naturalisation Rights Realm
In Germany, non-citizens can currently be naturalised in two ways. The government has a 
discretionary right to naturalise non-citizens who are not deportable, have accommodation 
and are economically self-sufficient (Nationality Act 8-9). Non-citizens also have a statutory 
right to naturalise if they fulfil a number of requirements (Winter 2004: 9-13; Interior 2005f: 
88).178 The criteria that must be met are: eight years legal residence (seven if the non-citizen 
has completed an integration course), confirming a commitment to the Basic Law, holding a 
residence or settlement permit on other grounds than education and refugee protection, having 
the ability to ensure subsistence for oneself and one’s dependents without recourse to social 
assistance (unless the non-citizens is under 23 or is not responsible for the need to receive 
social assistance or unemployment assistance), giving up or losing one’s previous citizenship 
(unless this entails particularly difficult conditions), and not being convicted of a crime (save 
for minor offences).179
This right to statutory naturalisation also covers non-citizens’ spouses and children. Non­
citizens are, however excluded from this right if they do not have adequate knowledge of the 
German language, if there are concrete grounds to assume that non-citizens have supported 
activities that aim at subverting the free constitutional system, or if the non-citizen is liable for 
expulsion on the grounds of supporting a terrorist organisation or endangers the free 
democratic order by violence or publicly incites violence (Nationality Act 10-12). A person 
bom in Germany of non-citizens becomes a German citizen according to the jus soli principle,
178 This statutory right (Rechtsanspruch) constitutes the highest level o f  certainty in German law , and is stronger 
than the in general entitled to (Regelanspruch) that first replaced the discretionary state right in this area (Cinar 
1994: 54; Green 2000: 111).
179 M inor offences are defined as convictions leading to small fines or custodial sentences o f  up to six months 
that were ‘suspended upon probation and quashed upon the expiration o f  the probation’ (Nationality Act 13).
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provided that: one parent has been a legal resident in Germany for eight years, or one parent is 
an EU/EEA citizen, or one parent has a settlement permit. These citizens, however, lose their 
citizenship if they fail to renounce any other citizenship and declare their wish to retain their 
German citizenship, in writing, between their 18 and 23 birthdays; this group of citizens can 
also apply for dual nationality until their 21 birthday if surrendering a second nationality is 
impossible or causes unreasonable hardship (Nationality Act 4, 10-12, 29) (Geddes 2003: 94; 
Martin 1994: 209; Rittstieg 1994: 113; Joppke 2000: 152; Embassy 2006a: 2; Winter 2004: 5- 
7; Nationality Act 4, 10-12, 29).
The Rationale(s) Behind the Naturalisation Rights Realm
The first thing to notice is that the right to set the rules for naturalisation or membership 
belongs to the German people, as part of their right to exercise state authority:
This does not mean that the legislator is unable to influence the com position o f  “the people” under 
Article 20 (2). The B asic Law em powers the legislator to set conditions for gaining or losing  
citizenship status (see Articles 73 [2] and 116) and thereby to establish the criteria for membership  
in the body politic. (BVerfG E 83, 37b (1990): 198)
Article 73 provides the federal legislative branch with the exclusive right to legislate in a 
number of areas that are essential to the unity of Germany, and the right to set citizenship 
criteria is one of the enumerated rights; others include foreign affairs, defence, migration, 
standard of time and currency and so on. The federal legislative branch has made extensive 
use of this right lately and has made citizenship more readily available to long-term residents. 
These new rules contrast rather starkly with the laws that previously regulated naturalisation. 
The previous naturalisation regime famously traced its roots to the naturalisation act of 1913 
(Reich- und Staatsangehdrigkeitsgesetz of 1913), and was based on a strict jus sanguinis 
principle that extended German citizenship to all people of German stock, but all but barred 
non-Germans from citizenship. Discretionary naturalisation of non-Germans was an 
exception, only to be made if it was in the public interest. German citizens were born, not 
made. The previous naturalisation law must, however, be seen in its historical context. West 
Germany was, officially and in legal terms, an incomplete state aiming at reunification, and its 
citizenship law made it the homeland of all Germans. The rationale behind this law was, the 
historical context notwithstanding, clearly communitarian.
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This fact was perhaps best illustrated by the (non-binding) guidelines of the old naturalisation 
regime. These guidelines famously stated that ‘Germany is not a country of immigration; it 
does not seek deliberately to increase the number of German citizens through naturalisation’ 
(Green 2000: 110). It stipulated that non-citizens only could naturalise once they had 
demonstrated a commitment to German culture (Bekenntnis zum deutschen Kulturkreis), and 
provided that they had lived a clean life (unbescholtenen Lebenswandel gefiihrt hat), over and 
above not being convicted of a crime. The present law, on the other hand, is not based on this 
thick concept of cultural integration, and provides long-term residents with the statutory right 
to naturalisation on the condition that they fulfil certain criteria. The radical change of the 
naturalisation law was a major political event in Germany, and it touched a raw nerve by 
changing the conception of membership in the German nation (Joppke 1999: 21-27; Boswell 
2003: 81; Green 2000: 114; Kantstroom 1993: 179-180; Neuman 1998: 268; Joppke 2000: 
151-156; Koopmans 1999: 630; Geddes 2003: 93-95).
The move away from an exclusive jus sanguinis principle, however, does not mean that 
membership is open to all on an equal basis, or that the current naturalisation law rests on the 
cosmopolitan rationale. Membership is still exclusive, and not all long-term residents have the 
right to become members; the fact that only individuals who are prepared to give up any other 
citizenship (and who have not committed a crime) are accepted as members provides the 
clearest example that membership remains exclusive and that it is not simply based on 
residence. The fact that citizenship is not open to all residents on an equal basis is also 
reflected in the fact that the principle of jus sanguinis still applies for all children bom of 
German citizens, and that persons bom of non-citizens still are treated differently to persons 
bom of citizens, in terms of citizenship in Germany.
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Section 111
The Normative Position o f Germany
The clarity of the Basic Law -  in terms of which rights are universal and which rights belong 
to members -  makes it easier to discern the rationales behind non-citizens’ legal standing; it 
also, more importantly, has a very fundamental impact on non-citizens’ legal standing. The 
Basic Law’s clear commitment to universal values as an absolute check on all exercise of 
state authority means that no aspect of the treatment of non-citizens can be pushed outside the 
remit of the constitutional order. This means that the German constitutional system is seen as 
co-extensive with the German polity, and that the Basic Law limits ALL state authority 
(Kommers 1997: 39). The Basic Law clearly commits Germany to the cosmopolitan rationale, 
but also to the communitarian rationale. The cosmopolitan rationale underlies the system of 
individual rights that carve out a sphere of inalienable rights, guaranteeing that all individuals 
have the right to exercise self-determination. This sphere of rights controls, and sets the 
boundaries for, all exercise of state authority in Germany.
The right to exercise state authority is, however, not derived from the right to individual self- 
determination. Rather, it is legitimised by the fact that state authority constitutes the 
expression of the democratic will of the particular German nation, which alone holds the right 
to communal self-formation and national sovereignty. The right to exercise state authority 
hence rests on the communitarian rationale, whereas the limits for the exercise of this right 
rest on the cosmopolitan rationale. This creates a dual constitutional structure that engenders 
the need to balance the rights to communal and individual self-determination. This has been 
solved in Germany by providing non-citizens with a right to basic individual autonomy, while 
rights that are central to the political formation of the nation are reserved for Germans.
What has emerged in Section I and II is, generally speaking, clearly a weak cosmopolitan 
approach, where individual and national autonomy are balanced so as to leave room both for 
national and individual self-determination. In more detail, it can be said that the right to 
control admission, in general, rests with the sovereign nation, and that many specific statutes 
concerning admission are constructed as to serve the interest of its members. Exceptions to 
this general rule are, however, made on the grounds that non-citizens’ basic right to autonomy
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must be respected. Thus, refugees have the right to protection and non-citizens who seek to be 
reunited with their families, in general, are entitled to admission.
Non-citizens’ civil rights are also upheld under this universal right to individual self- 
determination. This includes a basic, but not complete, right to equality before the law, as a 
right to complete equality would undermine Germany’s ability to exercise national self- 
determination and to reserve certain rights for members. The German state’s level of 
discretion, provided by the limitations to non-citizens’ equal law protection, is restricted in 
general, and particularly when it comes to basic rights, and the state cannot infringe on the 
essence of non-citizens’ universal right to individual autonomy. Certain constitutional rights 
are, however, reserved for Germans alone, including the right to freely choose one’s 
profession.
Political rights are also seen as belonging to Germans, as the German democratic system pre­
supposes a particular nation as the source of democratic legitimacy. Most non-citizens are, on 
the other hand, included in almost all social provisions, and have the right to ‘survival in 
conditions of human dignity’, under the Basic Law (Bank 2000: 159-162; Kieser 2000: 6-9). 
The right to control naturalisation remains, all the dramatic changes withstanding, the nation’s 
prerogative, and only non-citizens deemed suitable are allowed to naturalise. In sum, 
Germany is clearly committed to a weak cosmopolitan perspective where non-citizens’ basic 
rights to individual autonomy is combined and balanced against Germany’s right protect the 
interest of the German nation. This balance upholds Germany’s right to put the interest of 
Germans first, in limited areas. The German approach is, alas, not perfectly consistent. Four 
important inconsistencies can, in fact, be identified and these will be analysed in detail below.
Normative Inconsistencies
Germany’s commitment to admitting refugees is directly reflected in the Basic Law as well 
as in Germany’s ratification of several international conventions. This means that non­
citizens have a right to protection, not only if they face political persecution, but also if they 
face threats of torture or capital punishment, or serious and concrete dangers to their lives, 
health or freedom. The glaring inconsistency caused by only granting protection to political 
refugees hence does not arise in Germany. That said, Germany’s use of safe third countries 
provisions has attracted much criticism, and raises the question of whether Germany 
effectively has withdrawn refugees’ right to protection. It is clear that the safe country rule
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deprives refugees of the right to choose Germany as the country where they will seek 
protection, and that this rule is part of a game where states try to shift the perceived burdens 
of protecting refugees to others (Thielemann 2003).
This does not, however, mean that Germany fails to protect refugees by putting them in 
harm’s way, as only non-citizens who can be returned to states that afford refugees 
substantial protection -  including protection from deportation to another state where they 
may suffer persecution or their lives might be at risk -  are denied the right to protection. This 
is ensured either by the normative ascertainment of safe states or by an individual evaluation 
of particular cases as described earlier (Knipping 1995: 278-279; Kommers 1999b: 110).180 
And as long as a refugee is not deported to a country where her basic rights will encroached 
upon, her universal right to refugee protection is upheld, though she is denied a choice of 
where to seek protection (Neuman 1993b: 505, 520).
The visa regime has received less attention in Germany, but it is here that the inconsistency 
arises. The problem is not the existence of a visa regime; this is a legitimate part of 
controlling admission, and is compatible with a commitment to basic universal rights for 
non-citizens. The problem is that the current visa regime halts many non-citizens’ attempts to 
seek admission even from non-safe states. Non-citizens must first of all demonstrate that they 
have adequate funds for their trip and stay, health insurance with a coverage of 30,000 €, and 
that they intend to return home in order to obtain even a Schengen visa.181 Germany (like the 
other members of the Schengen Convention) has, moreover, actively put countries that are 
seen as producing too many refugees on a list of countries whose citizens require a visa to 
travel to Germany.
180 It should be noticed that the difference between states’ im plem entation  o f  these C onventions makes it difficult 
in practice for Germany to assess where these non-citizens eventually end up (N oll 2000: 209). This issue w ill, 
however, not be pursued further here, as it falls outside the scope o f  the thesis as an issue o f  implementation. It 
should be noted, however, that a normative inconstancy arises in this area if  safe third countries fail to protect all 
refugees’ basic right to individual autonomy.
181 A  Schengen visa is required for short-term stays, the rules for obtaining a resident or a settlem ent permit have 
been discussed earlier. The Schengen Convention o f  1995 abolished internal border controls among its 
signatories, including Germany. The Convention and a set o f  key m easures taken by the signatories were 
incorporated into the Treaty o f  Amsterdam in 1999 and hence constitute E U  law. The Convention was 
accompanied by so-called com pensatory measures, designed to ensure the interests o f  the parties, these m easures 
include a com mon visa regim e for short-term visitors. This means that the rules for short-term visas to Germany 
are set at the EU  level and constitute EC law  (Com m ission 2006). Schengen visas are not o f  direct concern to the 
analysis at hand as they pertain to short-term visitors, w ho are not included in the analysis. Schengen visas are, 
however, o f  indirect interest as they affect many refugees’ ability to reach Germany in order to seek protection.
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While the visa regime in general aims at upholding immigration laws, it also is in part 
designed to keep out refugees (Gibney 2003: 5; d'Oliveira Jessurun 1991: 179; Collinson 
1995: 80; Phuong 2003: 12; Noll 2000: 165-166; Embassy 2006b). The fact that Germany 
deliberately tries to reduce the burden of upholding the recognised right to refugee protection 
is underscored by the fact that German embassies, contrary to some other European states, do 
not accept asylum applications; that is, the very same officials who handle visa applications 
do not deal with asylum applications (ECRE 2006; Noll 2000: 181, 441-444). It should be 
noted that exceptions to visa requirements can be made for refugees under the Schengen 
Agreement, but there is no rule guaranteeing such an exception under German law, which to 
the contrary states that:
In exceptional cases, the Schengen visa m ay be issued  when the requirements for issuance as 
stipulated in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement are not fulfilled , for reasons 
o f  international law or on humanitarian grounds or to safeguard the interests o f the Federal 
Republic o f  Germany. (Immigration A ct 6 (2a) em phases added)
It is also clear that the carrier sanctions are designed to discourage companies from bringing 
potential refugees to Germany. The companies cannot, after all, assess who will be recognised 
as a refugee, and are liable to pay a fine for all non-citizens they carry without a visa who are 
not later recognised as refugees. Meanwhile, the economic cost associated with denying bona 
fide refugees to travel with the company is limited to the potential lower demand for tickets. 
Part of the aim of the visa regime and the carrier sanctions is hence to reduce the number of 
refugees making it to Germany, so as to lower the cost to the German state (Noll 2000: 173, 
177-182; ECRE 2006). This means that the German visa regime clearly undermines refugees’ 
ability to seek protection, and it is incompatible with Germany’s commitment to the basic 
universal right to individual self-determination.182 To actively impede individuals from 
enjoying the right to refugee protection, on the grounds that they are trying to receive the very 
entitlement which is a recognised legal right in the first place, is the equivalent to being 
committed to providing something to another person and holding it out with one hand whilst 
impeding the receiver from taking it with the other hand. This is clearly normatively 
inconsistent, not to say Kafkaesque.
182 It arguably also violates Germany’s legal obligation under international law , as the indiscriminate use o f  visa 
requirements deprives non-citizens o f  the right to apply for protection although they have com e within the 
jurisdiction o f  Germany (and can apply for a visa) (N oll 2000: 4 4 1 -4 4 4 ).
213
Non-citizens have a right to family reunification in Germany. This right is derived both from 
the Basic Law, which protects the right to family life, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Rubio-Marin 2000: 215). This is also reflected in the Immigration Act, which 
gives residents the right to be joined by family members who are non-citizens. Germany does 
hence treat the right to family reunification as one of the basic rights owed to all persons as 
part of their right to individual self-determination. The problem is that individuals enjoy this 
universal right under different conditions. Non-citizens who are not EU citizens must fulfil 
certain economic requirements in order to be able to exercise this right. It could possibly be 
argued that the universal right to family reunification could be restricted if the state could not 
cope with the economic cost generated by this right, although the Court has ruled out a quota 
system as this does not guarantee individual examination of all cases. There is, however, no 
need to pursue the question of whether this right can be restricted in a way that is compatible 
with a commitment to basic universal rights, because Germany fails the more basic test of 
providing this basic right on an equal basis by only restricting certain individuals’ right to 
family reunification.183
Nor can the current distinction be defended on the ground that less well-off non-citizens have 
a lesser interest in living with their families than other individuals. For as Rainsbourogh, the 
great English political activist, stated in the Putney Debates in 1647 ‘the poorest he in 
England has a life to live as much as the richest he’. A basic right can simply not coherently 
be withdrawn from a sub-section of individuals on economic grounds.184 The combination of 
lack of membership and economic means are not a valid discrimination ground for a universal 
individual right. These grounds instead reflect the government’s desire to reduce the cost to 
the nation and give priority to its members, making it clearly incompatible with a commitment 
to provide all individuals with their basic individual rights to autonomy on equal grounds. 
Indeed, it seems difficult to imagine a more invidious ground for discrimination than the 
combination of lack of membership and economic means, as a person fitting this description 
is likely to be, if anything, in greater need of the right to live with her family than a wealthy 
individual living in her native country.
183 It is  noteworthy that refugees are in a better position in this respect than other non-citizens, bar for EU  
citizens, as refugees initially can apply for fam ily asylum , which means that the w hole fam ily (spouse and 
unmarried minor children) receives refugee status, even if  only one fam ily m ember qualifies directly for political 
asylum. The econom ic conditions for fam ily reunification can also be waived for refugees (A sylum  Procedure 
Act 26; Immigration A ct 29).
184 It is o f  note that the French Supreme Court, in effect, recognised a constitutional right to fam ily reunification 
in 1978 (Joppke 1998b: 285).
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That said, the inconsistency in this area is mitigated by the fact that non-citizens can challenge 
the denial of family reunification under the proportionality principle. The limited protection 
that the proportionality principle provides in this case, although valuable, does not remove the 
inconsistency however, as individuals still do not enjoy this basic right on equal terms. Non­
citizens who are well-off, German citizens, and EU citizens enjoy this right without having to 
demonstrate that a denial of this right places a disproportionate burden on them, whereas poor 
non-citizens have to prove that it does in order to enjoy this right. The notion that the 
guaranteed rights in the Basic Law only, or only fully, apply to individuals who are 
financially well off, contradicts the Basic Law’s strong commitment to equal freedom based 
on personhood. This is all the more so given the fact that the Basic Law specifically 
recognises that all individuals must be guaranteed a certain amount of resources as a part of 
the state’s obligation to uphold the universal right to individual self-determination.
Non-citizens can be deported on a number of different grounds in Germany, but they can still 
be said to enjoy the right to be secure in their abode. This follows from observing that long­
term residents are protected from deportation, and that they can only be deported if they 
constitute a real danger to the German community.185 Non-citizens also enjoy the right to have 
their deportation cases tested individually, and their interests are weighted against the state’s 
interest in upholding national security, according to the proportionality principle. The fact that 
non-citizens do not have a right to legal representation in deportation cases does, however, 
give rise to an inconsistency, as full procedural protection ought to be awarded when 
fundamental interests are at stake. The importance of fundamental procedural rights in 
deportation cases is, after all, something that the Court itself has emphasised:
185 The fact that non-citizens and citizens are not treated in the same way in this respect, as citizens cannot be 
banished under any circum stances, is com patible with a commitment to a universal right to basic autonomy. This 
fo llow s from noting that there sim ply is nowhere to deport citizens to, and it should be remembered that citizen s’ 
right to m ovem ent within the state can be restricted to protect other individuals. N on-citizens a lso must have a 
connection to the country to which they are deported, beyond the right to live as a citizen in another state. The 
level o f  connection that a given non-citizen has with the country o f  which she is a citizen varies, o f  course, but it 
is these kinds o f  factors that are taken into account when a court rules on the proportionality o f  the deportation. 
This argument could, prim a  fa c ie , be applied to fam ily reunification as w ell. This argument is, how ever, not 
applicable to fam ily reunification cases. This fo llow s from the fact that it is  a universal right to live with o n e’s 
fam ily in one’s abode, and not sim ply anywhere. The above argument fails in this context even on the 
benevolent assumption that the parent and child share a com m on citizenship. The grounds for restricting fam ily  
reunification for som e non-citizens in practice is, m oreover, not based on any potential difference betw een the 
need o f  citizens and non-citizens, which in theory could be justified, but on purely econom ic and membership  
grounds.
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First, such a peculiarity o f  deportation orders could not lead to a diminution in the protection o f  
fundamental rights; rather, the significance o f  fundamental rights as the foundation o f  every  
human com m unity [as declared in Article 1 o f  the Basic Law] must a lso  be taken into account in 
the practice o f  deportation. (BVerfG E 35, 382 (1973): 53)
It is especially difficult to see why the right to legal counsel does not apply in deportation 
cases when the right to be secure in one’s abode is recognised as a basic right.186 The lack of 
full procedural due process protection in deportation cases also raises the question of why 
there are no statutes of limitations (another cornerstone of procedural due process) in 
deportation cases. Illegal residency is a crime in Germany, and it takes its place among 
unforgivable crimes, such as murder and genocide, as offences to which no statute of 
limitations apply (Cyrus 2003: 9; Cyrus 2006: 11; Strafgesetzbuch StGB (Criminal Code) 78 
(2)). This makes no difference to legal long-term residents as they enjoy protection from 
deportation, and can only be deported on serious security grounds once they have established 
themselves in the country. This protection is, however, not available to undocumented 
residents, who perpetually remain subject to deportation.
It is debatable whether individuals can be denied procedural safeguards like statutes of 
limitations, but that need not concern us here as it is absolutely clear that it is incompatible 
with a commitment to equal concern of all, in cases where basic rights are concerned, to treat 
individuals differently due to their membership; and this is what Germany does, given that 
comparable crimes have statutes of limitations. (See the U.S. case study for a more detailed 
analysis of why the absence of any statute of limitations on violations of the immigration laws 
is inconsistent with the basic right to individual autonomy.)187
It is particularly striking in this regard that the Court has held that lifetime imprisonment 
without a chance of parole is incompatible with human dignity. This decision was based on 
the argument that all punishments must be proportional to the crime, and the state cannot turn 
offenders into mere tools of its aims. This in turn means that a person, as an autonomous 
being, must be given the chance to atone and re-enter society. Much of the reasoning in this
186 The fact that non-citizens can be deported on general preventive grounds, as long as the hardship is seen as 
proportional, also seem s inconsistent with the dignity o f  all human beings, as this means that particular 
individuals are treated as a m eans to an end, as Zuleeg points out (N otes 1986: 323).
187 From a legal perspective, under German law , undocumented residents are often treated as non-citizens 
abroad. This m eans that they are deprived o f  the added protection that socially  established non-citizens enjoy  
under the proportionality principle, for exam ple (Rubio-M arin 2000: 215).
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case seems to contradict the sole focus on the state control approach deployed with reference 
to undocumented residents:
The free human person and his dignity are the highest values o f  the constitutional order. The state 
in all its form is obliged to respect and defend it. T his is based on the conception o f  man as a 
spiritual-moral being endow ed with the freedom to determine and develop him self. . . .  The 
individual must allow  those lim its on his freedom o f  action that that the legislature deem s 
necessary in the interest o f  the com m unity’s social life; yet the autonom y o f  the individual has to 
be protected. This m eans that [the state] must regard every individual within society  with equal 
worth. . . .  The basic principle “nulla p oen a  sine cu lpa” [no punishment w ithout guilt] has the rank 
o f  a constitutional norm. Every punishment must justly  relate to the severity o f  the offense and the 
guilt o f  the offender. . . .  [The state] cannot tum the offender into an object o f  crim e prevention to 
the detriment o f  h is constitutionally protected rights to social worth and respect. (BVerfG E 45,
187b (1977): 316)
The fact that prisoners serving lifetime sentences (the above case refers to a man who shot his 
victim from behind at point-blank range) have a right not to become mere tools for the state’s 
legitimate desire to prevent crime, and that the severity of a crime must be taken into account 
when a person is punished, sits uncomfortably with the fact that undocumented residents 
never are pardoned for their crimes. One possible justification for this difference that is 
sometimes voiced is that since undocumented residents are not living within the society, they 
should therefore not be afforded any rights. This explanation, however, sits very 
uncomfortably with the notion that the Basic Law protects all individuals against all forms of 
state action, on the basis that all persons have a universal right to self-determination. An 
individual immigrant can hardly be seen as lacking this feature, which should entitle her to 
basic rights and equal concern, and she should thus, just like a murderer, not be turned into a 
mere tool of the state’s legitimate right to enforce the law.
The problem of the absence of statutes of limitations, moreover, spills over to the social rights 
realm, as long-term undocumented residents are deprived of basic social rights due to the fact 
that they cannot legalise their status, meaning that that schools and social services cannot 
provide them with services. This situation is incompatible with a commitment to all 
individuals’ equal right to basic autonomy. It is, for example, hard not to agree with the U.S. 
Supreme Court when it states that:
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Illiteracy is an enduring d isability ... The inestim able toll o f  that deprivation on the social 
econom ic, intellectual, and psychological w ell-being o f  the individual, and the obstacle it poses to 
individual achievem ent, make it m ost difficult to  reconcile the cost or the principle o f  a status- 
based denial o f  basic education with the framework o f  equality em bodied in the Equal Protection 
Clause (Plyler v. D oe (1982): 222).
It is indeed hard to see how a denial of the right to basic education is compatible with 
protecting and respecting the human dignity of all, as ‘illiteracy is an enduring disability’ that 
undermines the ability to individual self-determination, not least in a modem society (Plyler v. 
Doe (1982): 222). It is of note that Germany, which is at the forefront of international 
humanitarian law and has made the basic principles of international humanitarian law part of 
national law, has ducked the consequences in terms of undocumented residents’ rights, by not 
ratifying one Convention and adding exculpations to another, in order to uphold its state 
control approach to undocumented immigration. The undocumented status of a child in need 
of education, or the undocumented status of a person in need of shelter and food, does not 
make these needs any less pressing; to withhold these social rights on the grounds that the 
person or her parents have committed a relatively minor crime, often in the distant past, is 
incompatible with a commitment to respect and uphold the human dignity of ALL.
Conclusion
Germany has, after the collapse of the Third Reich, put the balance between national and 
individual autonomy at the very heart of its legal system. This means that Germany is well 
equipped to solve the tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales in 
the area of non-citizens’ legal standing. Indeed Germany’s approach to non-citizens’ legal 
standing is normatively consistent on the whole. Germany has achieved this by delineating a 
sphere of basic rights relating to individual autonomy which all state authority must uphold 
and respect; it has thus clearly limited the right of the political branches to infringe on non­
citizens’ basic rights. The German approach is, nevertheless, inconsistent in certain limited, 
but important aspects, as described above.
These inconsistencies are partly a result of the fact that the rights non-citizens enjoy under the 
Basic Law are insufficient in terms of family reunification and procedural rights in 
deportation cases. There is, however, a more systematic problem in relation to undocumented 
residents. This problem emanates from an overly legalistic perspective, where the fact that 
undocumented residents’ ability to live autonomous lives becomes tied to Germany is
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disregarded, due to their undocumented status. This leads to a situation where the right to 
human dignity, which is a universal right that covers prisoners as well as non-citizens, is 
undermined by undocumented residents’ illegal status, which deprives them of certain basic 
universal rights.
In sum, if Germany is to fully live up to its commitment to all individuals’ rights to exercise 
basic autonomy, it needs to stop actively impeding non-citizens from reaching its borders in 
order to claim their universal right to protection as refugees. It also needs to provide non­
citizens with full procedural rights in deportation cases, to provide the right to family 
reunification on an equal basis, and to stop withholding basic rights to undocumented 
residents. This task is an urgent one for two reasons. One, these inconsistencies have severe 
negative consequences for non-citizens in Germany. Two, these inconsistencies fit poorly 
with the German legal system in general and the Basic Law, which constitutes the core of the 
German political community, in particular.
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Chapter Six 
Final Conclusions and Comments
This thesis set out to fulfil two specific aims. The first was to deduce the normative rationales 
behind the laws that regulate non-citizens’ legal standing in the U.S. and Germany. The 
second was to conduct an analysis of the internal normative coherence of non-citizens’ legal 
standing in these two countries. These two aims have been fulfilled in the case studies in 
chapters four and five, which, in turn built on chapters one to three.
This means that this final chapter can raise the perspective and the level of abstraction 
somewhat More specifically, this chapter will do two things. It will first draw together the 
main strands of the thesis so as to be able to analyse the thesis’ major findings and 
contributions. This chapter will then take a second look at the case studies. The purpose of 
looking at the case studies again is not to reiterate the detailed analysis of the normative 
rationales behind non-citizens’ legal standing, or the analysis of the consistency of Germany’s 
and the U.S.’s positions. The aim here is instead to shift the focus and look more closely at the 
overall structure of the two legal systems that were analysed in chapters four and five. The 
purpose of this is to provide a deeper analysis of both why these legal systems generate 
generally coherent positions and why they fall short in specific areas. As part of the attempt to 
provide a deeper analysis of these legal systems’ overall structures, a comparison between the 
two will be made.
Overall Findings and Contributions
This thesis took the most profound and intrinsic normative tension in liberal nation-states as 
its point of departure: the tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian 
perspectives. The centrality of this tension in liberal nation-states was outlined in the first 
chapter, and subsequently put in the very specific context of non-citizens’ legal standing.
The second chapter was devoted to identifying the rationales behind the cosmopolitan and the 
communitarian perspectives. What emerged from this chapter were two philosophical 
rationales that embody the two main alternatives for the foundation of rights in a liberal 
nation-state. It became clear from this analysis that the tension between the cosmopolitan and 
the communitarian rationales is not only very central to liberal nation-states, but also runs
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very deep. It was shown in chapter two that what is contested is not merely the content of 
rights but ultimately the grounds on which rights should be based and therefore who should 
hold rights.
The third chapter was devoted to spelling out coherent approaches to the treatment of non­
citizens based on these two contrasting normative rationales. A considerable part of the third 
chapter was devoted to delineating the weak cosmopolitan perspective, which combines the 
two rationales into a consistent perspective. The construction of the weak cosmopolitan 
perspective rests on the deployment of a distinction between rights that are essential for 
individuals’ ability to exercise basic autonomy and rights that are not.
The fourth and fifth chapters presented the two case studies. The case studies drew on the 
insights of the preceding chapters in several ways. The first and second sections of the case 
studies connected the theoretical rationales drawn out in the second chapter to the actual laws 
that regulate non-citizens’ legal standing. This made it possible to deduce the normative 
rationales behind the treatment of non-citizens in the U.S. and Germany. The third section of 
the case studies, in turn, drew on the third chapter in order to identify inconsistencies in the 
actual treatment of non-citizens in each case.
The connection between political theory and the actual laws that regulate non-citizens’ legal 
standing constitutes the heart of the thesis. It is this connection that has made it possible to see 
behind the contents of the law and deduce the underlying normative rationales. This means 
that the thesis has not only been able to clarify what rights non-citizens’ are included in or 
excluded from, but also what the normative rationales behind the exclusion or inclusion are in 
each case. The result is that the thesis has been able to provide a truly political theoretical 
analysis of non-citizens’ actual overall legal standing. The thesis then built on this connection 
and the conclusions obtained from it, and proceeded to conduct a critical analysis of the 
normative consistency of the treatment of non-citizens in the U.S. and Germany. The depth 
and width of the analysis made it possible to identify the normative commitments the U.S. and 
Germany implicitly have made in relation to non-citizens’ rights. This, in turn, made it 
possible to put forward a detailed and critical agenda for analysing changes to the treatment of 
non-citizens based on the U.S.’s and Germany’s own normative commitments.
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So in what way has this analysis and the fulfilment of these two aims contributed to the 
discourse surrounding the treatment of non-citizens? The fulfilment of the first aim has 
resulted in the outcome that it has been clarified that a weak cosmopolitan perspective 
underlies non-citizens’ legal standing in both the U.S. and Germany. This thesis has thus 
shown that it is possible to combine the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales both 
in theory and practice. This means that what is often presented as a fatal contradiction is, in 
reality, an intrinsic but not insuperable tension. The complexity -  created by the fact that both 
the U.S. and Germany are partly open to non-citizens and include them on the universal 
cosmopolitan rationale, and are partly closed to non-citizens and exclude them on the 
communitarian rationale -  has hence been shown not to be the problem but the starting point 
for understanding the treatment of non-citizens in these two countries. The first contribution 
this thesis has made is thus to have identified the relevant starting point for a debate over 
possible changes to non-citizens’ legal standing in the U.S. and Germany. This is an important 
contribution, in that in order to discuss where we ought to go we need to understand where we 
stand and the nature of the current position.
More specifically, this thesis has shown that normative contributions that are based solely on 
one of the rationales, often in direct opposition to the other rationale, will fail to resonate with 
most people, appearing to them as too simplistic. These two liberal nation-states cannot be 
seen as either simply protecting the interests of their members or as simply being neutral 
arbitrators between autonomous individuals; they are doing, and are committed to doing, both. 
That is, this thesis has shown that normative contributions that aim to affect non-citizens’ 
legal standing in the short or medium-term must be based on the fact that the cosmopolitan 
and communitarian rationales can be combined in a consistent way in a weak cosmopolitan 
perspective; and that this weak cosmopolitan perspective is deeply entrenched in the existing 
legal systems of the U.S. and Germany.
It must be remembered that the intention never has been to discredit or discourage political 
theorists who look beyond the present normative horizon and work on ideals for the future; to 
account for widely held beliefs is, after all, not necessary for all forms of political theory. The 
contribution that this thesis has made is instead to provide political theorists -  some of who 
want to account for widely held and deeply entrenched normative notions -  with a clear 
picture of what the normative nature of the current system is.
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The fulfilment of the second aim has generated a more critical contribution. The internal 
coherence analysis has produced a detailed and direct criticism of the current state of affairs 
from a normative perspective. The thesis’ main contribution in this respect is hence its 
detailed demonstration of that there are good reasons for improving non-citizens legal 
standing in limited, but distinct and important areas. This means that the thesis has put 
forward an agenda for change and identified the core areas that urgently need reform. This 
agenda is, moreover, contextualised -  in the sense that the proposals for changes are tied to 
specific laws and situated in the existing legal systems of the U.S. and Germany.
This thesis has also made a more general contribution. This contribution pertains to the larger 
question of what implications the normative structures of liberal nation-states have in terms of 
how they relate to non-citizens when acting in the world in general. This thesis has shown that 
at least the U.S. and Germany are committed in principle to respect non-citizens’ basic right 
to individual autonomy when acting in the world, but that they are not committed to treat non­
citizens and citizens alike in all areas. To the extent that the U.S. and Germany fail to respect 
non-citizens’ basic right to autonomy when acting in the world, they contradict the normative 
foundation of their societies. On the other hand were they to give citizens and non-citizens 
equal concern in all cases, they would likewise contradict the normative foundations of their 
societies. The question of how Germany or the U.S. should relate to a given person can hence 
not be reduced to a question of membership or to a question of individual autonomy. The 
normative structures of these two countries necessitates that both the question of membership 
and what is at stake in terms of the ability to exercise basic autonomy are made part of the 
equation.
The need to take both these factors into consideration is often overlooked and the U.S. and 
Germany, as well as other liberal nation-states, often invoke one or the other rationale 
depending on the context. The fact that liberal nation-states often talk about individual rights 
to self-determination one minute, just to turn around and talk about national sovereignty the 
next, often leads to confusion and charges of hypocrisy. The current U.S. administration’s 
combination of calling for the spread of the rule of law and respect for universal individual 
rights as part of its war on terror, while initially only extending the protection of the rule of 
law to those illegal combatants who were U.S. citizens, is only one example of this wider 
problem. This problem runs deep, and liberal nation-states in general seems to lack a clear 
vision of how they could combine their communitarian and cosmopolitan commitments. It is
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here that the this thesis has made a contribution, by showing that a policy based on both the 
cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales does not necessarily lead to inconsistencies, 
but that a consistent approach nevertheless demands that all rights that are essential for the 
exercise of basic autonomy are upheld. This finding, in turn, constitutes a theoretically and 
practically tenable model on which liberal nation-states’ could base their international co­
operation in order to clarify and thereby increase the legitimacy of their policies towards non­
citizens.
The Case Studies
Most of the basic rights analysed in the thesis have come before the constitutional courts, 
which have sought to balance the cosmopolitan and communitarian strands in their respective 
constitutions. Indeed the analysis of the case studies immediately showed that the 
cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales lie at the heart of alienage jurisprudence in 
both the U.S. and Germany. In fact, the basic doctrines and principles of alienage 
jurisprudence in these two countries are directly linked to the cosmopolitan and the 
communitarian rationales. In the relatively few cases where the basic rights had not been 
subject to a constitutional test but simply been decided by the political branches of 
government, the balance between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales was also 
very much in evidence.
The weak cosmopolitan perspective had left barely visible imprints in the political theoretical 
debate, and it had to be reconstructed with less support than the strong cosmopolitan and 
communitarian perspectives. The weak cosmopolitan perspective, however, emerged all the 
more clearly from the analysis of the actual treatment of non-citizens. It became clear that the 
distinction between basic and non-basic cosmopolitan rights was essential to making 
normative sense of the actual treatment of non-citizens; and that the overall normative 
foundation behind the treatment of non-citizens in Germany and the U.S. is that of weak 
cosmopolitanism.
It can be said in more detail, regarding the U.S., that the Constitution bears clear marks of the 
cosmopolitan rationale. The notion that the state’s power is limited by individual inalienable 
rights to self-determination is intrinsic to the U.S.’s constitutional and political system. That 
is, the U.S. Constitution does not endow the nation and its democratic government with an 
absolute right to national sovereignty. The democratically elected representatives of the nation
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are bestowed with great powers, but they are bound to respect certain universal individual 
rights to self-determination. The bulk of the individual rights to self-determination are, 
furthermore, truly universal and the Supreme Court protects non-citizens’ basic rights under 
the aliens’ rights doctrine. The ultimate rationale behind this doctrine is that non-citizens, as 
self-determining individuals, have an a priori right to pursue their own lives and hence the 
constitutional protections of this right cover citizens and non-citizens alike. The U.S., 
however, developed a strong sense of national sovereignty as it successfully asserted itself on 
the international stage, and in the wake of this historical development, the plenary power 
doctrine was bom. This doctrine gives the democratically elected representatives of the U.S. 
great plenary powers by placing certain aspects of the treatment of non-citizens beyond the 
purview of the Constitution. This discretionary power ultimately rests on the notion that the 
elected representatives express the will of a particular nation, which in turn enjoys the right to 
national sovereignty by virtue of constituting a bounded political community based on shared 
social meanings and internal solidarity.
This combination of a Constitution that guarantees universal individual rights of self- 
determination and a plenary power doctrine that places part of the regulation of non-citizens 
beyond the purview of the Constitution and in the hands of the nation sets the scene for a 
complicated balancing act. The key question in terms of understanding non-citizens’ legal 
standing is thus not whether the rights in the Constitution are based on the cosmopolitan 
rationale, but one of under which circumstances non-citizens can avail themselves of these 
rights. The key question is hence: to what extent does the Constitution constrain the 
government’s exercise of power over non-citizens?
The Supreme Court has created a system for determining non-citizens’ constitutional standing 
that in general can be said to revolve around two questions. One, how basic the right is in 
terms of individual self-determination; and two, how sensitive the issue is in terms of national 
sovereignty. In cases where the issue at hand is considered sensitive in terms of national 
sovereignty, the Supreme Court in general invokes the plenary power doctrine, e.g. admission, 
deportation, political rights and naturalisation. In cases that are not sensitive from the 
perspective of national sovereignty and that involve fundamental individual rights, on the 
other hand, the Supreme Court in general chooses to protect non-citizens’ individual rights 
under the aliens’ rights doctrine, e.g. most civil rights and basic social rights. This, broadly 
speaking, generates a weak cosmopolitan perspective on non-citizens’ constitutional rights.
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This weak cosmopolitan perspective has been further strengthened by statutory legislation that 
on the one hand provides non-citizens with rights that are essential for the ability to exercise 
basic individual autonomy, e.g. refugee protection and basic social rights, and on the other 
hand excludes non-citizens from rights that are not essential to the exercise of basic 
autonomy, e.g. non-basic social rights and political rights.
This does not, alas, amount to a fully consistent weak cosmopolitan approach. The most 
serious inconsistencies in the U.S. position result from the fact that refugees enjoy insufficient 
protection, that non-citizens lack the right to family reunification, and that they are denied the 
right to be secure in their abode. It is not consistent with upholding all individuals’ basic right 
to self-determination to deny non-political refugees who risk losing their lives refugee 
protection; or to deny persons who belong to a family consisting of at least one person who is 
a non-citizen the right to live together; nor is it consistent with upholding all individuals’ 
basic right to self-determination that non-citizens perpetually are subject to deportation on 
discretionary and/or retroactive grounds.
The structural cause of the inconsistencies can be traced to the nature of the Supreme Court’s 
chosen way of balancing non-citizens’ right to individual autonomy against the nation’s right 
to national sovereignty. The Supreme Court has always been willing to seriously constrain the 
political branches’ right to national sovereignty in cases that pertain to the treatment of non­
citizens. The Supreme Court has resisted all attempts to weaken non-citizens’ basic rights to a 
fair trial. The government’s attempts to usurp non-citizens’ property and to restrict non­
citizens’ right to free speech have also been declared unconstitutional. The political branches 
have nevertheless, with the blessing of the Supreme Court, encroached upon non-citizens’ 
basic right to individual autonomy in the areas of admission and expulsion. The reason for the 
Supreme Court’s unwillingness to protect non-citizens’ basic individual rights in admission 
and expulsion cases is not that restrictions in these areas would circumscribe national 
sovereignty more than in other areas, where the Supreme Court staunchly has upheld non­
citizens basic individual rights. Nor is the explanation that no basic rights are at stake in these 
areas.188 So what is it in the structure of the U.S. legal system that leads to inconsistency?
188 The right to fam ily reunification has been called a natural right by the Court and is upheld vis-a-vis citizens; 
non-political refugees are recognised as in need o f  protection, but there is  no right to be given temporary 
protection status; discretionary deportation has been recognised as unfair and as contradicting the basic ethos o f  
the Constitution.
226
At first, the explanation seems to be the power of stare decisis. The Supreme Court has 
simply stuck with decisions made early on. This explanation, however, only begs the question 
of why the Supreme Court went down this route to begin with. The underlying answer to this 
question is that the Supreme Court ultimately has based the plenary power doctrine on the 
nation’s absolute right to communal formation, and that admission and expulsion cases are 
seen as connected to the nation’s right to communal formation. That is, the ultimate structural 
reason behind the fact that the government can exercise plenary power in these areas is that 
the nation is seen as holding an absolute right to decide who can live in its midst, as part of its 
national right to communal formation. Hence the difference between the strong protection 
non-citizens enjoy in a court of law and in terms of being secure in property, home and person 
on the one hand, and the weak protection non-citizens enjoy in deportation cases on the other, 
can best be explained by the fact that the latter areas are seen as being essentially related to 
communal formation. In sum, the structural weakness that generates the main normative 
inconsistencies in the U.S. constitutional system is that the Constitution is regarded as 
inapplicable in cases that are seen as central to communal formation. National sovereignty 
hence enjoys priority, and instead of balancing national and individual sovereignty in these 
cases, the Supreme Court chooses to negate non-citizens’ basic rights. The result of this is that 
the Constitution fails to fulfil its primary function of checking absolute power. That is, the 
partial disablement of the Constitution opens the door for the exercise of absolute power, with 
the predictable result of that individuals’ basic rights is encroached upon.
The U.S. does not need to surrender all rights to national sovereignty in these areas in order to 
achieve normative consistency. All that is required to solve this problem is that non-citizens’ 
basic rights be made part of the equation, so that the government’s need to control admission 
and expulsion is weighted against non-citizens’ individual rights. This can be done much in 
the same way as the Supreme Court balances non-citizens’ right to equality before the law 
against national sovereignty in other areas, such as social rights and the right to freely choose 
one’s profession. There is thus no need to invalidate the plenary power doctrine altogether in 
order to remedy this normative inconsistency; it is perfectly possible to combine the plenary 
power doctrine and the aliens’ right doctrine. What is needed, however, is an extension of the 
aliens’ right doctrine at the expense of the plenary power doctrine, so as to allow the aliens’ 
rights doctrine to extend its protective shield to all rights that are necessary for the exercise of 
basic autonomy. There also needs to be an extension of non-citizens’ statutory rights, not least 
in the area of refugee protection.
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It can be said in more detail regarding Germany, that the Basic Law thoroughly commits 
Germany to both the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales. The Basic Law clearly 
limits the exercise of all state power by stipulating that it must respect and protect all persons’ 
individual rights to self-determination; the cosmopolitan rights are relatively few, but they 
enjoy lexical priority, as it were. The foundation of state power is, on the other hand, based on 
the existence of a particular German nation which, as an exclusive collective, holds the right 
to exercise state authority and national self-determination. This means that membership and 
the right to participate in the national political process is exclusive to persons that have been 
recognised as members of the particular German nation, but that the nation nevertheless must 
respect all individuals’ rights to exercise basic autonomy.
The strong commitment to upholding non-citizens’ basic rights to individual autonomy is 
reflected in the Basic Law’s very first paragraph. It is also reflected in the fact that the Basic 
Law contains a fundamental right that only pertains to non-citizens -  the right to political 
asylum -  and the fact that the Basic Law explicitly incorporates basic principles of 
humanitarian international law into German domestic law. That the right to exercise state 
authority rests with the German nation is equally clear from the Basic Law. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has also clarified that the concept of the German nation does not 
refer to all the residents of Germany, but refers to a particular, exclusive German citizenry 
that alone holds the right to define itself. The structure of the German legal system is hence 
clearly a weak cosmopolitan one.
This means that the question of when non-citizens are to be included in a particular right turns 
on whether the right is considered to be a basic right or not. The Basic Law contains an article 
that provides all persons with a general right to human dignity as well as enumerates basic 
rights. The Bundesverfassungsgericht makes use of both to uphold the cosmopolitan thrust of 
the Basic Law, and no aspect of non-citizens’ legal standing falls outside the remit of the 
Basic Law. Statutory law in this area, especially the implementation of key international 
conventions, further strengthens this weak cosmopolitan system by providing non-citizens 
with several important additional cosmopolitan rights.
The structure of the German legal system is thus straightforward and robust. Alas, 
inconsistencies have nonetheless arisen. The fact that the protection non-citizens enjoy in the
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area of family reunification is too weak does give rise to some limited inconsistencies. The 
more severe inconsistencies, however, arise in relation to undocumented residents.
Undocumented residents remain liable to deportation indefinitely, and are denied basic social 
rights. There are, of course, perfectly good and consistent reasons for treating transgressors of 
the law differently. The problem here is that undocumented residents are deprived of certain 
basic rights so as to encroach upon their absolute right to human dignity, and that they are 
deprived of rights that other transgressors of the law enjoy.
The Basic Law protects all individuals, and being documented or legal is not a requirement 
for possessing human dignity. German law also clearly recognises that the right to exercise 
autonomy is intrinsically linked to basic social rights and the right to secure residency. The 
question is thus one of why undocumented residents are denied certain rights that have been 
recognised as basic, and part of individuals’ right to human dignity. It should be said that 
there still is hope that the Bundesverfassungsgericht will protect undocumented residents’ 
basic rights in this area. This does, however, look unlikely. Germany clearly pursues a state 
control approach where undocumented residents are seen purely as subjects of state control 
rather than individuals who have broken the law but who retain basic rights. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has not indicated that it will rule this unconstitutional and the 
notion that a legal resident status is a precondition for full protection of the Basic Law seems 
to have crept into the German legal system; and it is this notion, whereby universal 
cosmopolitan rights partly become dependent on a legal resident status, that lies behind the 
structural shortcoming of the German legal system.
To remedy this inconsistency, Germany needs simply to modify its state control approach to 
recognise that the deportation of undocumented residents ought to be covered by the rule of 
law in general and the proportionality principle in particular. Germany also needs to abolish 
the laws that put providers of basic social services under a legal obligation to report the 
immigration status of their clients, as well as the legal sanctions against persons who provide 
undocumented residents with services that enable these non-citizens to live basic autonomous 
lives.
In sum, both the U.S.’s and Germany’s legal systems have structures that make the distinction 
between basic universal rights and other rights an intrinsic part of these systems. This
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structure is anchored in constitutional law, but much statutory law enhances rather than 
undermines this basic distinction. It is these structures that lie behind the fact that the U.S.’s 
and Germany’s overall treatment of non-citizens is largely consistent and follows a weak 
cosmopolitan perspective. The systems, nevertheless, have flaws that generate 
inconsistencies. The major problem in the case of the U.S. is that non-citizens’ basic rights 
fall outside the purview of the Constitution in cases that are seen as related to communal 
formation. The major problem in the German case is that documented status has partly 
become a requirement for inclusion in cosmopolitan rights.
A Comparison of the two Case Studies
It is of note that the similarities between the case studies are greater than the differences. Both 
the U.S. and Germany are strongly committed to the weak cosmopolitan perspective. That is, 
the structure of both these two liberal nation-states’ legal systems is based on the premise that 
the exercise of state authority and national sovereignty are limited. This limitation is also, in 
both cases, based on the idea that individuals have a universal right to basic self- 
determination, and that the state must respect this a priori right. The cosmopolitan rights are 
predominantly found in the civil rights realm, but both countries also uphold rights to refugee 
protection, which are derived from international humanitarian law, (mainly) on a statutory 
basis. The joining together of humanitarian international law with national constitutions that 
put an emphasis on cosmopolitan rights is also central to the broadly coherent weak 
cosmopolitan approaches of both countries. Both Germany and the U.S., moreover, deploy the 
same general system for deciding when the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales 
apply. That is, both these liberal nation-states in general exclude non-citizens from rights 
unless a right is fundamental to individuals’ ability to exercise basic autonomy.
So much for the overall similarities; there are, however, also particular similarities in terms of 
the inconsistencies that have been identified. The two most striking of these are that 
undocumented residents indefinitely remain subject to deportation, and that visa regimes 
prevent non-citizens from accessing their recognised right to refugee protection. Visa regimes 
have simply been used to separate the issues of admission and refugee protection, so as to 
decrease the costs of the obligations both Germany and the U.S. have recognised that they 
have vis-a-vis refugees. The fact that undocumented residents perpetually remain subject to 
deportation is a consequence of there being no statutes of limitations for illegal entry and
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illegal residence in the U.S. and Germany. The root of this problem is not that undocumented 
residents are treated as criminals, but that they are not treated as ordinary criminals.
The reason for depriving undocumented residents of the rights that ordinary criminals enjoy is 
sometimes said to be that deportation constitutes an element of a state’s ultimate function -  to 
secure the nation’s borders, whereas the prosecution of other crimes is part of the maintaining 
order within the borders. This is clearly a false distinction, as the undocumented residents 
have established themselves within the borders and pose no overall threat to the security of 
the state. The notion that the U.S. and Germany are being invaded by undocumented residents 
that pose a threat to the peace might be a powerful image. The fact is, however, that 
undocumented residents do not pose a greater threat to the peace of the U.S. and Germany 
than other criminals. Undocumented residents may be a serious problem, but so is crime, and 
neither is comparable to an organised territorial threat; in fact many undocumented residents 
play a constructive part in society. The argument that the states’ discretionary power over 
undocumented residents is required by the specific threat they pose hence clearly fails.189 
Indeed the reasons why undocumented residents are deprived of the rights that ordinary 
transgressors of the law enjoy are more mundane. In the U.S., deportation falls squarely 
within the plenary power doctrine; hence non-citizens enjoy no Constitutional protection in 
this area. This, combined with that the political branches of the government have found it 
expedient to deprive non-citizens of this basic right, explains why non-citizens remain liable 
to discretionary and/or retroactive deportation in the U.S. No plenary power doctrine exists in 
Germany, and legal residents enjoy a right to be secure in their abode. Undocumented 
residents, however, perpetually remain liable to deportation. The reason for this is that 
Germany partly has made legal status a requisite for enjoying protection under the Basic Law, 
leaving undocumented residents exposed to infringements of their universal right to basic 
self-determination.
There are also interesting differences between the two case studies. The differences can 
largely be traced back to the structures of the two constitutional systems at hand. The German 
system is characterised by clarity in terms of non-citizens’ legal standing. The focal point of 
the Basic Law is its first paragraph, which stipulates that all state authority must respect and 
protect the human dignity of citizens and non-citizens alike. The Basic Law, moreover, makes
189 The argument that transgressors o f  immigration law s belong to the exclusive minority o f  crim inals that are so  
heinous that no statutes o f  limitations need apply fares no better, as d iscussed in detail earlier.
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a distinction between universal rights that cover all individuals and rights that only cover 
Germans. The fact that the framers of the Basic Law were sensitive to the need to regulate 
non-citizens’ rights has resulted in the outcome that the German constitutional system has a 
stable foundation for dealing with the issue of non-citizens’ legal standing. In this respect, the 
framers of the Basic Law benefited from recent history, which has demonstrated the inherent 
and immense danger of placing non-citizens outside the realm of moral concern.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution had not benefited from this historical lesson, and they 
did not set out a clear framework for non-citizens’ legal standing. That said, it is clear that 
many of the rights secured in the U.S. Constitution rest on a cosmopolitan rationale and apply 
to all individuals as persons. What is not clear, in contrast to the German system, however, is 
that the political branches of government have a general legal obligation to always respect 
non-citizens’ basic right to individual autonomy. Technically speaking, this difference is a 
consequence of the fact that the fifth amendment in the U.S. Constitution has not been given 
the same general universal scope as the first and second articles of the Basic Law. This 
means, on a practical level, that non-citizens in the U.S. have been deprived of virtually all 
legal protection in areas where non-citizens in Germany enjoy the protection of the 
proportionality principle. The cases in point are family reunification and the right to secure 
residency for non-citizens who are legal residents.
This means that the U.S. government’s right to national sovereignty is not balanced against 
non-citizens’ individual right to self-determination in all cases, as it is in Germany. This 
difference is a matter of degree and should not be overstated. The Supreme Court does engage 
in this balance act in certain areas, and non-citizens are in general covered by the fifth 
amendment’s due process clause. That said, the fifth amendment has not played the same 
central role for non-citizens’ legal standing in the U.S. as the first and second articles of the 
Basic Law have done in Germany. This is not due to a difference in the nature of the rights 
that the fifth amendment and the two first articles of the Basic Law are to protect. The fifth 
amendment and its due process of law clause uphold individuals’ right to basic self- 
determination just as the two first articles of the Basic Law and the principles of the rule of 
law and proportionality do. The difference is that the fifth amendment has not been given the 
same universal scope and does not protect non-citizens in all cases. This is an effect of the 
fact that plenary power puts the protective force of the Constitution out of play in certain 
areas in a way that is not comparable to the German system. The plenary power doctrine
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hence, to a large extent, deprives non-citizens of the strong general protection of cosmopolitan 
rights embodied in the fifth amendment. This means that the Supreme Court has decided what 
rights non-citizens enjoy with reference to particular parts of the Bill of Rights instead of with 
reference to a general right to basic self-determination. The result of this is that no absolute 
limit to the state’s discretionary power over non-citizens exists, as the extent of the state’s 
power depends on the particular area of law. It is this feature of U.S. alienage jurisprudence 
that has resulted in the outcome that the U.S. encroaches on non-citizens basic right to self- 
determination in certain areas. These encroachments subsequently give rise to inconsistencies 
in the U.S.’s treatment of non-citizens. Non-citizens enjoy stronger legal protection in 
Germany than in the U.S., and Germany has as a consequence of this avoided several of these 
inconsistencies that arise in the U.S. The main structural explanation for this is that the Basic 
Law does not permit any area of state authority to be placed outside constitutional constraints, 
i.e. does not allow for a plenary power doctrine.
This is, however, not the only factor behind the fact that Germany’s treatment of non-citizens 
is more normatively coherent than the U.S.’s. The different standing of international law in 
the two constitutions is another key factor. This difference also stems from the fact that the 
Basic Law so clearly recognises that no aspect of state authority, international or domestic, is 
absolute. The Basic Law’s connection to, and incorporation of, humanitarian international law 
is natural from this perspective. The attractiveness of international humanitarian law that 
bestow individuals with cosmopolitan rights is less clear from a U.S. perspective, where the 
Constitution’s validity in the international arena is a more moot point and where there is a 
sense that the government has the right to exercise absolute power over non-citizens in certain 
areas. It is natural from this perspective that the U.S. has ratified fewer international 
conventions that restrict the government’s authority over non-citizens compared to Germany. 
That this is a natural difference does not change the fact that the U.S. would avoid some of the 
inconsistencies that plague its treatment of non-citizens were it to adopt Germany’s approach 
to international law.
Germany’s position is, however, not more consistent in all respects. Undocumented residents 
enjoy a stronger legal standing in the U.S., since undocumented residents in the U.S. enjoy 
basic social rights under the aegis of substantial due process. This means that the U.S. has 
avoided some of the inconsistencies that have arisen in Germany, by staying clear of 
Germany’s pure state control approach.
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In sum, the U.S.’s and Germany’s treatments of non-citizens are very similar, and this is a 
consequence of the fact that their legal systems have the same basic structure. Both countries 
have constitutions that uphold many cosmopolitan rights, and both countries have 
implemented international conventions that uphold cosmopolitan rights for refugees, in 
particular. The main difference, and explanation for the fact that Germany’s position is more 
coherent, is that the Basic Law precludes the possibility of putting any aspects of the 
treatment of non-citizens beyond the highest law of the land, and that Germany has gone 
much further in incorporating humanitarian international law into its domestic law. The clarity 
of the German constitutional system in terms of non-citizens’ legal standing hence makes 
Germany’s treatment of non-citizens more consistent and transparent compared with the U.S. 
The U.S. has, however, been more sensitive than Germany to the fact that undocumented 
residents, despite their illegal status, have the right to education and subsistence. This means 
that the U.S. avoids some of the inconsistencies of the German system on this score and that 
both countries can learn from each other in terms of developing a more consistent approach to 
the treatment of non-citizens.190
The Final Conclusion
This thesis has shown that both Germany and the U.S. are deeply committed to both the 
cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales, and that the treatment of non-citizens in each 
of these liberal nation-states represents a balancing act between these two values. The answer 
to the title question -  persons or aliens? -  is hence both. Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and property as autonomous individuals, and in that respect non-citizens are persons. The 
foundation of the German and U.S. states is, however, that they constitute particular nations 
and as such they have a right to communal formation and sovereignty. Citizens hold the 
exclusive right to decide political formation as well as the exclusive right to equal concern in 
all areas, and in that respect non-citizens are aliens.
This dual commitment reflects a longstanding philosophical and legal tradition of embracing 
both individual and communal sovereignty. This tradition stretches back to and connects
190 It is  also o f  note that an alm ost entirely consistent approach em erges i f  one com bines the legal protections 
non-citizens enjoy in these tw o liberal nation-states. That said, non-citizens still w ould have insufficient 
procedural rights in deportation cases, insufficient protection in the area o f  fam ily reunification and 
undocumented residents w ould still lack the right to secure residence (a right they enjoy in other liberal nation­
states, as discussed earlier).
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modem day Germany and the U.S. with the ancient Greek and Roman civilisations. The fact 
that the treatment of non-citizens is based on both the cosmopolitan and the communitarian 
rationales is not all together surprising from this perspective. What is more surprising is the 
finding that this dual commitment does not give rise to a hopelessly normatively contradictory 
approach to the issue of non-citizens’ legal standing. To the contrary, it has been 
demonstrated, the listed inconsistencies notwithstanding, that an overall consistent approach 
to the treatment of non-citizens already exists in these two liberal nation-states. That said, this 
thesis has also put forward a detailed agenda for reform based on the existing normative 
commitments.
These are important findings, and it is hard not to think that much would be gained if the 
discourse around non-citizens’ legal standing in the U.S. and Germany would pay heed to the 
fact that these states must be understood as weak cosmopolitan states, and that this is a tenable 
normative position which Germany and the U.S. could achieve with some adjustments to the 
current law. This would not, of course, end the debate or result in a consensus on non­
citizens’ legal standing. It would, however, lead to a more focused debate that corresponds to 
the kind of polities these two states actually are and that pertains to how this very large group 
actually is treated.
This means that the thesis’ main contributions are that it has clarified what the existing 
normative commitments in these two states actually are; that is, it has clarified where we 
stand today. It has also put forward a critical and detailed agenda for change based on existing 
normative commitments. The value of implementing these changes is foremost normative, but 
it would also strengthen the legitimacy of current systems by making them clearer and more 
coherent. A consistent approach to the treatment of non-citizens could, moreover, be useful as 
a general guiding framework for liberal nation-states’ interactions with non-members in other 
areas. That is, it could partly remedy liberal nation-states’ general problem of that their dual 
commitment to the cosmopolitan and the communitarian rationales often result in their policy 
towards non-members being seen as hypocritical.
To finish were we started, it is very interesting to note that Sidgwick argued, some one 
hundred years ago, that the treatment of non-citizens was based on the communitarian 
rationale, and that the cosmopolitan rationale remained an ideal for the future (Sidgwick 
1897: 308). What this thesis has clarified is that the future Sidgwick hoped for has partially
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arrived. It has done so in force, and the cosmopolitan rationale currently underlies much of the 
actual treatment of non-citizens. Whether our future holds a continuation of this process, so 
that the cosmopolitan rationale will ultimately underlie all laws regulating the treatment of 
non-citizens and liberal nation-states will be turned into cosmopolitan states, remains to be 
seen. What is clear at this point is that the prevalent persons or aliens dichotomy fails to 
capture the normative basis behind non-citizens’ legal standing as well as the possibility of a 
coherent weak cosmopolitan approach. Non-citizens are both persons and aliens, and this is 
generally speaking a coherent position. That said, this thesis has laid bare normative 
inconsistencies that Germany and the U.S. must remove in order to be true to their weak 
cosmopolitan positions and traditions.
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